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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the factors that determine the behaviour of criminal 
entrepreneurs in legitimate markets. The particular aspect studied is how such 
entrepreneurs enter a new market when they immigrate into a new country (Chapter 
1).  
 
The empirical focus of the thesis is the Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs involved in the 
sale of stolen cars. More specifically, the dissertation compares their market 
behaviour in Bulgaria and in Spain between the late 1990s and 2010. The empirical 
basis for the dissertation is a comprehensive analysis of summaries of 86 Spanish 
police investigations against organised crime networks, as well as fieldwork 
consisting of interviews with 79 offenders, law-enforcement officers, entrepreneurs, 
and car-dealers in Spain and Bulgaria (Chapter 2). 
 
To best understand the intertwining of criminal entrepreneurs and legitimate markets 
the thesis starts by examining the operations of the car markets in Spain and 
Bulgaria (Chapter 3). It goes on to explain the ‘car-theft industry’ – focusing on how 
criminal enterprises and networks are structured and operate (Chapter 4). The 
analysis then continues by comparing how stolen cars are sold by illegal 
entrepreneurs in Bulgaria and Spain, and the different ways in which ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ markets intertwine (Chapter 5). The conclusion of this analysis is that 
Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs failed to enter the market for used cars in Spain, 
and instead preferred to traffic and sell the stolen cars in Bulgaria.  
  
There are two sets of factors that explain the reasons behind this failure. The first 
one is the local socio-economic and historical legacies in Bulgaria, which explain how 
illegal entrepreneurs and buyers (typically part of local economic elites) are linked 
(Chapter 6), and the factors that fuel demand for stolen cars. The role of the 
Bulgarian immigrant community in Spain is also considered. The second set of 
factors, examined through the lenses of economic theories, includes the economic / 
business rationale that influences the illegal entrepreneurs’ behaviour when entering 
a market (Chapter 7). The thesis goes on to conclude (Chapter 8) that it is the first 
set, the complex socio-economic and historical factors that best explain the 
behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs and their failure to sell stolen cars in Spain. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The debate on the ‘globalisation of crime’ has probably become as banal as the one 
on ‘globalisation’ itself, yet it has remained far less sophisticated: criminologists have 
often been left to rely on superficial and unreliable evidence, trying to connect the tips 
of many icebergs into a global crime picture. What remains obvious is that increased 
labour migration following the end of the Cold War, globalisation of financial markets 
and communication technologies, increased tourism and travel, have created and 
opened new opportunities to criminal entrepreneurs (Albanese 2000). In Europe 
these processes have been more radical than in other regions of the world, 
precipitated by the removal of state border inspections through the creation and 
subsequent expansion of the EU’s Schengen Agreement.1 
 
While some forms of ‘global crime’ (e.g. complex financial and tax crimes, or cyber 
crimes) are the result of new criminal opportunities created by globalisation 
processes, crimes associated with trans-border movement of criminals is a much 
older phenomenon. The migration of Italian mafia or Chinese triads to the United 
States, for instance has been well described (Critchley 2009, Curtis at al. 2003); 
while in Europe, Moroccans in Spain, Turks in Germany, and Caribbean immigrants 
in the UK, for instance, migrated in the decades before 1990. The Eastern 
Europeans were only the latest wave of criminal and labour migrants after the end of 
the Cold War and again with the accession of many Eastern European countries in 
the EU. 
 
Despite the fact that this recent wave of migration of criminals has received attention 
from both law enforcement agencies and criminologists, the phenomenon of 
‘integration’ of criminal migrants into their new host markets for illegal goods and 
services has received little attention. This thesis aims to fulfil this gap, by examining 
the factors that influence this ‘integration’ process.  
 
Not all criminal migrants engage in ‘market type’ organised criminal activities: many 
might engage only in petty crimes; others engage in crimes for which there is no 
                                                          
1 The two EU accession waves of East and Central Europe were in 2004 and 2007. Visa restrictions for 
Bulgarians and Romanians were lifted only in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The UK was the only EU 
member state to keep visa restrictions until the two countries became members in 2007.  
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market (e.g. burglaries, VAT fraud, or credit card-fraud). The empirical focus of the 
present thesis, though, – ‘car theft’ – is a market type of criminal activity. As such it is 
closely connected to the legitimate car market. The relation between the illicit good 
(i.e. the stolen car) and the legitimate market make the case of car-theft similar to 
other organised criminal activities related to legitimate markets: illicit excisable goods 
(tobacco, fuels, and alcohol), stolen or fake cultural goods, counterfeit goods, illicit 
firearms, or smuggled consumer goods that avoid import tariffs. Illegal entrepreneurs 
who engage in the production or distribution of any of these illicit goods inevitably 
have to compete and to engage with the legitimate market participants. In such ways 
they become part of the legitimate markets and part of legitimate economic life.  
 
The empirical focus of this thesis is the case of Bulgarian car-theft enterprises and 
their presence in the markets for stolen vehicles in Spain and Bulgaria. More 
specifically the thesis examines how criminal entrepreneurs entered the markets for 
stolen cars in both countries in the period between 1998 and 2008.  
 
This introductory chapter aims to expand on the broader theoretical issues, in 
particular on the present debate about the structure and operation of ‘illegal markets’ 
and market entry, and on the relation of these debates to broader sociological 
theories, in particular to the sociology of markets. It also introduces some non-
sociological theoretical frameworks from economics and international business 
studies that are relevant to the analysis of ‘market entry’. 
 
1.1 Markets and market illegality 
 
The entry into a market for illegal goods might seem to be a narrowly defined issue 
but its theoretical underpinnings in sociology, economics, and criminology are much 
broader and can be clearly outlined. Market ‘entry’ is one aspect of the operation of 
any market. Therefore, its theoretical consideration falls within the realm of economic 
sociology and more narrowly in the field of the ‘sociology of markets’. The latter has 
grown in recent decades, building upon the classic works of Weber (Economy and 
Society, 1978) and Durkheim (Division of Social Labour, 1984).  
 
The operation of markets for ‘illegal goods and services’, at least since 1967 (United 
States: President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
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Justice (1967:1) has become an important analytical framework through which 
criminologists analyse ‘organised crime’. While criminologists have generally not paid 
attention to the issue of entry into such markets, the issue of ‘barriers to market entry’ 
has been a topic of significant academic debate amongst economists, and in 
particular strategic management studies. This academic interest has grown in recent 
decades as multinational corporations have continuously expanded their operations 
into new markets.  
 
The economists’ take on the market as a concept, has differed from that of 
sociologists: it has implied the existence of an abstract space in which aggregate 
demands and supplies meet and, through successive adjustments, end up defining 
the market price. The market, therefore, is a structure that formats and explains each 
individual commercial transaction. The modern economy is seen as a ‘system of self-
regulating markets’ (Polanyi 2001: 38). 
 
1.1.1 Sociology of markets  
 
The concept of the market sits at the core of sociological theory and economic life. 
Weber2 (1978: 635-636) described the market as ‘the coexistence and sequence of 
rational consociations’. For Weber the behaviour of market participants is rational, 
impersonal, following only the actor’s interests, governed by the rules of the market. 
He describes the free market as moving towards ‘capitalistic monopolies’ acquired 
through the power of property. Market rules are either autonomously agreed by 
participants or imposed by different groups, especially political and religious 
organisations (p.639) 
 
Classical economists have been criticised for not paying enough attention to the 
‘market’ (Lie 1997). For neo-liberal economists, the medieval and the modern 
‘placeless’ market basically have the same characteristics. The behaviour of all 
participants is subjected to their will to maximise their utility (Lie 1997: 343). In all 
these classic economic analyses market externalities, institutions, social networks, or 
power considerations have been largely neglected (Lie 1997: 344).  
 
                                                          
2 For Weber economic action is a key aspect of ‘social action’ and consists of the material interests of 
the actors, which are influenced by the actions of other actors. (1978: 63-69). 
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Economic sociology has therefore tried to fill these gaps over the past few decades. 
Fligstein and Dauter (2007: 106-108) outline five ‘schools of thought’ in the sociology 
of markets, each of which explains market structure and participant behaviour slightly 
differently, through the ‘network’, ‘institutionalist’, ‘performative’, ‘political economy’, 
and ‘population ecology’ approaches.   
 
Scholars in the network tradition have focused on relational ties between actors as 
the ‘building material’ of social structure. Granovetter (1985) has argued that 
economic behaviour and markets are embedded in networks of interpersonal 
relations. These relations establish the levels of trust needed for the functioning of a 
market. White (1981) further argued that firms and market actors observe the 
behaviour of other actors, and that ultimately determines their behaviour. 
 
The performative school of thought views economic action as a result of calculative 
processes involving the specific technologies and artefacts that actors employ 
(Callon and Muniesa 2005). Their basic idea is that economic action is about 
calculation, and that how the qualities of goods are calculated (i.e. the amenability of 
goods to calculation, the calculative capacities of actors, and the interaction between 
them in the act of exchange) is crucial to understanding the market structure. 
 
These first two schools of thought have generally not taken into account the role of 
governments. Institutionalists focus on how cognition and action are contextualized 
by market rules, power, and norms. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) for instance, argued 
that the market (‘organisational field’3) becomes more homogenous, as market actors 
become more similar: e.g. as a result of state (political) pressures (e.g. legislation 
that regulates a certain market), or firms mimicking each other’s behaviour (e.g. 
offering the same products), or ‘due to the fact that the various professionals working 
in the firms have the same backgrounds. Many institutionalists focus only on some 
effects of government interventions, and ignore others (Fligstein and Dauter 2007: 
107). Laws, regulations, and institutionalized practices regulate the relationships 
between firms, owners, governments, and workers in ways that produce fundamental 
differences in the market structures of societies (ibid). One such example is the role 
of government in regulating and enforcement of property rights. The ‘exchange of 
                                                          
3 They use the term ‘organisational field’, as a more encompassing one, so that not only competitors but 
also regulatory authorities, suppliers, and contractors are included.  
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property rights is the elemental market transaction’. (Carruthers and Ariovich 2004: 
24) 
 
1.1.2  ‘Organised crime’ and illegal markets 
Despite the fairly well developed theoretical framework provided by the sociologists 
of markets, criminologists have not used it in the analysis of markets for illicit goods 
and services. Part of the reason behind this seeming omission is that, since the first 
conceptualisations of ‘organised crime’ in the 1960s, the duality of ‘market-based’ 
and non-market organised criminal activities was quickly grasped. The US 
President’s Commission on Organised Crime (Cressey 1969) focused on defining as 
the core definitional characteristic of organised crime ‘the provision of illegal goods 
and services’: a definition that fitted well the core activities of the US Cosa Nostra 
(illegal gambling, narcotics, loansharking). Shelling (1971) quickly picked on this 
somewhat one-sided view, pointing out that many criminal activities in which the 
Cosa Nostra was involved were not demand-driven (i.e. non-market based): e.g. 
extortion, tax evasion.  
 
The difficulty in coming with ‘activity-focused’ answers to the question ‘What is it that 
we call organised crime?’ is that it gradually moves towards providing long lists of 
various characteristics that authors feel should be attached to ‘organised crime’: such 
as the use of force, corruption, specialisation, continuity of operations, code of 
secrecy (e.g. Albanese 2004, Hagan 2006).  
 
All these efforts served different interests. While Cressey (1969) provided a 
description that was appropriate to conceptualise a phenomenon for the purposes of 
law-enforcement agencies, later authors tried to describe a social phenomena within 
a conceptual framework created for law-enforcement purposes. The term ‘organised 
crime’ was useful for the FBI to prioritise the criminal activities which had a larger 
impact on the US economy, on corruption, or on public perceptions of safety. Yet, it 
was hardly apt to describe a wide range of deviant practices. The ‘organised crime’ 
term was then adopted in the media and in popular, and policy and legal language 
(e.g. the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime).   
 
The academic debate on defining ‘organised crime’ has recently focused on 
‘dimensions’ (Hagan 2006) or ‘characteristics’ (Albanese 2004) of organised crime. In 
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doing so, it left aside the issue of ‘white-collar crime’ which Sutherland (1940, 1944) 
had evoked three decades earlier (even though he specifically implicated the Italian 
mafia in some activities). Sutherland explained (1944) how ‘white-collar’ crimes were 
treated in a way aiming to de-stigmatize the actual offenders (professionals and 
corporate managers). These approaches left aside and conceptually divorced a wide 
range of criminal activities from those that were attributed to ‘organised crime’.  
 
The analysis of markets for illegal goods and services shifts the focus away from 
trying to fit one or another complex criminal activity into an ‘organised’ or ‘white-
collar’ straitjacket. A criminal enterprise may well be involved in all three market, non-
market, or white-collar crimes.   
 
The debates on the definition of organised crime and its role in the markets for illegal 
goods and services gradually led to a consensus amongst criminologists, who now 
describe organised crime as ‘a continuing criminal enterprise’ (Albanese 2004: 10). 
This enterprise model or paradigm viewed organised crime as an economic activity 
that happens to be illegal (Liddick 1999: 403-404). Smith (1980) was probably the 
first scholar to more seriously consider these parallels, as he talked about a 
‘spectrum of legitimacy’ of enterprise activities. To him the governing rules of ‘the 
legal side of the continuum apply on the illegal side as well’ (Smith 1994: 130). 
Reuter (1985), drawing on the notion that legal and illegal enterprises function in 
similar ways, used the principles of industrial organisation and marketplace dynamics 
to analyse the ‘numbers gambling’4 industry in New York City. 
 
Arlacchi (2001: 5-12) suggested that the parallels between legal and illegal 
enterprises are not always appropriate. He argued that illegal markets are ‘artificial 
creations’, yet are a ‘threat to human dignity’. Arlacchi explained that since illegal 
markets have grown ‘in parallel with the development of the welfare state’, and 
‘international law’, they cannot be only analysed from an economist’s standpoint, as 
arising from the simple change in supply and demand. They should also be seen as 
an ‘undesired consequence in the struggle to protect human dignity’.  
 
                                                          
4 ‘Numbers game’ is an illegal lottery, where a bettor attempts to pick three or four digits to match those 
that are later randomly drawn.  
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The analysis of organised crime and illegal market actors in terms of networks was a 
logical development in the theoretical debate on organised crime. Some authors 
(Mcillwain 1999, Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004) even tried to apply social network 
analysis. The illegal markets are populated by a range of players: from single 
individuals, who might act as opportunistic providers of services for different groups; 
to small groups of criminals (or a family) that might provide a particular illegal service, 
to larger illegal enterprises that might thrive in areas where there is little government 
control. 
 
 
1.2 Markets and illegality 
 
The present thesis subscribes to the above notion that the markets for illegal goods 
and services are populated by illegal enterprises. It assumes that theories that 
explain the behaviour of legal enterprises (from economic sociology, economics or 
related academic disciplines) can be used to explain the existence of illegal 
enterprises. The reality though is that the conceptual separation and distinction 
between a legal and illegal market is difficult, if not impossible, when it concerns a 
product that is not illegal per se, such as the car, the firearm, or the cigarette. One 
can truly speak of an ‘illegal market’ only in the case of products or services that are 
entirely banned by the law: e.g. narcotics or prostitution (in the countries where they 
are outlawed). In all other cases, though, one may have ‘goods’ that are illegally 
distributed on the (legitimate) market. 
 
The structure and operation of a market, where illicit goods and services are traded, 
is diverse and industry specific. Very few economic analyses of markets from such a 
perspective have been carried out: the main reason is the lack of quantitative data 
that lends itself to economic analysis. The existing studies utilise the fundamental 
economic concepts used to describe legal markets: demand and supply curves, price 
equilibrium. Typically these studies focus on specific industries – such as Gambetta 
(1993) on private protection, Reuter (1985) on the numbers, loansharking, and 
bookmaking industries, Reuter and Caulkins (2006) on illegal drugs markets, Levitt 
and Venkatesh (2007) on the prostitution market, or Bian and Moutinho (2011), 
Veloutsou and Bian (2008), Wee et al. (1995), and Ang et al. (2001) on counterfeit 
goods. 
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Qualitative tools have been used to describe ‘organised criminal activities’ much 
more often, although not many criminologists have embarked on comprehensive 
analyses from a ‘market perspective’. Some recent studies that have adopted this 
approach include studies on the markets for stolen art and antiquities (Korsell et al. 
2006, Massy 2008, Polk 1999, Bezlov et al. 2007: 177-192), illegal arms or firearms 
markets (Naylor 1995, Cook et al. 2005), markets for stolen vehicles (Antonopoulos 
2009, Ferwerda et al. (2005), illegal cigarettes market (Hornsby and Hobbs 2007, 
Lampe 2002b, 2003), the illegal drugs markets (Paoli 2000, Bezlov, T. 2003). Some 
authors have gone even further, not simply examining a specific market for illegal 
goods but entire sectors of the economy, where illegal goods and services are 
traded: e.g. Hobbs et al.’s (2003) study on the night-time economy in the UK, or 
Venkatesh (2006) on the illegal economy of a Chicago suburb.  
 
Very few authors, though, have dared to generalise about the characteristics of illegal 
markets from their studies. The lack of data, particularly economic data (Levitt and 
Venkatesh 2007: 1) is the most obvious reason why far fewer economic analyses 
have been made. The above-mentioned studies that come from an economic 
perspective fit more closely with the industrial organisation (IO) field in economics. In 
IO the analytical focus is on how the size and organisation of the market, and firms’ 
behaviour affects their competition and profits.  
 
Few authors have suggested overarching theories and generalisations that lay down 
common economic principles of illegal markets, in the way conventional micro- or 
macroeconomics does. However, Shelling (1971), Reuter (1985), Naylor (2004) have 
attempted to suggest some general characteristics.  
 
Naylor (2004: 19) states that the fundamental difference between the behaviour of 
legal and illegal ‘firms’ is that while the predominant objective of the legal firm was 
profit maximization (or some approximation of it) the corresponding objective for the 
illegal ‘firm’ would be risk minimization – which means it is problematic whether it 
should be considered a firm at all.’ He argues, though, that in either case (legal or 
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illegal firms), profit maximisation is not an absolute rule, and many other factors exist 
(e.g. egos, prestige, thrills).5 
  
Shelling’s (1971) main argument was that ‘organised crime’ was seeking to 
monopolize the illegal markets, where it could establish control and regulation by 
levying ‘taxes’. Reuter (1983) argues that a monopoly of illegal markets is quite rare, 
a single criminal organisation could achieve this only under specific political 
circumstances or with the aid of a centralised police authority. The tendency of 
criminal organisations is to integrate vertically within illegal markets, and to attempt to 
cartelise them.  
 
Further on Reuter’s (1985: 23) study of the illegal gambling, loansharking, and 
bookmaking industries in New York leads him to conclude that ‘illegal markets are 
populated by localised, fragmented, ephemeral, undiversified, and rather small 
enterprises (not big hierarchical organisations)’.   
 
Similarly, Hobbs (2001: 555), discusses the transformation of the local criminal 
neighbourhood firm from traditional family-based associations into a networked 
system, with ‘disorganised deviant scavengers’. He describes the local drugs market 
as ‘disintegrated criminal firms typified by flexibility and unpredictability, operating 
within multi-layered networks of pecuniary opportunity constituted by both personal 
criminal networks and specific activity networks’.  
 
1.2.1 Market environment and illicit entrepreneurs 
Regardless of whether an illegal enterprise is selling an illegal product (drugs) on the 
illegal market or counterfeit cigarettes on the cigarettes market it may face some 
similar difficulties in comparison to legitimate firms.  
 
The firms in an illegal market face a market environment, where there are a number 
of disadvantages in comparison with legal markets (Naylor 2004):  
• constricted information flows that result in :  
                                                          
5 For instance, in Bulgaria’s stolen vehicle market, car-insurance companies are important players, 
some of them being in contact with car thieves, and occasionally negotiating with them, or forcing them 
to return vehicles. 
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o shortage of capital supplies; credit is based solely on trust, and it is 
difficult to enforce collection, 
o objective price data are lacking, 
o high search costs for alternative suppliers  
• and the time horizons (indeed, the very existence) of enterprises are often 
coterminous with those of the entrepreneurs 
• customer retention: the buyer is a risk; one source of economies of scale 
remains untapped: ‘customer loyalty remains with the retailer’, as the buyer 
does not know the entrepreneur.  
 
Cook et al. (2005) describe the market for illegal guns in Chicago as a thin market, 
i.e. a market where there are very few buyers for the illicit products. In such a market 
advertising is not possible, and the risks associated with the market exchange are 
high (theft, arrest, injury or death). Therefore, buyers and sellers need lots of 
additional information about their trading partners. This seriously increases the 
transaction costs and leads to large mark-ups of the price of the goods. In thick 
markets, on the other hand, such as drugs, where there are multiple buyers and 
sellers, institutions develop to facilitate the exchange of goods, and sellers and 
buyers have incentives to develop their reputations. 
 
Another key difference between legal and illegal entrepreneurs concerns market 
regulation. Unlike legitimate market players who may resort to judiciary or law-
enforcement to enforce a deal, for illicit entrepreneurs the access to of government 
and law-enforcement authorities is either changed or missing. In some cases, 
criminals might use corruption and use the law-enforcement agencies (or judiciary 
and politicians) to regulate the market (by eliminating competition) (Naylor 2004).  
 
In cases when the government is weak or not involved, then the use of violence or 
the monopoly of violence is taken over by criminals. Protection becomes a specific 
commodity that the mafia produces, promotes, and sells (Gambetta 1993, Fiorentini 
and Peltzman 1995). In some countries the services of contract enforcement, and 
more generally protection, come to define the core operation of organised crime, as 
is the case with the American Cosa Nostra (Reuter 1985), the Sicilian Mafia 
(Gambetta 1993), the Hong Kong Triads (Chu 2000), the Yakuza in Japan (Hill 
2003), or organised crime in Russia (Varese 2001) and 1990s Bulgaria (Tzvetkova 
2008). In these cases the demand for mafia’s protection services arises from the fact 
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that market transactions are ‘unstable’, because trust is scarce and fragile, and no 
agency is present to enforce the market rules. 
 
1.2.2 Behaviour and structure of the illegal firm 
The market behaviour and structure of the illegal firm is influenced by the fact that 
illegal entrepreneurs are constantly at risk of arrest, and from the threat of product or 
asset seizure by the authorities (Reuter 1985, Naylor 2004, Arlacchi 2001), or violent 
action by competitors. 
 
Firms, therefore, adopt a number of economically inefficient strategies to minimise 
risks:  
• decisions need to be highly personalised (Naylor 2004) 
• information is tightly controlled (through fear or money)  
• increase of trust levels within firms through recruitment of family members, 
individuals with the same ethnic background, or  
• keeping the enterprise small 
• building walls and isolating ‘operational units’ and controlling information 
exchange between them 
• increasing the number of intermediaries or people involved in a task to reduce 
risks: while in legal firms the operating rule is to increase efficiency by 
reducing multiple layers of intermediation, illegal entrepreneurs strive to 
reduce direct control over the various stages in the production or distribution 
chain. 
 
A number of authors have noticed that the risks force illegal enterprises to limit their 
geographic scope of operations. While, on the one hand one can speak of global or 
national markets for certain illegal commodities, such as drugs, the illegal markets 
are usually local in nature and could be described as a constellation of local players 
Reuter (1985: 21-22). Enterprises remain local in nature because:  
• remote management of illegal enterprises is difficult;   
• transportation and communication between multiple locations increases risk; 
• multiple law-enforcement divisions might be conducting investigations, thus 
increasing the risk of arrest; 
• remote operations make it difficult to develop ‘brand loyalty’. 
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Naylor notes that legal firms are free to take their products to wherever the buyers 
are: in the neighbourhood or around the world. Illegal firms are often identified with a 
particular territorial base. For example, Koper and Reuter (1996) show that location 
specificity of an illegal market arises in many retail drug markets (or even with illegal 
gambling before phone / internet became widespread) because buyers and sellers 
need to be able to find each other efficiently. They note that even law-enforcement 
agencies often think of drug markets in terms of a specific location. On the other 
hand, in ‘thin markets’, such as the illegal guns market, location is risky and difficult 
to establish, as purchases are rare, customers need to be trusted, and the location 
becomes transaction-specific (Cook et al. 2007).  
 
As Hobbs (1998a: 408) indicates, it is ‘at the local level that organised crime 
manifests itself as a tangible process or activity’. The political economy of the 
neighbourhood provides the dynamic for ‘variations in serious crime collabourations’. 
Hobbs notes that in localities where social conditions have disintegrated (due to 
immigration, workforce mobility, housing policies, etc) the notion of the ‘traditional 
neighbourhood’ and the ‘family firm’ model has also disappeared along with the 
notion of territoriality. 
 
Another difference between legitimate and illicit enterprises is noted by Arlacchi 
(2001: 8) who argues that the access to violence and intimidation is a key point that 
differentiates the two, as it leads to the ‘easy establishment of local monopolies’.  
 
1.3 Illicit entrepreneurs and market entry 
Despite the fairly extensive literature on illegal markets, the entry into illegal markets 
in a new country has not been addressed in any depth. There are two strands of 
criminological literature which provide some relevant insight: the literature on crime 
globalisation, and the fairly small body of literature on ‘mafia transplantation’. In either 
of these literatures one would have expected to find discussions on market entry. Yet 
insufficient empirical material and a non-market based analysis approach probably 
explain the deficit of academic work in this area. 
 
To analyse how criminals organise themselves in different illegal markets it is 
necessary to examine the organisation and structure of the markets, and the 
technical, social, and financial barriers to entry (Levi 1993). Entry barriers into illegal 
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markets vary with the level as well as the type of market one is considering (Koper 
and Reuter 1996: 8). For instance, entering as a high-level drug dealer, where 
knowledge, skills, and capital are required is much more difficult: the capital required 
for a 500-kilo shipment of heroin represents the value of about $10 million. On the 
other hand, revolving credit is available to individuals engaged in lower-level 
transactions (ibid). Entering a market for illegal guns, where the quantities and total 
value of guns sold at a local market is much smaller, and the role of wholesalers is 
played by legitimate stores, means that entry barriers are much lower (ibid). 
 
1.3.1 Globalisation and crime   
 
Many authors have argued that since the 1990s there has been an increasing 
internationalisation or globalisation of crime (Berdal and Serrano 2002, Castells 
2000:171; Naim 2006; Thachuk 2007, Glenny 2008). Berdal and Serrano (2002: 2) 
state that ‘the scale and scope of transnational criminal activity, measured as a 
component of the global economy, has increased dramatically over the past quarter 
century’. Shelley (2006), without much supporting evidence, argues that illicit 
businesses branch out around the world to take advantage of cheap raw materials 
and cheap labour, establishing facilities worldwide for production or distribution 
needs, all facilitated by the communications and international transportation. 
 
Newman (1999) claims that most illegal markets have become global in scope and, 
with the exception of arms and cars, involve trafficking of illicit products from the 
developing world or states in transition to the developed world. Castells (2000: 171) 
argues that the strategy has been to set up ‘management and production facilities’ in 
low-risk areas, where they could influence the institutional environment, while 
targeting markets with high demand and opportunity to achieve high profit margins 
(e.g. drug production and distribution). 
 
Most often, the claims of the growing trans-border movement of criminals have come 
from law enforcement agencies whose reports on organised crime have increasingly 
focused on foreign, immigrant, or ‘ethnic’ criminal groups or networks (e.g. Europol 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment reports, SOCA 2010; Korps Landelijke 
Politiediensten 2004). Such reports, particularly the ones in the EU and North 
America, often portray crime groups from East European countries as having gained 
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a dominant position in certain types of criminal activity. In Germany, for instance, 
Bundeskriminalamt (2008), and in the Netherlands, the Korps Landelijke 
Politiediensten (2004: 184) name Polish and Lithuanian groups as being dominant in 
the theft and trafficking of stolen vehicles. The Belgian Police’s (2007) report on 
sexual exploitation is entirely structured along ethnicity / nationality focused chapters 
(Albanian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Belgian, Nigerian, etc.). Europol’s own reports 
(2006, 2007, 2008) discuss criminal activities in terms of foreign ethnic groups and 
even directly attribute crime trends to the impact of EU enlargement (2008: 23) or  
globalisation (2008: 28). Europol (2007: 8) even defined as the highest threat to the 
EU the non-indigenous criminal groups which carry out international operations.  
 
Some authors disagree with the argument that crime has globalized significantly in 
the 1990s. Den Boer (1999) argues that organised crime, and in particular criminal 
activity associated with mobility and transnationality, has become a substitute for 
Cold War threats. The EU has begun to confront ‘the enemy within’ (Den Boer 1994 
and 1997, quoted in Den Boer 1999: 17). She explains the ease with which this has 
taken place by the fact that many organised crime activities are ‘victimless’ and the 
difficulty in demonstrating results makes political accountability more problematic.  
 
Some authors (Thachuk 2007: 7-15; Franko Aas 2007) have argued along similar 
lines, that in the aftermath of the Cold War, transnational threats were given a 
broader definition, and the policy focus shifted to new non-state threats, such as 
terrorism or organised crime. On the other hand, Thachuk (2007) argues that such 
threats are formed and amplified by ‘major trends in the global system’, including 
globalisation of economic activity and communications, and the growing imbalance of 
a small number of stable democracies and a large number of unstable countries with 
weak governance. For Thachuk, the key ingredient to the globalisation of crime, in 
particular smuggling, is corruption. Corruption allows criminals to operate fluidly 
across countries, while at the same time it undermines governance and statehood.  
 
Other authors (Ruggiero 2003: 173) have argued that the analyses of proponents of 
crime globalisation are ‘centred on the feeling of vulnerability that developed 
countries harbour towards criminal activity originating in other countries’ and that they 
represent a new version of alien conspiracy theory.  Taylor (2002) explains that 
governments’ focus on ‘foreign crime’ is a way of shifting attention away from the 
‘structures of opportunity within the host society that may be conducive to the 
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recruitment of native citizens into locally organised crime’. Van Duyne (2004: 21-51) 
also suggested that the image of organised crime as a threat to society was created 
in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK only in the late 1980s 
and 1990s. In that period police, prosecution, and the media increasingly talked 
about the threat of organised crime, often based on poorly substantiated reports and 
studies from academics and law-enforcement agencies alike (ibid.)  
 
Regardless of the above debates, it is a fact that over the past two decades the size 
of immigrant populations in many EU countries has increased significantly 
(International Organisation for Migration 2008: 457). Certainly, many criminals 
immigrated alongside labour migrants. To what extent and how these immigrant 
criminals and criminal entrepreneurs managed to enter the local markets where 
illegal goods and services are sold is a valid question. 
 
1.3.2 The illicit entrepreneurs and the new markets abroad 
 
Varese’s work (2004, 2005, 2011) on the provision of criminal protection services in 
legal and illegal markets is one of the few attempts to address this question. His 
approach is not explicitly ‘market based’, and he uses the term ‘mafia 
transplantation’, which he defines as ‘the ability of a mafia group to offer criminal 
protection over a sustained period of time outside its region of origin and routine 
operation’ (Varese 2005: 7).  
 
Varese examines how in some cases mafias succeed in setting up a branch of the 
organisation in a new territory, but fail in others. In essence, Varese analyses how 
the mafia enters the market for extra-legal private protection in one country but fails 
to do so in another. He has analysed two cases in more depth. First, he studied 
(2004) the successful transplantation of the Russian mafia ‘in opening a branch in 
Budapest’ and its failure to do so in Rome. In the second case he studied the case of 
`Ndrangheta, and compares the successful transplantation from Calabria to 
Bardonecchia (Piedmont) and an unsuccessful one from Calabria to Verona 
(Veneto). 
 
Varese’s overall conclusion is that the level of demand for criminal protection was the 
key factor that determined whether the mafia transplantation would be successful. 
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The list of factors that, according to him, facilitated mafia transplantation includes the 
following supply and demand factors. The supply (push) factors are: 
• Presence of migrants from mafia territories: although this is a contributing 
factor, it does not provide a sufficient explanation.  
• Forced relocation of mafia groups (following mandatory law enforcement 
action). 
• Mafia wars at their original location. 
• Explicit expansionist strategies of established mafia groups. 
• Kin-based recruitment and organisational structure facilitate transplantation, 
as when an entire family emigrates it quickly reconstitutes itself at the new 
location. 
• Lack of local supply: when there is a time lag between the emergence of a 
demand for protection and the provision of a suitable local supply, groups 
from outside may seize the opportunity to supply mafia services. 
 
The factors that contribute to a greater demand are: 
• The lack of trust of local businesses in the formal local market regulatory 
institutions. Yet, Varese admits (2004: 13) that the Russian mafia succeeded 
opening a branch in Budapest, while it failed to do so in Rome, although both 
locations had ‘low-trust societies’. 
• The weak state: particularly its inability to define and protect property rights. 
• Incentives to form cartel agreements in the legal economy. 
• The existence of large illegal markets. 
 
Gambetta (1993: 250) focuses on a different set of factors that explain (the lack of) 
‘mafia migration’. He observes that the Sicilian mafia has largely remained confined 
to Western Sicily and Catania because it is heavily dependent on the ‘local 
environment’. Gambetta further argues that the initial costs of transferring mafia 
activities are prohibitively high, as they would include information gathering and 
advertising, especially when kinship, friendship, and ethnicity networks are not 
available.  
 
Gambetta points out that the case of Cosa Nostra in the US mafia is not an 
exception, because mafia families did not move to America but emerged 
spontaneously there, when the supply of and the demand for protection met: a 
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‘sufficient number of emigrants moved there [...] bringing along the necessary 
skills for organizing a protection market’, and the Great Depression and 
Prohibition created demand for protection (1993: 250). 
 
Galeotti (2000: 37-40) examines6 the Russian mafiya primarily as a provider of 
protection services. He provides some observations on what he calls ‘mafia 
penetration’ outside the former Soviet Union (into 26 foreign countries according to 
Russian authorities in 1998). Galeotti explains that there are three types of 
penetration. ‘Hard penetration’ (p.38) is the establishment of a criminal network 
alongside or in competition with indigenous organisations. Yet in these cases Galeotti 
does not discuss local illegal markets, but rather argues that the Russians get 
involved in non-market crimes, such as fraud and money-laundering. ‘Soft 
penetration’ includes the establishment of ‘legal or paralegal business’ and contacts 
with local criminals. It involves different types of economic crime, such as money-
laundering or production of counterfeit goods. Lastly, the ‘service penetration’ 
includes the provision of services to other criminal groups, ‘from contract killings to 
cyber crime’. Galeotti (2004) attributes the successful penetration, particularly in 
former ‘Eastern Bloc’ countries to: 
• Russian immigrant communities 
• Contacts with local criminals 
• Access to corruption / contacts with local corrupt officials. 
None of these factors is examined in any significant depth, however, neither is 
much empirical evidence provided to substantiate these claims.  
 
Castells (2000: 172) argues that in the post-Cold War globalisation of crime the 
approach has been for ‘organised crime from different countries’ to establish strategic 
alliances and cooperate locally, rather than fight for the turf. This has happened 
though ‘sub-contracting arrangements and joint ventures’. 
 
Balloni et al. (1999) examined the infiltration of organised crime into Italy’s Emilia-
Romagna.7 The authors use official arrests data to show the influx of foreign crime 
syndicates in Italy. They put forward two explanatory factors. The ‘pull’ factor is the 
wealth of the region, compared with other parts of Italy, which has attracted the 
                                                          
6 His analysis is based solely on media and law-enforcement reports. 
7 The research was almost entirely based on analysis of law-enforcement statistics of crimes committed 
by foreigners (arrests and verdicts against criminals). 
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attention of criminals. The ‘push’ factor is the inability of immigrants to enter the legal 
labour market, which creates a pool of illegal migrants ready to participate in illegal 
markets and activities. Yet the authors do not explain how and what facilitated the 
entry into local criminal markets. 
 
Sands (2007) and Resa-Nestares (1999: 47-62) both analyse the factors that have 
aided the entry of ‘international crime groups’ into Spain since the 1990s, a process 
that, according to Resa-Nestares, started in the early 1970s. Resa-Nestares’ 
compares the penetration of the ‘Russian mafia’ and Columbian drug cartels in 
Spain. His analysis of the factors that facilitated the process includes a list of all the 
problems relating to the investigation of organised crime in Spain. The factors listed 
(but not supported by any primary empirical evidence) by Resa-Nestares (1999) and 
Sands (2007) almost overlap and include: 
• Spain’s geographical situation as natural gateway into Europe for drug 
traffickers. 
• Legislative factors: (1) absence of specific organised crime legislation; (2) 
framework overly protective of the rights of criminal defendants; (3) 
insufficient judicial resources: only five examining magistrates dealing with 
organised crime cases.  
• Deficiencies within the law-enforcement system: (1) multiple police forces with 
little coordination; (2) police corruption. Sands particularly focuses on the fact 
that Spain is a weak state, and draws on the above-mentioned arguments of 
Varese (2001) or Gambetta (2003). 
• An economic and financial system that is open to proceeds of crime (1) no 
investigation of suspicious foreign investors; (2) banks willing to operate with 
organised crime finances; (3) construction and tourist industries vulnerable to 
criminal abuse. 
• The presence of immigrant communities (in the case of the Columbians). 
• The existence of local smuggling networks in border regions (such as in 
Galicia) or among some ethnic groups (such as Roma). 
 
The role of immigrant communities and the country of origin have been also 
highlighted by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004), who attributed the dominance of 
Turkish groups in the Dutch heroin market to: 
• the fact that Turkey is an important supply country 
• the relatively large size of the Turkish community in the Netherlands 
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• the extended family relationships between the members of this community. 
 
The weak empirical basis (newspaper articles and police reports) of the above 
mentioned studies is probably their common denominator. Another deficiency is that, 
except for Varese (2004, 2005, 2011), other authors have not used a comparative 
approach (e.g. comparisons between countries of successful and unsuccessful 
‘market entry’). Even Varese’s conclusions are based on limited evidence, as the 
offender perspective is missing from his work. Some of the academic work presented 
in the next section suffers from similar deficiencies, although the empirical basis for 
legitimate markets is generally much more solid.  
 
1.4 Market entry: non-criminological approaches 
‘Market entry’ is a term borrowed from economics and largely comes from the 
economic field of industrial organisation. There are two strands of economic literature 
that deal with issues of market entry: international business studies and management 
strategy studies. While the former deals primarily with the issues of market entry into 
foreign markets (‘internationalisation’), the latter examines the entry into any market. 
As the body of literature on either is significant, the following two sections only 
present some of the fundamental theoretical frameworks of each field. In later 
chapters some of the specific arguments will be presented in a greater detail. 
  
1.4.1 International business studies 
The issue of market entry and, particularly, ‘foreign market entry’ has been discussed 
by scholars in international business studies in terms of ‘foreign direct investment’ 
(FDI). Over the past quarter century, the leading explanation about the international 
expansion of firms has been based within the so called ‘eclectic paradigm’, 
developed by John Dunning (1979, 1988), who built upon the works of Vernon (1966) 
and Hymer (1979). Also known as the Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) 
paradigm, it was developed because of the difficulty that classic economic theories 
had in explaining the behaviour of multinational corporations (MNCs). Through the 
OLI paradigm, Dunning (2004: 8) tried to explain the ‘extent, pattern, and 
geographical distribution of a group of firms’ from one country or from one industry 
into a new foreign market. 
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Hymer (1979) first addressed the question of why firms initially go abroad and begin 
to engage in outward direct investment. Hymer argued that much FDI gravitates to 
business sectors where major competitors are so few that the market could be 
characterised as oligopolistic or monopolistic. His main contribution was that he 
shifted attention to the issues of ‘market entry barriers’ and ‘market imperfections’ as 
key factors in understanding the issues of foreign market entry (Tallman 2004: 46). 
Vernon focused on the local market and location characteristics, which explained 
why certain countries attracted companies to invest there. Vernon came up with a  
‘product life-cycle theory’ according to which investment abroad follows a three-part 
cycle: (1) a firm offers an innovative product / service; (2) once established, 
competitors push the product price down; (3) the product reaches its zenith and is 
gradually displaced.   
 
Dunning drew on a mix of theories (industrial organisation, firm theory, ‘location’ 
theory) to formulate the OLI paradigm and to explain the propensity and advantages 
of a firm to invest abroad. He argued that there are three types of advantages that 
arise, when companies invest in a different country: 
 
• Ownership advantages: i.e. the advantages of owning an asset / production 
facility in a foreign country instead of paying a fee or hiring someone else 
there. There are advantages related to owning particular unique intangible 
assets (e.g. unique technologies) or owning complementary assets.  Cantwell 
and Narula (2003: 4) pointed out that these advantages must be considered 
in relation to the behaviour of other foreign companies that try to enter the 
market, not simply in relation to domestic companies in the host country. 
 
• Internalisation advantages include a number of factors: costs of negotiation 
with a foreign partner, uncertainty (e.g. in relying on a foreign supplier), 
insufficient level of control over foreign partners, cross-border taxes and 
tariffs, and opportunism. These costs could make it more profitable for a firm 
to expand into a foreign market rather than to rely on local partners.    
 
• Finally, there are advantages to the location (i.e. the specific foreign 
country) selected by the company: transportation costs of goods from or to 
the foreign market should be considered; cultural similarities that might exist 
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between country of origin and destination are also a factor (e.g. Spain and 
Bulgaria); risks of expropriation (e.g. by an authoritarian government); 
government incentives (e.g. tax incentives), and factor endowments8. 
 
Maitland and Nicholas (2003) have criticized the OLI paradigm for focusing on 
exclusively on external factors that explain the firm’s decision to make an investment 
abroad and its choice of mode of entry. They explain that studies of large MNCs, 
such as Unilever, Kao, General Electric, and NEC have pointed to ‘internal 
resources’, ‘management capabilities’ and ‘administrative heritage’ as the firm-
specific factors that lead to internationalisation of the business activities. 
 
Maitland and Nicholas (2003) also criticized the OLI framework and the resource-
capability approaches as failing to explain how the distribution of FDI differs across 
countries and industries. The growing influence of the resource-capability approach 
has meant that location-specific ownership advantages have been largely ignored. 
The effect of location has been reduced to a list of contextual factors, such as 
production costs, psychic distance, culture and government. 
 
New Institutional Economics, which focuses on social and legal norms that underlie 
economic activity, has evolved around the research question of ‘What explains the 
differential growth [including FDI] and development of societies across time and 
geographic space?’ Within this framework, Maitland and Nicholas (2003) explain that 
economic activity is shaped by a web of informal norms. For example local norms 
may support public officials extorting bribes from MNCs, given their ‘outsider’ status. 
MNCs may not be able to utilise bribery as a competitive tool to match the actions of 
domestic rivals. MNCs may be forced to watch from the sidelines, while host country 
companies engage in bribery to manipulate public tenders and induce public officials 
to restrict use rights on the assets of rivals (Maitland 2001).   
 
Another strain of internationalisation literature has examined the specificities of small 
and medium firms and the factors that determine, on the one hand, their propensity 
to internationalise (i.e. expand business activities to foreign markets) and, on the 
other hand, the factors that determine their market entry modes (Oviatt and 
                                                          
8 ‘Factor endowments: In economics a country's factor endowment is commonly understood as the 
amount of land, labour, capital, and entrepreneurship that a country possesses and can exploit for 
manufacturing’. (Wikipedia.org) 
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McDougall 1994). In view of the fact that most criminal enterprises are small, the 
research on small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) is particularly relevant. Crick 
and Spence (2007: 207) explain that generally the academic debate on SMEs has 
focused on the speed of ‘internationalisation’, and the factors that shape the 
managerial decisions to internationalise.  
 
Susman and Stites (2007: 229) specify that three main theories explain the 
internationalisation and selection of market entry mode. In all of them, though, the 
basic choice that firms face when entering a new market is whether to acquire / 
develop sales assets (e.g. distribution channels), or to contract them. The stage 
theory sees internationalisation as series of steps that reflect the firm’s experience 
and ‘maturity’. The entry into the foreign market is incremental, and based on 
‘experiential learning’. The network theory views the firm as a network of contacts 
and information that facilitates internationalisation. The firm’s available network could 
determine the entry mode of the firm. For instance, if a company is following a 
customer who has entered a foreign market, the company might create its own ‘sales 
assets’. If it is not following a customer, but rather is seeking new local customers, 
but it has no local network, it is more likely to ‘contract’ local ‘sales assets’. Finally, 
the ‘rationalist theory’ sees internationalisation and the choice of market entry mode 
as ‘rational calculations of risk and reward’.  
 
1.4.2 Market entry barriers and strategies 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm has partially influenced another strand of the academic 
field, which grew simultaneously with international strategic management studies 
(Tallman 2004: 43-55). The academic field that considers extensively the issue of 
market entry, and that in many ways also drew on classic industrial organisation (IO) 
theories, involves the study of competitive strategy, which since the late 1970s has 
most often been associated with the work of Michael Porter (2008). 
 
Joe Bain (1954) was the first to consider in more depth the barriers to market entry:  
• large economies of scale: incumbent companies usually already produce 
large quantities at a low price. All other things being equal, the new entrant 
may have to start with large-scale production to achieve the same price. Bain 
suggested that the large economies of scale also has a secondary effect, 
which is the large capital requirement; 
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• large capital requirements: the new entrant might need to make additional 
capital investments to compete efficiently 
In addition, Bain identified two additional factors: ‘product differentiation’ (how a new 
entrant imposes a new / different product), and ‘cost advantage’ (that incumbent 
firms might have). For all of the above Bain’s analysis showed that economies of 
scale and the capital requirements differed between industries. While capital 
requirements were high in both the steel and cigarette industries, the economies of 
scale were average in the steel industry, and low in the cigarette industry (McAfee et 
al. 2004: 4) 
 
Porter (2008), in his formulation of the strategic choices that market entrants face, 
partially built upon the work of Bain. He explained that a configuration of five forces 
shape the strategic environment of any industry (and they differ for each industry). 
Porter argued that new entrants pose a threat to incumbent companies as they take 
market share from them, and put downward pressure on prices, costs, and the rate of 
investment necessary to compete. The incumbent companies naturally have certain 
advantages over the newcomers and pose barriers to entry:  
• incumbent companies might be producing at very low cost because they 
produce in very large quantities (i.e. fixed costs are spread over many 
products), while the new entrant might not be able to right from the start 
producing in big quantities 
• incumbent companies might be favoured by a ‘network effect’, where the 
large number of local buyers purchasing their product influence each other to 
buy their product 
• customers might face additional costs to switching to the product of the new 
entrant 
• higher capital investments might be needed by the new entrant  
• the incumbents might have favourable access to ‘material sources’, good 
geographic locations, established brand identities, or cumulative experience  
• incumbent companies might enjoy better distribution channels 
• government policies might protect local players and hinder entry of new / 
foreign players. 
 
Over the past few decades, economists have focused on different factors in trying to 
define the nature of ‘barriers to entry’; e.g. on the incumbents’ high profits rather than 
on the entrants’ greater costs (McAfee et al. 2004: 10). Different authors, though, 
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have added to the long list of barriers: advertising strategies of incumbents, control of 
resources, government regulations, intellectual property, strategic use of sunk costs 
to increase the entrants’ losses, etc. (ibid.) That led the authors (McAfee et al. 2004; 
Church and Ware 1999) to classify them as ‘structural’ and ‘strategic’ barriers to 
entry. While the factors listed by Porter and Bain above would be classified as 
‘structural’ barriers, as they are part of the nature of the particular industry, the 
‘barriers’ that some authors listed were the result of strategic behaviour of the 
incumbents (e.g. advertising strategies, or other sacrifices of incumbent firms aimed 
at increasing the entrants’ costs.). For most authors, especially those following Stigler 
(1968), the strategic behaviour of firms does not constitute ‘barriers to entry’, and 
should be considered separately (McAfee et al. 2004: 10).  
 
These academic debates on internationalisation and market strategy provide the 
possibility of a structured approach to the study of market behaviour of illicit 
entrepreneurs. The analytical core of the thesis will be to examine their parallels and 
differences alongside the sociological insights from the empirical material collected 
for the present thesis. 
 
1.5 Research questions and thesis structure 
 
The various theoretical frameworks regarding the nature and structure of legal and 
illegal markets, as well as the extensive academic work on market entry barriers and 
internationalisation of firms leave one important question open: What factors 
influence the entry of illegal enterprises into a new market, particularly the one in a 
foreign country? To answer it, additional questions were formulated that aimed to 
explore the broader social contexts and their role in why criminals migrate, or why 
they migrate to certain countries, and choose certain markets.  
 
The initial working hypothesis, influenced by the Spanish media reports, was that the 
Bulgarian car-theft networks had taken a dominant ‘market position’ in the ‘market for 
stolen cars’ in Spain (which quickly proved not to be exactly the case). Some key 
‘variables’ were formulated and their impact on behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs 
was examined in the course of the data collection: corruption of public officials, the 
Bulgarian immigrant community in Spain, the ‘grey economy’ in Bulgaria, the anti-
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organised crime law-enforcement policies, the penal and criminal justices policies, 
the competitive advantages (in terms of technical skills).  
 
In the course of the research, the evidence suggested that the analysis should go on 
two other levels: a financial analysis of the costs of a criminal enterprise, which could 
help explain one aspect of the economic behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs; and a 
sociological / ethnographic analysis to understand the broader socio-economic 
environment, historical, and symbolic factors that shape their behaviour.  
 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Following the present introduction, 
Chapter 2 presents the research methods and instruments used in the study, 
comparing the approach adopted in the study to the ones used by other scholars. 
Most importantly, this chapter provides an analysis of the difficulties, challenges, and 
strategies used to collect the empirical information used in the study. Chapters three, 
four and five provide the specific empirical data to help understand how cars are 
stolen and sold.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the used car market and its principles of operation, as this is 
the main market where stolen vehicles are sold. It examines the demand and supply 
factors that have an impact on the sales of used cars (including stolen ones). It also 
presents the used-car industries in Spain and in Bulgaria, the different categories of 
used-car dealers and schemes, in what is generally a sector with a significant 
amount of irregular economic activity.   
 
Chapter 4 presents the main empirical data on the operations of car-theft 
enterprises. Starting with the relevant statistical data on motor vehicle theft, the 
chapter goes on to explore the mechanics of international car-theft rings, the players, 
roles, and trends. The chapter focuses on the car-theft industries in Spain and 
Bulgaria.  
 
Chapter 5 builds upon the data in the preceding two chapters, showing how stolen 
vehicles are sold on the used car market. It looks at the different channels of 
distribution and the role of the different players (dealers, criminal enterprises) as well 
as the buyers. Again a comparison between Spain and Bulgaria is carried out. A 
historical account, especially on Bulgaria, helps in the understanding of present-day 
organisation of sales of stolen cars. 
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Chapter 6 provides the broader social context within which the selling of stolen cars 
takes place. First it examines the role of the Bulgarian immigrant community in Spain 
in facilitating either car theft or the selling of stolen cars. As a point of comparison the 
chapter considers the social and political economy of two cities in Bulgaria, which in 
many ways illustrate how stolen cars are sold in Bulgaria. 
 
Chapter 7 considers the various factors that facilitate market entry for illegal 
enterprises (including the role of law-enforcement agencies, corruption) through the 
prism of internationalisation and market entry economic theoretical frameworks.  
 
The concluding Chapter 8 distils the main findings and puts them into a broader 
theoretical perspective, providing as well some policy implications and forecasts.  
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2 Methods and research instruments  
 
2.1 Researching organised crime 
 
Various authors have pointed to the difficulties and dangers in conducting fieldwork 
on organised crime (Rawlinson 2008a, Jacobs 2006, Venkatesh 2008). The list of 
obstacles is long: dangers of physical threats, legal threats, difficulties in accessing 
interviewees and establishing trust. Rawlinson (2008a: 291-292) also warns about 
the possibility of mystifying and glorifying organised crime, adding that coming with 
pre-conceptions about the objects of the study the criminologists contribute to a 
‘social construction’ of organised crime. She points out that many studies often over-
rely on secondary and official sources and data. Rawlinson also identifies as an 
obstacle the difficulty in clearly identifying the object of research: organised crime 
Jacobs (2006: 164) pays particular attention to the issue of validity of the results: is 
the researcher getting the ‘real story’? And argues that ethnographic fieldwork, where 
the researcher is present in the action, could be more distorting to the reality and 
influence the behaviour of the individuals observed. Research on organised crime 
suffers from lack of or incompleteness of data, and access to primary data is difficult.  
 
This chapter is split in two main parts: the first part analyses the data-collection 
approach undertaken, while the second part presents the methodology used to 
analyse the data. It also describes the limitations of the method employed and the 
data collected.  
 
Initially, two general methods were considered: a classic ‘participant-observation’ 
ethnography and a more conventional sociological approach, relying primarily on 
interviews and official data. The ethnographic method would have provided the 
richest information but was ruled out for several reasons, stemming from the nature 
of the empirical case selected: 
• The study period examined spanned over a ten-year period, and many 
participants and potential sources were no longer involved in car theft. To a 
38 
 
large extent the questions under consideration refer to the period between the 
late 1990s and 2008.  
• Many of the offenders studied were ‘migrant’ criminals who not only 
‘commuted’ between Bulgaria and Spain, but once in Spain were constantly 
on the move, making ‘participant observation’ a challenging and expensive 
task.  
• Last but not least, the only way of carrying out an ethnographic work would 
have involved the nearly impossible task of establishing oneself within a 
migrant transnational criminal network, which most likely dealt not only in 
stolen vehicles but also drugs, arms, credit card fraud, etc. – activities 
requiring a great degree of secrecy.  
 
Therefore it was decided that a more classic criminological approach combining 
semi-structured interviews with law-enforcement, offenders, and other stakeholders, 
as well as analysis of official data would yield the best results.  
  
2.2 Researching car theft 
 
When police or criminologists refer to ‘vehicle crime’, this term usually concerns all 
categories of vehicles: passenger cars (small, mid-range, sports, luxury, etc.), 
motorcycles, trucks, construction vehicles, other transport vehicles (coaches, vans, 
etc.), even sea vessels and aircraft. The term ‘motor vehicle theft (‘MVT’) is not used 
in this thesis, although this is the main police term commonly in use. Instead ‘car-
theft’ and ‘car thieves’ are the terms used, although in many instances the thieves 
might be involved in the theft of vehicles other than cars. 
 
A review of the research methods adopted by researchers on vehicle theft reveals 
that the approach selected for the present thesis is not very often employed, as only 
Jacobs, Topalli and Wright (2003) have undertaken interviews with active offenders. 
As vehicle theft is a crime that is reported to the police almost 100% of cases and 
also covered in victim surveys, a great number of analyses are limited to analyzing 
police and formal statistics. The table below presents a summary of the main 
methods used by academics. 
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METHOD  SAMPLE AUTHOR 
Crime victims survey / police statistics 
analysis 
N/A Clarke & Harris (1992); Hardy (2006); 
Sallybanks & Brown (1999); Paternoster 
& Bushway (2001)*; Tremblay et al. 
(1994); Tremblay et al. (2001); Batelaan 
& Moll (2004)*; Brown (2004)*; Engel & 
Prummel (2007)*; Walsh & Taylor 
(2008)*;  
Interviews with law-enforcement 
officers 
N/A Gerber & Killias (2003)*; Aldridge 
(2007)*; Engel & Prummel (2007)* 
Police reports / media N/A Clarke & Brown (2003)*;  
Morselli and Roy (2008)* 
Ferwerda et al. (2005)* 
Semi-structured interviews with 
(former) auto-thieves (imprisoned & 
post-penitentiary) 
56 
100 (under 25) 
 
Copes & Cherbonneau (2006a, b)* 
Light et al. (1993) 
Antonopoulos & Papanicolaou (2009)* 
Semi-structured interviews with active 
offenders    
28 Jacobs, Topalli, & Wright (2003)* 
Information from police record & self-
reports from participants in offender 
programme  
67 
48 
Davies (1993)  
Galvin (1997) 
Evaluation of re-offending of 
participants in a programme 
30 
10 
Procter & Townsend (1994) 
Belton (1997) 
Information from police record, 
offender project and probation records 
35 
40 
Wilkinson & Morgan (1995) 
Leicester Community Projects Trust 
(1997) 
Self-reported telephone survey of 
parents, social workers, and police 
12 Edinburgh Community Safety Unit (1996) 
Table 1. Methodological approaches to researching car theft 
Sources: Slobodian and Browne (2001: 476-478); *own elaboration 
 
2.3 Data collection 
 
The collection of data for this thesis consisted of three key components:  
• review of police and official statistical data and reports 
• review of media reports 
• semi-structured face-to-face interviews. 
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The process lasted about two years due to the difficulties of access to interviewees, 
both offenders and law-enforcement officials, and was carried out between 2007 and 
2009.  
2.3.1 Police data 
The starting point of data collection regarding car theft and Bulgarian criminals in 
Spain included the analysis of 88 summaries of police reports on operations of 
Spain’s National Police and Civil Guard between 1997 and 2010 against organised 
crime groups and networks9. Of these, 55 case reports specifically concerned 
Bulgarian car-theft groups in Spain (or groups that included Bulgarians). Twenty two 
case reports were on car-theft groups not involving Bulgarians. In addition, 12 case 
reports involving Bulgarian organised criminals involved in other crimes, such as 
prostitution, drugs, credit-card fraud were analysed. The case reports prior to 2000, 
were obtained from the Spanish dailies El Pais and El Mundo (who normally just 
reprint the police press release). The rest were available from the website of the 
Spanish Ministry of Interior (www.mir.es).  
 
Each of these reports is 1-2 pages long and describes the car-theft scheme, 
trafficking routes, and structure of the criminal network or group; the ethnicity, 
gender, age, name, city of birth, or previous convictions of offenders; types and 
numbers of stolen vehicles, city or town of the arrests. After comparing the data in 
the case reports with the total number of arrests reported to the Bulgarian Embassy 
in Madrid by Spanish authorities, it was established that these cases included 
practically all arrests of Bulgarian car thieves reported. The list of the cases in 
summary format is presented in Annex 2 to the present thesis. 
 
Several types of police statistical data were also used: 
• Arrests and registered crime data (general vehicle theft statistical data from the 
Bulgarian Ministry of Interior, Spanish Ministry of Interior, Interpol; data on 
arrested Bulgarian suspects from the various police forces from around the EU, 
as well as several other EU countries – Belgium, Netherlands, and the Czech 
Republic). 
• Crime victims survey data (International Crime Victims Surveys). 
                                                          
9 In addition one case (C-0911) was recounted by investigators in Bulgaria, as the investigation started 
into the sale of stolen vehicles.  
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• Car industry data (from Eurostat, national statistics, or business analysis). 
• Migration related data (from various surveys, or official migration statistics from 
the Spanish Ministry of Labour).  
 
The common problems with the analysis of these different types of data are 
discussed further below. 
 
 
2.3.2 Media review 
 
Rawlinson (2000: 355-357) has highlighted the advantages of using journalistic 
materials in the research of organised crime, although warning that such publications 
focus on easily assimilated phenomena and ignore subtle details. A more systematic 
review and analysis of Bulgarian and Spanish printed media was undertaken, and 
served several purposes: 
• To obtain information about the car-theft market, roles, and players. 
• To analyse the media portrayal of Bulgarian car thieves that might have 
influenced police actions. 
• To obtain leads for possible interviews with offenders. 
 
To this purposes key word search of online-databases of El Pais and El Mundo, 
newspapers was also undertaken, as well as Google-search on other Spanish media 
sources. Some TV footage, available on the internet, was also reviewed, yet this 
simply illustrated some of the police cases analysed. There were no journalist 
investigations into any of the crime stories in the Spanish media, and all materials 
simply reflected police press-releases, or were based on interviews with police 
officers.  
 
A comprehensive review of Bulgarian media was carried out, using an electronic 
database (similar to Lexis Nexis) that includes print and electronic media records 
since 1990. The majority of stories in Bulgarian newspapers translated Spanish 
media reports on the arrests of Bulgarians. Some, though, conducted follow-up 
journalistic investigations and interviews with car thieves, their families, or with 
Bulgarian investigators.  
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The approach undertaken was to cross-reference three sources: the media reports, 
the police press-releases, and data from the interviews. As interviewees generally 
avoided mentioning names of offenders, once a name was in the media, it was easy 
to question an interviewee and to obtain further details on the media story, or to 
snow-ball into other stories.  
 
2.3.3 Interviews 
 
The most substantial evidence for the present research has come from semi-
structured interviews that were collected over the course of about three years (2007-
2009). The purpose of the interviews was broadly to seek answers to the research 
questions, while the specific objectives included: 
• Understanding the operation of theft of vehicles and the sales of stolen 
vehicles in Spain and Bulgaria, as well as the broader social and market 
contexts in either country; 
• Understanding the ‘business model’ of enterprises involved in stealing / or 
selling of stolen vehicles  
• Exploring personal histories and migration related motivations of the market 
participants.  
 
The broad categories into which the 79 interviewees fall are (detailed descriptions of 
all interviewees are provided in Annex 2 of the thesis): 
• Law-enforcement representatives (police, customs officers): 21 law-
enforcement officers were interviewed, in Spain and Bulgaria – mostly from 
vehicle-crime units or criminal police, but also police liaison officers in 
Bulgarian embassies.   
• Offenders: 23 offenders in total were interviewed: all were active offenders 
and were either presently participating in various roles in car-theft or had 
formerly participated in car-theft rings. 
• Used-car market participants (car dealers, mechanics, leasing company 
representatives): 6 car dealers / mechanics were interviewed who owned 
dealerships or car-repair shops in Sofia, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, and Dupnitsa. 
All the interviewees had international experience and had been also involved 
in the import of used cars. 
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• Immigrants: 10 immigrants were interviewed, who had spent time in various 
parts of Spain. Some of them were recruited via informal contacts, and some 
were arranged by an NGO in Pazardjik (see map in Annex 1). 
• Nineteen others interviewees were entrepreneurs, lawyers, academics, 
NGOs representatives. Six businessmen (entrepreneurs) were interviewed to 
obtain a more general understanding of customers of luxury cars or social 
context of luxury car market). In addition, a defence lawyer in Spain was also 
interviewed, who had worked with Bulgarian offenders. Finally, some of the 
staff at the NGO in Pazardjik were a good source of information. 
 
The two main categories of interviewees, offenders and law-enforcement officers, 
deserve special attention, as each category required a special approach in 
development of the sample, questionnaire, and interview approach. 
 
The issue of access to interviewees is probably the key one: the main factor that 
helped me overcome these difficulties was my dual identity: as a PhD student at LSE 
and as a researcher at the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) in Bulgaria. 
CSD, a Bulgarian think-tank where I have worked since 2003, was well known, and 
worked well in providing access to the ‘gate-keepers’: the Ministry of Interior, the 
various non-profits, or the journalists.  
 
On the other hand, the publicity that CSD gives to its reports could have also been 
off-putting, particularly to offenders. CSD reports are quoted in media, or by law-
enforcement officers as grounds for policies and actions.10 Therefore, when 
conducting interviews with offenders, the other, less threatening identity of a London-
based PhD student was emphasised. 
 
The abbreviations used throughout the thesis to denote the information derived from 
these interviews are: LEI (law-enforcement interviews); OFI (offender interviews), IMI 
(immigrants), CDI (car-dealer interviews), OTI – (other interviews).  
 
The recruitment process of both law-enforcement and offender interviewees 
gradually pushed the entire thesis in a ‘ethnographic’ type of study, as the majority of 
                                                          
10 I have also appeared several times in TV news reports, and provided newspaper and radio interviews 
for most major national media. 
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interviewees (law-enforcement, offenders, immigrants, and others) in Bulgaria ended 
up being concentrated in two small towns, Gabrovo and Pazardjik, as well as Sofia 
(see map in Annex 1). Hence Chapter 6 provides case studies on the cities of 
Gabrovo and Pazardjik. The two small towns both had significant number of 
emigrants and offenders who had gone to Spain. Many of these were either returning 
periodically from Spain back home to Bulgaria or had returned permanently. I took 
advantage of this population of labour migrants and offenders, who felt much more 
comfortable discussing, what seemed to be their ‘far-away life’ in Spain. The town of 
Gabrovo also happened to be where my mother was from, and I had a wide network 
of acquaintances that included immigrants, law-enforcement, and entrepreneurs / 
offenders. My family connections opened many doors and provided quick access to 
much information – information that would have otherwise taken several meetings 
was available already at the first interview.  
 
2.3.4 Law-enforcement interviews 
 
My introduction to the issue of car-theft was through a series of interviews with law-
enforcement officers. The Bulgarian Ministry of Interior responded positively to a 
request and arranged meetings with the Heads of Car-theft Units in Sofia and Varna, 
several detectives in the respective units, officers who had participated in joint 
operations with the Spanish police (including working in Spain), and liaison officers 
(Madrid and Brussels). The majority of these interviews required several meetings, 
once an informal relation with the officers was established. On several occasions, I 
spent several hours at the unit, witnessing their day-to-day work, which usually 
concerned ransom-seeking car-thefts. The Consul at the Bulgarian Embassy in 
Madrid was also interviewed on a couple of occasions, as she had been involved in 
prison visits and representation of Bulgarian offenders between 2002 and 2005 and 
again between 2007 and 2010. 
 
Interviews with the Spanish law-enforcement, despite a four year effort, and several 
official letters, and the personal help of several Spanish diplomats were not possible. 
It was explained that although the heads of car-crime units had agreed to speak to 
me, ‘a higher level political decision was taken’ forbidding them from providing me 
with interviews. Despite this, several informal interviews were undertaken in the 
course of other research I did on behalf of the European Commission, which 
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provided me with access to Customs officers, Civil Guard, and National Police 
officers. 
 
The key challenge of the law-enforcement interviews in Bulgaria was their 
unwillingness (or inability) to discuss the higher levels of car-theft / stolen-car sales 
networks in Bulgaria. It stemmed partly from the fact that these levels were rarely 
targeted by the law-enforcement officers, and that all arrests were of middle- to low-
level car thieves. Some of the high-level names were mentioned reluctantly, and it 
was explained that they had solid high-level protection (by either law-enforcement 
officials or politicians) and that it would be better not to discuss them. For instance, in 
Varna, a local criminal syndicate that within a decade had been transformed from a 
racketeering operation into the largest holding of legal companies, was clearly a 
factor that local police officers took into account during the interviews. While 
detectives from other towns claimed that this criminal syndicate was involved in 
protecting, and even directly smuggling stolen cars from Western Europe / towards 
former Soviet Union, the local officers interviewed denied all these claims. The most 
plausible explanations for this position, suggested by other interviewees, were either 
fear or influence (if not straightforward corruption).  
 
The issue of police corruption does not figure prominently in methodological issues of 
conducting organised crime related research. Venkatesh (2008) notes the dangers 
that corrupt police officers can pose, as they feel threatened by offenders who could 
be a source of information about corruption schemes.11 With the exception of two 
offenders, most of the offender informants and investigators I interviewed were 
located in different towns, so this danger did not exist. In addition, the focus of the 
interviews was Spain, so there was no direct threat to the particular interviewees 
from any of my other respondents.  
 
Another issue that I faced in the course of the interviews was the curiosity that a 
couple of my law-enforcement interviewees expressed about my offender sources of 
information. In part this problem was avoided, as the majority of my interviews with 
investigators took place before the offender interviews. I used the fact that I was not 
                                                          
11 Venkatesh was in fact directly threatened by corrupt police officers, who closely monitored his 
research in a Chicago suburb.  
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aware of the offenders’ identities, or that they did not reveal names, as a way of 
rebutting questions from the police.  
 
Despite these difficulties, overall a level of trust was established with several of the 
police officers, and they were quite willing to share their knowledge on ‘Spaniards’ 
(as car thieves working in Spain are known). Issues of police or judicial corruption 
were gradually shared as well, further indicating an increased level of trust from the 
interviewees.  
 
Although a structured questionnaire was used only during the initial interviews, the 
subsequent meetings were generally held to discuss the findings from the interviews 
with offenders, analysis of data, and the various tables and figures that were 
produced. 
 
2.3.5 Offender interviews 
Offender interviews are tricky and difficult. A special issue of Trends in Organised 
Crime (2008/11) provides a number of aspects on the challenges: access to 
interviewees (Antonopoulos 2008), safety during interviews (Arsovska 2008, 
Rawlinson 2008b), social distance with offenders (Antonopoulos 2008); the value of 
offender interviews and the validity of data (Antonopoulos 2008, Arsovska 2008, 
Siegel 2008). 
 
The present research faced many of these difficulties. A total of 23 interviews were 
conducted with offenders, of which 20 were with males and 3 were with females 
(prostitutes). Four of them were from the capital Sofia, while the rest were from 
Pazardjik. The majority of the interviewees had ‘worked’ in Spain, while the rest had 
experience in Italy, France, and Germany, Austria, Belgium, or only in Bulgaria. 
Almost all offenders had something to do with car-theft: they were either professional 
car thieves, drivers (who drive the stolen cars, including cross-border), or other types 
of specialist roles. All of them had other criminal careers as well: as drug (mostly 
heroin) dealers, low-level pimps, burglars, petty thieves, credit card skimmers. All 
were professional criminals: very few had ever had legitimate jobs or even 
considered a legitimate job as a future alternative.   
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Much could have been written about the social background or criminal careers of 
individual offenders, but the issue was left out as it was outside the focus of the 
thesis. What probably is worth mentioning is that there was a great variety of social 
backgrounds: the majority of offenders were older (in their 30s) and grew up as kids 
during communism. A few came from very poor or marginal backgrounds, but the 
majority came from, what before 1990 was considered, ‘normal middle income 
families’. These families quickly became poor after the 1990, when the offenders 
were in their late ‘teen’ or early 20s during the chaotic 1990s.  
 
Recruitment and access 
 
The initial idea of the research was to conduct interviews with imprisoned offenders. 
The indication from investigators that it would be very difficult to identify such 
offenders for two reasons: (1) Many offenders are not in prison on car-theft related 
charges – therefore the Prison Services administration would not have been able to 
approve a specific request for car thieves. (2) Interviews with the general Consul 
general at the Bulgarian Embassy in Spain identified a similar situation in Spain, 
adding that very few such offenders are extradited to Bulgaria.  
 
The interviews were arranged through three other channels: 
 
• Police assisted: the Sofia Police Department arranged two interviews with 
offenders who were known to have been operating in Spain and Italy. The 
Bulgarian police regularly conducts a ‘prophylaxis’ of offenders: a procedure, 
in which known offenders are summoned to the police station and questioned, 
usually a way of extracting intelligence information. The two offenders were 
apprehended and brought to a police station by the police as part of a routine 
visit. Following their meeting they were asked if they would mind talking to me 
in coffee shop near the police station. Naturally, although this was supposedly 
a voluntary meeting, in practice it was most likely that the offenders had felt 
obliged to agree. They were quite cautious, and not sure about what 
criminological work was about. This meeting was of interest as, during the 
first 20 minutes, three investigators, the two offenders and I sat around a 
table in a coffee shop. The conversation between cops and offenders went on 
in a friendly manner about recent news from the car-theft world, and the 
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vehicles and thieves involved, and so on. It was striking how difficult it was to 
distinguish, the offenders from the investigators (who were plain-clothes 
detectives), either by their appearance or their speech. They all seemed to be 
equally fascinated by how great the particular vehicle or motorbike stolen 
was, by how skilfully it was stolen, or by the rumours of who was the ‘lucky 
winner’ who stole it.  
 
• Journalist assisted: one interview in Sofia was arranged through a 
journalist, who had published an extensive interview with a ‘former’ car thief. 
The journalist had assured the car thief about the confidentiality of the 
meeting, and therefore the interview lasted several hours in the relaxed 
atmosphere of a half-empty restaurant in the suburbs. This interviewee had 
agreed to talk in exchange for a small payment (50 euros).12 In addition, four 
interviews with three prostitutes and one pimp took place in the context of a 
two-day documentary film shooting, in Pazardjik that was being undertaken 
by a French TV film producer. The film crew managed to obtain access and 
film some of the interviews inside the home of one of the prostitutes / pimps. I 
conducted most of the interviews off-camera. These interviews were aimed at 
establishing the broader social context of prostitution in Pazardjik, but it 
provided very good insight into wider social context, as well as criminal 
networks in Pazardjik (several of the car-theft offenders interviewed were also 
pimps). 
 
• NGO-assisted: The majority of interviews were arranged with the assistance 
of representatives two NGOs – one based in the town of Pazardjik (112 km 
east of Sofia) and a second one in Sofia. Over a two-year period, the NGOs 
arranged meetings with 16 offenders, a number of which were interviewed 
several times. Some of the interviewees had been ‘clients’ for some time to 
the NGOs, receiving help or services from the organisation. One additional 
interview was arranged with a former car-thief who worked at a non-profit 
providing social assistance to offenders in Sofia.  
 
                                                          
12 Payment of interviewees and focus group participants is a standard practice in Bulgaria. Even though 
the pay is not significant, most social organisations and sociological / market agencies pay small fees to 
motivate participants.  
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• Two other interviews took place by chance. On a flight from London to Sofia, 
I sat next to an offender from Pazardjik, who was living in Barcelona, had also 
spent time in Madrid, Marbella, and Milan, had much knowledge of drug 
dealing South America, Africa, and Amsterdam; had keen interest in the UK’s 
penal policies on drugs; had a background as a judo athlete from a sports 
school; and most importantly detailed knowledge about the car-theft business. 
The three-hour long interview was one of the most insightful in terms of 
understanding the higher-level negotiations of the drugs and car-theft 
businesses. The second incidental interview took place after a long taxi drive, 
where the taxi-driver admitted that he had been international truck driver who 
had driven platform trucks with stolen vehicles from Italy. He then agreed to a 
short conversation discussing his experience. 
 
Trust and sincerity 
 
The key challenge of obtaining fairly credible information in the short few hours that 
the interviews lasted was establishing some level of trust. In the case of the 
interviews arranged by the police, this was clearly missing and hardly possible to 
achieve. In all other cases, the gate-keepers became the guarantor of this trust. 
Multiple interviews conducted with some offenders also increased the level of trust 
significantly. 
 
The main gatekeeper used to arrange the interviews in Pazardjik was an NGO 
worker who often served as mediator, and provided support to offenders in trying to 
solve some of the problems they faced with the local police. They trusted him, and he 
was able arrange numerous meetings with them in exchange for a small payment of 
€20. These interviews were used to ‘snowball’ additional ones, as some interviewees 
agreed to bring along their offender-friends to participate in further interviews. One of 
the major advantages of using a local gatekeeper was that he had access to ‘itinerant 
criminals’: the majority of these offenders were migrating, constantly changing their 
mobile SIM cards, and the most likely way to find them was by spotting them 
accidentally in the centre of town when they were back from ‘work’ abroad.  
 
The interviewees had little idea about the exact topic of the interview: the only 
agreement was that their identity would not be revealed to me, or that they would not 
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be asked to reveal any names. This condition worked to our mutual advantage as it 
also shielded me from any possible legal complications around my knowledge of 
particular crimes. 
 
In the beginning of the interviews, I clearly identified myself as ‘a student from 
London, with a scientific interest in vehicle theft in Spain’. Nevertheless, by the end of 
the first year almost all the interviewees had revealed their first names, and even 
gave me their mobile numbers (or one of these numbers). They also referred at least 
to the names of other offenders that were known from the local press. 
 
Some of the interviewees were understandably nervous, and tried to work out 
whether I was a cop, or they would ask me if I had recording equipment. Some would 
observe me carefully and conclude that I had the posture of a police investigator. 
Usually with these suspicious individuals, little was shared during the first interview. 
In the subsequent interviews more information was revealed, particularly about the 
specific countries or towns where they had worked. Obviously for all the above 
reasons I did not use a tape recorder. Sometimes offenders felt uncomfortable and 
carefully observed what was recorded as notes. I even avoided taking any notes 
during the first 30-40 minutes of the interview, until the respondent felt more 
comfortable. Recording equipment was not used in law-enforcement interviews 
either. Most of the time, therefore, the quotations throughout the thesis are 
approximations of what was said. 
  
Most interviews took place in a cosy meeting room at an NGOs offices in the centre 
of Pazardjik, a location with which the interviewees were familiar. Some of the follow-
up interviews took place in a nearby downtown bar, where local pimps and cops 
hung out (according to the interviewees, who were also pimps).  
 
The gatekeepers were well familiar with the criminal background of most of the 
interviewees. This proved to be useful, as I could then compare the level of sincerity 
of the interviewees. The facts that were most often hidden related to the 
interviewee’s participation in other criminal activities, especially drugs and 
prostitution. The interviewees attempted to strictly stick to the topic of car theft. 
Nevertheless, in almost all interviews they spoke of other criminal activities (as these 
were part of the questionnaire), and on several occasions they recounted stories 
about their own participation in these criminal activities. 
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The main issues which the interviewees usually lied about were: 
• Their relation to car-theft: although the fixer of the interview had some idea 
about the background of the interviewees, many of them might have had only 
contacts or friendship with car thieves. As car thieves also engage in many 
other crimes, other offenders hear stories and know about car-theft even 
without having been directly involved in it. These types of lies emerged only 
after additional interviews, and more detailed questions, and once a stronger 
relationship of trust had been established. 
• The people they knew: they often claimed that they knew or had worked with 
people who they considered to have power or reputation. Two well known 
car-thieves – brothers were most often mentioned. 
• Their participation in other criminal activities (particularly denying involvement 
in drugs distribution). 
• Their position in the car-theft group: some would claim that they were ‘thieves’ 
whereas on closer examination it became clear that they did not know 
technical specifics, and were in fact only assisting car-thieves with auxiliary 
tasks.  
• Money: boasting about how much they made. Usually the most effective way 
of finding out the real cost of something was to ask how much others make 
(e.g. asking the thief how much would a mule makes).  
 
 
Paying interviewees 
 
The issue of paying respondents was considered carefully, and as it was established 
that there were precedents, it was considered appropriate. The payment did not 
seem to reflect significantly on the level of sincerity of the respondents, as there was 
no significant difference between the quality or the openness of interviewees who 
were paid and those who were not paid. The offenders who were paid were promised 
20 euros upfront, regardless of what they were to reveal. Several interviewees 
started the interviews saying that ‘they have very precious information that they can 
share with me’. My approach, though, was to tell them that ‘precious information’, 
such as names of other thieves or specific technicalities of auto-theft were of no 
interest and that the conversation was to be more general.  
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Nevertheless, some difficult issues arose. Several interviewees saw an opportunity to 
make more money from the interview. Several offered to demonstrate the theft of a 
car. One tried to sell a CD with mobile phone recordings of the abuse of victims of 
human trafficking. Another orchestrated an elabourate scheme, where for 100 euros 
he ‘arranged’ a number of meetings with his friends in Barcelona and Madrid, all of 
which turned out to be hoaxes. Both had tried to defraud the NGO’s staff on previous 
occasions as well, by ‘borrowing’ money or selling stolen goods. The second person 
was detained and imprisoned shortly after that for petty theft. In both cases, I 
managed to avoid any complications (even though I ended up in a coffee shop in 
Barcelona waiting for people who never showed up). Two other offenders invited me 
to join them on a trip to Spain, where they offered to introduce me to other offenders, 
and ‘drive together a stolen car back to Bulgaria’. The advice of several investigators 
was not to take advantage of these invitations. The offers were unlikely to have been 
genuine, as the offenders had known me for only a few hours when they made the 
offer, and it was more likely to have been seen as an opportunity for a free trip to 
Spain, without any real intention to be of assistance to me. 
 
 
Representativeness and validity 
 
Although the number of interviews with offenders seems too small to establish any 
level of representativeness, there are a number of arguments to counter this 
argument: 
• The total number of Bulgarian car thieves in Spain is approximately several 
hundred. The individuals that were interviewed worked within different 
criminal networks and in all the main areas where Bulgarian criminal groups 
have been detected (Madrid, Costa del Sol, Valencia-Barcelona).  
• The structure of car-theft networks is fairly flat, therefore all interviewees were 
exposed to (or at least were well aware of) the different aspects of the car-
theft operations and market. 
• There were no significant discrepancies between offender accounts and other 
sources of information. 
• Even though most offender interviewees were from the same town 
(Pazardjik), they did not work only within ‘Pazardjik groups’, but joined groups 
and networks with other offenders from across Bulgaria. In cases where the 
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city of origin of individuals arrested by Spanish police was provided, there did 
not seem to be groups of participants from particular towns. 
 
 
Gender issues 
 
The involvement of women in the car-theft market should not be understated. 
Although no evidence was found that women are in high-level positions within the 
networks, in the majority of cases discussed, and in the networks dismantled by the 
Spanish police, there were women involved. Women are used as drivers (e.g. of pilot 
vehicles) or to accompany mules transporting stolen vehicles (i.e. being disguised as 
a ‘couple’). They could also have various auxiliary functions in transferring money or 
forged documentation. In addition, prostitutes that were related to car-theft networks 
could play different roles. From the offenders interviewed, only one female prostitute 
had had involvement in car-theft networks. None of the investigators interviewed 
were female; only one other law-enforcement official and one government official 
were female. The subject matter of the present research is not ‘gendered’ to an 
extent that suggests that under-representation of women in the interviewee sample 
poses analytical problems. Therefore, no specific efforts were made to interview 
female offenders or law-enforcement officers.  
 
 
Interview structure and questionnaire 
 
The structure of the questionnaire used in the offender interviews was developed in 
two phases. Some of the first interviews took place while the operational data of the 
Spanish police was still being analysed, and some of the interviews with the law-
enforcement officers were still under way. As a result their quality was generally 
lower. The quality of the interviews also increased over time, as I became more 
familiar with the topic, the interviewees seem to treat me with more respect and I was 
able to ask more specific questions.  
 
All the interviews were semi-structured: although all the questions were asked in all 
the interviews, the conversation was open and each one followed its own unique 
pattern. Usually, by a way of introduction, an oral history approach was undertaken, 
asking interviewees to reflect on the period 1999 – 2006, or around the time they 
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entered the car theft industry. Elements of life histories were also infused, as more 
general considerations, such as emigration, were discussed. The similar ages of the 
author and the interviewees allowed for an easy-going conversation, and reduced 
social distance. In an effort to reduce this distance further, I used a language that 
matched theirs, involving lots of derogatory expressions and swear words that the 
interviewees used. For instance, when referring to prostitutes, the offenders (and 
often even police officers) usually used the words ‘sluts’ or ‘cunts’; they also added 
derogatory adjectives when discussing police officers (particularly corrupt ones). 
 
2.3.6 Other interviews 
 
Using informal connections, ten interviews were done with Bulgarian immigrants in 
Madrid, Marbella, and Barcelona. Interviews with immigrants, who had returned from 
Spain were also arranged with the help of the NGO based in Pazardjik.  
 
Arranging the interviews with car dealers proved as challenging as those with 
offenders. These were all arranged via informal networks, through acquaintances, 
and via the NGO in Pazardjik. Any attempts to use the snow-ball method for further 
interviews with car-dealers proved unsuccessful. As one police officer noted ‘You 
should not be surprised, no used-car dealer is really clean’ [LEI-4].  Informal personal 
relations were also used to arrange several interviews with entrepreneurs and 
academics.  
 
2.3.7 Anonymity 
 
The protection of interviewee identity was a key factor in either achieving some level 
of openness or protecting their safety, both in law-enforcement and offender 
interviews. Some offenders preferred to remain anonymous, and did not reveal even 
their first name.  
 
In addition, an extensive effort was made to make anonymous a number of 
individuals, mostly for legal purposes. Their names are widely known and published 
in the Bulgarian media. Their role in the car-theft or used car industries was 
confirmed by offenders or law-enforcement officers. Yet, none of these individuals 
have ever been convicted for car-theft, and some have never even been prosecuted 
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(despite the numerous stories about them in the media). In the thesis, either fake 
names have been created, or nicknames have been used.  
 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 
2.4.1 Overall approach 
The two approaches that were considered included analytic induction and grounded 
theory. Analytic induction implies that a hypothesis needs to be developed (Bryman 
2001). As the research topic was little explored and multiple hypotheses were to be 
tested, it was decided that an inductive approach would not be appropriate. 
Therefore, a grounded theory approach, as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
was undertaken. 
 
Bryman (2001: 391) as well as Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that there is a 
range of tools which inform the grounded theory approach: theoretical sampling, 
coding, theoretical saturation, constant comparison. Bryman (2001: 391-393) also 
suggests a number of outputs of the grounded theory approach, such as concepts, 
categories, properties, hypotheses, and theories.   
 
The present research used a few of these tools. A theoretical sampling approach, 
where data was continuously collected and analysed, and influenced further data 
collection steps, was considered a more appropriate approach for two reasons. 
Firstly, the lack of an initial hypothesis that could be tested and the general dearth of 
knowledge on the empirical case of car theft, made it more appropriate to gradually 
accumulate knowledge, conduct additional theoretical research and test different 
variables. Secondly, for practical and financial reasons, it was difficult to arrange a 
continuous field study in Bulgaria and Spain, with back-to-back interviews, 
particularly with car thieves. The main data-collection process of interviewing was a 
slow and opportunistic process that spanned more than two years.   
 
The coding, being another central tool of the grounded theory, was used to develop a 
range of concepts. The interview output was coded to distil the key concepts of the 
research. The process, as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990:61) involved 
‘breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data’.  The 
coded concepts were used to develop the ‘key categories of the research’: the role of 
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immigration or access to product-distribution outlets. These categories were used to 
develop some initial hypotheses that were further tested in interviews. 
 
The present research, particularly its empirical analysis, does not aim to create a 
formal theory but rather a substantive theory. The difference between the two follows 
Bryman’s (2001: 392) definition, where substantive theory refers to a ‘theory in a 
certain empirical instance or substantive area’, while formal theory refers to a ‘higher 
level of abstraction’ and has ‘wider applicability to several substantive areas’.  
 
 
There are certainly criticisms of the grounded theory approach that need to be taken 
into account. Coffrey and Atkinson (1996) suggest that the coding process could 
result in a loss of the sense of context and the narrative flow. This would be 
particularly the danger if the interviews focused solely on the years of market entry. 
This was avoided by broadening the scope of interviewees to include immigrants, 
entrepreneurs, and other market participants. Charmaz (2000) argues that grounded 
theory is objectivist and aims to uncover a reality that is external to social actors. The 
constructivist approach that she suggests ‘assumes that people create and maintain 
meaningful worlds through dialectical processes of conferring meaning on their 
realities and acting within them…Thus social reality does not exist independent of 
human action’ (Charmaz 2000:521). This criticism is certainly well grounded, given 
that the interviewees were asked about events that took place some time ago, as 
well as about events that it was difficult to be entirely open or honest about. 
 
2.4.2 Considering official data 
 
As noted in the first part of this chapter, two types of official data were used: (1) 
official police / judicial statistics; and (2) Spanish police report summaries of 
investigations of organised crime. Hobbs (2000) and Rawlinson (2008a) have 
outlined a range of risks in considering official data on organised crime. Hobbs 
(2000) points to the dangers of using witness testimonies, such Joseph Valachi’s 
before the Kefauver Committee, which informed many (Cressey 1967, 1969) wrong 
impressions about the structure of Italian organised crime, and were later disproved. 
Hobbs, though, explains that legal cases and case histories could be useful in 
reconstructing cases that ‘cross international and legal jurisdiction’ (Hobbs 
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2000:173). The use of court case files was also considered, but it was decided that it 
would be of little value to the research, as no landmark trials were known to have 
taken place against car-theft enterprises. In addition, there were practical difficulties, 
as access to case files is available only to qualified lawyers in Bulgaria and in Spain. 
Also, in Bulgaria information gathered through special reconnaissance (e.g. wiretaps) 
is not made public, i.e. the access to the cases would have been only partial and 
patchy.   
 
The warnings of Hobbs and Rawlinson were well founded. On the one hand the 
police interviews showed that the police usually have a partial view on the issue. The 
Spanish police had a limited view of how the sale of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria is 
organised. Similarly, the Bulgarian law-enforcement officers had a very patchy view 
of how Bulgarians operated in Spain, usually being limited to a few transnational 
cooperation cases they had worked on. In Spain, particularly, an attempt to analyse 
the Bulgarian criminals had led to certain stereotyping of how ‘criminal groups are 
structured’: often this being only one of their numerous possible modes of operation. 
Yet these police stereotypes were a useful starting point for the questions to the 
offenders, and to test their accuracy.  
 
A range of official statistics on car theft and arrest of Bulgarian suspects were 
considered: data on motor vehicle theft rates, arrests, and criminal groups. Police or 
crime victim survey statistics tell little about the volumes of stolen vehicles that are 
sold in a country or a given geographic area because: 
• The number of stolen vehicles exported outside the area, and not sold locally 
is not known. 
• The number of stolen vehicles imported from abroad and sold locally is also 
unknown. 
At best, statistics from surveys or police records provide only one piece of the market 
puzzle.  
 
Nevertheless, a limited review of the statistical data was considered useful, as it 
showed the level of activity of criminal networks. Both police statistics and victim 
surveys are fairly reliable, as the theft of a car is considered significant enough by 
most victims, who report it in over 90% of cases (Nyiri 2005; Gounev et al. 2006: 56-
59). In addition, insurance requirements often stipulate that a police report is needed 
when filing an insurance claim for a stolen car. As a result, vehicle-theft data from 
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police statistics, particularly in Western Europe, are reliable. In addition, police data 
on non-recovered vehicles was considered (Van Dijk et al. 2007: 52-53) to be 
indicative of the level of involvement of organised crime in car theft13.   
 
Some authors, though, have warned (Hardy 2006, Batelaan and Moll 2004) that 
international statistical comparisons of motor vehicle theft (MVT) could be 
problematic. The vehicle theft statistics of countries like Spain are based on 
registered crimes, as they are reported by the victims, while in other countries, such 
as Germany, Italy, or Austria, statistics include crimes for which there has been 
already an initial investigation. There are also other differences, for example in the 
use of terms such as ‘joy-ride’ thefts, which some countries classify not as car thefts 
but as ‘unauthorized use’. (Hardy 2006, Nyiri 2005). 
 
One general issue concerns the use of statistics from Bulgaria. Before 1989 the 
communist propaganda claimed that crime would gradually disappear, and statistics 
were not made public.14 Therefore, the crime statistics used in this thesis make little 
reference to the period before 1989.  
 
Other official police data that was considered included a comparison of arrest rates 
and the statistics on Bulgarian suspects in Spain or other EU Member States. 
Several caveats about this data should also be pointed out: 
• Such rates do not present any indication of the total population of Bulgarian 
suspects in a given country. 
• They could reflect police priorities or effectiveness, rather than increases or 
falls of the actual suspect population: making analysis of crime trends 
misleading 
• Suspects often have fake passports or stolen identities, underestimating or 
overestimating the actual number of Bulgarian suspects in police statistics. 
  
In Bulgaria no public reports on data on organised crime are published. In Spain, the 
data on organised crime is collected by multiple agencies. Their purpose is not to 
give statistics on organised crime, but rather to analyse the problem and prepare 
Spain’s contribution to the annual Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessment. For 
                                                          
13 The cars that were recovered were presumably stolen for joy-riding. 
14 Political changes in Bulgaria started in November 1989 with the resignation of Todor Zhivkov, who 
was the head of state between 1962 and 1989. 
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a first time in 2011, the Spanish Ministry of Interior published an very short and 
general statistical overview of the 2010 organised crime situation in the country 
(some previous year versions of that analyses have also been partially leaked in the 
media or to academics in previous years, and were also used).  
 
2.4.3 Considering offender data 
 
Hobbs also highlights the dangers of relying solely on incarcerated criminals’ 
accounts, and the risks of producing studies of inmates. Hobbs (2000: 168) points 
out that that most research on professional and serious crime is biased, as it focuses 
too much on ‘the lower orders’. This was certainly one of the dangers with this 
research; with the exception of three interviewees, all the offenders were at the lower 
levels of the criminal networks. This did not present a particular problem, however, 
because the organisational structures involved in car theft and trans-border 
smuggling are fairly flat. In addition, interviews with ‘customers’ (businessmen) and 
law-enforcement provided much insight about the higher levels involved in car-theft 
rings. 
 
2.4.4 Considering crime victims surveys 
 
Crime victim survey data complement official police statistics. In terms of 
international comparison, the European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS) and the 
UN International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) data was used. The second type of 
data came from crime victim survey data from Bulgaria (National Crime Survey – 
NCS data set): the Bulgarian equivalent of the British Crime Survey. It includes a set 
of questions on vehicle crime.15 
 
The crime victim surveys have been useful in trying to estimate the actual numbers of 
vehicles not recovered by the police. They are also a useful tool to study particular 
types of vehicle thefts, such as the ones for ransom that occur in Eastern Europe and 
                                                          
15 The questionnaire is largely based on the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) questionnaire. 
The sample is nationally representative random samples of 2,000 – 3,000 adults of over 16 years of 
age. Over the years a number of questions have been added to the survey, aiming to capture problems 
specific to Bulgaria, such as the ransom-seeking car thefts. Methodological details and relevant English-
language publications can be found at www.csd.bg/ncs. 
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Greece. The comparability and methodologies of crime victims surveys, in particular 
the ICVS, are riddled with problems, but they remain the most appropriate data for 
making comparisons between countries. The present thesis does not rely much on 
the use of crime victim surveys, neither are major conclusions based on data where 
fine differences between data could make comparability problematic. Therefore, no 
further statistical analysis was undertaken and the data is used as presented in the 
reports of EU ICS, ICVS,  or the NCS. 
 
2.4.5 Scope and consideration of the case study approach 
 
Studies on organised crime are often done by focusing on well-defined geographic 
areas: cities, countries (as most law-enforcement agencies do); or regions (e.g. 
various regions in Italy). Despite the cultural and historical specifics into which the 
particular criminal market is embedded, some authors have tried to generalise their 
conclusions, seeking to derive broad theoretical conclusions. Reuter (1985: x) has 
suggested that the results of his study could be generalised, as there are various 
economic factors that are likely to produce similar results in illegal markets. Similarly, 
Gambetta (1993) used the empirical evidence on Sicily to argue that protection of 
illegal markets is the main commodity in which mafias trade. The claim to universality 
of results is a challenging task that requires multiple tests of the hypothesis beyond 
the particular context of the market examined: something that the above authors 
have failed to do convincingly. 
 
In international business economics, ‘market entry’ is usually studied by using 
quantitative analysis of various databases of company data. To mention just a few 
examples: Bryce and Dyer (2007: 90) analysed the Compustat North America 
database of 24,178 companies, to identify 889 companies that have entered the ten 
most profitable industries between 1990 and 2000. This data analysis was 
supplemented by additional research and interviews with industry experts to analyse 
privately owned companies (the Compustat database is only of publicly traded 
companies), or to identify major players who entered several industries. There are 
various other examples, such as Crick and Spence’s (2007) study of foreign market 
entry of UK and Canadian small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (where a sample of 
firms was drawn from the respective databases in the UK and Canada); or Lu and 
Wu’s (2007) study of 164 Japanese SMEs’ entry into new geographic markets. 
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Such datasets are certainly not available for illegal enterprises. Therefore a case 
study approach was considered as the most appropriate one. The few studies on 
illegal market entry, such as Varese (2004, 2005), Galeotti (2000) have relied mostly 
on media and law-enforcement reports to carry out their analysis. 
 
The empirical research in this thesis focuses on the case of markets for stolen 
vehicles in Spain, and the attempt of crime networks and groups dominated by 
Bulgarian nationals to enter this market between the late 1990s and 2008. As a point 
of comparison, the thesis considers the operation of the market for stolen vehicles in 
Bulgaria. 
 
The selected case study could serve as a ground for some limited generalisations to 
other contexts and markets for two reasons. First, the market for stolen vehicles is in 
many ways similar to the markets for the distribution of other stolen / illicit goods 
(illicit cigarettes, alcohol, oil, counterfeit goods, or cultural goods) that thrive on 
informal and deviant economic activities, fused into legitimate markets. Second, the 
comparison of a failed market entry in Spain with a successful one in Bulgaria is a 
methodological approach, which allows one to seek broader validity of the 
conclusions of the thesis. 
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3 The used-car market 
 
3.1 Demand, supply, and distribution in the used-car market 
Stolen vehicles are sold mainly on three markets: the market for used car-parts, the 
market for used cars, and the fairly small illegal market for stolen vehicles. While the 
first two markets are ‘legal’ and legitimate products are sold alongside stolen ones, 
the third one is illegal, as the vehicles there never become legitimate. Bulgarian 
criminal networks in Spain steal and sell the stolen cars almost exclusively on the 
second market, the one for used cars.16 Therefore the main research questions in 
this thesis focus on how these criminal networks attempted to enter the market for 
used cars in Spain, and what were the advantages of selling them on the Bulgarian 
used-car market. The present chapter examines how the used-car markets and 
industry function both in Bulgaria and in Spain. 
 
The regulatory environments and local socio-economic specifics create specific local 
car markets – either on a local, regional, or national level. There are three main 
markets that could be discerned, where the stolen vehicles are sold: 
 
• Markets for used cars: either domestic (where the vehicle was stolen) or 
internationally – in another country. Most of the used-car markets are usually 
country based: national regulations on vehicles or vehicle imports or production, 
or local economic conditions, determine the demand and supply. 
 
The stolen vehicles could be sold within different segments of the used car 
market, depending on the type of vehicle (cars, motorcycles, commercial 
vehicles, etc.): There are separate market segment for: passenger cars (which in 
turn is further segmented into small, medium, luxury cars); construction vehicles; 
passenger transport vehicles (busses, vans, etc.); commercial cargo transport 
vehicles (light or heavy trucks); and motorcycles. Each of these has its own 
                                                          
16 Selling the stolen cars to a ‘chop shop’, ‘a quick sale in the Gypsy neighbourhood’, or to other 
criminals, seems to be more of a sideline for additional income for some car thieves, but not the main 
business of criminal entrepreneurs in Spain. (OFI-16) 
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specific supply and demand drivers. The type of the vehicle that is stolen 
determines the mode of distribution (as it relates to different buyers), the type of 
theft skills needed, organisation of the theft, support infrastructure, trafficking 
logistics. 
 
• The market for vehicle parts is usually the second most likely destination for 
stolen vehicles, after the used car market. The distribution methods and networks 
there are generally different from the ones through which used cars are sold, as 
they involve ‘chop shops’ / repair shops (where the stolen vehicles are 
disassembled), junk yards, or car-parts stores where the vehicles are sold 
(Herzog 2002; Tremblay et al. 2001). The internet has also become a preferred 
place to sell engines of stolen cars (Dimitrov and Yochev 2010). There is no 
indication that Bulgarian car thieves in Spain have been involved in this market17. 
Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004: 86) argue that for the international market the 
‘whole car’ is valuable, while for the domestic market (in their case the 
Netherlands), the car’s ‘components are more valued’. 
 
• Market for vehicles stolen for committing other crimes. This is certainly a 
smaller market as the number of potential buyers (i.e. other criminals) is far 
smaller. Stolen vehicles could be sold to other criminals involved in robberies, 
burglaries, contract killings, transportation of illegal goods (e.g. drugs) or 
migrants, etc. The supply and demand factors of this market are different from the 
above-described markets. In Spain, the main buyers (of mostly stolen light trucks) 
in this market have been drugs distributors involved in smuggling of hashish or 
cocaine. In Bulgaria, contract killers or kidnappers have also used such vehicles.  
 
• Market for scrap metals. In recent years, with the increase in the price of metal, 
older vehicles have increasingly become targets for scrap-metal thieves who 
steal old vehicles and sell them both to scrap yards and for used car parts. (e.g. 
BBC 2008, Dimitrov and Yochev 2010) 
 
As explained, the Bulgarian car-thieves have been involved primarily in the sale of 
stolen vehicles for the used car market. Defining the limits of the used-car industry 
                                                          
17 When concerning high-end models, some customers in Bulgaria might order a vehicle to be stolen 
only for its parts. Such thefts mostly take place domestically. [OFI-20] 
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and describing the used-car market is fairly complicated as it is fused with the well-
structured new-car industry, on the one hand, and the entirely chaotic consumer-to-
consumer (C2C) market for used cars on the other. The present chapter consists of 
two parts. The first part describes how the used-car market generally operates, 
reviewing academic studies and data from the US and Europe. It describes how the 
distribution of used cars works and the factors that shape distribution channels. It 
provides some industry characteristics and reviews the regulatory environment. 
Finally, it examines the demand and supply factors that shape the used-car market. 
The second part analyses specific characteristics that differentiate used-car markets 
in Spain and Bulgaria.   
 
 
3.1.1 Supply and distribution in the used-car market 
 
The retail car distribution, or the ‘motor trades’ sector is characterised by a great 
number of small enterprises. In Europe, according to Eurostat, in 2004 there were 
709 000 enterprises involved in the motor trades sector, with a total of 3 578 000 
people working in them. Although of these only 182 000 enterprises were involved 
solely in ‘sale of motor vehicles’ (see table below), the actual number of enterprises 
is difficult to establish, as some maintenance and repair shops also sell used cars. In 
countries like Bulgaria, where the market has a number of ‘grey-market 
entrepreneurs’ (see section on Bulgaria below), sole-entrepreneurs often do not even 
register dealerships, but function more as private sellers or intermediaries.  
 
 No. of 
enterprises 
Employment 
Total motor vehicles and motorcycles distribution   709 000 3 578 700 
Sale of motor vehicles  182 000 1 587 400 
Maintenance & repair of motor vehicles  396 500 1 315 000 
Sale of motor vehicle parts & accessories  95 000 577 800 
Sale, maintenance & repair of motorcycles  35 000 98 400 
Table 2. The Motor Trades sector in the EU (2004) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The second hand vehicle dealers usually specialise in particular types of vehicles –
motor-bikes, light trucks, commercial vehicles, construction vehicles, and passenger 
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cars. The ‘used car’ segment of the industry is difficult to discern, as the ‘new’ and 
‘used car’ sales are often carried out by the same firms. Used car dealerships may 
specialise in selling low-priced, mid-range or luxury cars. The dealers who sell luxury 
cars, though,18 are very few as they serve a much smaller customer base.  
 
There are three main distribution channels for used cars:  
• franchised dealers19 (who also sell new cars, and offer to ‘trade-in’ customers’ 
old cars, which the dealers then sell)  
• independent used-car dealers (some of which, especially those selling 
exclusive luxury cars may also sell new such cars if there is no franchised 
dealer) 
• private sales. 
 
The supply of used cars to each of these distribution outlets differs greatly across 
national markets.  
• Franchised dealers, i.e. the ones that sell new cars, usually encourage the 
customers to trade in their used vehicle, and their main source of used cars is 
the ones ‘traded-in’. 
• Independent dealers have three different sources of used cars: 
o They might purchase them at auctions where firms (either franchised 
dealers, or car-rental companies), might be selling large fleets of 
vehicles, usually ones that have been leased for some time. 
o Private individuals might directly approach a dealer to sell their car. 
o In under-developed new-car markets (such as the ones in Eastern 
Europe), the main source is import from other countries – vehicles 
might be acquired either from auctions, private sales (through the 
internet) or, most commonly, from other dealers.  
Stolen vehicles are also an option for both types of dealers, but particularly for the 
independent ones, for whom the supply of vehicles is more constrained.  
                                                          
18 There is no universal definition of ‘luxury car’, but car-dealers interviewed agreed that normally cars 
that cost over 30,000 euros are considered luxury cars. There are different ranges within the luxury 
segment as well, with the high end usually considered as those costing over 100,000 euros.  
19 The manufacturers are interested in having only a few big franchised dealers rather than many small 
dealers. The rational is that this would lower the degree of intra-brand competition: i.e. there will not be 
many small dealers selling the same car make and competing against each other by offering lower 
prices. In major European car markets, the number of franchised dealers has shrunk by about 25% 
between 1997 and 2003, while the market has grown (Buzzavo and Pizzi 2005:3) 
  
Figure 1. Used-vehicle market shares by distribution channel
Source: Navarre et al. (2007: 11)
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used car they were buying, while sellers knew of any possible defects. This 
asymmetric knowledge that buyers and sellers had of the product’s quality set two 
possible directions in which the market develops.  
 
One possibility is that bad used cars will drive out good used cars from the market: if 
buyers do not know the quality of the car until after they buy it, there will be no 
incentive for sellers to provide good used cars or to reveal to the buyers problems 
with the cars. If used-car buyers discover that they have purchased a ‘lemon’ (i.e. a 
used car with problems) they will attempt to sell it to another unsuspecting buyer. 
Therefore, Akerlof suggests, the average quality of the market will decline: it will 
become a ‘market for lemons’. A second possible outcome suggested by Akerlof, is 
that institutions may develop to counteract the effects of information asymmetry: 
warranties, certification schemes, developing brand and reputation: all helping the 
buyer tilt the balance of information of the quality of the used car.20  
 
The theoretical debate on the asymmetry of the market inspired a number of scholars 
to empirically test Akerlof’s hypotheses. Most of this empirical research suggested 
that Akerlof’s first hypothesis about ‘adverse selection’ that leads to a market decline, 
was not observed in more empirically grounded studies (Genesove 1993, Bond 1982, 
Emons and Sheldon 1985). Bond (1982), for instance, studied the used pickup trucks 
market in the US, showing that the market has developed mechanisms (e.g. 
warranties) to counteract the effects of uncertain quality. As a result, market quality is 
generally good. Emons and Sheldon (2002) carried out some analysis of the used-
car market in Switzerland. They used the ownership biographies of all 1985 cars 
registered in Basel for the period 1985-1991. The authors examined Akerlof’s 
hypothesis showing that lower-quality cars tend to be resold more often than higher-
quality cars. They argued, though, that the ‘lemons’ issue was not widespread and 
did not create a general market decline, as only 10% of owners resold their cars 
within the first year after the purchase.  
 
                                                          
20 Wilson (1980) has further examined Akerlof’s model of the market equilibrium in the used car-market. 
He argues that in the absence of information on the quality of, for instance, a range of used cars that 
include some good ones and some ‘lemons’, there is no need for the market to have one average price. 
Instead a range of prices may exist, depending on the mechanism through which the prices are set. Kim 
(1985) also considers some situations under which the market equilibrium suggested by Akerlof does 
not hold, and the quality of traded used cars may be higher than that of non-traded cars. 
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There is much evidence to support Akerlof’s theoretical point of the tendency for 
market to be infused with strategies to change the ‘asymetric information’. It is 
increasingly prevalent for car dealers to include a warranty on a used car: this usually 
covers a short time-span (3 to 12 months). In the US, where the certified vehicle 
market is strongest, sales of manufacturer-certified vehicles have more than tripled 
between 1997 and 2006, totalling approximately 1.5 million units in 2005. American 
used-vehicle buyers were the most likely to use independent car valuation services 
(e.g., Kelley Blue Book, Edmunds.com) in the shopping process (62%), compared 
with 34% of German, and only 11% of French used-vehicle buyers (Navarre et al. 
2007). In the US, another approach to building trust with customers is to provide a 
‘vehicle history’ (i.e. the number of owners, accident record, etc). 
 
Sociologists DiMaggio and Louch (1998) carried out the most relevant empirical 
research to examine Akerlof’s hypotheses. They focused on the mechanisms that 
customers develop to counter information asymmetry. They used the United States 
General Social Survey (GSS) data to examine how buyers and sellers in the used-
car market in the US manage the asymmetry of information. In the GSS, persons 
who had purchased cars from used-car or new-car dealerships, or from private 
individuals, were asked about their relationship to the seller or to the owner of the 
dealership. The respondents were asked, when purchasing the car, whether they 
used (1) a relative, (2) a friend or acquaintance, (3) a friend of a friend or of a 
relative, (4) or a relative of a friend, or (5) ‘not a friend, but someone with whom they 
had previous business dealings’. Respondents were also asked about their level of 
satisfaction with their purchase. 
 
DiMaggio and Louch argued that the greater the risk that a transaction poses to 
consumers, the more likely consumers are to seek out sellers to whom they have 
pre-existing social ties. They showed that car transactions between private sellers 
and buyers entail more intensive use of social relations and networks (i.e. are ‘within-
network exchanges’) than do purchases of cars from dealers (See Table 3 below). 
This relates back to the point made about the market share of different retail 
distribution channels. 
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Transaction  (n) Relative Friend / 
Acquaintance 
Friend of 
a friend 
No prior 
dealings 
No 
relationship 
All car sales 646 7.5% 15.9% 6.2% 8.8% 61.6% 
Any new car 207 2.4% 11.1% 3.9% 9.2% 73.4% 
Any used car 439 9.8% 18.2% 7.3% 8.7% 56% 
Used car from individual 250 15.6% 23.2% 7.2% 6.4% 47.6% 
Used car from dealer 189 2.1% 11.6% 7.4% 11.6% 67.2% 
Table 3. Within-network exchange by type of transaction: General Social Survey (US) 1996 
Source: Adapted from DiMaggio and Louch (1998) 
 
DiMaggio and Louch explained that consumers use social relations to reduce risk in 
two ways: by asking friends about their experiences in order to determine the dealers 
with the best reputations. They try to identify and assess the reliability of potential 
transaction partners to whom they have no direct or close indirect social ties. 
DiMaggio and Louch called this ‘search embeddedness’. Second, they may purchase 
a car from a dealer or a person with whom they have an ongoing personal 
relationship that the dealer may feel unwilling to jeopardize. They call this ‘within-
network exchange’. The main regulatory mechanism within this exchange is the 
‘reputation’, whose effects are quickly and accurately communicated across the 
network. (Williamson 1991:291, quoted by DiMaggio and Louch 1997)  
 
The GSS also surveyed private individuals who had sold their used cars to private 
buyers. The analysis showed that sellers were less likely than buyers to prefer to 
transact with people to whom they are socially linked, and more likely to prefer to 
transact with strangers (ibid. p.627). 
 
One of the explanations that DiMaggio and Louch gave for the reason why 
embedding of transactions in social relationships is preferred is that it leads to more 
positive outcomes of the transaction. Of people who bought used cars from dealers, 
15.3% without ties but only 5.0% with ties describe themselves as ‘not so satisfied.’ 
 
Finally, DiMaggio and Louch explained that that the intensity of use of social 
networks reflects not only buyers' preferences for using personal networks, but also 
the size and composition of the networks that they have available to them. For 
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instance a purchase of a home in the US is often associated with moving to a new 
town or place. At such new locations, the social network is limited and home buyers 
are less likely to engage in transactions using their social contacts.  
 
3.1.2 Industry characteristics 
The analysis shows that small and medium-sized enterprises (i.e. those with fewer 
than 250 people) employed 88.5% of all people working in the motor trades sector. In 
fact, a survey of the largest association of used-car dealers in the US (NIADA with 
more than 20,000 members) showed that in 2009, 59% of dealerships had fewer 
than 5 employees.21 In addition, the same survey in the US showed that 75% of 
these enterprises had only one location / outlet. This sets the motor trade sector 
apart from other distributive industries or the non-financial sector in general, where 
respectively SMEs provide employment to 73.7% and 67.1%. This leads analysts to 
describe the motor trade as having ‘atypical employment characteristics’ (Eurostat 
2007: 274).  
 
There are two other characteristics of this sector: First, the gender balance is heavily 
shifted towards men; 82% of the employees in the motor trade sector are male 
(30.5% above the average for other non-distributive trades). In the course of the 
research for this thesis, the car-dealerships visited rarely employed women and only 
in secretarial and supporting roles – none of them were dealers. Secondly, the 
workforce is much younger – on average the number of younger employees is 20% 
higher than in the non-financial sector (although in line with the distributive trades 
sector). From a criminological point of view, all these factors suggest that the industry 
employment profile is vulnerable to criminal involvement. (Ibid.)  
 
The industry’s structure is partially shaped by the regulatory environment as well. 
The regulation of the ‘motor trades’ industry in the EU, and particularly car 
distribution, differs from the regulation of other industries in the EU as it has been 
granted some exclusivity, as well as from the way the motor-trade industries are 
regulated in the US and Japan. In the EU, unlike in the US and Japan, car 
manufacturers have been exempted from free-trade and market competition 
                                                          
21 21.9% had 6-10 employees, and 19.1% had over 10 employees; 9% stated that they had only 1 
employee. (NIADA 2010: 6) 
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regulations22 and have been allowed to impose a number of requirements and 
limitations on franchised car dealers. These have included:  
• Quality requirements for the set-up of the dealership. Often these have 
implied significant investment, and have therefore presented a ‘market entry’ 
barrier.  
• Exclusive assignment of territory: i.e. dealers were limited to setting up show-
rooms in a specific geographical region or country. 
• After-sales service by the dealer was mandatory. 
• Brand exclusivity: dealers were allowed to sell only one brand (or one 
manufacturer’s brands). 
• Sales to other car retailers (i.e. resellers) were not allowed. (DaimlerChrysler 
2003). 
 
These regulations started to change gradually only after 2005, and even further after 
2010 with the new EU legislation coming into force. This new legislation allowed 
dealers to be permitted to build additional customer delivery points, in addition to 
their contracted sales location, anywhere in the EU. 
 
3.1.3 Demand for used cars 
The reasons for change in demand for new and used cars generally could overlap. 
The overall health of the economy is the most reliable predictor (growing GDP, rising 
incomes, falling unemployment). The income distribution within the population, 
though, could determine the specific market segments that are likely to grow. For 
instance, if average incomes are fairly low, demand growth will be concentrated in 
the lower-priced vehicles segments of the market, as opposed to higher-priced ones.  
 
Demand for cars could also change for other reasons: 
• Taxes strongly influence demand (taxes for vehicle registration, as well as 
annual road taxes). 
• Growth in industrial output, as well as an increase in consumption, could lead 
to increased demand for commercial vehicles (e.g. lorries). 
                                                          
22 The existing regulatory system has maintained an exemption from EU competition rules via a Block 
Exemption 1400/02 which runs until 2010. The Block Exemption provides for various measures of dealer 
protection to be included in all franchise contracts, for example, a minimum notice period for termination 
of franchise contract. 
72 
 
• High fuel prices or insurance costs may discourage customers from buying a 
car. 
• Replacement demand cycles: the average time over which consumers 
replace their vehicles with new ones. 
• Market saturation (e.g. the average age of the vehicle fleet in the country; the 
number of cars per capita). 
• Improved road infrastructure may encourage the purchase of cars. 
• Environmental standards (lax regulations could encourage the import of old 
used vehicles) (Bresnahan and Yao 1985). 
• Population growth: the growth of demand for used cars in Spain, for instance, 
has been explained partially with the growth of immigrant population 
(FECAVEM 2006) 
 
Other factors affecting new car sales include changes in style, engineering, safety, 
and quality (which hasten the obsolescence of existing models). The demand for 
both new and used cars is also subject to seasonal and cyclical economic patterns. 
For most motor vehicles, sales are strongest from March through June, and weakest 
from November through January. The cyclical patterns usually coincide with the 
economic ones: during strong economic times demand for cars is high, and during 
downturns it is low.  
 
The demand for different categories of vehicles market could be differently affected 
by the economy. Growth in international trade might lead to an increase in demand 
for light trucks, while not affecting necessarily the demand for construction vehicles 
or motorcycles. Different categories of vehicles also have different demand elasticity: 
for instance, luxury vehicle markets have different demand specifics from the markets 
for low-priced small cars. For instance, higher gasoline price could increase the 
demand for small vehicles, it might not have any impact on the demand for high-end 
luxury cars.  
 
The relation between demand for new and used car demand is complex. Purohit 
(1992) showed that in the mid-priced car market segment, for instance, only 
significant innovations in new cars may affect and lower the demand for (and price 
of) used cars. Smaller innovations such as design changes, do not affect the price of 
used cars, and they can be a ‘substitute good’ (i.e. direct competition) for a new car. 
Certain new models of one brand of cars could directly compete with older models 
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(i.e. used cars) of another brand. Some new models (that for instance follow 
environmental standards and have less powerful engines) could even create bigger 
demand for some used-car models with more powerful engines. (Berkovec 1985).  
 
The luxury segment of the car market shows even more peculiar relations between 
new and old car demand, as it is a market segment with very few customers. For 
instance, during the economic crisis in the US, when new luxury vehicle sales 
dropped 31% in 2008, luxury car producers, such as BMW, Daimler, and Toyota 
Motors, supported used-car sales in an attempt to maintain ‘brand loyalty’. That led to 
a sales increase of 4.6% in luxury used cars (Green 2009). The support relied on a 
‘certification scheme’, which eliminated the ‘asymmetric information’ issue but 
lowered significantly the profit margin – to 3%, i.e. making it similar for new and used 
cars.  
 
The complexity of the demand between used and new cars becomes apparent when 
one compares seemingly similar national markets (US, Japan, France, Germany, 
Spain). For instance in Japan (where the purchasing power is similar to Western 
European markets) the purchase of a used car is associated with lower social status 
and it is avoided (resulting in 1/1 ratio of new and used car sales) (Navarre et al. 
2007:7). On the other hand, in Bulgaria, where purchasing power is much lower, the 
demand for used cars is much greater than for new ones. 
 
 UK US France Germany Italy Bulgaria Spain Japan 
Used car / new car ratio 3 2.6 2.6 2 2 5.8 1.4 1 
New car sales (thousands) 2,567 16,995 2,070 3,320 2,262 65 1,517 5,852 
Used car sale (thousands) 7,701 44,138 5,400 6,650 4,586 380 2,080 5,984 
Table 4. New to used car ratios 
Source: Navare et al. (2007) 
 
The demand for used cars has also been influenced by the greater role that the 
internet has started to play. The internet has levelled the market place, as all 
companies and private sellers compete on the same websites for used cars. Buyers 
can now potentially gain the upper hand. They are increasingly knowledgeable about 
cars, their quality, residual value, prices applied, finance charges, availability – and, 
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more and more frequently, the profit margin that the dealer makes in closing a deal. 
The internet has also allowed for the creation of a common EU market, as customers 
may not only compare prices between countries but may also purchase and sell cars 
across the EU. Navarre23 (2008: 12-13) shows that between 2001 and 2007 the 
proportion of consumers24 who stated that it is likely or very likely that they will 
purchase a car over the internet increased from 2% (2001) to 20% (2007). In 
European countries the proportion was even higher – 25%. 
 
Consumer behaviour regarding the use of internet for used-car purchases differs 
significantly between countries, depending not only on the level of access to the 
internet, but on broader consumer attitudes towards online trade. French used-car 
buyers, for instance, are less likely to consult information websites: only 35%, 
compared with 46% in Germany and 47% in the US. Independent e-tailer sites were 
much more likely to be used by German customers. As many as 47% of German 
used-car buyers planned to consult independent e-tailer sites for their next purchase, 
compared with only 16% of French and 19% of American used-vehicle buyers. 
(Navarre 2007:18) 
 
The lack of a direct interdependency between the demand for used and new cars 
explains why dealers, especially franchised ones, sell both new and used cars, 
without the two necessarily competing with each other. Yet, for certain models and 
situations, new and used cars could compete.  
 
Finally, one issue which would be discussed later in this thesis is the question of 
whether there is specific demand for stolen cars that has its own dynamic different 
from the ones for used or new cars. The answer is not straightforward and has many 
caveats that could be best explained after the empirical evidence in this thesis is 
presented. Generally, the demand and distribution channels and modes of stolen 
cars coincide with the ones of used cars. Therefore, comparable data on the volume 
and trend in these new and used car markets provides much insight into the sale of 
stolen cars.  
 
 
                                                          
23 This research was carried out for Capgemini, an international consultancy company.  
24 The consumer survey was carried out with 2,600 consumers in UK, Germany, France, US, and China. 
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3.2 Bulgaria’s car market 
Following the above analysis of the general principles of organisation of the used car 
industry, the next two sections aim to present the car markets in Bulgaria and Spain, 
the trends in demand and supply, structure and organisation of the market, the 
characteristics of the main players in these markets: dealers and buyers. The car 
markets in Bulgaria and Spain have some significant differences in terms of the 
income levels of customers, and the overall maturity of the market. Yet, as the data 
below shows, there were also quite a few similarities, in terms of trends in demand, 
and ‘market saturation’, during the period analysed.  
 
Bulgaria’s automotive market is much smaller than Spain’s by any measure but its 
growth between 2001 and 2008 was much more robust: the used car market tripled 
in size, while the new cars sales increased 5 times (Figure 2 below). The majority of 
these cars were imported, although the data in Figure 2 excludes private sales.25 
According to the Association of Car Importers in Bulgaria, about 80% of the cars sold 
domestically are through ‘private sales’ (Capital 17.08.2007). A significant proportion 
of such ‘private sales’, though, are in fact done by used car dealers, who are sole 
entrepreneurs (see more on this below). Bulgaria’s per capita ownership of cars 
doubled between 1994 and 2007 from 223 to 413 per 1,000 people (EIU Markets and 
Indicators database). With the economic crisis hitting Bulgaria, in 2009 the market for 
both new and used cars crashed by 41% (National Statistics Institute 2009): a 
process that continued well into 2010.  
 
                                                          
25 Annual imports of used cars almost quadrupled, from around 100,000 in 2000 to an estimated 
370,000 in 2008. 
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Figure 2. Bulgaria: New and used car sales (1993-2008)26 
Source: Based on Ministry of the Interior data and Association of Car Manufacturers and their 
Authorized Representatives for Bulgaria27 
 
The demand and sales of luxury-class vehicles increased even faster: between 
2001 and 2007 the sale of luxury brands increased seven-fold. The data in the table 
below are confirmed by the sales data of one of the big luxury used-car dealerships, 
Kapitolia (see more on it below), which reported that its sales grew by 30% between 
2005 and 2006 (Autopress.net 2007) 
 
                                                          
26 The data for 2007 is an estimate, as no reliable data are available; administrative changes by the 
Ministry of Interior more than doubled the official new-car registrations from 182,095 in 2006 to 348,887 
in 2007. The reason was that in 2006 new registration plate requirements forced many owners to 
suspend their registration, reducing the total stock of registered cars in Bulgaria by more than 30% 
(770,000); most were old cars from the socialist period that could not pass safety and environmental 
standards, or stolen cars that could not be re-registered. Some of these car-owners eventually decided 
to register their cars again in 2007 and 2008, therefore inflating the actual number of ‘new registrations’.   
27 Data on second-hand vehicle imports was provided on request by the MoI; Data on new car-sales: 
Association of Car Manufacturers and their authorized representatives for Bulgaria (http://www.svab.bg). 
74,473    
48,498    
15,520    
66,482    
87,084    85,116    
103,968    106,881    
126,260    125,017    
133,162    136,795    
223,551    226,708    
19,700    
11,200    7,963    12,362    11,958    13,069    13,365    14,631    
17,220    
25,786    
34,940    
45,300    
55,336    57,972    
-
50,000    
100,000    
150,000    
200,000    
250,000    
1993 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Used car sales New car sales
77 
 
 
Figure 3. Sales of luxury vehicles in Bulgaria (1992-2007)28 
Source: Own calculations based on the Union of the Importers of Automobiles in Bulgaria 
data (UIAB) 
 
In addition to income and economic growth, another significant factor that helped 
spur the growth in vehicle sales, and in particular the luxury ones, was the growth of 
the financing opportunities for both new and used cars (See Figure 4). In Bulgaria the 
main financing scheme is through leasing contracts. The lease, though, is structured 
more like a bank car-loan. The residual loan amount at the end of the lease, 
regardless of the term (it could be a one- or two-year lease), is less than 20% of the 
value of the car, and for longer-term leases less than 10% (even though during this 
period the car might have depreciated by only 50%). Therefore close to 100% of 
customers choose to purchase their cars from the leasing company at the end of the 
lease. This is quite different from some other countries, where the monthly lease 
payments are similar to the depreciation of the car, so that at the end of the lease the 
customers do not buy the car, but lease another car. The car is then sold by the 
leasing company on the used-car market. Therefore, the supply of used cars 
generated by leasing companies in Bulgaria is insignificant.  
 
                                                          
28 Luxury vehicles are calculated based on sales figures for the following makes: Audi, BMW, Jaguar, 
Jeep, Land Rover, Lexus, Mercedes, and Mini. Other luxury brands, like Cadillac, Hummer, or Corvette 
did not have any official sales figures until 2008, and might have been purchased and imported 
informally by buyers. Numbers of other car makers’ luxury models could not be extracted from the 
general numbers provided. 
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 Figure 4. Value of leased cars and commercial vehicles 2001
Source: Bulgarian Leasing Association
 
The leasing companies are an important player in the used
Although the above data do not show the proportion of used cars, an interviewee 
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3.3 Bulgaria’s used
 
3.3.1 Industry structure
In Bulgaria the motor trades sector numbered 8
49,000 were employed in 2004.
market employed as many as 70,000
involved solely in car
not say much about the way the sector is structured. 
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dealers sell are imported mostly from Germany or Italy. On the one hand, geographic 
proximity to the countries from where the cars are imported shapes the profile of the 
regional market. On the other hand, local demand also plays a role: e.g. the poorer 
regions of the country generate a demand for lower-class cars.  
 
Since the mid 1990s, when the import of used cars started to pick up, small 
entrepreneurs travelled to Central or Western Europe. Bulgarian entrepreneurs would 
go to the areas with concentrations of car-dealerships – large cities like Milan, 
Munich, or Vienna – and purchase one or two cars and drive them back, sell them, 
and go back for more. Sometimes the connection between Bulgarian and local 
dealers are friends or a relatives who might have known the local dealer from whom 
they purchase the car, sometimes it was just a matter of shopping around 
dealerships for a good deal. By the early 2000s, good relations between Bulgarian 
importers and local dealers were well established, the internet became more and 
more of a medium in the used-car trade, car-transport companies developed, and 
larger shipments of cars started to flow towards Bulgaria. Entrepreneurs would go 
abroad and select the cars, store them in large parking lots and transport them to 
Bulgaria. By around 2005-2007 the transport companies were hardly managing the 
huge flow of cars, as transporter trucks were working around the clock (CDI-1, CDI-2, 
CDI-3). 
 
Bulgarian importers often used each other’s connections to dealerships in Western 
Europe. Therefore, informal regional networks developed where dealers in certain 
regions of Bulgaria worked mostly with dealerships in particular towns in Germany or 
Italy. There are no strict boundaries, but dealers could generalise that: South-western 
Bulgaria (Pernik, Dupnitsa, Sofia) mostly imports cars from Italy. Milan (Italy) hosts a 
significant immigrant community from Dupnitsa (CDI-5). Dealers in Montana (in 
northwest Bulgaria), for instance, have established connections with towns in 
Southern Bavaria (Munich, Rosenheim) and Austria.  
 
Distribution 
The retail distributors of used-cars in Bulgaria could be placed into three categories: 
private sellers, franchised dealerships, and independent dealers. The independent 
dealers, in turn, are of two kinds: (1) dealers who run their own dealerships (with a 
physical infrastructure) and (2) small dealers, often one-man operations, who do not 
have their own dealership space but sell the cars on open-air market exchanges. All 
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these categories act in the single market space created by the internet (the biggest 
websites are cars.bg, mobile.bg, avtomarket.bg).31  
 
The sale of used cars through franchised dealers of new cars is very new in 
Bulgaria and represents a very small share of used car sales. The franchised 
dealerships until 2003–2004 were only concentrated in the seven cities with 
populations of 100,000 (Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Ruse, Stara Zagora and 
Pleven – see map in Annex 1. It was only with the steep growth of the new-cars 
market after 2003, that franchised dealerships opened in some of the smaller 
towns.32 Most franchised dealers have a very limited selection of used cars and have 
only recently started selling them. The main reason is that when a new car is 
purchased the ‘trade in’ of a used one is rarely offered, or is only part of an ‘exclusive 
offer’.   
 
In terms of the sale of luxury cars, the small number of luxury used-car dealers has 
provided an opportunity for franchisers of luxury brands to sell used cars, and almost 
all of them do. In addition, some of them offer a trade-in. What sets these franchised 
dealers apart from the luxury used-car dealers is that they are exclusively reputable 
multinational companies. BMW / Mini is represented by Kamor Auto (an Israeli 
company), while Mercedes is presented by Balkan Star Group, owned by German 
multinational corporation Willi Betz. The German company Hugo Pfohe owns the 
Moto Pfohe dealership network in Bulgaria that sells Jaguar, Land-Rover, Volvo, and 
Ford. The Austrian-based Porsche Salzburg (owned by the Louise Piëch and 
Porsche families) has operated the distribution network (Porsche Bulgaria) that sells 
VW and Audi since 2005.  
  
In Bulgaria almost every major city has an open-air market (called avto-borsa, or 
‘car-exchange’ markets) where sole entrepreneurs and small dealerships sell 
second-hand vehicles. To the outsider these may just look like a concentration of car-
dealerships or a big parking garage with used-cars for sale (see Figure 5 below) 
 
                                                          
31 In addition, leasing companies sell both on the wholesale market to dealers, and directly via the 
internet to ultimate buyers. They are still a very small part of the market. 
32 Several of these smaller towns are within 20-km radius of cities, so opening a dealership does not 
make sense (Pernik is near Sofia, Pazardjik and Asenovgrad are near Plovdiv). 
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In reality, what on the outside looks like a single car-dealership is a parking lot, where 
sole entrepreneurs pay a monthly ‘parking fee’ to display their cars. Almost none of 
these dealers have registered companies. They sell the vehicles simply as ‘private 
individuals’.  Some dealers might have only one car at a time or might have 20 or 30. 
Some could be just part-timers, showing up to sell vehicles only at the weekend. It is 
noticeable that the parking lots also have a number of small caravans, out of which 
the dealers work.  
 
There are a number of open air markets in Bulgaria that function as ‘wholesale’ 
markets. Such markets exist in Montana (Northwest Bulgaria), where every Monday 
morning for over a decade dealers have parked their stock; Dimitrovgrad, in 
Southeast Bulgaria is another regional market. The markets in Dupnitsa and 
Gorublyane (Sofia) are the biggest, though, and they serve as wholesale points for 
much of the rest of the country. The market in the town of Dupnitsa,33 for instance, 
consists of around 60 car dealerships and open-air ‘exchanges’ with approximately 
250 dealers. The other market is 2010 Gorublyane (Sofia) and had about 10 officially 
registered used-car dealerships and a number of ‘exchanges’ hosting an estimated 
2,000 dealers. In 2007, the year with the highest number of sales, there could have 
been 4,000-5,000 traders, according to some estimates34. Most cars there are 
imported from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Italy.  Both markets attract not only 
Bulgarian, but also Macedonian used-car dealers.  
 
Some car dealers import used cars from Western Europe and sell some directly to 
buyers while others are resold to smaller dealers. The smaller dealers, who purchase 
cars in bulk from Gorublyane and Dupnitsa, usually resell them in smaller towns 
around the country. One feature that sets the open-air markets apart is that they are 
largely selling cheaper vehicles, normally those worth under 3,000 euros. The 
markets of Gorublyane and Dupnitsa are quite closely related: first, because some 
dealers from Gorublyane also sell their cars on the Gorublyane used-car market; and 
                                                          
33 Dupnitsa has population of 35,000 and is located 60 km south of Sofia and 60 km east of the main 
border crossing with Macedonia, Gyueshevo. Until December 2009, Macedonians needed entry visas. 
The importance of the Dupnitsa market gradually started declined as the Macedonian government 
introduced some import taxes, and Macedonian dealers started buying directly from Italy, once visa 
restrictions were lifted in 2010. 
34 The calculation is based on the fact that, at the time of the research, there were at least 5,000 cars at 
the Gorublyane markets, while many traders had only a few cars each. 
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second, because some dealers on the Gorublyane market purchase cars in Dupnitsa 
and resell them at Gorublyane.  
 
  
Figure 5. The Gorublyane car market in Sofia 
Photo credit: Sega and Trud  
 
Two characteristics make the open-air markets special: the large share of informal 
economic activities, and their relationship to organised crime.  
 
In terms of the first characteristic, there are a number of business practices aimed at 
hiding revenues and avoiding payment of taxes (income tax or VAT) and import 
duties (prior to the 2007 EU accession of Bulgaria). The result is that the majority of 
the used-car dealers operate in the ‘informal economy’. The schemes they use are 
the following: 
• Monthly ‘parking fees’ at open-air market are always paid in cash. The 
parking-lot holders, therefore, do not declare much of the revenue. They 
generally impose the requirement of cash payment on the dealers. For the tax 
authorities it is difficult to establish the actual number of cars or dealers at any 
time. The parking fee varies according to the city and the general market 
situation (i.e. the demand for cars). On average in Sofia the parking fee has 
been in the range of 25-50 euros per ‘parking spot’ per month. In smaller 
towns it could be as little as 10 euros per month. 
• The dealers do not transfer the title of the vehicle to their name when they 
acquire the vehicle from the foreign dealer or private seller. Instead, when 
they find a buyer, they arrange for the title to pass directly between buyer and 
the original seller (even when this person / dealer is in Italy or Germany). 
They may also purchase and import the vehicle as a private person, and then 
resell to a buyer as a private person. The final result is that the deal is 
declared to be between two private persons. VAT (20%) is not paid. The 
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dealers collect their profit in cash. No income tax is paid either. (CDI-1, CDI-2, 
Standard Daily 2008) 
• The declared car-sale value is many times lower than the real one. The 
dealers might offer an additional discount to the buyer to convince him / her to 
agree to such purchase. This is usually irrelevant to the buyers, and most 
agree; they are asked to pay in cash. Again, the actual VAT or income tax 
paid is significantly lower than it would be otherwise. 
• Document fraud: one practice that is common for dealers on the ‘open-air 
markets’, but also for some independent car-dealerships, is manipulating the 
year of production of the vehicle, and tampering with the odometer. This could 
serve two purposes: either charging the buyer a higher price, or defrauding 
the regulatory authorities (for instance, there are maximum age requirements 
for taxis). These schemes often require some level of organisation, as they 
involve car-repair shops, document counterfeiters, and printing shops.35 
• Registering the car as being owned by a disabled person. An analysis from 
Customs showed that until 2007, some 30% of the imported cars were 
imported as if they were owned by disabled persons. The reason was that the 
disabled did not pay import duties. As the majority of cars come from the EU, 
this problem subsided after Bulgaria joined the EU, but it is still an issue as 
there are other tax advantages. 
• A new scheme that attracted especially the buyers of luxury vehicles has 
become widespread since 2007. The government introduced a tax advantage 
measure to benefit small businesses, allowing them to purchase small 
commercial vehicles by paying lower VAT. The importers started ‘remodelling’ 
luxury 4x4 vehicles by removing the back seats and selling them as 
commercial vehicles (They would readily re-install the seat after the vehicle 
was purchased and registered).  
• A VAT fraud scheme used mostly by luxury car dealers works in the following 
way: the importer registers a company, which imports the car; the imported 
car is sold to a leasing company or to another dealer; the company, which 
has only nominal owners, then just goes bankrupt, owing lots of VAT to the 
government which it never pays. For instance, for a single 100,000 euro 
                                                          
35 In the town of Kyustendil (population 50,000, 40 km west of Dupnitsa) 100 out of the 170 taxis in the 
town were found to have counterfeit car documents. The investigation found that it was the used-car 
dealerships near Dupnitsa, where the taxis were purchased, that had arranged the document fraud. 
(Kirilov 2009)  
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imported car, the company owes 20,000 euro to the state. It can therefore sell 
the car at an attractive price. 
 
The influence of organised crime over open-air car markets goes back to the 1990s. 
The largest open air market in Gorublyane is on land owned by the municipality of 
Sofia. In the 1990s, the land was leased by the municipality36 at under-market prices 
to several individuals. Some sources claim that one racketeering insurance firm, VIS-
2 (see next chapter), used its close connections with the Sofia municipality to take 
the contract in 1996 even though the other main racketeering firm, SIC, also made an 
unsuccessful attempt to do the same (Angelov 2007:127). At present (2010), two of 
the main owners of the largest parking lots are in many ways representative of the 
Bulgarian transition to democracy. One is a well known businessman / oligarch, and 
athlete, as well as former mayor of Gorublyane. The second one is an individual 
founder of another former private security / insurance company Apollo and Balkan 
(see next chapter). 
 
The second big used-car market, the one in Dupnitsa, has been under the control of 
two former law-enforcement officers-turned-criminals. Their case took on national 
prominence and even attracted the attention of the European Commission. They 
were both former officers of the National Service for Combating Organised Crime,37 
and were allegedly involved in drug-distribution and extortion rackets (Bulgaria: 
Parliamentary Committee on Internal Security 2008)38. The two officers initially met in 
the early 1990s at the National Anti-Terrorist Squad. Many members of this squad 
became leading organised crime figures, including some of the founders of SIC, Lev 
Ins, and Apollo and Balkan – the major racketeering insurance / security companies. 
In 1996, they moved to the National Service for Combating Organised Crime’s drugs 
unit, from which they were fired on allegations of connections with organised crime. 
They came to national prominence after 2006, when a series of journalists’ 
investigations and local politicians revealed that the ‘brothers’ and their associates 
had gradually taken over the town of Dupnitsa, providing protection rackets to most 
                                                          
36 The mayor from that time has been prosecuted for five major deals (sales of municipal assets) where 
corruption was suspected. His personal responsibility was never proven, and he was not convicted. As 
an example of how the mayor is connected to the parking lots deals, one interviewee pointed that the 
restaurant that sits at the end of one of the parking lots is run by a former head of the mayor’s security.  
37 The main law-enforcement agency tasked with fighting organised crime in Bulgaria. 
38 Although the two were arrested they were later released and none of the charges, brought by the 
prosecution were successful.  
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businesses and controlling local government (the two were officially advisors to the 
mayor). Their admitted involvement in the car-trade business includes only ‘import of 
exclusive client armoured limos, which are then exported to Russia and the Arab 
world’ (Capital 2006).  
 
The way the Dupnitsa open-air market operates is similar to the one in Sofia. The 
land on which the parking lots are situated is leased to firms controlled by the two 
former officers, either by the municipality or the Rila Monastery at below-market 
prices. Much of the land is classified as agricultural land, which makes the existence 
of the dealerships illegal. Every car sold at the market pays a monthly parking fee to 
the firms related to two ex-officers. [LEI-19, CDI-5] In addition to the monthly fees, 
car-dealers are forced to advertise on billboards controlled by the firms. (Dessant.net 
2010) In 2008, the Minister of Interior, was forced to resign, after it emerged that he 
had met secretly with the two former officers (Capital 2006, Parliamentary Committee 
on Internal Security 2008).39 Following this, a night-raid by tax, customs, and police in 
November 2008 checked 3,038 vehicles in the car-dealerships around Dupnitsa. 
Twelve cars were seized, and 80% of the car dealerships were found to be operating 
without the necessary licenses (Banker 2008). 
 
The second category of independent dealers, those with their own dealership, could 
be placed in three categories in terms of the market segments in which they operate: 
dealers of luxury vehicles, of mass-market vehicles, and of mid-range cars. The last 
category, might sell in addition to mid-range cars, an occasional luxury or low-cost 
car.  
 
During the 1990s, and until 2001–2002, such dealerships were rarely allowed to 
function independently, particularly in small and mid-size towns.40 Until the used-car 
market boom after 2000, such towns had only a few used-car dealerships. Even 
today, the 14 towns with population of 50-100,000 have on average between five and 
15 used-car dealerships. In the 1990s, these small-town used-car dealerships (and 
criminal enterprises selling stolen vehicles) were either directly run by, or paid 
                                                          
39 The Minister of Interior was forced to resign because it became clear that he had tried to settle a 
dispute between the two former officers and their competitor in the drugs-distribution business (who was 
another former Anti-terrorist Squad officer). 
40 In addition to the capital, Sofia, with a population of around 1.2 million, Bulgaria has only six other 
cities with a population of over 100,000, and 14 others with a population of over 50,000 people.  
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protection to, the grupirovki (e.g. SIC, VIS-2, Apollo and Balkan, etc.). The majority of 
dealerships, though, were (and continue to be) concentrated in the six cities with 
populations over 100,000; in particular the capital Sofia, Plovdiv, and Varna.  
 
Unlike the franchise dealerships, there are no chains of used-car dealerships with 
offices throughout the country. Although the market entry barriers to the used-car 
business are fairly low (a plot of land and a small caravan), there were so few sales 
in small towns that it made little business sense to set up independent car 
dealerships until after 2000.  
 
Unlike other independent car dealers, the luxury used-car dealerships require a 
substantial investment – not necessarily in infrastructure (building) but in the 
purchase of the vehicles. Such dealerships appeared in Bulgaria only at the end of 
the 1990s, and multiplied with the growth in demand for luxury vehicles after 2002–
2003, when the demand for cars picked up sufficiently. Until then, the few luxury cars 
that were purchased were imported from Western Europe, only after an order was 
made from a customer in Bulgaria.  
 
The luxury used-car dealerships are concentrated exclusively in the six big cities, but 
the majority are concentrated in Sofia, where a dozen exclusively luxury car 
dealerships exist. They not only sell used cars, but also import new cars, which do 
not have officially franchised importers or import models with special extras and 
features, which the franchised importers generally do not import (e.g. high-end 
limited edition Mercedes or BMW series).  
 
The social background, history, and business practices of this top tier of used-car 
dealers in Sofia says much about the luxury car business.41 The most direct 
generalisation to be made about them would be that they are related to corrupt 
political circles, illegal entrepreneurs and money laundering. A short profile of these 
car dealers provides the details: 
 
• Kapitolia Group includes the Kapitolia dealerships and Premium car, and it 
is the first and largest luxury used-car dealer in Bulgaria. Kapitolia has been 
                                                          
41 The data about company ownerships of these companies and businesses are from the official register 
database of companies in Bulgaria maintained by Ciela.net.  
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allegedly related to organised crime for a long time. In the 1990s many of the 
cars on offer were importer stolen cars [LEI-4, LEI-6, OFI-20]. Its first 
dealership showroom is situated on a piece of land situated in the main city 
park in central Sofia.42 For about a decade the land was rented from the 
municipality of Sofia for a below-market price, and was later acquired by the 
dealership again at a below-market price. The owners of the showroom were 
initially related to VIS-243. ‘I know the guys that work in Kapitolia today, 
because they are the same guys who worked for VIS-2 before: they were 
accountants, or the type of people who were not publicly visible, but now that 
Kapitolia does not sell stolen cars they came upfront’ [OFI-20]. The present 
owner is co-owner of a construction company; he is also a co-owner of a 
major yacht dealership, where his business partner is a former security 
services officer and arms-dealer).  
• Sofavto: The two owners of this dealership are also owners of a construction 
company. Until 2007 they were also officially co-owners with the owner of 
Kapitolia in Sofavto-Avtotransport. For some time it was claimed that Sofavto 
was part of the same group of companies controlled by the circle of people 
around Kapitolia.   
• A2: the ultimate ownership of this dealership, though, is not very clear, as the 
main stakeholder is a Swiss-based company. The A2 key owner is a minority 
owner of a construction company and a car-leasing company, again with the 
Swiss-based company. Similarly to the Kapitolia owner, he is a partner in 
another one of yacht-dealing companies with the same arms-dealer. What is 
more intriguing is A2 owner’s sudden career change, from a car-dealer to a 
politician. The opening of his A2 new showroom in 2006 was blessed by the 
(then Sofia mayor) and present Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. The owner 
then became involved in politics, and was elected as Sofia city councillor, 
becoming the head of the Economic Commission of the Sofia City Council 
and the Specialised Municipal Privatisation Fund. He presently enjoys much 
high-life coverage in the gossip media.  
• Ontario A & A: The two brothers, who own this dealership, also own a 
construction company, as well as a private security company (which boasts 
                                                          
42 The equivalent in London would be acquiring a piece of land from the borough of South Kensington 
and setting up a car-dealership on a portion of Hyde Park. 
43 VIS-2 is the racketeering insurance company into which the racketeering-privates security company 
was transformed.  
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on its website that it is run by former Ministry of Interior and National Security 
Service  officers). The main owner also had a sudden career change, when in 
2009 he joined the Ministry of Transport (leaving behind his ownership in any 
companies), and became high-level officer at the Executive Agency 
‘Automobile Administration’ (government salaries in Bulgaria for this grade 
are between 800 and 1,000 euros per month). This position, though, means 
that he is in charge of much of the permit regulation for commercial transport 
in the country, as well driving licence exam administration. In September 
2010, a number of the agency’s employees publically announced that he was 
involved in schemes for the sale of driving licences (Mediapool 2010a).44  
• Avtolux: the ownership of this company is unclear. The two nominal owners 
have no other business in Bulgaria, and within two years of registering, the 
company had revenue of over five million euros.  
• F1: This dealership is owned45 by a well-known corrupt customs officer. The 
owner was also involved mainly in car dealing until he had a sudden career 
change, becoming a customs officer with a monthly salary of 250 euros. In a 
2003 leaked report of the Ministry of Interior he was pointed to as one of the 
main organisers of contraband of consumer goods in Bulgaria. He rose to 
public prominence in 2006 when he was dismissed from the Customs 
Administration and was investigated for a large-scale mobile phone 
smuggling scheme through Sofia airport. When in late 2008 he was 
kidnapped and later released it emerged that he was the beneficial owner of 
the F1 car-dealership in Sofia. As mentioned in the next chapter, he is also 
being investigated and is at the bottom of scheme that involved a major 
Austrian leasing company.  
 
There are several common characteristics that can be discerned in the descriptions 
of the dealerships listed above. First, the connection with politicians; in almost all of 
these cases there is a connection either to local politics or to national politics. 
Although they seem to involve merely medium- or lower-level civil servant posts, in 
                                                          
44 For many years the agency has been rife with corruption. In 2009, the Ministry of Transport revealed 
that only in the period 2006–2009, 60 public servants of the Agency were fired on corruption charges. 
There were allegations that positions at the Agency (for driving licence examiners) were sold for 30,000 
euros. One in seven driving licences in the country was sold, according to the Ministry of Transport 
estimates quoted by the media (Mediapool 2010b). 
45 The dealership is formally registered on the name of a front person, who according to some journalist 
owns 24 other companies, all heavily indebted due to various fraud schemes. (24 Chassa 2010a) 
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Bulgaria these are in fact political appointments. The reason is that these particular 
government posts control some significant source of bribery income46.  
 
The second common feature of these luxury car dealers is the connection to money-
laundering schemes. Although it seems to be just circumstantial evidence: most 
luxury car dealers co-own luxury yacht dealership, leasing and construction 
companies. These are the main types of businesses used in money-laundering 
schemes. Three of the dealerships were clients of the leasing company Private 
Finance Union (AD), which was the target of one the biggest money-laundering 
investigations (for €50 million) in Bulgaria.47 Several interviewees confirmed that a 
number of investigations, focused on dealers of luxury yachts and cars, were initiated 
by the German authorities (most luxury cars are imported from Germany). This 
partially explains the unclear ownership structure and suspicious ‘business model’ of 
some of the dealers. [LEI-10, LEI-11] 
 
The main segment of the used-car industry is the independent dealerships dealing 
in low-priced cars (under €3,000). It is difficult to generalise about the profile of this 
category of used-car dealer. Almost all of them at some point participate in the same 
tax-avoidance schemes as do the dealers that sell through the open-air market 
exchange.  
 
Some of these dealers are simply small entrepreneurs. Another group, though, are 
various types of criminals or local ‘grey’ entrepreneurs who use used-car dealerships 
as part of a money-laundering scheme, and investment opportunity, or a front 
company to other illegal activity. Research on laundering the profits of sexual 
exploitation showed that, along with luxury goods stores, used-car dealerships were 
the preferred method of laundering profits from prostitution networks abroad. The 
profits from Bulgarian prostitution networks, operating, for instance, in Italy or 
Germany, are invested in buying used cars in these countries. The cars are then 
imported and resold in Bulgaria. In this way the profits are laundered (Petrunov 2009: 
98; LEI-1, LEI-2, OFI-19). As in these cases the dealers’ main goal is not higher 
                                                          
46 It is much talked about that key customs posts used to be sold to candidates, who after need to share 
the bribery income with their supervisors and political protectors. 
47 Several individuals related to this investigation (the nominal director of the PFU (Konstantin Deshliev), 
his mother, and one of the suspected ultimate beneficiaries, Ivan Todorov, aka The Doctor) were 
murdered between 2005 and 2007.  
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profits but quick turnover, these dealerships are very competitive, as their prices are 
usually lower (ibid. p.99). Such dealerships are clustered in towns where prostitution 
networks are largely concentrated (e.g. Sliven, Varna, Bourgas, Pazardjik, Sofia) 
(Gounev et al. 2009). In Pazardjik, for instance, the head of one of the main women-
trafficking networks (exporting women to France) was the owner of at least one used-
car dealership in the town (OFI-18, OFI-19), and allegedly his network operated 
several such dealerships in the Pazardjik region (Banker 2007). One investigator 
from a car-theft unit estimated that probably ‘several dozen, but not more than 100’ 
dealerships in such towns (LEI-3) were owned by individuals at various levels of the 
prostitution networks.  
 
The drugs trade also involves used-car dealers. To drug dealers, used cars serve not 
only as a way to launder profits, but also to smuggle drugs (inside imported / 
exported used or stolen cars) and enable the wholesale distribution of drugs. There 
have been a number of cases involving drug seizures at used-car dealerships (Trud 
2009); the burning of a dealership’s used-car stock where the dealership belonged to 
a drug dealer (Netinfo 2004); or the murder of a drug dealer who owned a car 
dealership (24 Chassa 2009). In Sofia, two well known drug dealers who control part 
of the drug distribution network in Sofia (Bezlov et al. 2007: 90-91) also own a car 
dealership (OTI-14). One well-known case relates to a Varna municipal councillor, 
businessman, and former anti-terrorist unit officer, who was arrested on allegations of 
controlling the drugs and prostitution trade in Bulgaria’s second largest city, Varna. 
His used and luxury car dealership was also central to his business activities, as the 
dealership also owned a city stadium. Similarly to other dealers he was partner in 
construction companies, oil trade, and in one of the city’s main football clubs. 
(Spasov 2008)  
 
3.4 The used-car market in Spain 
 
For the past two decades Spain has been a relatively unsaturated car market 
compared with Italy, France, Germany, or the UK. Between 1990 and 2004 the 
number of cars per 1,000 people increased by 63% to 454, but this was still fewer 
than the other big Western European markets (Eurostat database). While the 
average age of cars in Spain is around eight years, they remain slightly older than 
91 
 
other EU countries (the average age in France and Germany is seven years). By 
2006 31.9% of registered passenger cars were more than ten years old, which was 
close to most other West European countries (Asociación Española de Fabricantes 
de Automóviles y Camiones  - ANFAC (2006: 62, 78).  
 
This has made Spain an attractive market for automotive companies, and until the 
2008 crisis, vehicle sales were increasing rapidly, as demand remained high. The 
combined numbers of new and used car sales in Spain was on average between 2.5 
and 3 million vehicles per year (see Figure 6 below).48  
 
Figure 6. Spain: new and used car sales 
Source: Datamonitor, Economist Intelligence Unit (2005: 303) 
 
With revenues of $20.1 billion, and 2.1 million vehicles sold in 2007 only through 
dealerships, and about the same number sold through private sales49 (Datamonitor 
2007) Luxury cars represent only 1.2% of all new car sales (Datamonitor 2002: 8)50, 
and about 3% of used car sales (Fundación Instituto Tecnológico para la Seguridad 
del Automóvil (FITSA) 2002: 99).51 As in Bulgaria, in Spain the demand for such 
vehicles grew much more quickly than the demand for medium and low-priced cars. 
                                                          
48 Spain is also a producer of vehicles, 82% of which are exported (e.g. in 2006, out of 2.7 million 
vehicles produced, 2.2 million were exported). (Anfac 2006: 58). 
49 Private sales grew from 38.8% in 2004 to 53.6% of all used-car sales in 2007 (Datamonitor 2008). 
50 Sports (2.7%) and executive categories (8.4%) add another 11.1% of total car sales. (Datamonitor 
2002: 8) 
51 For comparison, in the US the NIADA (the National Independent Automobile Dealers Association) 
survey showed that only 4.6% of the dealerships declared that the average price of a used car sold was 
over $20,000. In addition, only 11.4% of dealerships sold vehicles that were on average 1–2 years old 
(NIADA 2010: 8). 
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For instance, annual sales of new all-terrain vehicles (generally falling in the luxury 
category) almost doubled from 82,978 in 2003 to 135,563 in 2006, while overall car 
sales grew by less than 10% in the same period. Similar trends are noticed with high-
end luxury vehicles (costing over €100,000). In 2004, 3,563 such luxury vehicles 
were sold; by 2006, sales almost doubled to 6,644 (Anfac 2006: 57). 
 
3.5 Spain’s used-car industry  
In 2004, in Spain around 390,000 people worked in 76,200 enterprises involved in 
the sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles (Eurostat 2007: 
273). As Figure 1 (at the beginning of this chapter) showed, the structure of the used-
car industry in Spain is similar to that in other EU countries: approximately half the 
used-car sales are done by private individuals (48%), 38% by franchise dealers, and 
only 14% of through independent dealerships. As noted above, the franchise dealers 
in Spain operate much like the rest of the EU – they usually sell only one brand of 
cars; they offer to trade in the old one for a new one, and they offer some type of 
limited warranty.  
 
In Spain there are no ‘open-air market exchanges’. The closest equivalent is that in 
some towns near the centre or near the train station there are small parking-lots or 
entire streets, where private sellers simply park the car with a ‘for sale’ sign and a 
contact number.  
 
In Spain, the independent dealers are of three types. There are small dealerships, 
where the risks of the buyer are similar to those described above in Bulgaria. The 
second type are the bigger dealerships, some of which have been established for 
up to 30 years, and which have a well-developed local or regional client base and 
reputation. Each of these might sell a few thousand cars per year. These dealerships 
might have several showrooms, and might run separate dealerships for used and 
new cars. Some of the well known names include Yamóvil, Canalcar, Autos Vilaza o 
Autocasión in the Madrid area.52 An even more developed form of these dealerships 
are the ‘integrated service centre’ types of dealerships (e.g. Mundiauto, Ciudad de 
Automoción), which offer a number of additional services for the car (diagnostics, 
repairs, car-parts) and amenities (restaurants, child-minding, and free parking), 
                                                          
52 As the market in Spain is very big, it is difficult to provide an exhaustive account of specific 
dealerships as was done for Bulgaria.  
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therefore transforming the entire used car shopping experience (FITSA 2002: 100).  
Some of these dealerships might have a network only in some provinces of the 
country and have a strong regional presence. The common feature of all these 
dealerships is that they rely on branding and reputation, which usually makes the 
prices higher than in small dealerships. In addition, they provide warranty schemes 
and after-sales service.53 Lastly, some rental car companies also sell their old fleet 
of cars.  
 
Similarly to dealers in Bulgaria, in Spain used-car dealers tended to engage in 
various fraud and tax-evasion schemes: 
• Fraud: tampering of odometers seems to be widespread practice in Spain 
and there is ‘common knowledge [of its existence] amongst dealers’ (Guardia 
Civil source quoted in Bague 2006). An investigation in 2008 in north-western 
Spain (Galicia, Asturias y Castilla y León) found that at least 120 used-car 
dealers used the services of a company (Truck and Car Technology Systems) 
to change the odometers of 35,000 vehicles. Truck and Car Technology 
Systems also sold at least 33 machines to dealers, and an unknown 
additional number of vehicles were tampered with (Laopinioncoruna.es 
2008).54 In all the major schemes uncovered, it was not only independent 
dealers, but major franchisers that took part as well. 
 
• VAT fraud schemes amongst car dealers in Spain are common as they are 
in Bulgaria, but the scale is far bigger (LEI-20, C-1108, C-0504, C-1009). In 
Spain VAT paid in the sale of a used car is 16% (in 2010), but even if the 
transaction is between private individuals a 4% tax needs to be paid. One 
common scheme has been to declare to customs authorities the imported 
vehicle as scrap. One of the big cases in Spain involved a criminal network 
that imported thousands of luxury vehicles worth €365 million over a four-year 
period, defrauding the state of €60 million worth of VAT [C-1009]. In these 
more complex cases, the scheme involves the setting up of a front company 
‘A’ (usually limited partnerships) with no capital and registered on the name 
                                                          
53 In Bulgaria, at the very end of 2010, warranties were introduced for the first time by a small number of 
independent dealers as a measure against the economic crisis and plummeting sales.  
54 North-west Spain is not an exception: in 2004, 30 dealers of luxury cars in Seville were investigated 
for the same practices (Autopista.es 2004). In 2006, 51 dealers in Girona and Barcelona were also 
accused of altering odometers (Bague 2006). 
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of insolvent individuals. Company ‘A’ transfers the vehicles to company ‘B’, 
using invoices that include the VAT. Company ‘B’ serves as buffer: it has no 
assets and is owned by the same owners as company ‘A’. The vehicles are 
then passed on to another company ‘C’ that either sells them directly to the 
client or to car dealerships around Spain. Company ‘A’, though, does not pay 
the VAT to the state and if it is investigated the nominal persons behind it are 
declared insolvent. These savings are used to reduce the final price of the 
vehicle. These schemes also often involve used-car dealers in Germany, 
France, Belgium, or Italy, from where cars are most often imported, as well as 
those in Spain through which the vehicles are distributed. In one of the cases, 
the cars did not even reach Spain, as Company A was in Germany or 
Belgium, and Company C (the final sellers) was in France, while only 
Company B, the one that actually committed the fraud was in Spain [C-1009]. 
 
• In another scheme, three dealerships defrauded at least 150 customers by 
declaring bankruptcy after having collected money for the vehicles but did not 
transferred the title. (Car and Driver 2008) 
 
• Money-laundering: As one of the main trafficking gateways for cocaine and 
hashish, and a country with relatively lax anti-money laundering control over 
the sale of real-estate,55 a significant amount of laundering of drugs-related 
profits takes place in Spain. Almost all investigations into drugs-related 
money-laundering schemes include schemes that launder some of the profits 
via luxury vehicles. These usually involve importing used cars from other 
countries (e.g. Germany) and then selling them through dealerships in Spain. 
One of the big investigations, regarding the laundering of some 380 million 
euros, of drugs-related profits involved the investigation into two car 
dealerships (in Santiago and in Villanova) owned by the individuals running 
the money-laundering of the drugs rings. The dealerships were also involved 
in some of the VAT fraud schemes described above. (Abella 2007)  
 
                                                          
55 Reporting obligations of realtors to anti-money laundering authorities only entered into force in 2005, 
and dealers in goods where cash-payments of over 15,000 euros are made were only made to report 
such payments in 2010. (Financial Action Task Force – FATF- 2010: 25-27). 
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3.6 Comparing market entry conditions 
 
In Spain, the used and new car markets combined are approximately ten times 
bigger than these markets in Bulgaria. The Spanish market is bigger in overall 
volume as well as on a per capita basis. In 2007 there were 503 cars per 1,000 of the 
population in Spain, compared to 413 in Bulgaria (Economist Intelligence Unit 
Markets and Indicators Database), which was lower than most other big EU countries 
(Germany, UK, Italy, France). Bulgaria had a much older car fleet than Spain, 
although both countries had car fleets that were older than the EU average.56 The 
overall trends of the car market were very similar for both countries in many respects. 
Both were unsaturated markets, with a lower per capita car ownership and relatively 
older car-fleet. Economic conditions were similar – booming economies, rising 
incomes, and growing construction and transport sectors. There was strong demand 
for cars, especially luxury cars. On the other hand, the new to used car ratios in 
Spain ranged from 1:1 to 1.4:1 while in Bulgaria it ranged from 1:8 in 2003 to 1:5 in 
2008. In Spain, the ratio differed significantly from other West European countries, 
where it is 3 (UK), 2 (Germany), or 2.6 (France) (Navarre et al. 2007: 7). Such low 
ratios in Spain (which is also the case with Japan) indicate the existence of socio-
cultural factors that make the used car less desirable, as used goods are ‘linked to 
lower social status (ibid.). 
 
The structure of the used-car industry in Bulgaria differs in many ways from that of 
Spain, and has a business environment that facilitates the entry of (illegal) 
enterprises into the used-car market. First, in Bulgaria the market is dominated by 
independent car dealers who are much more likely to engage in tax fraud or illicit 
activities. This also facilitates the sale of stolen cars. The VAT-avoidance scheme 
where the buyer purchases the car from a foreign private person, and the 
dealership’s name is not even involved in the transaction reduces the legal risks for 
dealers, who become more willing to facilitate the sale of a stolen car. The second 
difference is the relations with, and control over, dealerships or open-air car markets 
in Bulgaria by individuals involved in organised crime (including car theft). In this way 
criminal entrepreneurs may easily tap into a distribution network for the sale of stolen 
cars. 
                                                          
56 The average age of passenger cars in Bulgaria in 2008 was 12.7 years, dropping from 14.4 in 2003 
(the highest average age in the EU).  
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The sale of luxury cars in Spain takes place mostly either through franchise 
dealerships or via independent ‘supermarket’ type independent dealerships that sell 
the entire range of cars, including luxury cars. In addition, the average annual sales 
per dealership in Spain are 10 times larger (498 cars per year per dealership) 
compared to the average sales in Bulgaria – only 49 cars per year per dealership. In 
Bulgaria, luxury car dealerships were a relative novelty, concentrated in a few cities. 
The established way of buying luxury cars until such dealerships became widespread 
after 2003–2004 was by using informal networks of dealers, or ‘ordering a car’ which 
is purchased in Western Europe and delivered in Bulgaria. Franchise dealers in 
Bulgaria still account for an insignificant part of used-car (luxury) sales. 
 
There is also a significant difference in the average sale price of used cars in Spain. 
Most used car dealers in Bulgaria import used cars which they buy from used car 
dealerships in Europe (as the Bulgarian new car market is too small and cannot 
supply enough second hand cars). All car dealers interviewed explained that they do 
not import used cars from Spain, because their prices are much greater than in Italy 
or Germany. In Spain, the average prices for used cars sold via dealerships in 2006 
started from around €10,000 for small cars, and reach as much as €29,000 for high-
end vehicles. (Federacio Catalana de Vendedores de Vehicles a Motor – FECAVEM 
quoted by FIRA Barcelona 2006). In Bulgaria, on the other hand, a 2004 marketing 
survey showed that 75.3% of the people who intended to buy a car in the next 12 
months planned to spend €5,000 or less on their purchase, and only 1.4% intended 
to spend over €7,000 (Vitoshar Research 2004). The high prices in Spain explain 
another difference in the used car market. While in Bulgaria only luxury used cars are 
financed via leasing [CDI-4], in Spain 65% of used cars sold via dealerships are 
purchased via some type of financing (FECAVEM 2006). 
 
The dominance of small independent car-dealers makes the Bulgarian used-car 
market much more fractured, and prone to ‘informal’ arrangements. In Spain, on the 
other hand the majority of sales pass through established corporations (either 
franchises, or dealerships with multiple showrooms) which are unlikely to engage in 
the sales of stolen cars. 
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The next chapter provides an in-depth look at how international car-theft enterprises 
operate, and how they relate to a number of legitimate industries, including the used-
car industry.  
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4 The car-theft industry 
 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide the background to the empirical focus of 
the thesis: the car-theft industry. The chapter lays out the available data on the size 
of the car-theft industries in Spain and Bulgaria, their trends, and geographical 
specifics based on statistical and victim survey data. It then provides a description of 
the car-theft industry and the illegal enterprises and players around which the 
industry is structured. Where possible, the data provided concerns both Bulgaria and 
Spain. Its relation to the legal used-car market and the sale of stolen vehicles are 
considered in greater detail in the next chapter.   
 
Many authors have commented in general about the thefts and smuggling from 
Western Europe into Eastern Europe, explaining the flow by the East’s demand for 
cheaper goods (Europol 2004, 2005, 2006), Gerber and Killias (2003), Clarke and 
Brown (2003). Very few studies, though, explain how the car-theft industry works and 
how it relates to vehicle markets. Clarke and Brown’s (2003) overview of the 
knowledge gaps about international trafficking of stolen vehicles demonstrates the 
need for further research in this area. The few studies that specifically examine 
aspects of organised crime (Wallace 2004; Morselli and Roy 2008, Hardy 2006, 
Bezlov et al. 2007, Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou 2009, Bruinsma and Bernasco 
2004) provide only partial views of how car theft relates to the legitimate used car 
markets. Morselli and Roy (2008) focus only on the various activities associated with 
the car-theft ‘criminal script’. Bezlov et al. (2007) examine in depth the operation of 
the car-theft industry in Bulgaria but their primary focus is on the theft of vehicles that 
are then returned to the owners for ransom. The same issue is also the main focus of 
the Gerber and Killias (2003) study on Kaliningrad (Russia).  
 
Brunisma and Bernasco (2004) provide a short analysis of Eastern European car-
theft networks in the Netherlands, but they do not discuss in any detail the sale of 
stolen vehicles. Nevertheless, their study is insightful, as it examines the ‘social 
networks’ that structure the car-theft ‘industry’. 
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The analysis by Ferwerda et al. (2005) of car-theft in the Netherlands is probably the 
most comprehensive study on organised crime aspects of car-theft published to date. 
It is based on the analysis of 25 cases between 2003 and 2005, but again it focuses 
mainly on the ‘upstream’ side of the crime, i.e. the stealing, but not the selling of 
stolen cars (considering nature and structure of groups, and organisation, methods of 
stealing, etc.)  The study mentions the issue of sales of stolen vehicles in the Dutch 
market for used cars, explaining that the ‘brokers’ (as the study calls the individuals 
responsible for placing or arranging the sale to the final customer) were almost 
always of Dutch descent. Only in cases where the ‘demand’ came from a foreign 
country, were the brokers of non-Dutch descent. The cases analysed showed that in 
the majority of cases these brokers had some type of official import-export company 
for used vehicles. Antonopoulos (2009: 487) also explains that no evidence was 
found that any foreigners, including Bulgarians, were involved in the sale of stolen 
vehicles in Greece.  
  
Other studies (Batelaan and Moll 2004, Europol 2006, Prummel and Engel 2007) 
are based on the analysis of official statistical data, and do not consider the market 
structure or players. Similarly, the UK Home Office studies on car theft (Brown and 
Saliba 1998, Brown and Billing 1996, Brown 1995, Houghton 1992) focus on specific 
aspects of UK car-theft prevention policies. The methodologies do not go beyond 
examining law-enforcement databases or victimization surveys, and do not address 
aspects of organised crime at any considerable length.  
 
Much other research focuses on explaining changes in MVT rates, yet none of it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship with the used-car market. 
Clarke and Browne (2003) have provided anecdotal evidence about the global 
changes in demand and supply for stolen vehicles, including those in Europe, with a 
long list of factors that facilitate cross-border stolen car trafficking: patterns in the 
legal trade in used cars, quality of customs and border controls, levels of corruption, 
migration flows, and law-enforcement priorities. 
 
The analysis of the car-theft industry in Bulgaria and Spain, presented in the next 
sections, includes many of the aspects that have been partially analysed in the 
studies listed above. Certainly, there is some variation in terms of structures, 
organisation of criminal groups or background of criminals. Such differences are not 
analysed or compared, as the research methods used in this thesis (particularly the 
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active offender interviews) make comparison with preceding ones difficult. None of 
the studies considered specifically address the selling of stolen cars in Spain or in 
Bulgaria.  
 
4.1 Defining the car-theft industry 
 
Before describing the complex dynamics of the car-theft industry, it is necessary to 
define its boundaries and characteristics. Traditionally ‘vehicle theft’ has been 
analysed in terms of ‘types of vehicle theft’ (Jacobs, Essers and Meijer, 2002; 
Batelaan and Moll 2004; Clarke and Harris 1992: 6). These authors distinguish 
between the following three vehicle theft activities:  
• Vehicle theft for recreational means (temporary use): stolen vehicles are used for 
joy-riding, and are usually recovered by the police.  
• Vehicle theft for transport use (often in relation to other crimes): stolen vehicles 
are used as a means of transport in burglaries, robberies, contract murders etc.  
• Vehicle theft for financial gain: the stolen vehicles are either sold on the used-car 
market or stripped down and sold for parts.   
The above typology is based on the intended use of the stolen vehicle. If one takes a 
market-based approach: the analysis would only concern the third category, vehicle 
theft for financial gain. Only these types of thefts supply the used-car markets on 
which stolen cars are also sold.  
 
The thefts from cars, or of cargo from commercial vehicles (Engel and Prummel 
2007), although classified as ‘vehicle crime’, constitutes part of a different market: the 
one for stolen goods (from robberies, burglaries, or thefts from cars).  The theft of 
vehicles to extort a ransom rarely appears in any general typologies, as it does not 
exist as a phenomenon in Western Europe or in the US. Such thefts, though, 
represent a significant proportion of the vehicles stolen, particularly in countries 
where trust in the police or insurance companies is low. The vehicles are stolen, and 
a ransom is requested from the victim, via intermediaries, for the vehicle to be 
returned. This market has been described as a phenomenon of Eastern Europe 
(Gerber and Killias 2003 in Kaliningrad (Russia), Bezlov et al. 2007 in Bulgaria; 
Interviews show that it exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OTI-8), Czech Republic 
(OTI-6), Greece (OTI-7), and, to a limited extent in Southern Italy (OTI-9). In Spain, 
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this type of theft has not been observed. Nevertheless, Bulgarians involved in the 
ransom-seeking thefts in Bulgaria have certainly made their way to Spain, and the 
distribution networks for the sale of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria partially overlap with 
the networks used in obtaining ransom from victims – e.g. repair shops, garages, etc. 
(LEI-4, OFI-4, OFI-20).   
 
The analysis of Spanish police cases, and all interviews confirmed that Bulgarian car-
theft enterprises in Spain were primarily engaged in thefts for financial gain, and in 
particular theft of luxury cars for resale. Therefore, throughout the thesis, the focus of 
the analysis is on this category of vehicles. Motorcycles or sailing boats are 
excluded, wherever possible, from statistical data analysis. 
 
4.2 Bulgarian vehicle thieves in Spain   
 
With the removal of visa restrictions for travel in 2001, a growing number of Bulgarian 
vehicle thieves moved westwards, including to Spain. Until the early 1990s Spain 
was primarily a destination or a transit country for stolen vehicles, as Italian, French, 
Belgian or German networks imported most stolen vehicles. With its economic 
development and a growing sales  of new and luxury vehicles, after the mid 1990s 
Spain started to become a source of stolen vehicles (Gomez 2005: 210). Since 
1980s and in the early 1990s the primary foreign criminal networks involved in car 
theft in Spain were Polish. (ibid.) 
 
In Bulgaria there is little institutional memory about when the first vehicle thieves 
moved to Spain. Law-enforcement interviewees in Bulgaria pointed to the years 
around 2000.57 Some of the offenders went to Spain on fake passports in the mid-
1990s, reporting that there were already established groups of Bulgarian car thieves 
there at that time. The first sporadic Spanish media reports of Bulgarians being 
involved in vehicle theft in Spain are from 1993-94, but they argue that at this period 
the involvement was more sporadic as the main car-theft groups were still run by 
                                                          
57 This could partially be explained by the fact that the Vehicle Trafficking Unit at the specialized 
National Service ‘Fighting Organised Crime’ (the equivalent of SOCA) was disbanded in 1999, and 
many of its officers moved to other departments.  
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Spaniards.58 (Alvarez 1994) By 1994, a number of Bulgarian, Polish, and Russian 
groups have established themselves and have started stealing and trafficking out a 
significant number of vehicles (ibid.) The analysis of Spanish police cases shows that 
after 1997 the Bulgarian criminal groups seemed to have established a consistent 
and, after 2000, a growing presence. 
 
Since the late 1990s there has been a shift in the categories of vehicles stolen by 
Bulgarians in Spain. In the early to mid-1990s, reports indicated that Bulgarians were 
also involved in the theft of mid- and low-range priced cars, such as Fiat, 
Volkswagen, or Lancia (Alvarez 1994). After 1997, police reports and interviewees 
increasingly point to the fact that the involvement of Bulgarians is almost exclusively 
in the theft of high-priced vehicles: 
• Luxury cars (in the jargon of some Bulgarian car thieves ‘топалка’ 
[topalka]): e.g. BMW, Mercedes, Audi, as well as luxury models and 4x4 
models of various makes (e.g. Jeep Cherokee, Toyota Landcruiser)59. There 
is a range of luxury cars: starting at the low end from over €30,000. Some 
Bulgarian groups targeted only high end vehicles, starting from €100,000 (C-
0903). 
• Commercial vehicles: light trucks, vans, and construction vehicles.  
 
Police sources indicate that already around in the mid-1990s Bulgarian car thieves 
were shipping stolen vehicles towards Bulgaria and Northern Africa (C-0495, C-0497, 
C-0897, C-1197, C-0298, C-0798). By 2000, Spanish police sources claimed that 
Bulgarians, Moroccans, and Poles were dominating car-theft in Spain. Since 2001, 
though, the Spanish police data show a growing trend in the number of operations 
against Bulgarian car-theft ‘groups’ or ‘networks’. According to descriptions of police 
operations from that period, in the first three months of 2000 three different ‘groups’ 
of Bulgarian vehicle thieves, operating in Madrid and Costa del Sol, and stealing 
mostly light commercial vehicles, were ‘dismantled’.  
 
                                                          
58 One police officer interviewed in 1994 explains that Bulgarians took advantage of the fact that licence 
plates from Sofia were similar to the ones from La Coruna, and under the pretence of being tourists 
returning home would smuggle vehicles out (ibid.). 
59 The very top end luxury vehicles are not very often an object of car-theft for various reasons, not least 
because there are very few of them and could be easily spotted by the police. 
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4.3 The supply of stolen vehicles 
 
There are a number of reasons why information on trends in the supply of stolen 
vehicles is important. First, as there is lack of credible data on demand, supply data 
(i.e. police statistics on reported car-theft) can be used to examine trends in the 
demand for stolen cars. Second, it illustrates the impact that Bulgarian car thieves 
might have on the used-car market in Spain. The trend data also help to analyse how 
various factors (immigration, socio-economic factors) that influence market entry 
might have changed over time.  
 
Several obstacles to estimating the actual supply of stolen cars to any used-car 
market should be noted: 
• Although one might know the number of stolen vehicles in a given country or 
region (from police statistics or crime-victim surveys), and use the rate of non-
recovered vehicles as a proxy to establish the likely number of vehicles stolen 
for resale, there is no reliable data as to how many vehicles are exported and 
how many are resold on the local market. There is also no information about 
vehicles that are smuggled in from abroad.  
• This makes estimating the actual size of the market for stolen vehicles rather 
difficult. Although there are various estimates of legitimate used or new 
vehicle sales, for the above reasons it is difficult to know what proportion of 
sales are stolen vehicles.  
• The market for stolen vehicles for committing other crimes is entirely 
underground, and some of the cars might be later recovered. 
 
Estimating the market share of stolen cars in the used car markets in Bulgaria and 
Spain is even more difficult, as intra-EU trade in stolen vehicles is widespread, and 
both countries are known to be destinations for stolen cars in other Member States. 
The data from the police statistics and victims’ surveys (see figures below) shows 
that there is little that makes Spain or Bulgaria special in comparison with other 
countries in Western Europe. Neither has extraordinarily high levels of victimization 
or reported vehicle thefts.  
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Figure 7. One-year victimization rates for car 
owners (2004)  
Source: EUICS (2005: 27), CSD (2005) 
Figure 8. European capitals: average 
prevalence rates of car-theft victims (2001 - 
2004) 
Source: EUICS (2005) quoted in Van Dijk et 
al. (2007: 34) 
 
4.3.1 Trends and geography of car theft in Spain 
 
Spain is both a destination and a source country for stolen vehicles. According to 
Europol (2007: 26) it constitutes part of the so-called ‘South-West criminal hub’ in 
Europe, and as such it is a destination for stolen vehicles from other EU countries 
(Europol 2007). Several major operations by the Spanish police in recent years have 
contributed to these conclusions. For instance, only one police investigation 
discovered that between 2004 and 2010 more than 600 cars that had been stolen or 
fraudulently imported from Western Europe (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Holland, Italy) were sold in Spain (C-0504). 
 
The police statistics show that Spain was one of the few countries in the 1995–2001 
period to experience an increase in the number of stolen vehicles (measured in terms 
of the number of stolen vehicles as a percentage of the country’s car fleet). During 
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the same period most West European countries, including the UK, Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands experienced declines. (Batelaan and Moll 200460).  
  
The overall trend, though, for the decade between 1997 and 2007 was downwards 
except during the 2001–2002 period (Figure 9).   
 
Figure 9. Spain: car-theft and the car market (1991 – 2006)  
Source: Based on Batelaan and Moll (2004); Spanish Ministry of Interior statistics  
 
There are some regional specifics of the car theft in Spain (Figure 10): thefts in the 
regions where the Bulgarian vehicle thieves are most active—Madrid, Costa del Sol 
and Valencia—constituted between 45% and 47% of all thefts in the 2003 - 2006 
period. The police data also shows that while the rest of Spain experienced a 25.29% 
fall in MVT between 2003 and 2006, in these three regions MVT fell only by 20.09%.  
 
                                                          
60 Their calculations are based on WODC/European Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice 
Statistics 2003 and Anfac.  
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Figure 10. Regional specifics of vehicle theft 
Source: Spain Ministry of Interior annual statistics / own calculations 
 
Further insights into the dynamics of the vehicle-theft market could be gleaned from 
the vehicle recovery rates (Figure 11). The calculations of organised crime income 
are usually based on the share of stolen vehicles that had not been recovered.61 
At the regional level, comparable data were not publicly available. Therefore any 
calculations of the size of the car-theft industry need to be based on: (1) the fact that 
annually around 30% of vehicles are not recovered; and (2) that 20% of the non-
recovered ones are older models that are dismantled and sold for parts (LEI-12). 
                                                          
61 The recovery rate of stolen vehicles in Spain is not part of the officially published annual statistics of 
the Ministry of the Interior, and breakdowns by makes are not provided. The only official EU publication 
that provides Spain’s recovery rates is Europol (2006), and that seems to be reported in error; for 2004 
out of 122,248 vehicles, 85,001, or 70% were not recovered: this seems to be a mistake. All police or 
Ministry of Interior public statements in the Spanish media contradict these numbers. In fact this mistake 
makes Europol’s own estimate of the organised crime revenues in the EU from vehicle theft, to be 
overvalued by almost half a billion Euros. 
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This number, though, excludes the vehicles that are trafficked in
abroad. Spain is also 
transported to Morocco or other African countries (Europol 2005
police seizures of vehicles in Spain often reflect th
originating from Northern Europe, Fra
for imported stolen cars.
 
In addition, keeping in mind that Bulgarian vehicl
cars and light trucks, one should further analyse the data on 
vehicles in Spain.  
 
Figure 12. Stolen and recovered vehicles by type in Spain (1999)
Source: Spanish Ministry of I
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The data on the breakdowns (Figure 12) reveals one very important fact: two-
wheelers, which (motorcycles / mopeds) comprised 32.77% of all registered MVT, 
had a very different recovery rate62:  
• The recovery rate for motorcycles was only 38%, while that for cars was 
86%; for trucks it was 71%, and for vans 68%. Therefore, due to the 
significant proportion of motorcycles in the overall number of stolen vehicles, 
the overall recovery rates reported are significantly different for cars: a factor 
that needs to be taken into account in any market analysis. 
• Motorcycles constitute 13–14% of registered vehicles63 but 32.77% of all 
stolen vehicles: i.e. they are much more likely to be stolen.64  
 
What the above statistical data does not show is what proportion of stolen cars are 
luxury-class stolen vehicles, and how this share has changed over the years. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, the proportion of thefts of expensive cars (over €22,000) of 
overall thefts increased from 14% in 1995 to 24% in 2003. (Ferwerda et al. 2005: 22) 
The explanation that Ferwerda et al. put forward is that this increase is partially 
explained by the fact that there was a greater number of luxury cars available.  
 
The above data leads to the conclusion that Spain’s used-car market is huge in 
comparison to the number of stolen vehicles sold: most likely less than 15,000 stolen 
vehicles are sold in Spain annually, less than 0.5% of the total number of used cars 
sold. On the other hand if the majority of the stolen cars luxury ones, then their share 
of the market for luxury vehicles is probably more significant.   
 
4.3.2 Bulgarians and the supply of stolen vehicles in Spain 
 
The role of Bulgarian car-thieves in Spain seems to be widely exaggerated by the 
media, mostly led by the active law-enforcement public reporting of almost every 
case that involves the arrest of members of Bulgarian criminal networks. A review of 
the national newspapers El Mundo and El Pais (for the 1990–2010 period) illustrates 
                                                          
62 In none of the analysed Spanish police operation reports were Bulgarians connected with the theft of 
motorcycles or mopeds; neither was it mentioned by any of the interviewees. 
63 Own calculations, based on Euromonitor-compiled statistical data.  
64 Reports on stolen motorcycles imported to Bulgaria concern mostly imports from Germany and 
Austria, Italy, or Canada (MoI 2003). 
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this approach: usually the articles present general statistical data about the ‘tens of 
thousands of vehicles being stolen by car-thieves in Spain every year’, and then go 
on to explain particular schemes or cases, most often related to Bulgarian car thieves 
(e.g. Cerdan and Rubio 2003). Such media representations leave readers with the 
impression that groups of foreign criminals steal over 100,000 cars every year in 
Spain. ‘In 2002 we did a study in Madrid: 2700 Audi cars were stolen in 2.5 months. 
More Audis were stolen than purchased in that period. ‘The average ‘life’ of an Audi 
A6 between its purchase and theft was 6 months’ comments one police investigator 
when asked about Bulgarian car theft networks. (Gómez 2005: 214)  
 
The total number of vehicles stolen for resale from the regions where Bulgarian car 
theft enterprises were active (Madrid, Costa del Sol, and Valencia) was an estimated 
5 34465. More on the geography of activity of Bulgarian car-thieves is provided in 
Chapter 6.  
  
 
Figure 13. Estimate of the share of vehicles stolen by Bulgarian car thieves 
Source: author calculation based on Spanish Ministry of Interior 2004 car theft statistics. 
 
Estimating the actual level of involvement of Bulgarian car thieves could shed light on 
the extent to which law-enforcement action might have influenced their entry into 
Spain’s market for stolen vehicles. To do this, two pieces of information could help in 
the analysis: the number of criminal enterprises and their average annual activity. 
Car thieves generally agree that in the 1990s theft of cars was quick and simple and 
a dozen cars could be easily stolen in a single day. By 2004, though, when Bulgarian 
                                                          
65 The calculation is based on several assumptions and estimates made by police: (1) the ratio of cars / 
trucks to motorcycles in the three regions is the same as nationally – 67% of the total number vehicles. 
(2) Only 30.5% of the cars stolen were not recovered – based on the 1999 figures. (3) 20% of the non-
recovered vehicles were sold for to ‘chop shops for spare parts. The 1999 Ministry of Interior was 
quoted in El Mundo (2000)  
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car thieves were most active, almost all interviews with offenders indicated, the one 
criminal enterprise on average stole and cloned between 2 and 3 cars per week.  
 
Bulgarian car-theft networks, though, had only a share of 5344 cars stolen in the 
three regions, as other groups were also involved. One police official stated in 2003 
that ‘the police was aware of 7-10 Bulgarian car theft groups’, which ‘dominate the 
trafficking of luxury vehicles’. In his opinion at the time, the number of people directly 
involved in all these groups was no more than 60 individuals (ABC 2003). Another 
police source, Alfredo Marijuan, the Head of the Criminal Investigation Unit at the 
Malaga Police Directorate, believed that in the Costa del Sol region alone (Malaga, 
Marbella, Benalmadia, and Torremolinos) there were five or six Bulgarian car-theft 
groups, while the total number of Bulgarian car-theft offenders exceeded 1,000 (this 
most probably included repeated arrests, however, often under different names, over 
a long period of time) (24 Chassa 2007).66  
 
Most offenders were aware of 4-5 other Bulgarian ‘illegal enterprises’ (in addition to 
the one they were involved in) operating in big cities like Barcelona or Madrid. But 
there were also groups operating out of smaller towns, such as Alicante, Valencia, 
Costa del Sol: indicating that possibly between 10 and 20 ‘illegal enterprises’ were 
operating at any one time. Some interviewees indicated that they changed 
‘enterprises’, depending on where there was ‘work’. This estimate corresponds to the 
statistical data provided by the Spanish police on arrests of Bulgarian car-thieves 
(see figure and table below).  
 
                                                          
66 The Spanish police cases indicate that between 1999 and 2009 there had been at least 428 arrests of 
Bulgarians involved in car theft. This data says little because: (1) The Spanish police often tends to 
arrest a wider range of participants – ‘anyone present in the apartment’ at the time of the arrest [LEI-9]; 
(2) many networks / offenders operate undetected; [OFI-4; OFI-5] (3) the data includes repeated arrests 
of the same individuals. 
 Figure 14. Number of Bulgarian nationals arrested in Spain (1997
Source: Policia Nacional; Guardia Civil; Bulgarian Consulate 
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4.3.3 Trends in the supply of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria 
 
The car-theft industry in Bulgaria is more than a criminal phenomenon. It comprises 
the history of local organised crime and the country’s transition to a market economy. 
The history of this industry (since 1990) is important, as it explains the present day 
structure of the market and the behaviour of its participants.  
 
Until 1990 car theft was almost non-existent in Bulgaria, and car theft was carried out 
by ‘generalist’ criminals.67 The borders were tightly controlled by the Communist 
government. There was a very small used-car market only between private sellers. 
Most people could afford only one car in a lifetime. The last decade of the communist 
period in Bulgaria (1980-89) saw a severely constricted domestic vehicle market. The 
waiting period to buy a new car often exceeded 10 years and prices were 2.5 times 
the average annual salary. Imports of used cars from Western Europe were not 
allowed. Immediately after the political changes of 1989, and the opening of trade to 
the West, this high demand for cheap second-hand cars (including stolen ones) was 
satisfied by the immediate mass import of cheap used cars and the opening of the 
first official dealerships for new cars.  
 
The newly created class of nouveaux riches and their growing conspicuous 
consumption created the demand, particularly for luxury vehicles. This growing 
demand was strangled by the stringent import regulations and high import duties, 
which provided incentives for the growth of domestic thefts and smuggling of stolen 
vehicles from abroad. The domestic criminal justice system was corrupt and had 
abdicated, while international law enforcement cooperation between East and West 
was yet to be established, and broader international instruments to fight trafficking of 
stolen vehicles were still in their infancy. All these factors made trafficking and 
registration of stolen cars a very low-risk and relatively cheap undertaking that 
yielded attractive profits.  
 
Police figures support these observations, since between 1989 when political 
changes began and 1992, vehicle thefts in Bulgaria rose by 224%. A secondary 
                                                          
67 Some cross-border trafficking of stolen vehicles from Western Europe towards the Middle East 
passed through Bulgaria, and that was tolerated or ‘taxed’ by the Communist regime. (LEI-11) 
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market for stolen car parts also developed quickly. By 1991–1992 the used-car 
market already existed mostly in the form of open air markets rather than dealerships 
and stolen cars (trafficked or locally stolen) were sold on it. [CDI-1] The theft of 
vehicles to extort a ransom68 also increased rapidly. [LEI-1, LEI-2, LEI-7, LEI-11] 
 
In this early period there was relatively little organisation either of the used-car 
market or the car-theft industry. Between 1992 and 1994, though, the used-car 
market (including the domestic distribution of stolen vehicles) and the car-theft 
industry (local car thefts, ransom-seeking car thefts, international trafficking), came 
under the control of the major ‘mafia-type’ crime groups in Bulgaria known as 
grupirovki. [LEI-1, LEI-3, OFI-1, OFI-2, OFI-7, Tzvetkova (2008)] Even if the 
grupirovka was not directly running the particular car smuggling network, they still 
imposed a protection racket of 10% to 20% of the profits [OFI-20].  
 
Much has already been written about this period of organised crime in Bulgaria 
(Tzvetkova 2008, Center for the Study of Democracy 2004b, Bezlov et al. 2007). The 
grupirovki were initially set up by former athletes, police or military officers as private 
security firms (e.g. VIS-1, Group 777). They imposed protection rackets both on 
smaller criminal groups (e.g. car theft or drugs distribution) and on legitimate 
businesses through violence and intimidation. Subsequently they expanded their 
racketeering services to include protection rackets of private luxury or new vehicles. 
A refusal to accept the protection service led to theft, damage, or bombing of the 
vehicle [OFI-1, OFI-2, LEI-3].  Due to their connections with the police and the 
politicians and their capacity to use violence or the threat of violence, the grupirovki 
controlled and provided protection (from prosecution) of the car-thief groups. They 
used their services to steal or traffic stolen cars. 
 
In the mid 1990s, the value of vehicles stolen in Bulgaria reached €75-80 million 
annually (Bezlov et al. 2007: 155). This accounted for nearly 1% of GDP. If one adds 
the vehicles trafficked from abroad, the car-theft industry revenues vehicles probably 
represented an even bigger share of the country’s GDP. In 1994, according to MoI 
                                                          
68 The ransom-seeking thefts are described in detail in Bezlov et al. (2007) and will be further analysed 
in Chapter 6.  In this scheme the stolen vehicle is returned to its owner for a ransom via a complex 
network of intermediaries that includes mechanics, repair shops, used-car dealerships, insurance 
agents, and even compromised police officers. 
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data, the number of vehicles stolen in Bulgaria surpassed the number of new vehicle 
sales (see Fig. 15 further in text). 
 
In 1995 the Law on Private Security Companies (PSCs) was amended and such 
companies had to be re-licensed by the MoI. All known racketeering PSCs were not 
licences and they had to look for a new form of legitimate organisation. They found it 
in registering as insurance firms69. This began a new period in the car-theft industry.  
 
The provision of insurance became a new form of protection racket, targeting not 
only businesses, but private citizens, especially owners of the growing number of 
Western cars.70 Gradually many people simply chose (without being subject to any 
racket) to buy auto-theft insurance from these companies, as it provided them with 
assurance about the security of their cars. These companies (VIS-2, SIC, Levski-
Spartak, Apollo and Balkan) insured about 90% of all new imported vehicles, but also 
controlled the domestic car-theft and sales of stolen cars, and all aspects of 
international trafficking to and from Bulgaria.71  
 
If a vehicle was not insured by one of the main racket-insurance companies, it could 
be stolen or damaged. The method of recognition for the thieves was an insurance 
company sticker, identifying which company had insured the vehicle. Since the 
insurance companies were closely related to or directly controlled car-theft groups at 
the local level, the car was ‘theft-proof’. If a car was stolen, that was usually done by 
groups controlled by a rival insurance company. As it was more problematic to 
retrieve the car from the rivals, the stolen insured vehicles were often recovered by 
importing an identical stolen model from Western Europe [LEI-2, LEI-3, LEI-5].  
 
The entire auto-theft insurance market was split amongst the main racketeering 
firms, which extended their services of retrieving stolen cars to all other insurance 
companies. Representative of Sofia Ins. (an insurance company owned by 
Multigroup) described in the following way their alliance with VIS-2: ‘This is 
                                                          
69 VIS split into two and two insurance companies VIS-2 and SIC appeared. Club 777 registered Sila. 
Apollo and Balkan and Spartak were set-up by former anti-terrorist unit.  
70 The insurance racket also spread across many other forms of property, from small shops or 
restaurants to street kiosks. Even municipalities were forced to insure public bus stops, and each stop 
had a sticker identifying its insurer.  
71 The control methods were brutal and violent. Groups of former athletes were using violence against 
rival companies, car thieves, or individuals resisting extortion and racketeering practices. (Gounev 2006) 
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something like a co-insurance contract regarding certain makes of cars’ (Capital 
1996b). Companies that had no such an arrangement with one of the racketeering 
insurance companies either had prohibitively high insurance rates or simply did not 
offer insurance for certain models of cars which thieves targeted (Capital 1996c)  
 
‘The only to recover a stolen car, which your company had insured, is to be 
related with the criminal groups and channels for export of stolen cars. 
Otherwise you are [your company is] in the insane situation of making 
insurance pay-outs for each stolen car, which would mean that your 
company is doomed to bankruptcy’ [insurance industry representative quoted 
by Capital 1996] 
 
As results in the later 1990s all car thefts were controlled by these companies. 
Whereas VIS-2 had a more significant presence in the big cities, SIC controlled the 
thieves in the small towns. In 1995, SIC’s insurance premium revenues alone were 
around €40 million, approaching those of the largest insurance companies (Capital 
1996e). In 1997, VIS-2 and SIC’s combined revenues were 10.5% of the total 
insurance market, and much greater share of the car-insurance market, which was 
their main source of revenue. In 1996 SIC insured 40,000 cars: the majority of them 
luxury or new cars (unpublished police report quoted in Tzvetkova 2008: 240). Only 
62 of these cars were stolen (and not retrieved) in 1996 (ibid.), while in 1995 the 
number was only 34 (Capital 1996e). The following year, 1997, the number of cars 
insured with SIC increased to 50,000 insured via the company’s 340 offices around 
the country (Tzvetkova 2008: 240, Capital 1996e). SIC also owned its own chain of 
repair shops, where all insured vehicles that had been in an accident were supposed 
to be fixed (they also served to facilitate money laundering and financial fraud 
schemes (Capital 1999). 
 
‘Around 1996-97 I was working for a brigade in Sofia...we were [related] with 
SIC. These were crazy times...man...I get nostalgic when I think about these 
times! We used to steal sometimes 40 cars per day...We didn’t touch any of 
the cars that had stickers, and we stole only uninsured cars. We paid [SIC] 
10% in the beginning...but then the rate went up to 20%. But we only told 
about 2 out of 3 cars we stole...the others we used our own connections to 
sell...Every car could have been returned for a ransom...but you remember 
that during these years you didn’t even had to steal the car to get the 
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ransom72... usually we would first wait for a couple of days to see if the owner 
would look for the car, and if no one looked for the car, we sold it for parts or 
to someone...SIC rarely provided the clients, one of our guys was the one 
with connections and sold the cars’ [OFI-20] 
 
‘I worked from 1997 to 2001 as car-thief....This was crazy time...The police 
was some kind of a criminal organisation...but not very well 
organised...hardly organised at all...’ [OFI-22] 
 
‘There are a couple of cases that I remember well from this time. The first one 
was with a Head of Parliament...her car got stolen, and she called me: ‘Mr. 
Minister, could you please help me, it’s a new car, my husband put so much into 
it’. I was quite sceptical, I could do anything, because you know once a car it’s 
stolen for resale it’s gone. But I called the police district where the car was 
stolen, and I instructed them to put some effort. The next morning they called me 
‘Minister, we found the car!’ [laughing] It was pretty clear to me that they knew all 
the thieves. In another case, I heard that Mr. X’s car [a prominent politician] was 
stolen. I was expecting him to call me, but he never did. He didn’t even bother to 
report it to the police, he simply called the head of VIS, and the car was returned 
immediately’ [LEI-17] 
 
By 1998 the scale of the car-theft insurance racket had reached epidemic 
proportions, not seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe. VIS-2 and SIC each employed 
over 2,000 people and had country-wide coverage. The two firms were hierarchical 
and their presidents were publicly known as ‘organised crime’ bosses. With their 
influence continuing to grow, the government came under foreign and domestic 
political pressure for change. In 1998, all insurance companies had to be re-
registered and specific provisions in the 1998 Law on Insurance banned insurance 
companies from providing ‘protection services’. A special change in the 1998 Law on 
Road Traffic made it illegal for vehicles to display any insurance stickers, due to 
‘obstruction of the driver’s vision’. 
  
                                                          
72 That was how the protection / insurance racket worked. The crews of racketeers would go around 
neighbourhoods and would look around for expensive cars. They would wait for the owner to show up, 
and ask for a ransom, or threaten to steal the vehicle.  
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As a result, insurance companies abandoned racketeering practices. Nevertheless, 
VIS-2 and SIC managed to find ways to transform themselves, and preserved their 
control over the car-theft industry [LEI-3, LEI-5, LEI-7] (see section on present-day 
role of insurance companies below). SIC was renamed into SIC-Union, and it merged 
its operations with the licensed insurance company Bul-Ins. VIS-2, renamed Planeta, 
became an insurance broker, but gradually disappeared. Spartak (renamed Levski 
Spartak) managed to remain in the insurance business under the name Lev Ins.  
 
 
Figure 15. Car theft and car sales in Bulgaria (1992–2008) 
Source: Based on Ministry of Interior data and Association of Car Manufacturers and their 
authorized representatives for Bulgaria 
 
Between 2001 and 2002, the car-theft rate dropped by 30% and despite the slight 
rise in 2003, the downward trend remained steady, marking an average 12.8% 
decrease for the period between 2003 and 2007.73 The crime victim surveys showed 
a less robust downward trend (Gounev et al. 2006: 56)74 and a falling recovery rate, 
particularly in the 2001–2004 period.  
 
Until 2006-2007 ransom-seeking thefts continued to dominate car-theft, although in 
absolute terms, and as a share of overall MVT, they also declined. Police estimate 
                                                          
73 Since the National Crime Survey was first conducted in 2002, the data indicate that 95–100% of the 
victims of car-theft report the crime to the police. 
74 Interviewees who state that their vehicle has been stolen are then asked if it has been returned, and 
whether they had to pay a ransom. 
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that up until that period 60% of car-thefts were related to ransom seeking (LEI-1, LEI-
2, LEI-5, and Ministry of the Interior 2002). The victimisation surveys support such an 
estimate, although due to fear, fewer victims admit to having been asked for or paid a 
ransom (see table below).75 For instance, in 2005 only 31% of victims admitted to 
having been asked to pay a ransom (National Crime Survey 2006 data set).  
 
 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Victims whose cars were recovered 
(by paying a ransom or by the police) 
70% 67% 52% 58% 51% 56% 
Table 7. Recovery rates in Bulgaria (2001–2007) 
Source: National Crime Survey data set. 
 
The continuous drop in the MVT rates, particularly after 2001, does not indicate a 
shrinking market for stolen cars. The majority of stolen vehicles sold in Bulgaria in 
that period started to come from abroad. This was facilitated by the fact that during 
that period the used car imports were liberalised and low-cost Western cars started 
to flood the used car market. Another key explanation for the post-2001 drop is that 
many well-known car thieves – particularly those able to work with luxury and well-
protected vehicles – migrated, or worked primarily abroad (LEI-1, LEI-4).  
 
4.1 Structure and business models in the car-theft industry 
 
The structure of any market and industry depends on the relevant production and 
distribution processes. The present and next sections describe the operation of the 
car-theft industry from two different angles: ‘processes’ and ‘actors’. First, it presents 
the most common ‘business processes’ [criminal script] followed by Bulgarian 
criminal entrepreneurs involved in theft, trafficking, and sale of stolen vehicles. 
Second, it presents the roles of the different actors involved in these processes, and 
the way they are interrelated in the market for stolen cars.  
 
Stealing a vehicle and selling it has become an increasingly complex task over the 
past two decades, due to growing number of vehicle-security and law-enforcement 
                                                          
75 The average ransom was around €1,100, while the average price of a stolen vehicle was €3,050. 
(Gounev and Bezlov 2005) 
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measures. Since the 1990s a vast vehicle security industry76 has sprung up across 
Europe: much of it driven by the insurance industry77 which has made certain car-
alarms mandatory. Since 1998, all new cars are produced with engine immobilisers, 
making joy-riding thefts by non-professional thieves less and less frequent. Van Dijk 
et al. (2007) attribute the falling MVT rates between 1989 and 2005 across the EU to 
such new security measures. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) and the 
2005 European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS 2005) showed a sharp decline in 
victimisation rates connected to joy-riding thefts (from 1.2% in 1989 to 0.6% in 2004, 
prevalence among the adult population).   
 
Law-enforcement efforts and modern border controls with databases on stolen 
vehicles have been introduced gradually since the late 1990s. Interpol’s Automated 
Search Facility-Stolen Motor Vehicle (ASF-SMV) is the largest and most useful 
database that law-enforcement agencies use. It has data on over 4.2 million stolen 
vehicles across the world, and allegedly it has assisted in the seizure of 37,000 
stolen vehicles so far (Interpol 2009). Other databases EUVID (European Vehicle 
Identification Database) introduced in 2001 and EUCARIS (for vehicle registration 
data of EU Member States) have been used to identify scrapped and stolen vehicles. 
Private sector databases (insurance companies or manufacturers) are also 
integrated or used by law-enforcement agencies to identify stolen vehicles. Most 
importantly, individual buyers have also gained access to such databases. In 
Bulgaria, when purchasing a used car, any citizen can submit a request to the 
Transport Police and consult the Interpol database on the status of the vehicle they 
are about to buy.  
 
This increasing degree of sophistication of anti-theft devices and government policies 
to counter vehicle theft has made professional vehicle theft a rather complex 
enterprise. It involves a range of players, depending on the particular scheme. In 
Spain, Bulgarians car-theft enterprises have a similar business operation process, 
which might have a number of variations (see figure below). First, a (stolen) car 
dealer orders a vehicle. The vehicle is acquired either through theft, or through 
                                                          
76 In Spain this industry has reached an annual turnover of around €150 million, in addition to the 
increasing number of sophisticated built-in anti-theft devices that new vehicles have. (Cantalejo and 
Moral 2008). 
77 In the UK in 1993, for instance, the British Insurance industry tasked its research centre, Thatcham, to 
start testing and rating security systems, following ‘widespread media reporting about joy-riders stealing 
cars’ (www.thatcham.org/security).  
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insurance / leasing fraud. It is then ‘cloned’, as the vehicle identification identification 
(VIN) of a non-stolen vehicle are incised on a stolen one. Following this the vehicle is 
either sold in Spain to a local customer or trafficked across borders to another 
country to be sold to a final customer.  
 
Figure 16. Car-theft enterprise operational model 
 
Some of the steps in this process may be omitted if the vehicle is sold, for instance, 
to other crime groups for temporary use (e.g. for drug transportation). In that case, 
the identity of the vehicle might not need to be completely changed. If the vehicle is 
sold locally, then transportation logistics arrangements (‘cross-border smuggling’) are 
not needed. In the following sections each of these steps will be described in a 
greater detail. 
 
4.1.1 Identifying a buyer 
 
Most of the interviewees stated that usually a vehicle is stolen only after an order is 
received, i.e. a dealer puts an order or a potential buyer is identified. The buyer could 
be identified directly by the criminal enterprise itself (e.g. through informal relations 
with other criminals who might need a car), or via intermediaries, usually criminal 
entrepreneurs who are intermediaries or sellers of stolen vehicles. The order may 
also come from a bon-fide buyer or dealers who are interested in buying a used car. 
 
There are at least two reasons why most car thefts need an order in advance: 
• Reducing financial risks: significant costs are incurred in the stealing, cloning, 
and transportation of the vehicle. (see Chapter 7)  
• There are risks of being detected associated with the continuous storage and 
exposure of the stolen vehicle, even if it is cloned. 
2. Acquisition / 
theft
3. Cloning
4. Delivery5. Sale
1. Order
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Some offender interviewees argued that a prior order is not always necessary. The 
dealers have a good idea about the demand for luxury vehicles. ‘If some new car-
model is out, like the new BMW-X6, you know everyone wants it, you will be able to 
quickly find someone to buy it’ [OF16]. 
 
 
4.1.2 The theft 
 
Stealing of a luxury vehicle is not a quick process. Although the actual process of 
entering and driving it away may take only a few minutes, or even seconds, preparing 
to steal a particular model, funding the right vehicle (the one that has been ordered) 
and choosing an appropriate time and situation to steal it can be time consuming. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, the estimated average weekly number of thefts is 
probably 2-3 cars for the average car-theft enterprise.  
 
On rare occasions, big theft operations take place when multiple cars are stolen at 
once: typically from (used) car dealerships. In one such case in Sofia, Bulgaria, 
within two hours eleven newly imported luxury vehicles (BMW, Mini Cooper, VW), 
worth at least €400,000, were stolen from dealership parking lots, only a couple of 
days after they were imported (Novinar.net 2009). 
 
Spotting a vehicle and following the victim to their home, or sitting in a car-park in a 
shopping mall and waiting for the right vehicle to arrive, may take a few days. 
Planning other steps to overcome various security measures, especially GPS 
tracking devices, can also require quite extensive planning.  
 
One way to reduce this time-consuming process is by obtaining data from vehicle 
registration offices on vehicle brands and owners, and their home addresses. In 
Bulgaria, one of the interviewees was a former police officer who used his police 
connections, and for a small fee would obtain the needed information. According to 
some interviewees some Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs in Spain (and in Italy) also 
managed to find corrupt officials who would provide them with such information. [OFI-
1] 
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The image of the car thief opening a car with a slim jack and driving it away is only 
one of a number of ways (and probably a less and less frequent one) to steal a 
vehicle. The following is a list of the most common ways described by interviewees or 
in the police cases.  
 
Technically, there are numerous anti-theft devices and technologies (including 
immobilizers, GPS tracking,78 and alarms,79), and almost an equal number of ways to 
overcome these and steal the vehicle. For the purposes of this thesis it is of little 
value to go into detail about any of these. It suffices to say that the increasing 
number of immobilizers and computer security devices have made car-theft of luxury 
vehicles a crime, where a technically savvy person is needed. The complex security 
systems have forced thieves to use a range of other methods: 
• Car-jacking (e.g. while victims are at a fuelling station or in a public parking 
place).  
• Robbing a car owner of their car keys (C-0704). 
• Burglary of the car-owner’s home with the purpose of stealing car keys. 
• Theft of keys from a client by prostitutes. 
• Theft of fuel-tank cap (for making a copy of the key – for certain models). 
• Deception: a variety of approaches have been employed to get an owner out 
of a vehicle and distract them – from deliberate small accidents, puncturing 
the back-right tyre, tying rattling objects against the car, forcing the owner to 
stop and get out of the vehicle to inspect the noise (C-0704); responding to 
ads for a used vehicle and stealing it during a test-drive, etc.  
• Corruption of factory / dealership employees: there is a black market 
where corrupt individuals from factories, suppliers of security systems80 or 
used-car dealers, or other experts, sell keys, computer programmes, or other 
tools that allow thieves to overcome various security measures. There are 
also websites where devices to open cars could be bought (see below).  
                                                          
78 There are several ways to overcome this device: placing a lead cover over it, which prevents the GPS 
device from transmitting a signal; placing the car inside a trailer truck lined with lead; driving the car to 
an area where which is known not to have GPS coverage; using special devices that interfere with GPS 
transmission. 
79 Short-circuiting the alarm or blocking it through a ‘plug’ (tapa or ‘тапа’ in Bulgarian), are the standard 
theft approaches. 
80 In one reported case, a car-theft enterprise in Bulgaria managed to obtain car-security software from a 
software engineer who worked for a US supplier for BMW / Mercedes, which had outsourced its 
production in Bulgaria (Nikolaeva 2010). 
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• Fraud: One scheme involved writing to a Mercedes dealership on behalf of a 
non-existent company, requesting eleven duplicate keys for its vehicles. The 
thieves used forged documents of vehicles it had never purchased but which 
the thieves had identified as targets. The Mercedes dealership was 
suspicious and called the police, who found out that five vehicles had already 
been stolen and the other ones were on the thieves’ target list.  
• Insurance fraud: Both law-enforcement and offender sources state that this 
continues to be a significant source of stolen vehicles. There are several 
possible schemes. In Spain, Bulgarian criminal enterprises sometimes look 
for used-car ads (in newspapers or on the internet) and approach the sellers, 
offering them to buy the car at a low price. [OFI-7] Another approach is via 
informal networks (repair shops, dealerships, parking garages) to identify 
potential customers. As one offender described it ‘we find them or they find 
us’. [OFI-1] Vehicle owners sell their cars to intermediaries at a price which is 
about one-third of the value of its theft insurance cover. Another popular 
scheme that aimed to maximize the profits had the following scenario: a 
stolen vehicle from Spain was imported to Bulgaria, cloned, registered and 
insured. It was then re-exported to Russia, where it was sold. In this way the 
profit was doubled as money was received both from the sale and from the 
insurance payout [OFI-3]. In either of these schemes, using the original 
documents, the vehicle is driven to its destination, for instance to Bulgaria, or 
it is sold locally in Spain. Once all transfer procedures are completed and the 
vehicle’s identity is changed, the owner reports the car stolen to the police 
and the insurance company.   
• Lease fraud: Bulgarians in Spain have used three different approaches to 
this type of scheme: (1) creating fake financial records of socially 
disadvantaged individuals (e.g. drug users), and using these individuals to 
lease a new vehicle. Once the vehicle is leased a few payments are made. 
This provides sufficient time to smuggle the vehicle out of the country, or 
change its identity. Soon the payments stop. (2) Similar to this is the ‘bankrupt 
company’ scheme. It involves the setting up or buying of an extant company, 
using the company to lease several vehicles (including commercial ones). 
The vehicles are then transferred to the destination country or sold. The 
company then goes bankrupt and the lease payments are terminated.   
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The other scheme is similar to the insurance fraud. The car-theft 
entrepreneurs need to find customers who have difficulties with the leasing 
payments on their cars, and are willing to ‘terminate’ their contract.81 During 
periods of economic growth, many businessmen and construction companies 
leased expensive vehicles or heavy construction equipment. The financial 
crisis made them all potential customers for car-thieves, who were willing to 
relieve them of their debt. Customers would voluntarily sell their car to the 
thieves for a small amount, and would announce it as stolen to the police after 
the car had been exported or cloned. In this one case, the ‘stolen’ leased 
vehicles were exported from Bulgaria via Germany (where their documents 
were counterfeited to look as if they belonged to German leasing companies) 
and then sold to customers in Spain via a Spanish-run independent used-car 
dealership in Pamplona. The case is interesting as it shows that extensive 
networks are needed to organise the scheme. The main organiser of this 
particular theft enterprise had extensive contacts amongst local businessmen 
in the southwest region of Bulgaria. He also had his own construction 
company, which gave him access to a network of local / regional contacts. An 
important detail, though, was that he was close friend and partner of the head 
of security of one of the main insurance companies, related to car-theft 
groups (see below on their role in the car-theft industry). (C-1010) 
 
• Theft of rented vehicles: Another scheme involves the use of counterfeit or 
stolen credit cards to rent luxury vehicles. The vehicle’s security information is 
then noted, copies of the keys are made, and other security systems 
examined. The vehicle is then returned to the rental agency, and after some 
time it is stolen. (C-0298) 
 
4.1.3 The cloning 
 
                                                          
81 Due to the economic crisis many car manufacturers lowered the prices of new vehicles to such an 
extent, that many car-owners found themselves in a situation where, for instance, they still would have 
another €80,000 worth of payments left, while for this amount they could now buy the latest model of the 
car.  [CDI-4] 
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Regardless of the approach used in acquiring / stealing the vehicle, the second step 
is changing its identity, or ‘legalizing it’, so that it can be sold as a legitimate vehicle. 
This process usually takes place soon after the vehicle is stolen either in Spain or in 
Bulgaria. Over the past few years, with the increase in security measures, the 
sophistication of the cloning process has also grown. In the early 1990s some thieves 
went only as far as changing the licence plates and forging the vehicle documents; 
but in the past decade the process has become much more complex: using lasers to 
change the various security markings, and above all the VIN (vehicle identification 
number), or entirely replacing parts of the vehicle with new ones that have a different 
VIN. Technically the forging is quite difficult, but once it is done, the police usually 
need special equipment to detect a well-forged VIN.  
 
Since the late 1990s, Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs in Spain commonly clone all 
stolen vehicles, usually soon after the vehicles are stolen, or after they are 
transported abroad. For that purpose they use the identity and documentation of a 
non-stolen vehicle. The stolen vehicle is usually taken to a garage or a mechanic’s 
shop, where its identity can be changed. Groups, therefore, usually need to rent 
space, such as a warehouse, for this operation. If this is not available, it could be left 
at a public parking place for a few days, and once the licence plates and forged 
documentation are ready, it is moved to a place where additional changes are made. 
(C-0104) The case files of the Spanish Police indicate that Bulgarians have 
connections and have cloned vehicles from Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Austria. 
 
The cloning process has several preparatory steps, and it differs in some ways from 
the criminal scripts described by other authors (Tremblay at al. 2001; Morselli and 
Roy 2008), particularly at the first stage – the identification of the vehicle to be 
cloned.  
 
There are several ways to identify a vehicle that could be cloned:  
• The Internet is used to find a used car in another Schengen82 country. Under 
the pretence of purchase, copies of the vehicle documents (VIN and identity 
                                                          
82 The Schengen agreement eliminates border controls between countries, members of the European 
Union (as well as Iceland and Norway). As of 2010 it was signed by 23 of the 27 EU Member States 
(UK, Ireland; Romania and Bulgaria were about to become members in 2011). In 2007, the Schengen 
area was expanded, as the agreement was signed by ten countries, mostly in Eastern Europe. 
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information) are obtained via fax and email. In this case, the thieves take 
advantage of the fact that, normally, national vehicle registries are not directly 
connected to common EU VIN-databases – therefore upon registration or 
during a police stop there is no threat of being detected. [OFI-2] 
 
• The second way is through contact persons in other countries who personally 
obtain the vehicle information from scrap yards. In this case sometimes the 
original documents of a scrapped vehicle that has been in an accident might 
be used. In another scheme the criminals might take a car for a test drive 
from a dealership under the pretence of intended purchase, during which its 
identification is obtained.  
 
• Interviewees stated that some Bulgarians owned or had connections to scrap 
yards in Spain, who for a certain amount were willing to sell the vehicle ID 
information, and relevant vehicle parts. [OFI-15, OFI-17] 
 
• Using a registered vehicle’s information: A car owner, usually in Bulgaria 
but also in Spain, will provide all necessary VIN, licence plates, vehicle 
documents, and insurance papers, which are transferred to Spain. A car of 
the same model is then stolen, cloned, and trafficked to Bulgaria. During the 
annual technical inspections in Bulgaria (carried out by traffic police), the 
original car is shown and the clone remains undetected.  
 
There are cases in which a car has had four or five such clones [LEI-1, OFI-
1]. Bulgarian car-theft networks are known to have used the same scheme in 
Spain as well, where they legalise one vehicle using one of the methods 
described above. They then create multiple forged documents for several 
identical vehicles of the same model [LEI-1, LEI-2, OFI-1]. In one case 
described by the police, the network purchased a new high-value vehicle that 
was registered in the name of a woman participating in the organisation. 
Several identical vehicles were then stolen, cloned, and sold to members of 
other criminal organisations. If pulled over by the police patrol, they provided 
the contact information of the legal owner and, if necessary, she would 
appear to confirm the identity.  
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The analysis of the Spanish police cases shows that quite often the cloning / storage 
of the car takes place in place (far) away from where it was stolen. For instance, 
vehicles might be stolen in Costa del Sol, but cloned in Madrid (C-0903); or stolen in 
Madrid but the change of identity takes place in Toledo or Marbella (C-1206); or it is 
stolen in Costa del Sol and disguised in Seville (C-1006). In other cases, the vehicle 
is just left for 2-4 days at a public parking lot, while in the mean time, the necessary 
forged documentation, licence plates, etc. are prepared (C-0104). The change of the 
car’s identity requires a certain infrastructure, such as a warehouse or a garage. This 
is usually provided either by the illegal entrepreneur, colluding partners (C-1002), or 
colluding local Spanish-run repair shops (C-0704). In Bulgaria, in the Pazardjik 
region, the villages around the city were pointed as the usual location of the VIN 
changing, as well as services stations in town.  
 
Forging of the vehicle documentation is also important part of the cloning process. 
Many of the groups seem to have their own specialization in forging vehicle 
documentation. In some cases, this service is outsourced to local specialists who, in 
Spain, are not Bulgarians, and are not part of the immediate core group.  
 
Once the stolen vehicle is cloned and ‘legalised’, it then can be either registered in 
Spain or trafficked to another country. The thieves declare to the registration 
authorities that the vehicle is imported from the country from which the 
documentation of the cloned vehicle came. As national vehicle registration databases 
of EU Member States are not connected, and there are no borders check points 
between countries, the registration authorities (either in Bulgaria or Spain) cannot 
verify where the vehicle originally came from, or from which country it exited. 
 
4.1.4 Logistics: transportation and trafficking routes 
 
When the stolen vehicle is sold in another country, a set of fairly complicated 
logistical arrangements must be made to transfer it from Spain to its destination. For 
this purpose, in many cases ‘couriers’ or ‘mules’ are hired to drive the vehicle. While 
some interviewees recounted a single courier driving the vehicle from Bulgaria to 
Spain, others explained that they’ve driven only to the border with France, or to 
Greece, and there another mule drove it to Bulgaria. In the cases where a vehicle 
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was trafficked to the Middle East or the former USSR, another courier picked up the 
car from Bulgaria. 
 
In other cases, the vehicle is shipped via ports in containers, or mixed with non-
stolen vehicles on car-transporters. In these cases the vehicles are transported in 
trucks to the ports. On very rare occasions the thieves themselves might drive the 
stolen car to Bulgaria.  
 
The main principle in trafficking the vehicle is risk minimisation. If the vehicle is well 
cloned, then the risks are minimal: the offenders do not see the border crossing as 
high risk, as usually border checks do not include close VIN inspections. [OFI-5]  
 
The car-smuggling destinations out of Spain (or via Spain from the rest of Western 
Europe) have changed since the early 1990s, when according to Head of the 
National Police car-theft unit these destinations were primarily (Alvarez 1994): 
• For all-terrain vehicles: towards Africa. 
• For luxury cars: towards Japan and the United Arab Emirates. 
• Cheaper cars: towards Eastern Europe. 
 
With the establishment (in 1995) and subsequent rounds of expansions (1995-1997 
and in 2007) of the European Union’s border-free Schengen Area, there was 
increased involvement of criminal networks from the former Yugoslavia, the former 
Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and various central and northern African countries.  
 
In the 1997-2000 period, the first groups of Bulgarian car-thieves, who specialised in 
the theft of all-terrain vehicles, were exporting mostly to Morocco and Bulgaria (C-
0497, C-0897, C-0298, C-0798, C-0100, C-0600, C-1100). Direct transfers by sea 
from Portuguese ports to Bulgaria also took place. This was again a risk minimisation 
strategy, as some networks had managed to corrupt customs officers in Portuguese 
ports, who facilitated the trafficking. (LEI-4, LEI-2) 
 
The analysis of the Spanish police cases shows that as the demand for luxury cars in 
Bulgaria, the Middle East, and Russia increased after 2000, the primary destination 
for trafficked became Bulgaria. Bulgaria, though, remained the main destination for 
final sales or for resale to other car-traffickers.  
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The trafficking to Bulgaria takes place through France and Italy, and then via one of 
the Italian ports (Bari, Ancona, Brindisi) on a ferry to Igoumenitsa (Greece). (e.g. C-
0104) The Italian police occasionally raids the ferry-ports to Greece, Spain, Croatia 
or Tunisia looking for stolen cars: for example, the 2007 Operation ‘Italian Harbours’ 
resulted in nine cars being seized. (Interpol 2009) Therefore, some interviewees 
stated that instead of using the ports, they usually drove through Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Serbia. Greece, was another transit point, via which the vehicles are either 
transferred towards other Balkan countries (Macedonia or Albania) and Turkey, or 
imported into Bulgaria. 
 
Thus, in the majority of cases the only border that needed to be crossed between 
Spain and Bulgaria is the Greek-Bulgarian border crossing of Kulata (all countries in 
between fall within the Schengen border area). After January 2007, following 
Bulgaria’s entry into the EU, customs controls between Bulgaria and Greece were 
removed. This further facilitated the transfer of vehicles, particularly when shipped by 
commercial transporters, which are not inspected by the border police, as they are 
considered commercial cargo. Before 2007, though, the import of used cars usually 
involved some level of customs corruption. 
 
Figure 17. Smuggling routes used by Bulgarians from Spain 
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Source: own drawing based on data from Guardia Civil, Policia Nacional, Europol, Interviews 
(LE-2); Map drawing credit Reuters. 
 
Once in Bulgaria, vehicles might be transferred further to: 
• Macedonia and Serbia (or other ex-Yugoslav republics) 
• Ukraine, Russia, and Moldova, either overland or via the port of Varna 
• the Middle East / Persian Gulf via Turkey 
• Georgia / Armenia / Azerbaijan via Turkey. 
 
There is no evidence that Bulgarians have become involved in direct transfers from 
Spain through other Western European countries towards former Soviet Union 
countries. This method seems to have remained mostly used by other vehicle-theft 
groups operating in Spain, such as Polish, Estonian, or Lithuanian-run groups.  
 
Occasionally, Bulgarians have become involved in the transfer of vehicles to Sub-
Saharan Africa. This is done by loading the vehicles onto ships in some of the main 
Spanish ports (Algeciras, Valencia, Alicante), from which vehicles are shipped 
towards Nigeria, Senegal, or Cameroon. There have been instances, where vehicles 
have been shipped via the Canary Islands to Mauritania. There are at least three 
cases where Bulgarians have established contacts in the Spanish towns located on 
the African continent, especially Ceuta, through which vehicles are smuggled into 
Morocco. (C-0897, C-0298, C-0100) 
 
Usually, the mules involved in driving the vehicle to Bulgaria do not know the ultimate 
destination of the vehicle: a used-car dealership or another country. The mules 
usually transfer the vehicle to intermediaries, who in turn deliver them to the dealers. 
The last step on the criminal script, the sale of the stolen vehicle, is considered in 
detail in the next Chapter.  
 
4.2 Industry players and structures 
 
The Spanish police tend to think of Bulgarian car-thieves in terms of networks and 
groups. This is certainly helpful in the context of operational efficiency, as it helps the  
police to focus on a limited number of individuals, over a fairly short period of time 
that it takes to conduct an investigation. In the media and official reports, Spanish 
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National Police officials have described the involvement of Bulgarians in car theft in 
various ways. The description given was of hierarchical structures, but without 
‘dedicated members’, with a rather high turnover of individuals without much 
experience, who join and leave (ABC 2003). On the other hand, the other major law-
enforcement agency in Spain, the Guardia Civil, has consistently (for almost a 
decade) provided an identical description of Bulgarian criminal groups, comparing 
them to the functioning of ‘terrorist cells’: the coordinator is the only one that knows 
all the others, as the rest are organised as separate ‘groups’ or cells of thieves, 
mules, and VIN changers. (Cantalejo and Moral 2008) 
 
This local point of view provides only one side of the picture. From the more trans-
national point of view taken by the present thesis, the description of the enterprises 
and actors involved looks somewhat different. The interviews with offenders and law-
enforcement officers in Bulgaria and Spain revealed that the car-theft industry is 
populated by numerous enterprises and independent actors, that could be grouped in 
the following categories: 
• illegal enterprises involved primarily in stealing and trafficking of vehicles, 
called in this thesis for simplicity-sake ‘theft enterprise’ 
• illegal enterprises involved primarily in the distribution and sale of stolen 
vehicles or a ‘sales enterprise’, discussed in the next chapter 
• specialists (thieves, document and VIN-forging specialists) and other staff 
(mules, spotters) who work for different illegal enterprises when there is demand 
for their labour 
• legitimate companies (used-car dealerships, service shops, scrap yards, 
transport companies, insurance companies), and 
• corrupt public officials who facilitate the operation of the market. 
 
The figure below represents a conceptual model of how an international vehicle 
trafficking network between Spain and Bulgaria operates, and how participants are 
connected in a hypothetical transaction from the theft to the sale of the vehicle. This 
model depicts only one of the possible ways of such a transaction: some variations 
are shown using a dotted line connection. Depending on the ‘criminal script’ used 
additional market participants would be added. As described in the previous section, 
the order comes from the ‘sales enterprise’ or a bona fide buyer. The ‘theft 
enterprise’, based in Spain, then completes the order, and ships the stolen vehicle to 
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Bulgaria. The ‘theft enterprise’ normally works with a number of theft crews and other 
specialists, who are hired on ad hoc basis. 
 
 
Figure 18. Conceptual model of vehicle theft transaction 
Source: Author visualisation based on interview data 
 
The structure described above, with its numerous possible variations is explained in 
the next sections, question the rather rigid descriptions of Eastern European car-theft 
networks provided by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004). They argue that car-theft 
networks typically consist of three groups: one responsible for the theft, one for the 
‘recycling’ (i.e. cloning), and one, resident abroad, for the demand.  
 
The narrow view that Bruinsma and Bernasco have adopted towards analysing car-
theft networks is further exposed in their analysis of the cohesiveness of social 
networks. They argue that car-theft networks are considered by offenders as a ‘low-
risk’ type of crime, compared to ‘heroin distribution’. Therefore, ‘car-theft’ networks 
have ‘lower network cohesion’. Such networks, according to Bruinsma and Bernasco 
(2004) comprise social relationships that are only ‘instrumental’, participants who do 
not ‘maintain affective relationships’, and without a ‘central cluster’ in the network. 
The reality, though, is that to the majority of participants in car-theft networks, car 
theft is only one of their criminal activities, and many other activities (e.g. armed 
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83 The city of Pazardjik, where the majority of interviewees came fro
point in Bulgaria and the Balkans.  
Mr. Z  
Mr. Z is a car-thief from the second largest 
city in Bulgaria – Varna. His father teaches 
at a university. Mr. Z grew up to be 
technically savvy. In the 1990s he started 
using these skills to make his own alarm 
and immobiliser decoders. He got involved 
in the local market for stolen vehicles, 
which was largely controlled by the local 
structures of VIS, SIC and TIM. Gradually, 
he accumulated enough money from thefts 
and moved to Spain in 2000 with a partner. 
Once they were settled and familiar with 
the area they started organising burglaries 
and car-thefts. Then they started exporting 
cars back to Bulgaria. For this purpose 
they called upon trusted lower-level thieves 
from Varna and nearby Silistra. Mr. Z 
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vehicles to Moroccans and Lithuanians. Mr. 
Z was able to develop a GPS tracking 
system: GPS devices were installed on 
vehicles sold to Moroccan hashish 
traffickers. His group would then track the 
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the police raided Mr. Z’s ‘control room’ 
near Marbella, they found he was tracking 
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used Mr. Z’s control room to track and 
seize at least 4.5 tons of hashish. Although 
Mr. Z was arrested and held for at least a 
year, he was released as there was not 
sufficient evidence to convict him. (LEI-5, 
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Other criminal entrepreneurs might be based in Bulgaria, and might function more as 
itinerant enterprises. They just send a ‘coordinator’ on a temporary basis to organise 
the theft and trafficking of the vehicles [OFI-6].  
 
When speaking of ‘Bulgarian criminal groups’ in Spain, one is generally referring to 
such ‘car-theft entrepreneurs’ and the network around them. The offenders 
interviewed stated that they normally spent a few months working for one such theft 
entrepreneur, and then moved to another one in another town. When asked about 
how many such other entrepreneurs they were aware of, typically in the large 
metropolitan areas – Barcelona or Madrid – and nearby towns they were aware of 3-
4 others.  
 
Several of the enterprises described were ‘partnerships’ and included a local partner. 
The local partner often shares the profit and participates loosely in the coordination 
process. While Spaniards might be involved in all sorts of supporting functions, such 
as drivers, document forgers, electronics specialists (C-1203), a more significant 
participation is needed for one to be considered a partner. The contribution of the 
local established infrastructure (e.g. a garage, a used-car dealership) makes this 
person key to the operation, the risks, and to the profit-sharing arrangement. 
Commonly, interviewees stated that the local infrastructure used for cloning the 
vehicle is run by a Bulgarian, who has been established in Spain for some time. He is 
often the ‘owner’ of the illegal enterprise and coordinates all the others via a hands-
on manager.  
 
On some occasions, though, when the organiser is a newcomer (as was Mr. Z, see 
box above) and needs a local base, a local partner might be more advantageous. In 
this way, significant investment costs can be avoided, e.g. for the purchase of a 
repair shop, or garage (C-1206, C-0704). Such approach could also avoid police 
attention, who may start monitoring a suspicious new business. In one case, the 
police started monitoring the declared official revenue of a new garage, and quickly 
noticed the big discrepancy between its revenue and the number of vehicles that 
actually came into the garage. (C-0305)  
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In the Bulgarian context such car-theft entrepreneurs are usually based in regional 
towns84 where there is usually at least one individual who organizes and dominates 
both the stealing of cars and the sale of stolen cars. These are further discussed in 
the next chapter on the sale of stolen vehicles. More importantly, as a significant 
portion of the vehicles are stolen for ransom, there are overlapping networks and 
individuals, are involved in theft for profit and theft for ransom (discussed in Ch. 6) 
(Nikolaeva 2010, OFI-22).  
 
Front companies to cover up or facilitate the activities of the theft enterprise are 
sometimes used as well (C-0305, OFI-5). One case (C-0305) described such a 
situation: Bulgarian entrepreneurs set up several companies in Germany and Spain. 
A service station and used car-dealership registered in Spain officially exported used 
cars to Bulgaria and Germany. To further disguise the origin and destination of the 
stolen cars to both the Bulgarian and Spanish authorities, the thieves used the 
Spanish-registered companies to formally sell the stolen cars to German-registered 
companies, which in turn, made their official import of the cars in Bulgaria. The stolen 
cars that were exported from Spain used the identification numbers of vehicles that 
were legitimate vehicles which never left Spain (either normal cars, whose 
registration / VIN information the thieves had access, or vehicles that had been in 
accidents). 
 
In Spain (as well as in Bulgaria) the entrepreneurs running the ‘theft enterprise’ are 
not directly involved in the operational activities related to the theft. Their participation 
is usually limited to providing infrastructure (i.e. space for storing and cloning the 
stolen vehicles); and negotiating the terms of the deal (i.e. the price at which the 
‘selling enterprise’ would purchase the vehicles). The main coordination of the theft is 
carried out by one or two ‘supervisors’ / ‘coordinators’, who manage the hiring of 
‘specialists’ – to find the vehicle, and organise the theft, the cloning, and the 
trafficking. This ‘manager’ position serves as a buffer in case of investigations; it is 
usually carried out by a former thief who is no longer directly involved in thefts. The 
various roles are described below. 
 
                                                          
84 In Bulgaria there are 20 cities with population of over 50,000, in which there are probably such 
entrepreneurs. ‘Larger cities’ would be those with population over or around 100,000, of which there are 
eight (Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Russe, Stara Zagora, Pleven, Sliven, and Dobrich). See map in Annex 1. 
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4.2.2 The sale enterprise 
 
In the present thesis, the term ‘sale enterprise’ is used to differentiate it from the ‘theft 
enterprise’. The illegal entrepreneurs involved in the distribution of stolen vehicles 
are most often solely involved in the sale. The empirical data showed that Bulgarian 
'theft’ entrepreneurs in Spain sold the stolen cars via ‘sale entrepreneurs’ in Bulgaria. 
The ‘sale entrepreneurs’, who sell in Bulgaria vehicles stolen in Spain, might also be 
involved in stealing vehicles in Bulgaria. Equally, Spain-based entrepreneurs 
involved in the distribution of vehicles stolen in Spain or other EU countries, could 
also be involved in the local theft of vehicles. The operational and structural details of 
the distribution and sale of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria and Spain are provided in the 
next chapter.  
 
4.2.3 The specialists 
 
The car-theft, cloning, and trafficking is carried out by a number of specialists, who 
either work as ‘free-lancers’ or in small groups of 3 or 4. Usually, when the police 
break up a ‘car-theft network’, they see both the theft entrepreneur and the external 
specialists as a ‘group’. In reality, this ‘group’ is a temporary formation, as the 
‘specialists’ work with different entrepreneurs for only a few months at time, often 
changing towns.  
 
The offender interviewees stated that most of these individuals constantly move 
between Bulgaria and Spain, or within Spain. The spotters, the thieves, and the 
mules, usually spend a few months or a few weeks – depending on the ‘work load’ – 
working for one enterprise. Then they go and work for another one, or return to 
Bulgaria until a new job comes up . The VIN-forging specialist might be involved for 
even shorter periods – as little as a few days, once several stolen vehicles are safely 
stored, and their documentation falsified. The pay-rates for each position or service 
are quite standard, and all interviewees generally agreed on the pay-scale for each 
type of job (see Ch.7).  The roles of each are described in more detail below. 
 
4.2.3.1 Spotters 
Also known as ‘browsers’ (ojeadores in Spanish, or sagledvachi in Bulgarian) – these 
individuals are in charge of locating potential targets, and identifying the right 
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moment to steal the vehicle, or the patterns of movement and behaviour of the 
owner. They also provide information such as the age, sex, and description of the 
owner. Once a vehicle is identified they contact the ‘coordinator’ who in turn contacts 
the thieves. In Bulgaria, their role is often fused with the role of the ‘watchers’ – those 
who secure the scene of the theft, making sure that the owner or others do not 
surprise the thieves, or avoiding the police during the escape. The two roles also 
seem to be occasionally fused in Spain. These individuals might also be involved in 
selling other objects that are found in the stolen vehicle (jewellery, money, credit 
cards, documents, computers, cameras, etc.). (C-0706) The spotters also work in 
small groups of two to four people, and they might occasionally form a separate 
group that does not know who the thieves are, but communicates only with the 
coordinator. ‘When there are  no orders, these guys spend their entire time just 
cruising around, looking around for cars, so that when an order comes, they already 
know what is on offer in the city’ [OFI-15].  
 
4.2.3.2 Thieves 
The ‘limoneros’ (as the thieves are called in Spanish) are usually organised in small 
groups of three or four – in Bulgarian called a ‘brigade’ (brigada). The group could be 
a more permanent formation of people that have known each other for some time 
and trust each other. There are various degrees of technical knowledge required to 
be a thief. Generally one person in the group has a better understanding of how the 
various types of car security can be overcome. The rest might be involved in burglary 
or robbery as a means of obtaining the keys; or be good drivers for the quick get-
away.  
 
The more sophisticated thieves with specific technical knowledge to overcome the 
various security measures are known in Spain as ‘electronicos’ (‘electricians’). Most 
groups have at least one such professional. Many thieves with this extensive 
knowledge sometimes try to make it on their own (such as Mr. Z, see box above, or 
Pirana, see next chapter), or work independently for different groups. Their job is only 
to open and start the car. In less than a few minutes, such person could make 1,000 
euros.  
 
Such individuals are professionals who invest heavily in technology. They might have 
to buy instruments that might cost a total of €20,000, so that they have a range of 
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tools for many types of vehicles (see next section). Most of these high-end 
professionals are permanently settled in Spain.  
 
The groups of spotters and thieves take a number of risk-mitigation strategies to 
avoid detection: (1) the group members are hired from Bulgaria, where they have 
worked previously and trust each other; (2) many of them do not permanently reside 
in Spain but commute for a few months; (3) when staying for longer periods of time, 
they change their residence almost weekly; (4) their theft instruments and devices 
usually travel to Spain separately (they might be sent by bus or be taken across by 
international truck drivers). The instruments might even be temporarily stored in a 
third country, such as Italy or France; (5) if they are new to an area, they will spend 
some time driving around, getting to know the area and the get-away routes.  
 
The thieves’ pay depends on the complexity of the car and their role. Normally, they 
would get at least 400 euros per car, per person (i.e. around 2,000 euros for a four-
person brigade). If the car is a risky one, i.e. a very exclusive brand, the price could 
be much higher. The spotters and the ‘look-outs’ might get even less. 
 
The groups of spotters and thieves may work for different ‘theft enterprises’, run their 
own enterprise, and may move from town to town. Depending on the size of the 
‘enterprise’, the spotters and thieves might be assigned a number of smaller tasks – 
someone might be asked to go to a scrap yard to buy documentation, or to go to the 
document-forging specialists to make the car documents.  
 
4.2.3.3 Tool makers 
The thieves could use the services of various other specialists who might be involved 
in making devices and tools to steal cars. These range from mechanical tools to 
more complex devices.  
 
Interviewees spoke about toolmakers of more basic car theft tools in the town of 
Pazardjik. The previously state-owned Metalik Metal-Cutting Machines Factory 
(privatised in 1997), and situated on the outskirts of the town is a case in point. One 
such toolmaker (a former employee) used the factory’s facilities illegally (usually by 
paying a manager a small bribe), and was able to produce various tools of reinforced 
steel that required special machines for their manufacture. According to one 
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interviewee he must have supplied ‘half of Europe’ with car-theft tools (e.g. the ‘bear 
paw’ used to turn on the ignition). A local car-theft group even supplied a local 
toolmaker (nicknamed ‘Dr. Cutter’ [Dr. Frezov]) with a metalworking lathe and a metal 
cutter, who then worked round-the-clock for them. [OFI-15] 
 
The use of more complex devices, though, is needed in theft of vehicles with modern 
security systems. Car dealerships and related service shops also need these same 
devices for fixing cars, changing locks, etc. Therefore the market for them is rather 
gray: on the one hand, legitimate companies that produce such devices sell them to 
dealerships, yet anyone else could buy them as well. Car-makers have factories 
around the world, including in many middle- or low-income countries, where 
employees illegally sell parts, devices, or software through which car security can be 
overcome (Czech factories of VW / Audi were pointed as one such source [OFI-15]). 
 
Each new vehicle that is released onto the market has complex protection 
mechanisms. Cracking the software and security codes, or developing own software 
to open the vehicles takes place not only in Bulgaria, but also Russia or Ukraine, 
which are then sold over the internet. Such computer specialists are not just hackers 
but often hold regular jobs as IT engineers but work with car thieves to supplement 
their income. Generally, these individuals are highly paid by the thieves (LEI-3, OFI-
15, OFI-20, OTI-16). 
 
The prices of such devices vary significantly, according to the specific model of 
vehicle but, above all, according to how new the model is. Devices related to post-
2007 luxury models cost usually more than €1,000, while older ones can sell for less 
than €100. Devices for opening the latest high-end Mercedes or BMW models could 
reach as much as $10,00085.  
 
It is usually the thief that personally invests in such tools, but sometimes the theft 
entrepreneur might obtain them for the various crews that he hires. As one former 
                                                          
85 In Bulgaria, for instance, one such website is autodiag.hit.bg. Another one, popular amongst car-
thieves, Edilock Ltd. (www.edilock-bg.com/), which sells devices such as the €9,999 euro BMW key / 
transponder programming device OBD II that opens all BMWs produced between 2003 and 2011. Other 
websites, such as www.car-radio-decoding.com/shop, cater to international customers and provide a 
wide range of devices that could serve to open many different car models. Such websites warn that 
‘illegal use’ of the devices is at one’s own risk.  
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car-thief summed it up ‘Half of my money used to go for shit [tools] like this...but it 
was simply an investment in myself’ [OFI-22] 
 
4.2.3.4 VIN changers 
The ‘make-up men’ (‘maestros maquilladores’ in Spanish; in Bulgarian ‘maistori’ or 
‘chukachi’ [chisel men]) are hired to forge the identity of the stolen vehicle: erasing 
and replacing the VIN and other ID numbers with the ID of vehicles (or parts with ID 
numbers on them) purchased from scrap yards in Spain or other countries. These 
individuals are also often not permanently settled in Spain, but commute from 
Bulgaria whenever a batch of vehicles has been identified (LEI-4, C-0307). VIN 
riggers usually charge around €1,000 per car, depending on the type of car and the 
complexity, and available parts.  
 
4.2.3.5 Document forging 
The documents that are needed to ‘legalise’ the stolen vehicle usually use data from 
the documents of the vehicle that is being cloned. Some details about the car in 
these documents need to be changed (e.g. the car colour). One interviewee 
recounted that he was always sent to a local ‘print shop’ in Madrid where he would 
produce the necessary documents (OFI-5). The specialists who forge the documents 
might be part of the group (OFI-2). On several occasions, investigations have 
revealed that one of the complementary criminal activities of the criminal groups is 
the falsification of passports, or of credit cards, or the placement of counterfeit 
money.86 (C-0298, C-0803, C-0204, C-0704, C-0905, C-0708b, C-0607)  
 
4.2.3.6 Mules 
The use of couriers (‘pasadores’ in Spanish) or drivers to traffic the stolen vehicles 
across borders is ubiquitous in all reported cases. The drivers could be a separate 
group of people who are only in contact with the coordinator. In smaller enterprises, 
though, they know all the others working for the enterprise. The nationality of the 
mules hired depends on the destination of the stolen vehicle. In the instances when 
the vehicle was transferred to Morocco, Spaniards or Moroccans were hired to drive 
                                                          
86 There were dozens of print shops for counterfeit currency in Bulgaria in the period 2001–2005. One of 
the activities of many criminals is the placement and conversion (laundering) of counterfeit money into 
legitimate money or assets.  
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the cars over to Morocco on ferries. In the majority of cases, when the vehicle is 
driven to Greece, the former Yugoslav republics, or to Bulgaria, drivers of Bulgarian 
nationality are hired. The couriers driving to Bulgaria are paid in the region of 
€1,000–2,000, depending on the value of the car, and the corresponding risks. As 
with the thieves and spotters, the mules often come from Bulgaria and spend only a 
short period of time in Spain. On some occasions, the stolen car could be trafficked 
by a ‘team of mules’ – a man and a woman – which might seem less suspicious to 
law-enforcement officials. 
 
The mules, as one older thief explained, are usually young, because they are 
ignorant of the risks involved. ‘How stupid you should be to risk several years in 
some prison in Greece for a thousand euros.... the €1,000 euro pay will not be 
enough to pay even for a lawyer’ [OFI-16] Driving through countries such as Greece 
where penalties could be as much as several years (Cashman 2005), or Italy (where 
police operations on Adriatic ports are frequent) is risky. 
 
The mules that deliver the vehicles to Bulgaria rarely have any idea where the 
vehicle is going to be sold. They usually deliver the vehicle to an intermediary who 
eventually delivers the vehicle to its final destination. [OFI-5]  
 
4.2.4 Gray actors 
Legitimate businesses that are involved in the ‘legal’ economy are an important part 
of the car-theft industry. It will not be an exaggeration to say that without them the 
industry will come to a stall.  
4.2.4.1 Car scrap yards 
The scrap yards play an important part in the market for stolen cars and car-parts. 
They provide a good base for dismantling stolen cars; selling stolen car-parts or 
illegally imported car-parts. Scrap yards could also be used for money-laundering. 
Cars that have been genuinely scrapped following an accident turn into a precious 
commodity that car thieves use in the cloning scheme. Car thieves or illegal 
entrepreneurs (involved either in auto-theft or the sale of stolen vehicles) often own 
car-scrap yards. (LEI-1) In Spain, the scrap yards are usually owned by Spanish 
nationals, who may collabourate with Bulgarian car thieves. On some occasions they 
may sell the documentation and the key parts of the vehicle that are marked with 
identification information.  
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4.2.4.2 Car dealers 
The role of corrupt car dealers in the car-theft industry is limited, but there are some 
cases where car dealers, or the employees of car-dealerships, are complicit in the 
theft of luxury vehicles. There are two schemes. The first is to provide the thieves 
with copies of the keys of vehicles that have been sold. The second scheme is to 
provide data (the home address) of the buyers of luxury cars. (Nikolaeva 2010, OFI-
9) In one of the cases these two schemes were combined, as a Spaniard and South 
American thieves were directly running their own used car dealerships and repair 
shops. They were then stealing back the vehicles from their customers, using copies 
of the keys, cloning the vehicles and selling them again (C-1002). In Bulgaria, car-
dealerships have been used as ‘temporary storage’ for stolen cars before their further 
resale or export in the Middle East or the former Soviet Union (C-0704). The role of 
car-dealers in the sale of the stolen cars is discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
 
4.2.4.3 Transport firms 
The transportation of stolen vehicles does not always happen through mules; larger 
quantities are mixed with used cars and shipped using platform trucks. Previous 
research has shown that the transport sector in Bulgaria is extremely fractured, and 
in 2004 it consisted of around 4,290 firms with 15,563 lorries involved in international 
transport: a sector dominated by small firms, working on small profit margins and 
willing to engage in risky and criminal deals (Bezlov et al. 2004: 32-36). The firms 
involved in the transportation of stolen cars are either directly controlled by car 
thieves (e.g. Mr. B, a well known car-thief, who owns a transport company with 25 
lorries) (Cholakova 2005), or are simply companies that regularly transport used cars 
between Spain and Bulgaria. Drivers though, are usually well aware that the cargo 
includes stolen vehicles (OTI-18).  
 
4.2.4.4 Insurance companies 
The Bulgarian car theft industry has changed since the years of the racketeering 
grupirovki but the legacy of racket-insurance companies continues to have an impact 
on the theft of cars in less visible but significant ways. Since their ban in 1998, some 
racketeering insurance companies stopped their operations, while others managed to 
transform in a way that made the illicit part of their activities hidden from the public. 
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Some racketeering insurance companies ‘reinvented’ themselves under new names 
or merged with insurance companies who managed to obtain a licence to operate87. 
Although the racketeering stopped being part of their business practices, these 
insurance companies retained their control over car-theft groups to ensure that they 
did not suffer financial losses from car-theft. This allowed them to offer competitive 
prices and proved an efficient way to attract customers. Three of the largest 
insurance firms, all descendants of private security or racketeering insurance 
companies (Armeec [related with TIM], Bul-Ins [with SIC88], Lev Ins [with Spartak]) as 
of early 2011 still allegedly had relations and influence over car theft groups. These 
connections were used to recover stolen vehicles that they have insured. Armeec89, 
for instance had, what a former employees described the ‘office floor with the thugs’ 
[OTI-17]. If one of their cars is stolen, they would either contact some of the ‘ransom 
intermediaries’ to find out if the car is on the market of ransom, or may even violently 
attack some of the car theft brigades in the town to find out who has stolen vehicle. 
Thieves, though, rarely make the mistake of stealing cars insured by one of the 
above mentioned insurance companies. 
 
Although the 1998 Insurance Law banned the use of insurance stickers (which was 
the main way to signal the thieves which company has insured the car), the 
insurance companies registered their own ‘anti-theft marking’ companies90. These 
companies provide ‘encrypted marking’ which involves the laying of ‘totally inerasable 
(micro-engraving with carborundum) code, based on a minimum of the last ten digits 
of the chassis' number (VIN)’ on key parts of the vehicle. (Keit.bg)  This makes it 
unprofitable to the thieves to ‘clone’ the vehicle. More importantly each marking 
comes with a sticker of the marking company, which is displayed on the windows 
of the car, so that the thieves can clearly see it. In this way only a couple of years 
                                                          
87 The largest company, VIS-2 was not able to reinvent itself, while SIC, which enjoyed a close relations 
with the government of Ivan Kostov (1997-2001) (Capital 1996d) merged with Bul-Ins. 
88 An analysis of the Bul Ins’ present-day ownership structure leads to the lawyers of the main founders 
of SIC (see above) and a group of off-shore companies. 
89 Armeetz is owned by Chimimport, which is one of the largest publicly listed Bulgarian corporations. Its 
roots are in the business conglomerate known as ‘TIM’, which in the 1990s starter as a private security 
business in Northeast Bulgaria. TIM was started by former Navy special forces officers. Allegedly, TIM 
used extortion and aggressive debt collection tactics to build much of its present day business portfolio. 
In the 1990s TIM was involved in the theft and smuggling of vehicles in the Varna region. [LEI-1, LEI-2, 
LEI-8, LEI-9, LEI-18] 
90  The three insurance companies have established or indirectly control marking companies. The most 
widely used company Keit Ltd. is associated indirectly with Bul Ins, Info Assistance with Armeec, and 
Gold Car is directly owned by Lev Ins. (Capital 2010) 
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after the racketeering insurance stickers disappeared, the anti-theft marking stickers 
appeared, and the insurance companies continued to be able to ‘signal’ to the car 
thieves that the cars were insured by them.  
 
The insurance companies also turned the ‘anti-theft marking’ into a multimillion euro 
business91 by extending the marking service to most other insurance companies, 
which had no relation with car-theft groups (see Table 8 below). As of the end of 
2010, 70% of the 567,190 cars that had car-theft insurance in Bulgaria, were marked, 
wielding revenues €20 and €25 million. (Capital 2011b, Bulgaria: Financial 
Supervision Commission 2010). Apollo and Balkan, another racketeering insurance 
company, stopped functioning as an insurance company, but it continued to provided 
anti-theft marking through its private security company, Arcus Security92. Since 2000 
the Italian Insurance Company ‘Generali’ (Assicurazioni Generali), started to use the 
services of Arcus Security93. In January 2011, the Minister of Interior publicly called 
for the protective marking and the stickers to be banned, because ‘the stickers are 
part of the signals that are sent [by the insurance companies] to the criminal 
networks’ and they ‘exert significant influence over car theft’ (Capital 2011). During 
the roundtable forum where the banning of stickers was discussed, representatives 
of Lev Ins, Bul Ins, and Armeec all objected the ban. (ibid) 
 
Insurance companies 
ranked by car-insurance 
income 
Full car insurance 
(incl. 'car-theft') 
income (BGN, 
million) 
Liability 
insurance (LI) 
income (BGN, 
million) 
Car-theft and LI 
as a share of 
total income 
‘Protective 
marking’ 
companies 
DZI 75 46 81% Keit Ltd. 
Bul-Ins 68 12 95% Keit Ltd. 
Armeec 68 18 80% Info-assistance 
Bulstrad 67 41 67% Keit Ltd. 
Alianz 42 8 50% No marking 
Lev Ins 29 67 86% Gold car 
Unica 26 8 71% Keit Ltd. 
Euro Ins 25 17 80% No marking 
Generali 15 6 49% Arcus Security  
Victoria 13 11 68% No marking 
                                                          
91  
92 Many of the racketeering insurance companies did not even bother to sever formally the relations with 
the private security companies that preceded them. The private security firms simply established 
‘insurance companies’ and became shareholders in them. 
93 It is publicly known that the ultimate owner of Arcus Security is one of the well known criminal 
entrepreneurs in Sofia, who controls much of the drugs distribution in the city. 
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Insurance companies 
ranked by car-insurance 
income 
Full car insurance 
(incl. 'car-theft') 
income (BGN, 
million) 
Liability 
insurance (LI) 
income (BGN, 
million) 
Car-theft and LI 
as a share of 
total income 
‘Protective 
marking’ 
companies 
Bulgarian property 7 27 93% Keit Ltd. 
Interamerican 7 5 53% No marking 
HDI 5 6 81% No marking 
OZK 3 5 49% Gold car 
Table 8. Insurance and anti-theft marking companies in Bulgaria (2009) 
Source: Financial Supervision Commission, company sources quoted in Peev (2010) 
 
The table above shows a few things. First, two anti-theft marking companies, Keit 
and Gold-car, related allegedly to SIC and, respectively, Spartak racketeering 
insurers, provide ‘marking’ to several other insurance companies. Second, car-
insurance represents over 80% in the case of Armeec and Lev Ins, and in the case of 
Bul Ins 95% of their overall income, putting all three amongst the top 6 largest 
insurance companies in Bulgaria. 
 
The control over the car-theft groups is in practice done via an ‘in-house security 
department’, whose members are employed either directly by the insurer, or by a 
separate security company. There are two common methods insurance companies 
use to deal with car thieves: one is the use of violence against car thieves to recover 
stolen vehicles; the second, less often used, is negotiation with the ransom-seekers.  
 
The graph below shows how one insurance company is presently related to its 
security unit / ‘hit squad’, headed by a former car-thief, via which stolen cars are 
recovered.94 The head of the insurance company, who owns the company through 
front-persons, is a former anti-terrorist squad head, has been charged with numerous 
counts of organised crime and extortion. He was one of the two founding owners of 
another one of the major racketeering insurance company that operated in the 
1990s. 
  
                                                          
94 This information surfaced following a number of kidnappings (see below) the head of the security unit 
was allegedly involved.  
 Figure 19. Insurance company 
Source: Ciela company registry database
 
The role of the Bulgarian insurance companies is an important factor in analysing 
Bulgarian car thieves in Spain in four key respects:
• The insurance companies have created an atmosphere of fear amongst the car
thieves and tightly regulate the market for stolen vehicles in Bulgaria. Some 
offender interviewees claimed that it is much safer for them to work in Spain, and 
that working ‘solo’ in Bulgaria was practically impossible.
• The pool of available vehicles th
of insurance companies is small. 
opportunities in Bulgaria when compared with Spain, this restricts the 
possibilities even further
• On the other hand, the insurer
abroad: if subsequently 
often use the fact that it is stolen to avoid any additional costs, and might reveal 
its existence to the police
• There are speculations that 
participants in the car
in the country so that the demand for car
high. The compa
stolen cars. (LE
sale of cars that have been
scrapped to car-
 
                                        
95 i.e. when they pay a car
accident and has to be scrapped. Instead of just sending the car to a scrap yard, the company would 
sell it to car-theft groups, who use the VIN numbers to clone the vehicle or parts. 
Head of Security Unit
Private Security Company
Private Corporation
Insurance Company
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The involvement of insurance companies in the car-theft industry in Bulgaria 
contrasts sharply with the situation n Spain, where there are only sporadic reports of 
the occasional involvement of corrupt insurance brokers in the car-theft industry. The 
cases have been mostly related to insurance fraud. In the province of Pontevedra 
(Galicia), one such case uncovered by the police involved a number of insurance 
brokers, workshops, ‘damage evaluation experts’, and a drug-distribution network. 
The brokers colluded with criminals and service shops, using a number of cars that 
had minor damages from a 2006 flood, exaggerated the damage involved, and used 
stolen car-parts to fix some of the vehicles. (Laopinioncoruna.es 2009) 
4.2.5  
4.2.5.1 Leasing companies 
The leasing business in Bulgaria has also been linked to car-theft networks in 
Bulgaria. In 2010, the investigation of the Austrian bank Hipo Alpe Adria (HAA), 
exposed a number of fraud schemes in which the Bulgarian branch of the bank was 
also involved. In Bulgaria, the managers of HAA were involved in fraud schemes that 
facilitated, what in effect was, car theft. There were two types of schemes: in the first, 
the customers paid kick-backs to the managers who leased cars to them (as well as 
multi-million dollar yachts). After some time, the payments on the yachts were 
stopped, and the cars were returned to the leasing company, and new ones were 
purchased, while the entire risk and loss was carried by the company.  
 
In another scheme, the cars might not be returned at all, but exported and sold to 
car-theft networks abroad. This was one of the schemes that HAA was involved in. 
The entrepreneur who organised the scheme, bribed the head of HAA in Bulgaria 
and other top managers to approve multi-million euro loans for the purchase of high-
end luxury cars (over 100,000 euros) to either unemployed or low-income people. 
These were either the entrepreneur’s friends or acquaintances who were defrauded 
by him, because he had assured them he would pay for the leasing of the vehicles. 
The entrepreneur’s girlfriend even registered a luxury rent-a-car company that 
purchased a number of cars with HAA funding. The cars were then exported and sold 
to customers in the Middle East.  
 
In this scheme, legally the car is not considered stolen, but ‘mishandled’. The reason 
is that, contractually, the leasing company is the title-holder of the car, and simply 
has a contract with the buyer for the use of the vehicle. If the buyer fails to return the 
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car (and stops the payments), the only course of action for the company is to sue the 
buyer for non-payment of the loan. The company does not have any proof that the 
car has been sold to criminal networks, and cannot declare it stolen to the police, 
neither can it claim car-theft insurance. In other cases, the car is declared stolen, and 
the loss is accrued by the insurance company.  
 
In addition to the above described entrepreneur, the HAA had a number of high-level 
organised-crime figures amongst its customers: some of the SIC founders (see 
previous chapter). Using various front men, they leased several million euro worth of 
luxury cars and yachts, and later did not repay the amounts. Although, the HAA was 
more of an exception, it was the one of the largest leasing companies, which was 
even named as the main driving force behind yachting in Bulgaria (having funded – in 
2007 alone – the purchase of 75 yachts worth some 50 million euro). 
 
In 2010, a new scheme was attempted, where the leased cars were exported to 
Germany. There, the group made counterfeit documents showing that the cars were 
owned by a German leasing company. Following this, the cars were then imported 
into Spain, and offered at an independent used-car dealership in Pamplona. The 
scheme involved at least three local partners in Spain, who arranged the sales. The 
Bulgarians in this case still played the role of suppliers. [C-1010] (24 Chassa 2010b).  
 
4.2.5.2 Police officers 
Corrupt police officers can play direct roles in assisting car theft. In Spain their role is 
very limited, and although some interviewees were suspicious of police officers being 
complicit, it is more likely that they extrapolated from their knowledge of the Bulgarian 
context to Spain. In Bulgaria, police officers were involved in three ways. First, by 
providing data on targets (the traffic police have information on the brand and car 
model, and personal data on the owner). [OFI-15] Second, low-level patrol police 
officers had been directly involved in assisting thefts: they would warn thieves if a 
patrol car was in the area where the vehicle was being stolen. (OFI-8, Bezlov et al. 
2007) Lastly, in Bulgaria, traffic police officers have provided thieves with data on 
cars that have been scrapped after an accident, and could be cloned (similar to the 
role played by some scrap yards). (Nikolaeva 2010) 
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4.3 Competition in the car-theft industry 
 
The competitive landscapes look quite different in Bulgaria and Spain. There are two 
aspects that should be considered: competition in the supply of stolen cars, i.e. 
amongst ‘theft enterprises’; and competition in the selling of stolen cars, i.e. between 
‘selling enterprise’ and used car dealers / other selling enterprises (discussed in the 
next chapter). 
 
The car-theft ‘industry’ in Spain is generally ‘open’ and ‘entry barriers’ are low, 
particularly in big cities, like Madrid and Barcelona. No group tries to enforce or 
control certain geographic localities as a source of supply for car theft [OFI-1, LEI-3, 
OFI-10]. Although there are many theft enterprises, ‘there is enough bread for 
everyone’ [OFI-16]. In some instances, the lack of clear territories is a reason for 
‘clashes amongst competing groups’ [OFI-10]. In smaller cities, such as Alicante, 
‘groups more or less know who works where and find it undesirable to work on 
someone else’s territory’ [OFI-10] 
 
In Spain, the majority of the competing enterprises are usually defined, both by police 
and by offenders, in terms of their dominant ethnicity: Spaniards, Moroccans, Poles, 
Romanians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Albanians (OFI-10) (See Annex 3 data for OC 
group ethnic makeup). 
 
This competitive landscape has changed over the years, as the demand in some of 
the destination countries has changed. For instance, in the early 1990s Polish groups 
were very active in Spain stealing cheap cars (Gómez 2005: 211, quoting police 
source). By around 2001 - 2002, though, the police cases analysed indicated that 
Polish groups had already oriented themselves towards stealing luxury vehicles, and 
they were largely absent from police reports in the 2004 – 2010 period: the main 
explanation is that Poland which for many years was considered a top destination for 
cars stolen in Europe gradually became a ‘saturated’ market.   
 
The competing groups from other countries play a dual role. They are also potential 
customers, as they might have the connections through which to sell cars stolen by 
Bulgarian car-theft enterprises. Therefore the relations between Bulgarian and other 
car-theft groups were not described as hostile.  
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In Bulgaria the competition landscape seems quite different from Spain. Historically 
in the 1990s, the car-theft groups were associated with particular racketeering 
insurance companies:  
 
‘In that period in Lozenetz [a neighbourhood in central Sofia] it was about 30 of us 
that worked in this area for SIC....I didn’t know any of the groups that worked in other 
neighbourhoods, because we only stole cars in the centre of the city’ [OFI-20]  
 
This type of turf-protection and association of groups with insurance companies 
continued to exist after the closure / transformation of the racketeering insurance 
companies, although, it is only loosely respected by car-theft groups, especially in 
regards to big-cities or sea-side resorts.  
 
One respondent drew a parallel with the drugs markets, stating that while in 
Barcelona, it was not a problem for him to approach a drug dealer, even a street one, 
and sell him some cocaine (which the respondent might have received as a form of 
payment for a sold stolen car), this was not possible in Sofia. [OFI-15]  
 
The car theft at the local level is often controlled by the same criminal entrepreneurs 
who control the drug distribution. The market in Sofia is highly structured, and 
regions are controlled by particular drug dealers, and this monopoly is enforced with 
the use of violence. (Bezlov et al. 2007: 39-88). It is not always possible to tightly 
enforce this local-level control in big cities in Bulgaria: both law-enforcement officers 
and offenders gave examples of this. Therefore groups from the smaller towns often 
‘raid’ big cities or tourist resorts, and take the car back to their town. Offenders from 
Pazardjik, stated that they generally did not ‘work’ in Sofia, and that this was 
considered dangerous. ‘You can do it a few times, but if you start doing it regularly, 
‘they’ will find out’. [OFI-9] To local illegal entrepreneurs who control an area / town 
the luxury cars are like ‘natural resources’ they have at their disposal. They control 
the exploitation of this ‘natural resource’ and want a share of the profit. 
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4.4 Industry rules and regulations 
 
The rules governing the vehicle-theft industry in Bulgaria need to be seen in light of 
the history (described above) of the oligopolistic market model that the grupirovki and 
racketeering insurance companies imposed for most of the 1990s. Historically, there 
are very few instances in which criminal groups have established monopoly control 
over the car-theft industry. This has happened only in situations where such groups 
have assumed control, or have an impact on the vehicles market in general – such 
as they did in Bulgaria in the mid 1990s and in Russia for much of the 1990s.  
 
In the present day (2010), control over the distribution of stolen cars is difficult to 
establish. Yet, the role of insurance companies in Bulgaria over the car-theft industry 
cannot be dismissed. Law-enforcement officers and offenders agree that many prefer 
to either steal vehicles not insured by insurance companies likely to resort to force, or 
to move their operations abroad altogether. There were some attempts by former VIS 
and SIC hit-squad members to racketeer vehicle-theft entrepreneurs in Spain, but 
these proved unsuccessful. [LEI-4] Offender interviewees also stated that they had 
not seen any threat or attempts either from racketeers or from other vehicle-theft 
groups to monopolize vehicle theft in any particular area. 
 
The key mechanism for regulation in the car-theft industry is trust. Trust is the key 
principle in choosing partners to participate in the theft schemes. The main reason for 
bringing people from Bulgaria to Spain for different ‘jobs’ is described, by both 
offenders and law-enforcement sources, as the issue of ‘trust’: these are people that 
one can trust, because they have already worked together in Bulgaria.  
 
 ‘We were all one big pack, although everyone was running their own crew, 
and orders. ‘Tzuki’ was a very good thief, probably one of the best ones I 
know. But as soon as he started fucking around they ‘cooked him’ and went 
to prison for a few years. We found out that he was behind several thefts of 
cars from our depots, where we stored the cars that were already stolen 
and cloned’ [OFI-20]  
 
I loved cars, alarms, and things like this. It was a hobby for me. I started 
first being fascinated with locks of any kind; I actually really liked pigeons, 
and I started stealing pigeons as a kid – but the owner always had these 
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really heavy metal locks, so I had to learn how to open them...Then started 
working with cars.. My boss used to bring me a car and leave it with me for 
a few days to learn how the locks worked....When I started doing drugs they 
[my brigade] were afraid that I was going to ‘sing them’ to the police. Their 
opinion about me changed completely, and they kicked me out. [OFI-22] 
 
Violence is rarely used as instrument. In Bulgaria, only three known car-theft related 
murders have been registered since 2000 when the oligopolistic market model was 
dissolved (Bezlov et al. 2007). The murders of various car thieves in 2009 and 2010 
were all related to kidnappings for ransom (see Chapter 6). The majority of cases 
involving murders of Bulgarian car thieves or car-dealers in Spain also seem to have 
been related to drugs cases rather than to settling accounts related to car-theft.  
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5 Selling stolen vehicles 
 
The selling of stolen vehicles is a topic that is almost entirely absent from the 
academic literature. It is also rarely the subject of interest of police reports. The 
research or investigative focus is almost always on the theft of the vehicle. There are 
at least three reasons that might explain this. First, the police often do not prioritise 
‘victim-less’ crimes. While the theft is almost always registered and there is pressure 
to clear up the crime, the investigation of ‘sales enterprises’ (if located in a different 
country) are only part of the handful of international investigations. Partially this could 
be explained by the fact that the theft of the car and its sale almost always happen in 
different jurisdictions or police districts. Secondly, while the theft is commonly 
associated with juvenile or socially disadvantaged offenders, who attract much 
attention, the sale is more an elite, almost ‘white-collar’ crime, which is much more 
difficult to research or investigate. Lastly, police investigation into ‘sales enterprises’ 
is challenging because it is difficult to prove that the sellers / importers of stolen cars 
were not bona fide buyers themselves (which some sellers often pretend to be). The 
present chapter aims to shed some light on who are the sellers and the buyers of 
stolen vehicles in Spain and in Bulgaria. 
 
The ability to sell the stolen vehicles (in Bulgarian criminal slang ‘to untie the vehicle’ 
razvarjesh) is the transaction that constitutes the illegal enterprise’s entry into the 
used-car market. The data presented in the previous two chapters shows that, during 
the period of attempted market entry (2000–2008), Bulgarian car-theft networks 
faced very similar market conditions in Spain and in Bulgaria: booming used and 
new-car markets, with even steeper demand for luxury and construction vehicles. 
The new-car sales figures also suggest that the ‘criminal opportunities’ in both Spain 
and Bulgaria increased significantly, as more and more new luxury vehicles were 
sold and available for theft on the streets.  
 
The types of distribution channels for stolen cars in Bulgarian and Spain are in many 
ways similar. These channels in many ways overlap with the distribution channels for 
used cars described in Chapter 3. Although it is difficult to say what proportion of the 
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sales take place through a particular distribution channel, it could be summarised that 
there are two main types of sales of stolen cars: 
Direct sales to final customers: 
• To (mostly) bona fide customers, via ads in newspapers, magazines, used-
car sale websites, public spaces (street / parking lot sales) 
• To (mostly) non-bona fide customers: via informal networks (acquaintances, 
friends of friends, etc., or to informal intermediaries) 
 
Few theft enterprises attempt to set up an integrated structure with its own 
distribution network or their own used-car dealership. There are at least two main 
explanations for this: (1) it provides very limited opportunities for sales; and (2) it 
increases the risks, as the fully integrated business cycle (theft-cloning-export-sale) 
over-exposes the criminal network. This explains why no entrepreneurs rely only on 
this ‘closed business cycle’ model.  
 
Sales via intermediaries (to both bona fide and non-bona fide customers):  
• Used-car dealerships 
• Used-car open-exchange markets  
• Car service shops 
This seems to be the most common approach used by Bulgarian (and other foreign) 
entrepreneurs in Spain. As in any country, the distribution of high-class, luxury, or 
commercial vehicles is difficult, as there are fewer distribution channels and a 
smaller customer base for these than there are for the cheaper, mass-produced 
cars. As the analysis in the previous chapter showed, unlike in the 1990s, after 2000 
the resale of stolen vehicles almost exclusively focuses on luxury vehicles.  
 
The sale of hundreds of vehicles per year requires an excellent organisation and 
wide distribution network. Most car-dealerships do not make more than a few 
hundred sales per year (especially in Bulgaria). Selling large quantities (hundreds) of 
vehicles through informal networks, or through private sales relying on newspaper or 
Internet ads, as well as storing large quantities of stolen vehicles, is unfeasible and 
risky. Therefore, any larger degree of organisation requires the use of multiple risky 
channels, and especially legitimate used-car dealerships. 
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5.1 Selling stolen cars in Spain 
 
The analysis of the police cases of Bulgarian car-theft networks provides little insight 
as to how stolen cars are sold in Spain in part because very few sales of stolen 
vehicles by Bulgarians seem to have taken place in Spain. There are no data on 
Bulgarian stolen-car ‘sales entrepreneurs’ in Spain. Therefore an additional analysis 
of 22 cases involving networks that sold cars in Spain was carried out, in order to 
gain a broader understanding of how stolen vehicles are sold.  
 
In Spain the majority of stolen cars are sold to bona fide customers (being either 
dealerships or final customers). This usually takes place once the vehicle has been 
cloned, and fake car documents obtained, and the car has been registered. The sale 
of stolen cars is subject to little territorial control from ‘organised crime’. There is no 
regional / local control over the sales of stolen / luxury vehicles. The main reason is 
that, since most sales are to bona fide customers, the distribution mainly coincides 
with the legal channels of distribution of used cars. 
 
5.1.1 Direct sales 
 
In Spain, the Bulgarian theft networks rarely attempt direct sales to final customers. 
The direct sales seemed to be only an opportunistic ‘sideline’ business. In the cases 
where this happened, used-car sale websites or printed press ads were used to 
attract customers. The way such sales were approached was: (1) a vehicle, which 
could be cloned, was found; (2) a target vehicle to be stolen was identified. Then 
there were two alternatives: (3-a) either the vehicle was stolen and then an ad with 
an attractive sub-market price was put on the web (C-0707, C-0408, C-1209), or (3-
b) the targeted vehicle was advertised and it was only stolen if an interested 
customer wanted to see it (C-0307, C-0508).  
 
The use of the internet to sell used cars significantly changed the position of some 
the Bulgarian theft enterprises in Spain, because it provided them with country-wide 
access to final customers. As noted in the chapter on the used-car market, after 2001 
the internet increasingly became the main way to connect buyers and sellers of used 
cars. That’s why the attempts by the Bulgarian car-theft networks to sell cars via the 
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internet appear in police cases only after 2006 (although there might have been 
some prior to that as well). The use of the internet, though, seems to still have 
remained marginal. Luxury cars are a significant investment and the purchase of an 
expensive vehicle takes place either via informal networks or via used-car 
dealerships that might offer some type of warranty: in either case these are strategies 
that compensate the information asymmetry about the quality of the car between 
buyers and sellers. 
 
‘Street sales’ are also very popular in some parts of Spain: individuals simply leave 
their cars near train stations with ‘For sale’ signs (one could see dozens of vehicles 
lined up along main streets around some train stations).  This simple approach has 
been used by some criminal groups as well. For instance, a group (of Spaniards) that 
sold (mostly in Merida, Spain) 20 luxury cars stolen from Germany and Belgium, 
used the central streets of the city to display the ‘for sale’ signs. In this case, the 
group used a local man ‘known in Merida for working mostly as a dealer of imported 
used cars from Western Europe’. (C-0707d) 
 
The direct establishment of a sales outlet by criminal networks in Spain is rare, as 
it is a significant investment and risky (C-1002, C-0705). One such case (C-0705) 
involved a very large illegal enterprise run by Spanish nationals. It involved 14 
companies that were set up in six cities (Barcelona, Madrid, Seville, Huelva, Marbella 
and Alicante). They were used to smuggle in at least 600 cars from other countries 
(Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, The Netherlands, and USA). The enterprise 
used two types of companies. First, a number of used-car dealerships were set up 
that imported both stolen vehicles and used luxury vehicles, which were imported as 
scrapped vehicles to avoid VAT or import taxes. The importing companies sold the 
vehicles immediately to other companies that had nothing to do with car import-
export. In this way the legal entity was used as a front to disguise the individuals 
involved. Once the sale between companies took place in Spain, the vehicle was 
already ‘legalised’ and could be sold to the final customer. All companies were 
registered in the names of socially disadvantaged persons (mostly homeless people). 
The fiscal impact on the state treasury amounted to at least €152 million. The 
scheme also involved corrupt police, State Security, and Civil Guard officers.  
 
The last form of direct sales is the utilisation of informal channels of distribution – 
through friends, acquaintances, ‘friends of friends’, etc. – to final customers in Spain. 
157 
 
For Bulgarian criminal enterprises this seems to have worked with mostly one 
category of customers – other criminal networks, which seems to be the main 
social network within which most Bulgarian criminal enterprises operated. There are 
three types of customers: 
• Offenders who purchase the car in order to commit other crimes. In this case, 
the sale price is usually low and cloning of the vehicle is not even needed. 
The vehicle is for short-term use. Some small car-theft groups or even 
individual thieves can directly supply stolen cars, without needing an entire 
illegal enterprise: normally only fake licence plates and documents are 
necessary.  
• Offenders who buy the cars for their own personal use: this category seems 
to be small, as many offenders (including car thieves) prefer to minimize risks 
by avoiding driving stolen vehicles.  
• Criminal networks that buy the cars to sell them for profit (either in Spain or 
they export them). 
The access to this customer base requires wide informal connections. All interviews 
with both offenders and police, as well as the majority of Spanish police cases 
reviewed, reported that criminal entrepreneurs and car thieves were involved in 
various other criminal activities, both in Bulgaria and in Spain. There are several 
factors that explain their involvement in other crimes: 
• Seasonality / downtime: car markets in general (including those in Bulgaria 
and Spain) have annual seasonality: both in August, and between November 
and January the demand is very low. In March, June, and September it is 
almost double than what it is in August. (European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association 2009: 11-12). This seasonality is reflected in the used-car market 
(and stolen car sales) as well. Therefore, despite the high level of 
professionalism and specialisation required for car theft, illegal entrepreneurs 
and car thieves diversify their sources of income to compensate for 
‘downtime’, and participate in a number of other criminal activities.  
• Demand: The lack of a constant flow of orders for cars means, that many 
criminals involved in car theft look for additional sources of income. Several of 
the Bulgarian criminal networks dismantled were involved in the distribution of 
counterfeit money (C-0298; C-0202; C-0803, C-0407B). With the decrease in 
demand for cars due to the economic crisis, many car thieves turned to other 
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activities – drugs trafficking (see next chapter) and especially skimming of 
bank cards (OFI-16, OFI-14) (C-0298; C-0704; C-0607).  
• Skills: the skills used in car theft can be applied to other crimes, such as 
burglary, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, counterfeiting documents. In 
addition, car theft is facilitated by other crimes (burglary, robbery, and fraud 
may be used to get hold of car keys). Burglary and robbery are usually 
secondary or auxiliary activities to obtain keys to the vehicles. 
• Synergies: established trafficking routes, where smuggled vehicles can serve 
as containers for the trafficking of other illegal goods (drugs and arms). 
 
As the next chapter shows, Bulgarian car thieves gradually became involved in a 
number of other criminal activities and markets, especially in the drugs trade in 
Spain. Several offender interviewees, as well as a number of police cases indicate 
that stolen cars were sold to Moroccan drug traffickers, both for the purpose of 
transporting drugs, and for resale (C-0897, C-0298, C -0798, C-0100, C-0600, C-
1100, C-0205, C-0306). Africans were also clients (C-1007 – Cameroun and Nigeria).   
 
5.1.2 Use of intermediaries 
 
From the point of view of a Bulgarian theft enterprise set up in Spain, there are two 
main categories of customers: 
Wholesalers: this could be a ‘sales enterprise’, or another illegal network set up in 
Spain, that traffics vehicles out to another country: Moroccan (C-0209) or Lithuanian- 
dominated groups are the most frequent customers. Other car-theft networks that 
export the vehicles to sub-Saharan Africa (C-0202b, C-1007, C-1006), Western 
Europe (C-0508, C-1204) or the former Soviet Union (e.g. Ukraine, Armenia) (C-
0706b, C-1206) have also been customers of Bulgarian theft enterprises.  
 
Retailers: used-car dealerships (locally based in Spain). This type of customer is 
usually a local partner, part of the criminal network. An established, locally run used-
car dealership might be preferable to investing in one’s own dealership. It not only 
reduces the risks of being detected (typically, newly established dealerships for 
luxury cars run by foreigners raise the suspicions of the police) but also increases the 
chances of selling the vehicle. The distribution of stolen vehicles by Bulgarians in 
Spain, though, rarely relies on the local dealerships. In the 55 cases analysed this 
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arrangement was identified in only two of the Bulgarian cases (C-0307, C-1010), and 
in one case related to other foreign networks (C-0310). Interviewees, on the other 
hand provided more details on such arrangements. One interviewee worked for an 
illegal enterprise in Italy, where one of the partners was a local Italian, who had a car 
dealership. [OFI-9] Another interviewee viewed the sale to local dealerships as risky, 
as it is difficult to get them to collude: 
‘Selling to a local dealership [in Spain] is like going straight into the wolf’s 
mouth! I haven’t tried anything like this. I know some guys who tried it in 
2002, using some Spaniards, but it was a flop.’ (OFI-7)  
 
Another interviewee provided a slightly different view: 
‘It is difficult to find clients in Spain. Part of the clients were Bulgarians. 
Others could be found via car-dealerships, or via acquaintances...you may 
here that someone is looking to buy a BMW, and you offer then half-
price...For the used car dealerships you need good communication with the 
owner of the dealership, but this a higher level negotiation that only the boss 
does. None of our clients were random people, they were all the kind of 
people you can count on’ [OFI-11]  
 
Indigenous Spanish groups, on the other hand, seem to use car-dealerships as 
intermediaries in selling stolen cars a lot more often. Although in many cases dealers 
are defrauded into selling a stolen vehicle, without being themselves involved in the 
scheme (C-0910, C-1204), there are cases, in which they are part of the network (C-
0307, C-0909).  
 
In the Costa del Sol region, where Bulgarian car-theft networks operated, the 
Spanish police sources indicate that there are some independent used-car dealers, 
especially Irish or British nationals that are particularly prone to selling illegal luxury 
cars. Yet, there is no indication that Bulgarians relied on them, as these dealers 
worked with cars imported from outside Spain. (LEI-12) One of the cases (C-0211) 
provided a glimpse into how one such network operated. The high-end stolen luxury 
cars were imported from Italy and Central Europe. They were then distributed via car 
numerous dealerships throughout Spain: Pontevedra, Madrid, La Línea de la 
Concepción (on the border with Gibraltar) and Marbella (amongst others). The 
entrepreneurs running this ‘sales enterprise’ were wealthy businessmen living in 
luxurious houses in Marbella. One of them was also president of an exclusive sports 
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cars club, which understandably gave him access to many potential customers and 
distributors.  
 
The question of what proportion of buyers (either final customers or dealerships) of 
used cars in Spain are ‘bona fide’ buyers does not have a clear answer. The cases 
analysed indicate that most (C-0310, C-0202b, C-0307, C-0909) or all (C-0910, C-
1204) of the sales of stolen cars by Bulgarians or other foreign criminal networks 
were then sold to bona fide customers. Even in the cases where the cars were 
stolen, because there was an order placed by a client, these were still bona fide 
clients who had seen an advertisement on the internet and ordered the car. In one 
case, the police described the bona fide customers as ‘well-known personalities, 
some of which held senior positions in the regional government’. (C-0706)  
 
The fact that most buyers were bona fide often forced the sellers to adopt a number 
of strategies to dispel suspicions that the vehicles might be stolen: 
• The vehicles were sold with documents showing that they were imported 
from Germany / Belgium (from where many second-hand vehicles are 
imported). 
• The vehicles were fictitiously bought by companies so that the buyers 
(dealerships or final buyers) are led to think that they are buying second-
hand company cars (C-0409b). Companies were established in the names of 
homeless individuals or offenders. The cars were transferred from one 
company to the other and eventually sold, thus hiding the origin of the car. 
Some of these companies were presented as being involved in the import of 
used cars (C-0505). 
• The vehicles were transferred in the name of Spanish nationals (without their 
knowledge, in effect ‘identity theft’) (C-1003). 
 
5.2 Selling stolen cars in Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian car-theft enterprises based in Spain most often sell the stolen vehicles 
in Bulgaria to local illegal entrepreneurs ‘sale enteprises’. Occasionally, some car-
theft enterprises in Spain might make direct sales to acquaintances in Bulgaria, but 
most often the order comes from a local sales entrepreneur. There are two types of 
Bulgarian stolen-vehicle entrepreneurs: 
• entrepreneurs mainly or solely involved in local sales 
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• entrepreneurs who mainly deal with the re-export of the cars.  
In effect, the two are quite interconnected, and one entrepreneur might be involved in 
both types of activity.  
 
Usually, before they are stolen the number and type of cars are negotiated between 
sale entrepreneurs and the car-theft enterprise, and then ordered. In one case from 
1999, before engaging in a vehicle-theft operation, the group coordinator spent about 
a month and a half in Bulgaria and Macedonia arranging the infrastructure for the 
distribution of the stolen vehicles (light trucks). In the previous months, after similar 
preparation, 100 light trucks had been stolen and exported from Spain to Macedonia 
and Russia.  
 
5.2.1 The sales enterprise 
 
The distribution of stolen vehicles in Bulgaria is structured around car-theft / sales 
entrepreneurs: ‘2-3 guys in each of the bigger towns’ (LEI-1, OFI-9, OFI-3) and 
‘about 10 guys in Sofia’ (LEI-1). These entrepreneurs do not exercise any type of 
territorial control. In Pazardjik, for instance, some interviewees claimed that there are 
two individuals known to be the main distributors of stolen vehicles [OFI-4, OFI-5]. 
Another interviewee from Pazardjik stated that ‘there are only four big used-car 
dealerships, but they used front-men as owners of the dealerships’ and sold stolen 
cars occasionally. In Gabrovo there seemed to be a couple of ‘sales entrepreneurs’ 
[LEI-14, OTI-10]. Solo players would occasionally appear in smaller towns as well 
(see below Dryanovo example). 
 
These individuals might be engaged only in sales but might also have the 
connections to put together a car-theft crew (thieves and spotters) and send it over to 
Spain in cases where a theft-entrepreneur in Spain requests more man-power to 
complete an order. These sales entrepreneurs almost always have other businesses, 
including legal ones. They might even own used-car dealerships (usually via a front 
man). This allows them access to a wide network of potential buyers. 
 
The sales entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, usually, do not come in contact with the car at 
any point. This explains the difficulty of investigating them. Very few of these sales 
entrepreneurs in Sofia have ever been successfully convicted. (LEI-3, LEI-4) 
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They could either arrange a direct sale to a customer, use another intermediary sales 
entrepreneur, or a used-car dealer in another town, or sell via their own car 
dealership. In any case, layering the sale by introducing more intermediaries and 
middle men, especially in the transfer of the money, is usually done to reduce the 
risks. The majority of sales take place via personal connections (these will be 
considered in depth in the next chapter).  
 
One example of a Bulgarian sales entrepreneur who relies primarily on informal 
connections to sell stolen vehicles is a person nicknamed ‘Pirana96’ in the town of 
Gabrovo. Pirana started before 1990 as car / petty thief himself, but as early as the 
mid-1990s he became an ‘organiser’, a ‘theft and sales entrepreneur’, organising car 
thefts in northern-central Bulgaria. He started his career around 1997 by exporting 
stolen cars from Bulgaria to Italy and the Czech Republic, using his family (his father, 
wife, and even with the baby as a disguise) to drive stolen cars. Around 2002 he 
moved to Spain, to the Madrid area, where he came into contact with locally 
established entrepreneurs. He went back and forth several times, but in recent years 
he had established himself back in Gabrovo. He then gradually realigned his 
business towards selling stolen cars in Bulgaria. After a couple of deals were 
botched, his main focus became selling stolen cars from Spain in Albania, and more 
recently in Macedonia. In Bulgaria he had country-wide connections with other local 
car-sales entrepreneurs, as well as ‘exporters’ to the Middle East. He has also 
accumulated sufficient resources to invest in real estate and to buy a well-known 
restaurant in the city, therefore gradually becoming if not part of the local economic 
elite, at least well-known enough to local businessmen. This has further strengthened 
his connections and ability to sell stolen vehicles.97 (LEI-14, LEI-15, OTI-11) 
 
Used-car dealerships also play an important role for some ‘sales entrepreneurs’, 
either providing temporary storage for the stolen car, or as a means of access to 
access to bona fide customers. The used-car dealers that are used to sell stolen cars 
are primarily dealing in non-stolen used cars; they mix them in with stolen vehicles 
                                                          
96 The nickname is fictitious to preserve the identity of interviewees.  
97 Pirana has never been jailed, although he was given a conditional sentence with a 25,000-euro bond, 
which would be forfeited if he was convicted of another crime, which is how the interviewees explained 
his focus on selling stolen cars in Macedonia or Albania. As his business was mostly outside Bulgaria, 
local police simply prefer to use him as a source of information, as his crimes are outside their 
jurisdiction. [OTI-11]  
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[OFI-6, OF17, LEI-5, LEI-14]. The top luxury-car dealers, described in Chapter 3, 
normally do not participate in such schemes, and do not display and sell stolen cars 
(LEI-4). (This is not to say that such dealers are not in a position to arrange the sale 
of a stolen car, if a non-bona fide buyer approaches them. The shooting in early 2011 
of a well known car-thief on the premises of one of the well known luxury dealerships 
in Sofia supports this point). The used-car dealers are often in a position to detect if a 
car they are going to resell is a stolen one. In most cities there are certain car-
mechanics who are used to examine the condition of used cars. They can easily 
recognise if the vehicle is a ‘clone’ (usually because most of them at some point have 
been involved in changing VINs).  
 
In the period up to 2007, there were some used-car dealers or sales entrepreneurs 
who had sufficient protection from the authorities that they could sell stolen cars 
without much fear of prosecution. One typical example is Mr. Y.98 His used-car 
dealership was situated in one of Plovdiv’s Roma neighbourhoods.99 He was the front 
man for three ‘sales enterprises’ based in Plovdiv, which imported stolen vehicles. 
The police raided his dealership repeatedly between 2003 and 2004, on one 
occasion finding as many as 13 stolen cars for sale. The prosecutor assigned to work 
on the case blocked any further investigations, and the stolen cars were eventually 
returned, while Mr. Y was never prosecuted for car theft, despite several police raids 
that found stolen cars (LEI-1, Maritsa 2009).  
 
Mr. Y’s case is typical in several respects. He was little more than a ‘front man’, 
acting as distributor for the main ‘sales entrepreneurs’ in Plovdiv. He received 
protection by them throughout the years. In 1990s he was protected by the regional 
racketeering private security company in Plovdiv, known as ‘Club 777’, and later100 
on by SIC (see previous chapter), which were the main importers of stolen vehicles 
                                                          
98 Mr. Y was eventually arrested for distributing heroin via his dealership, where used cars were used as 
storage and distribution retail outlets for heroin. The dealership was situated in one of the largest Roma 
neighbourhoods and main heroin distribution points, in Stolipinovo (in the third-largest city in Bulgaria, 
Plovdiv).  
99 Stolipinovo is one of the largest Roma neighbourhoods in the country, with the majority of Roma being 
Turkish speaking and have Turkish self-identity. There are many metal-workshops (including car-repair), 
which follow the traditional blacksmith artisanship practised by the Roma. In the period 2000–2008 the 
neighbourhood was the main wholesale heroin distribution point in Bulgaria. 
100 Most members of the private security firm, ‘Club 777’, were murdered and some of the remaining 
figures joined SIC. The private security firms at that time also controlled the distribution of pirated music 
tapes / CDs. Mr. Y’s legal job was as a drummer of a well-known folk-music band. This is how, 
supposedly, he came into contact with Club 777. 
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at the time. With the disappearance of the racketeering companies in the late 1990s, 
the individual ‘sales entrepreneurs’ that took their place managed to secure corrupt 
relationships and to continue to provide protection. Up to 2009, when Mr. Y was 
finally arrested on drugs charges, he was protected by a well-known local lawyer, 
who was in an intimate relation with a prosecutor and the prosecutor101 (both of 
whom received regular share of the revenues from the sale of the stolen cars not 
necessarily only by Mr. Y102 but by the other sales entrepreneurs who worked with 
him).  
 
Almost all offender interviewees in Pazardjik also referred to the need to have such 
type of protection they called a ‘back’ to lean on (similar to the Russian organised-
crime concept of ‘roof’ (krysha). The ‘back’ not only gets a share of the revenue, s/he 
might be involved in connecting sellers to buyers for the distribution of stolen cars. 
The situation in Pazardjik, therefore, was quite similar to the one in Plovdiv: the ‘sales 
enterprises’ (and their used-car dealerships) were run by individuals with former 
connections to either VIS or SIC structures in the city. (LEI-1, OFI-7) Most offender 
interviewees referred to the nationally known figure of Mr. Big (not the real name):  a 
former-wrestler / co-owner of a racketeering insurance company, who turned 
businessman and politician (he became mayor of a local village). Mr. Big was pointed 
to as providing protection to all prostitution, drugs, car-theft / distribution networks in 
Pazardjik. This ‘omnipotence’ could be an exaggeration, but he has a long history of 
involvement in the stolen cars business (LEI-1). In Dupnitsa, as described in Chapter 
3, the ‘Galev Brothers’ play the role of providing a ‘back’ to local sales entrepreneurs.   
 
In other cases, the ‘sales entrepreneurs’ could be just independent car-dealers who 
want make some extra money. As explained in Chapter 3, car-dealers often travel 
directly to select and purchase used cars from local dealers in Italy, Germany, or 
Austria. This allows them to establish good relations. One case from the late 1990s 
was of a local car-dealership in the town of Dryanovo, a small town of about 10,000 
residents (but located 20 km from two larger regional district towns). The sale-
entrepreneur was a well-known businessman, with his main business being trade of 
                                                          
101 Neither she nor the prosecutor have been ever investigated, therefore their names would not be 
revealed. 
102 Mr. Y’s lawyer publicly claimed that in 2009, the day before Mr. Y was sentenced for drugs 
distribution, that the prosecutor offered a plea bargain agreement but demanded a 30,000-euro bribe to 
reduce the sentence.  
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car-tires (one of the largest in Bulgaria). His dealership was importing used-cars from 
Italy, and the local Italian partners started arranging the sale of vehicles that were 
declared to be stolen but were in reality an insurance fraud (see previous chapter). 
Dryanovo, just like nearby Gabrovo, is the type of town where racketeering / 
insurance companies had no significant presence, neither are there any other 
significant criminal markets related to drugs or prostitution. This sale entrepreneur, 
therefore, used his business connections to sell a few stolen cars a year to increase 
his profits (LEI-14, OTI-11). 
 
To reduce the risk of being detected, sales entrepreneurs in Bulgaria might work with 
a number of car-dealers or other sales-entrepreneurs (‘retailers’) around the country. 
In 2003, in an international operation, the Bulgarian Police found that the network 
being investigated had used dealerships in at least seven cities (Vratsa, Pernik, Stara 
Zagora, Plovdiv, Pazardzhik, Veliko Tarnovo and Montana (see map of Bulgaria in 
Annex 1) – practically a complete geographic spread throughout Bulgaria – to sell at 
least 60 stolen vehicles (C-0903). More than a dozen individuals in Bulgaria were 
involved in the distribution of these vehicles. In one other case, in 2010, the importers 
of stolen cars were situated in the town of Plovdiv, where the cars were initially 
cloned and registered. Following this, they were sold to intermediaries Gabrovo, who 
in turn found customers: either via informal networks to local businessmen, or via the 
internet and local car-dealerships to bona-fide customers. These local sales 
entrepreneurs simply invested in buying a low-priced stolen vehicle, and took the 
risks of finding the final buyer and sell it for profit.   
 
Another risk-reduction tactic that some sellers adopt takes advantage of the lack of 
regulatory standards for the used-car industry. The ‘used car exchange’ that some 
dealers run allow independent sellers to leave the vehicle at the dealership without 
any information or documentation for the car. If the police raid the dealership and 
discover the car, the dealer can claim that he has nothing to do with the car. A police 
officer described a raid on a used-car dealership in Varna, where three such stolen 
vehicles were recovered, yet no arrests could be made. The car-dealers said that the 
cars had been dropped off without any contact information and denied any 
knowledge of the vehicles having been stolen. [LEI-1] 
 
The use of a dealer, even though it increases the risk of detection of the vehicles 
because it is a more visible strategy, is less risky, as it is very difficult for the police to 
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prove that the dealer had knowledge that the vehicle he purchased was a stolen one. 
The courts presume that the dealers are always ‘bona fide buyers’, as the business 
model of the used-car business suggests that the used-car dealers buy the vehicles 
at much below the market price. Therefore, in many cases, even though the vehicle 
is identified as stolen, and it is proved that the VIN is rigged, the vehicle is returned to 
the car-dealer (LEI-14).  
 
The sales entrepreneurs sometimes serve as intermediaries, with connections to the 
second category of entrepreneurs, those who (re)export stolen vehicles to the 
Former Soviet Union countries or the Middle East. (LE1, LE2, LE10, OFI-9)  
 
For many years the Former Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia) had been a 
destination for vehicles stolen in Bulgaria and / or imported stolen vehicles which 
were then trafficked further.103 (LEI-4, LEI-11, LEI-14, OTI-12, OFI-20, OFI-22).  A 
police report in 2007 continued to identify the Former Soviet Union as the primary 
destination of stolen vehicles.104 In the early 1990s, in many countries of the former 
Soviet Union there were restrictions on the import of Western cars. In that period 
Russian-made cars (in particular Lada) were still the most common cars in Bulgaria. 
They were stolen and exported towards the countries of the Former Soviet Union. 
Representatives of big Russian crime syndicates had tried to set up bases in Sofia 
and in Varna, and to become engaged in the racketeering / private protection market. 
(LEI-18, OFI-20). These structures proved to be unstable. In Sofia, for instance, one 
such outfit had an arrangement with VIS and SIC (who protected the car-thieves in 
Sofia), who supplied it with huge105 quantities of stolen Russian made cars for export 
(OFI-20). In Varna, Odessa-based criminal outfits were directly involved in the export 
of stolen vehicles, but gradually TIM established its own control over the export. 
Although such direct massive presence disappeared at the end of the 1990s, 
                                                          
103 One interviewee claimed that even during communist times, stolen luxury vehicles from Western 
Europe were trafficked to the Soviet Union via Bulgaria [LEI-11]. Another argued that in the early 1990s 
the trafficking involved mainly Lada Samara (a popular Soviet-made car, sold in Bulgaria) [LEI-14]. 
104 I was allowed to read the report during one of the meetings with an interviewee, but the report is not 
public. 
105 ‘We used to bring them 20-30 cars per day. They were based at Tihia Kat [a well known motel-resort 
in the mountain near Sofia]. They had a parking lot with a few houses around them. I’ve seen this 
parking lot full with 40-50 [stolen] cars. These guys stayed there for a couple of years [1996-97]…There 
was rumour that there was a problem with VIS and SIC, and they kicked them out…but I don’t believe 
this…our mafia cannot beat the Russian mafia’. We usually declared [to SIC] only two out of three cars 
that we brought to the Russians, and we sold directly to them one. That might have been their problem 
with SIC and VIS. [OFI-20]. 
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connections with Russian / Ukrainian organised crime and high-level criminal 
entrepreneurs remained strong on many levels. The criminals connected to the 
former insurance / private security racketeering firms (VIS, SIC, TIM, or Spartak) 
remained involved in the trafficking vehicles to the former Soviet Union (United 
States: Department of State 2005). 
 
While the traffic to the former Soviet Union countries might be arranged by 
Bulgarians with connections there, the traffickers to the Middle East are typically of 
Syrian or Lebanese businessmen who are based in Bulgaria.106 They usually order 
and purchase the cars from Bulgarian car-theft enterprises in Bulgaria or in Western 
Europe (including Spain), and use their business connections in the Middle East to 
sell the cars. Once a car arrives in Bulgaria, they arrange for its traffic to the Middle 
East. Bulgarian mules usually drive the car to Turkey, where other mules pick it up 
and drive it further towards Syria. In addition, thousands of used cars have been 
conveyed by platform trucks to Iraq in the past decade, and this logistic was also 
used by exporters.  
 
These Syrian/Lebanese individuals are based mostly in Southern Bulgaria (Plovdiv, 
Sofia, Pazardjik), and sales entrepreneurs from Northern Bulgaria would normally 
have to turn to them [LEI-15].  Until he was murdered in the centre of Sofia in 2003, 
the most well-known exporter to the Middle East was Filip Naidenov – Fatik. Fatik’s 
father was a Syrian national, who worked with the Bulgarian communist State 
Security. He worked on securing smuggling channels (of drugs or arms) through the 
Middle East. Fatik was the owner of the Kapitolia car-dealership, and was one of the 
key figures involved in the transfer, allegedly, of ‘thousands’ of stolen vehicles from 
Western Europe towards the Middle East. He was also involved in drugs smuggling, 
which was the reason behind his assassination in 2003.  
 
None of the present-day smugglers to the Middle East have been prosecuted for 
smuggling of cars, and their names cannot be revealed. One such smuggler was a 
Lebanese who formerly worked for the Lebanese security service (Presidential 
protection), but is presently a businessman with interests in finance companies and 
                                                          
106 These were the most significant Arab minorities up to the 2003 Iraq War.  
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in the entertainment industry. He has been prosecuted for drugs smuggling107 and is 
known to have been trading in arms, but according to law-enforcement sources [LEI-
16, LEI-18] has also been involved in car-smuggling. Another exporter, who is fairly 
well-known Iraqi businessman with interests in the night-time economy, gambling and 
retail of consumer goods, tourism, also had connections to the Bulgarian security 
services. He has been investigated (but never convicted) for smuggling of 
amphetamine-type drugs towards Iraq, where he used transporters with used-cars as 
containers for the drugs. (Blitz 2009) Again, according to law-enforcement sources, 
his side business was the smuggling of stolen cars. [LEI-16, LEI-18]  
 
An example of a couple of smaller exporters were identified by interviewees, and 
they were based in Pazardjik. One was a Syrian, who has been prosecuted for 
various crimes, including extortion-racketeering, but has been convicted only for 
administrative offences. Since the 1990s he has run active trade between Syria and 
Bulgaria in consumer goods, and also has investments in retail and agriculture in 
Bulgaria. In addition, though, he uses his business connections in Lebanon to 
arrange for the transfer and sale of stolen cars. (LEI-1, OFI-9) The last example is 
also a businessman from an Arabic descent, who runs an import / export business 
mainly in food, tea, and tobacco products, but has become well known through the 
import of lighters and coffee. He is also known to export stolen vehicles. [OFI-14] 
 
 
5.2.2 The buyers 
 
In Bulgaria The profile of the buyers of stolen cars has gradually changed over the 
years from mass consumption of low-priced stolen cars in the 1990s to high-income 
customers towards the end of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, as explained, the 
stealing (domestically or internationally) and trafficking of cars implied much less 
expenses and risks (VIN rigging was unnecessary, and other expenses, such as 
bribes, salaries of members of theft crews were low). At that time even luxury 
                                                          
107 This individual has also been involved in one of the biggest cases of captagon production and 
smuggling towards the Middle East was the so-called Opitzvet Affair. He ran a company that not only 
funded the drug’s production, but was behind to the privatisation of one of the largest Bulgarian banks.  
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vehicles were sold at very low prices to customers, as few people could afford to pay 
the real price.108    
 
Presently, there are two categories of buyers who purchase stolen cars: the ‘bona 
fide’ customers, who believe that they are purchasing a legitimate car, and the 
customers who suspect or know that the car is stolen. Law-enforcement interviewees 
roughly estimate that in Bulgaria probably four out of five customers are non-bona 
fide customers: either they are well aware or at least have suspicions that the car is 
stolen. The buyers are practically never an object of investigation, as it is difficult to 
prove their knowledge that the vehicle they bought was a stolen one [LEI-15]. 
 
The profile of the bona fide category is similar to that of other luxury vehicle buyers: 
higher social status and income. These buyers might be attracted by the (stolen) 
luxury vehicle’s lower price (10–20% cheaper than elsewhere in the country), but are 
not aware that it was stolen. Sometimes, to avoid any suspicion, the vehicle is simply 
sold at the going market price. The bona fide buyers in Bulgaria may also be used-
car dealers.  
 
As in Spain, some risk-reduction measures are taken to lower the suspicions of bona 
fide buyers. The most widespread strategy is to sell the car several times between 
nominal owners. Usually, socially disadvantaged people109 are paid small sums (€50-
€100) to do this. There could be as many as four registrations (i.e. selling and buying 
the car by four different nominal owners, sometimes in different cities) that disguise 
the origin of the car, so that the car’s history looks convincing to the buyer. In cases 
of insurance fraud (i.e. when the car is sold by the owner to the car thieves) the 
thieves are even able to provide the bona-fide buyer with a legally obtained ‘expert 
                                                          
108 The sport-utility 4 wheel drive vehicle Mitsubishi Pajero was a popular model to steal, and these went 
for ‘4-5 thousand Deutsch marks’ [€2,000], while the Russian made Lada, for a ‘couple of hundred leva’ 
[$100] [OFI-20]. Today the starting price of a new Mitsubishi Pajero is around €50,000.  
109 The ‘nominal owners’ need not always be socially disadvantaged. Since 2007, dozens of individuals 
in Northern Bulgaria have turned this into a business. In neighbouring Romania, the fees for registering 
a car are about ten times higher (close to €3,000), while in Bulgaria it costs €250-€300. In Bulgarian 
towns near the Romanian border (Vidin, Dobrich, or Rousse) there are individuals, known as 
‘registratori’, who charge 25-50 euros and have up to 500 vehicles registered in their names – the actual 
Romanian owners drive the vehicles with a ‘power of attorney’ (NDT 2010). In addition, the registratori 
pay a 5-10 euro bribe to the local traffic police for a quick registration. A corruption investigation in Vidin 
showed that 30-40 cars per day are registered using this scheme (2-4 vehicles per day per registrator), 
while in Dobrich there were even more, 40-50 daily registrations (Interviews with Vidin Traffic Police, 
and Vidin Regional Prosecutor in Probg 2010). 
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certificate’110 issued by the police. The original car owner who engages in the fraud 
announces to the police that the car stolen (e.g. in Spain or Italy), and only after this 
happens, the car is sold to a buyer in Bulgaria. For this reason the car does not 
appear in Interpol’s or other databases which are used to issue these certificates.  
 
Non-bona fide buyers purchase stolen cars in order to save half or more of its regular 
market price. The non-bona fide buyer is usually found through informal channels, 
and has some level of trust with the seller. As one police officer put it: ‘This is a very 
small circle of people. They all know each other, and how much money each has, 
what kind of the car they drive (or would like to drive).’ [LEI-4] 
 
Buying a stolen car does not simply involve walking into a dealership and hinting that 
one would like to buy a vehicle at a lower price. It is a risky undertaking for the buyer 
as well as for the seller, particularly if the car needs to be ordered. Therefore, 
informal networks, and knowledge of the customer’s background are necessary.   
 
Interviews with car-dealers and leasing companies showed that, typically, the high-
class luxury vehicles are purchased by individuals who buy new models of cars 
annually, and even several times a year. One leasing company interviewee explained 
that the majority of their clients also have other businesses, and may also have 
leased industrial equipment or machines through the leasing company. [CDI-4] 
 
The non-bona fide customers for stolen vehicles can be grouped in the following 
categories: 
• Offenders: as one of the interviewees, a former car thief and a drug dealer, 
noted: ‘at the time when I was in Sofia [1997-2001], almost all [drug] dealers 
drove [imported] stolen cars’. [OFI-22] The ‘rule’ that many car thieves seem 
to follow is that they do not drive stolen cars. In the 1990s, the higher-level 
crime bosses did not shy away from driving stolen cars. Even as late as 2006, 
one of the big smuggling rings of luxury cars from Spain (22 cars were 
recovered by the police) was found to have had as its main customers the 
entire ‘elite’ of SIC.111 With the process of ‘legitimation’ that started in the past 
                                                          
110 This certificate includes an inspection of the VIN (to certify that the VIN corresponds with make / 
model of the car) and stolen vehicle police database (but not Interpol’s).  
111 The Margin brothers, Milcho Bonev, aka Bai Mileh, Ventsislav Stefanov (Blagoevgrad Regional 
Police Department press conference, quoted at Bl.grad.info (2006); Another SIC person was Dimitry-the 
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decade, many of them preferred to move towards fraudulent leasing or tax-
evasion schemes, importing cars and avoiding paying VAT, i.e. more refined 
methods of getting a cheaper car than driving a stolen one. Here, one uses 
connections and relations with other criminal networks.  
 
• ‘Exporters’: another category of offenders that might order vehicles to be 
stolen are criminal networks in Bulgaria that are involved in reselling the cars 
to the Middle East or countries of the former Soviet Union.  
 
• (Small) entrepreneurs: a typical customer described by all categories of 
interviewees is that of the aspiring entrepreneur or the ‘nouveaux riches’, who 
cannot afford to spend 100,000 or 200,000 euro every year on a new car, or 
does not have a million euro to buy ten different types of cars. The examples 
provided by the interviewees included a local businessman with a small food-
processing plant (OFI-21, LEI-14), or one with a private security company 
(LEI-15). Another was of a football player from a local secondary league 
team. In a country like Bulgaria, where 38% of the economy is informal (AT 
Kearney / Schneider 2010), a significant part of the high-wealth individuals 
have undeclared incomes. Another interviewee described these individuals in 
the following way: ‘These are not the businessmen that made their money 
with lots of honest work. These are guys who made quick money from corrupt 
deals or rigged privatisations, who suddenly found themselves with lots of 
cash. Many of them today [due to the economic crisis] do not have the money 
to go for these purchases anymore’ (LEI-14). The next chapter provides more 
insight into the social environment of this category of buyers, who are the 
main driver of the demand for stolen cars. Often, the informal networks used 
in the return of vehicles stolen for ransom, are used to find potential 
customers (see Chapter 6). 
 
• Companies: companies with informal economic activities (avoiding taxes by 
not declaring revenues and expenses) often try to cut on other expenses, 
including buying cheaper, stolen commercial vehicles. One example came 
from an interviewee, supplier of recycled plastics to petro-chemical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Russian-Minev (who started out in the early 1990s as a car thief in Central Europe): his four luxury 
vehicles (all stolen) were seized by the Bulgarian police during a night-club raid in the centre of Sofia in 
2002 (Sega 2002). 
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companies, many of which are in the grey economy, which occasionally might 
purchase low-cost stolen transport vehicles [OTI-12’]. The most wide-spread 
belief was that quite a few construction companies purchased stolen 
construction vehicles and machinery during the real estate development 
boom of 2000-2008. (LEI-4, OTI-11) One case included even a company, 
almost all of whose machinery was delivered from Spain, where it had been 
stolen. Another case involved a new car-rental company which ordered about 
20 identical Toyota cars to be stolen to start its business operations. (LEI-4) 
The involvement of construction companies is hardly surprising because quite 
a few successful car-thieves had turned into real-estate developers, mostly as 
a way to launder their money but also as an attractive business opportunity. 
(LEI-1) In addition, the real-estate development boom had attracted 
thousands of entrepreneurs: from oligarchs, to grey entrepreneurs, to criminal 
entrepreneurs. As Chapter 3 showed, most luxury used-car dealers had some 
participation in construction or real-estate development companies. Finally, 
‘the theft for ransom’ schemes in Bulgaria also targeted construction 
equipment and commercial vehicles, and there was already somewhat of an 
internal market for stolen construction vehicles and equipment112. (LEI-4, LEI-
3, OTI-11) 
 
• Public officials: In the 1990s police officers were amongst the most frequent 
customers of stolen cars. ‘The cops loved the ‘number seven’ [Russian made 
Lada 2107 model113], and we sold them very cheaply, for 100 leva [around 50 
euros]’ [OFI-20]. This gradually changed, and the interviews and media 
review shows that local government officials seem to be most often lured by 
‘status symbols’, such as luxury cars. Although some of them manage to 
arrange to obtain cars that had been confiscated by the customs, others seek 
low-priced luxury models for personal use. The mayor of a village near 
Pazardjik, who was also in the scrap-metal business,114 had become a regular 
customer for stolen vehicles. (OFI-18) The media periodically report on public 
                                                          
112 The theft for ransom of construction equipment is especially lucrative, as the value of some 
construction equipment could reach as much as €500,000, and the ransoms could reach as much as 
€25,000 (which is almost 10 times higher than the average for cars). In addition, construction equipment 
has far less identification protection, and could be easily disguised. (LEI-4, OTI-12) 
113 At that time, most police cars were of the same model – Lada 2107.  
114 As explained in the next chapter, part of low-level car theft is of old Soviet cars that are sold for 
scrap. This would explain the connections this mayor might have had. 
 officials who drive stolen cars: in 2009, the police confiscated the luxury 
Hyundai Santa Fe of the mayor of the village of Knijovnik (Hristov 2009). The 
mayors in the small town of Banya and in Varna, Bulgaria’s second largest 
city, have also been accused in the past of driving stolen cars (Vreme 2001, 
Dnes Plus 2003). 
 
To understand the mindset of the aspiring economic elite (both public officials and 
small entrepreneurs), one should know that the purchase of a stolen car is part of a 
larger illegal lifestyle that such individuals maintain. In September 2010, the 
Bulgarian Revenue Agency conducted a series of aerial inspections of luxury 
neighbourhoods of all the larger cities around the country. The majority of houses 
were found to be registered as offices or to lack any legal registration with local 
municipalities (i.e. they were either built illegally or the owners paid no property 
taxes). Two entirely unregistered developments were uncovered. One of them gained 
national prominence: it consisted of 45 luxury mansions owned by entrepreneurs and 
former or present (corrupt) customs and roads administration officials.115 Not only 
were the houses built illegally, but local utility company personnel were bribed into 
allowing the theft of electricity from the grid, or theft of water via an illegal water 
supply; an illegal road was also built. All this took place on the territory of a state-
operated water-supply dam, where construction is entirely forbidden. The head of the 
regional State Agency for Construction Control was sacked after allegations that he 
covered up the existence of this village for almost a decade.  
 
The normalcy of driving a stolen car cannot 
be better illustrated by pointing to the fact 
that hundreds of luxury cars seized at the 
borders and confiscated by Customs over 
the years have been donated for government 
use. Usually, when a stolen car is seized at 
the border, no effort is made to find the real 
owner. Therefore, unless the owner of the 
car is informed by their local police that the 
car has been seized at the Bulgarian border an
                                                          
115 All the public officials worked at the nearby border-c
€300 to €500 per month. 
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it, Customs do not bother sending it back to Western Europe. Since most owners 
have car-theft insurance, they rarely go after the stolen car. To the big insurance 
companies, tracing stolen cars is difficult and expensive; only very rarely do they 
make requests for vehicles. (LEI-10, LEI 11) 
 
Public auctions of the seized cars are not organised. Instead, the high-class vehicles 
are usually donated by the Minister of Finance to top government officials, e.g. 
ministers (including the Minister of Interior) and their deputies, heads of government 
agencies, heads of prosecution offices or courts, and mayors. Police chiefs (including 
the head of the police), regional police directorates, and high-level Customs 
Administration officials were also given such cars.116 An estimated half of the 
President’s National Security Service (NSS) vehicle park consisted of stolen cars that 
had been seized and donated to the NSS by the Customs Administration. (LEI-1, 
LEI-10, LEI-11, LEI-14)  
 
On one occasion, the head of the Sofia City Court was publically exposed as driving 
a confiscated stolen car, even though the legal owner had requested the car to be 
returned. (Capital 2009) On a number of occasions, when trying to travel 
internationally with such cars (to Greece or Romania), Police or Customs officials 
were stopped, as the vehicle was detected by the border authorities as one stolen in 
Europe. The lower-class vehicles are donated to other government bodies (e.g. state 
television, local administrations, etc.) (LEI-10, LEI 11). The donation of a stolen 
vehicle gradually became a way for the Minister of Finance to expand his personal 
political influence. In the late 1990s / 2000, some corrupt border police officers took 
the practice of confiscation even further: they practically stole luxury cars from 
transiting passengers. They would simply lie to the driver that the car comes up in the 
police data base as stolen, and seize it. This practice quickly provoked a diplomatic 
scandal, after close to a dozen such cases occurred, to the disbelief of foreign 
embassies who received the complaints from the owners who were robbed in this 
way [LEI-11].  
 
In Spain, on the other hand, although there are some parallels, the environment of 
corrupt government officials is different. Government officials in Spain are also 
customers for luxury cars, yet there is little evidence that they intentionally try to 
                                                          
116 In 2007, the BBC even had a special report about one such example.  
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purchase stolen cars. It is not an exaggeration to state that much of the demand for 
luxury vehicles in Spain in the years 2000–2008 came from government, especially 
local government. In some corruption-sensitive northern European countries, or poor 
countries such as Bulgaria, the purchase of luxury cars on the scale that it took place 
in Spain, would have certainly provoked immediate outrage. In Spain, though, the 
purchase of luxury cars seemed to be morally justified during the period of economic 
growth, at least in some circles. With the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, 
the public became sensitive to the local governments’ ‘love-affair’ with luxury cars: a 
series of journalistic and criminal investigations revealed that thousands of luxury 
cars had been purchased by local mayors or other government officials.117 In one 
major investigation into corruption and money-laundering in the past decade, 
involving 12 municipalities in four regions, the investigators came across hundreds of 
luxury vehicles purchased by public officials participating in the corrupt networks.118 
(El Pais 2010). 
 
One common characteristic of all these categories of buyers is their desire to drive 
the ‘latest model’ of car. This means that many of them tend to acquire at least one 
new car every year, and may possibly maintain a number of luxury vehicles: 
therefore maintaining a healthy demand. The other common characteristic is that 
they all want to acquire the car at a discounted price. Unlike the bona fide customers, 
these individuals are well aware of the risks, and that is reflected in the price of the 
vehicle, which could be less than half the actual market value.  
 
5.2.3 Corruption  
The opportunities for ‘sales enterprises’ in Bulgaria to use corruption as a tool to 
minimize the risks associated with the sale of stolen cars can be quite significant. 
Corruption is a factor that has consistently, for almost two decades, maintained a 
market environment where the large-scale sale of stolen vehicles has been possible. 
Sales enterprises use corruption in two main ways to facilitate the sale of the stolen 
vehicles. First, stolen vehicles are registered and legalised by corrupt traffic police 
                                                          
117 One investigation showed that the mayors of all but one of Madrid’s suburban municipalities drove 
luxury vehicles. (Madrid’s mayor drove a luxury model of Audi (A8) priced at 591 624 (Toledo and Friar 
2008). Another mayor, according to a Ministry of Finance audit, purchased a new luxury vehicle each 
year. (Junquera 2010) 
118 The report of the Central Fiscal and Economic Crime Unit showed that, at the top of the network 
alone, 49 luxury vehicles had been bought to launder bribes between 2000 and 2008. Many of the cars 
were registered in the names of fictitious companies to avoid detection.   
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officers. Secondly, it is used prevent or stop the investigation / prosecution of the 
sales of stolen vehicles. 
 
 
Corruption and car registration 
 
In Bulgaria, to register a stolen vehicle – and to avoid any detailed inspections during 
the registration process – usually involves corruption of the traffic police. Unlike 
many other countries, in Bulgaria, as a result of the significant imports of stolen cars, 
each new car passes through a thorough inspection by Traffic Police. Until 2007, 
during this process, the VIN markings of the vehicle were inspected in order to 
establish if they have been any tampered with (Interpol and domestic databases, and 
VIN registries were consulted before a valid registration was issued).  
 
In each of the 28 regional cities in Bulgaria, the registration of cars takes place at the 
Traffic Police registration office. In Sofia, for instance, the car-registration process is 
concentrated at one single location, and there are two inspection lanes, through 
which all cars are registered. As one interviewee stated ‘The managing officer at 
these lanes has been there for 15 years. Everyone knows that the guy registers 
stolen cars. You know they came up with a new system to have two guys on each 
lane, but he simply made a fake stamp of the new officer’s stamp.’ (OFI-3) 
  
The corruption within the traffic police is a broader phenomenon that provides a 
favourable environment for the sale of stolen cars. It starts from the fact that the 
traffic police in Bulgaria have been corrupt since the early 1990s, without any 
significant changes. Monthly, about 100,000 bribes are paid to traffic police officers, 
mostly by drivers who avoid being fined (Transparency International 2010). In 
addition, the processing of vehicle registrations, driving licences, or even traffic 
violation fines is extremely time consuming. They all involve visiting the single local 
Traffic Police office in the city where one lives, and queuing for many hours, or even 
for an entire day. This has created a number of intermediaries who ‘facilitate’ all 
these processes: e.g. the intermediaries can provide licence plates and car 
documents without any need to visit the traffic police office; if one’s licence is 
suspended due to many traffic violations, the intermediaries can quickly ‘fix’ one’s 
177 
 
driving record; they can provide special licence plates with numbers that are easy to 
remember, which criminals and drivers of luxury vehicles find particularly attractive.119 
 
This corruption does not simply concern low-level officers at local traffic offices. The 
traffic police heads are usually aware of the corrupt deals on the lower levels, and 
simply get regular ‘cuts’ from the bribes. Usually when a new government comes into 
power these corrupt networks are interrupted, and information surfaces in the public 
domain. In 2001, the Head of Traffic Police, was dismissed on corruption charges, 
some related to the registration of stolen cars. In 2006, with the new government, the 
Head of Traffic Police and his son were arrested and charged with running an 
organised crime group that included illegal car-registrations. The Head of Traffic 
Police was eventually convicted, but the trial against the son and the rest of the 
criminal group was still bogged down in court in 2010. The Head’s step-daughter was 
also prosecuted, as she ran a business temporarily modifying luxury cars, so that 
they could be registered as commercial vehicles to avoid VAT payment (this scheme 
was explained in Chapter 3). The scheme, certainly, involved many other corrupt 
Traffic Police officers, since for at least four of them, the police collected evidence. 
(Focus 2006) The Head and the other corrupt officers had provided the son with all 
necessary stamps and forms, so that he ran, in effect, a private traffic police 
registration office. Similar networks continue to operate on a smaller scale in towns 
throughout Bulgaria. In 2010, the police dismantled two groups that included corrupt 
traffic police officers in two separate operations in Bourgas that specifically registered 
stolen luxury cars. (Ibid.) 
 
Corruption and distribution of stolen vehicles 
                                                          
119 At some point, such licence plates were even used as a risk profile by the police to stop suspects. 
Some of the heads or grupirovki were known by their licence plate numbers: the ones that included lots 
of ‘8’ CA 8888 88 were commonly associated with VIS-2 grupirovka, while the ‘5’ was associated with 
SIC (e.g. CA 555555). The motorcade of a mafia head, with bodyguards in two or three tinted-window 
luxury vehicles, would drive through the city at high speed, in a demonstration of power using these 
kinds of number plates in sequence (e.g. CA 888888, CA 888887, CA 888886). This was a common 
sight in all Bulgarian towns until 2006-2007. 
 The use of corruption to facilitate the distribution, sale, or smuggling of stolen 
vehicles is widespread, and has remained fairly high even since Bulgaria joined the 
EU (Gounev and Bezlov (2010). The case described above of Mr. Y illustrated the 
point of the corruption networks that exist to provide protection. There are different 
modalities of corruption: typically the corruption of police officers is attempted first. As 
the previous chapter and the previous section showed, there is involvement of police 
officers both in the 
theft of vehicles, and 
in their registration. 
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One further point that should be emphasised is that the buyers often are individuals 
with sufficient political clout or connections at the local level. In the case of Plovdiv, 
several (nationally) well-known local businessmen were amongst the regular 
customers for stolen vehicles. Usually, even though they personally drove legal cars, 
they purchased stolen vehicles as presents for family members or managers of their 
companies. Therefore, such powerful customers, with direct influence over local 
political life, judiciary, or police could provide some level of protection from 
prosecution.  
 
The smuggling of stolen vehicles has been long connected also to corruption in 
Customs. The corruption in Customs served usually a double purpose: avoiding 
import taxes and VAT, as well as avoiding detection that the vehicle is stolen. As 
explained in the previous chapter, when the car is imported via a transporter or 
container, it is subject only to customs inspection. All interviewees confirmed that 
customs corruption facilitated the import of used cars. There are a number of reports 
on the issue of customs corruption in Bulgaria (Gounev and Bezlov 2004, Center for 
the Study of Democracy 2002, 2003, 2004). In addition, various smuggling channels 
protected either by local customs officers or by the National Service for Combating 
Organised Crime (NSCOC) have been detected. In one such case at the Danube 
River Bridge border crossing with Romania, it was discovered that several customs 
officers made sure that all stolen cars were imported and the documentation 
arranged during their shifts.120 When the case was uncovered by the NSCOC, the 
regional prosecutor, who also protected the channel, blocked further investigation, 
despite the report written by the Police and local head of Customs detailing the 
smuggling channel. Similar channels existed on the border with Serbia as well, where 
many of the imported used-cars from Western Europe came from. As with the issue 
of registration-related corruption, the corrupt environment in the Customs (in relation 
to used cars) was not created solely by the smugglers of stolen cars, but also by the 
importers of used cars. The importers regularly paid bribes per imported vehicle to 
speed up the processing and excessive waiting times, as well as to avoid import 
tariffs (LEI-9, LEI-10, LEI-1, CDI-1). The regular practice, as described by one car-
dealer, was when a trailer truck arrived at Gorublyane, for €10 per car (or €50-€90 
                                                          
120 This police report is classified and was provided by a law-enforcement officer who worked on the 
investigation.  
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per car transporter), the customs officer would immediately arrange the import. The 
alternative was to get stuck for a few days at a customs office (CDI-1).  
 
  
5.3 Comparing sales of legal and stolen cars 
 
The description provided in this chapter of the mechanisms and distribution channels 
for the sale of stolen vehicles shows that there is much overlap between the sale of 
legal and stolen vehicles. This particularly applies to sales of stolen cars to bona fide 
buyers, which seem to be a majority in Spain, and in a minority in Bulgaria. The two 
countries differ in an important way. In Spain, sales entrepreneurs go to a significant 
extent to disguise the true origin of the car so that even the used-car dealers could 
be deceived into buying the stolen car. In Bulgaria, such efforts are rarely needed, as 
the majority of sales are arranged via informal channels or to complicit buyers.  
 
The issue of the complicity of car-dealers raises another point. Franchise dealers, 
who account for majority of sales in Spain, are usually not complicit in the sales of 
stolen cars. They are still targeted by stolen-car sales entrepreneurs, but to a lesser 
extent than are independent car-dealers. One plausible explanation provided by a 
law-enforcement officer is that some of the franchise dealers have databases, where 
they might check if a car’s VIN corresponds exactly to the model being sold [LEI-4]. 
In Bulgaria, where franchise dealers have very few sales of used cars, car-theft 
networks do not try to sell stolen cars to them at all.   
 
The geography of distribution of stolen vehicles, though, does not necessarily 
coincide with the geography of distribution of legal vehicles. The reason is that while 
the legal sales of luxury vehicles are concentrated in regions / cities of Bulgaria 
where there is a concentration of economic wealth (and where there are also 
specialised dealerships for luxury cars), for stolen vehicles this is not necessarily the 
case. In Spain, where the focus is on bona fide customers, one could speak of some 
overlap – although as the prices are advantageous, many cases seem to relate to 
small and medium-sized towns. Some of the big concentrations of stolen vehicles, 
though, are in the Costa del Sol region, where there is a significant concentration of 
potential customers, where lifestyle and fashion create a pressure for upward 
mobility. 
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The sale of stolen and used cars seemingly merges on the internet. In Bulgaria and 
Spain, the internet is not a ‘direct sales’ distribution channel but an information 
source. Buyers only compare prices, features, contact information, or seek 
information on reputations of dealers. There are many internet forums where buyers 
exchange information on dealer reputation. Private sales of luxury cars, though, are 
not as common, as buyers making a significant investment look for a warranty of 
some sort. Therefore, while private sellers of luxury vehicles might find it easier to 
exchange their vehicle when buying a new one through a franchise dealer, the 
criminal networks make much more intensive use of the internet as a way to find 
customers.  
 
Although in Spain many of the sales take place through formal channels – internet 
ads or luxury car dealerships, i.e. the most plausible channels to be used by bona 
fide buyers – in Bulgaria the sales take place via informal networks. Even in many of 
the cases where dealerships are used as a distribution channel, the sales enterprise 
usually has some connection with the dealer.   
 
Due to the absence of an informal network, in effect what one observes in Spain, 
therefore, has been an attempt by the Bulgarian theft-networks to enter the legitimate 
market for used cars, rather than entering an illegal market. To enter this legal 
market, they needed sufficient credibility and, in most cases, a Spanish intermediary 
to carry out the sale. In Bulgaria on the other hand, this is only partially true: the 
informal networks that exist for the distribution of stolen cars are a parallel market 
structure, a niche in the used-car market, which comprises dealers, sale 
entrepreneurs, intermediaries, and buyers.  
 
The evidence from the interviews and the police cases shows that Bulgarian sales 
enterprises failed to access the existing (formal or informal) or establish their own 
retail distribution channels. As a result they effectively failed to enter the local market 
for used / stolen cars. On the other hand, they were able much more effectively to 
engage on the ‘wholesale level’, by supplying successfully other criminal networks 
which engaged in exporting stolen cars from Spain to Africa, the Middle East, or 
other countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
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The next chapter will attempt to disentangle the social networks and broader social 
environment within which the ‘sales’ and ‘theft’ entrepreneurs, and buyers function in 
Bulgaria and in Spain. The objective will be to explain this ‘failure’ to enter the retail 
distribution of stolen cars in Spain. Some further observations on how legitimate and 
illegal enterprises compete will be made in the last chapter.  
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6 The social organisation of selling stolen cars  
 
Social relations and the wider social context within which criminal / economic 
activities take place explain how individuals become involved in organised crime, 
how criminal enterprises are structured, and ultimately how (illegal) markets operate. 
More broadly, social structure (e.g. class, family, school experience) facilitates social 
(and economic) action (Granovetter 1992). Organised criminal activities are 
embedded in a web of social ties, relations, and informal networks (Kleemans and 
Van de Bunt 1999). The density and types of these relations explains how and why 
certain individuals become recruited into organised crime, manage to have 
successful criminal careers, could succeed in expanding their operation beyond their 
immediate local, or the way in which their criminal organisations are structured 
(Kleemans and Van de Bunt (2008), Kleemans and Poot (2008). The social ties and 
networks which they form could also become a ‘criminal capital’ which provides 
knowledge and technical skills to facilitate criminal activities or ‘beliefs and definitions 
which legitimise offending’ (Hagan and McCarthy 1997:138). 
 
Regardless of whether the social basis within which these social ties are situated is 
the urban working class (Hobbs 2001), the marginalised minority (Venkatesh 2006), 
the immigrant community (Finckenauer and Waring 1998), or a historically 
established territory (Gambetta 1993) these webs have deep historical roots. Yet 
they are constantly transforming under economic, political, or law-enforcement 
pressures. Hobbs (2001: 550) explains how the changing of the informal organisation 
of the urban working class milieu transforms the ‘territorially based family crime 
collaborations’ and ‘enduring fiefdoms’ into ‘loosely structured informal collectives of 
ad-hoc groupings’. The social aspect that almost any comprehensive analysis of 
organised crime touches upon is the political one: the ability of organised crime to 
influence or control the political process to secure impunity or revenues (Della Porta 
and Vannucci 1999; Paoli 1999, 2003; Allum 2010, WODC 2009; NSIC 1999). There 
are also more narrow aspects of social relations, or the embedding of criminal 
activities into legal market activities that have been noted (Kleemans and Van de 
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Bunt 2008). The criminal activity may thrive on the work relations, settings, or simply 
opportunities or synergies that legitimate commercial activities provide (e.g. 
international or domestic professional contacts, cross-border movement of goods, or 
distribution of goods).  
 
The types of social ties that are of particular interest to this thesis are slightly different 
and have been considered only in marginal ways: they concern the relations between 
buyers and sellers of illegal goods / services. Gambetta (1993: 54-58) describes the 
relation between buyers of protection services and the mafia as a ‘lasting bond’. The 
basis of this bond could be personal relations (friends, family, business associates) 
but it may also hold the elements of imposition (indirect threats, persistence, ‘foot in 
the door’ sales tactics). Much of the recruitment of customers is explained not 
through the use of ‘social networks’, but by relying on reputation, territorial control 
(monopoly) or coercion.121 Kleemans and Van de Bunt (2003) consider only in 
passing the role of the immigrant community and social ties in connecting criminal 
entrepreneurs and customers.  
 
The key concept that underlies these discussions is the broader issue of trust: which 
is the main driver for criminals seeking to establish closer social ties (Gambetta 1988; 
Lampe 2002a, Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004). In illegal markets, where reliable 
market information (about product quality, prices, reliability of competitors or 
customers) is in great deficit, trust is the main regulatory mechanism. 
 
This chapter aims to examine the wider socio-economic environment within which the 
sale of stolen cars and operation of the used-car market takes place. By comparing 
the socio-economic environment within which Bulgarian illicit enterprises operate in 
Spain and in Bulgaria, the chapter seeks to provide an explanation as to why the 
Bulgarian car-theft enterprises failed to enter the used-car market in Spain, but 
managed to do so in Bulgaria. 
 
This wider context is important because, as the previous chapters have shown, the 
sale of stolen – and a great number of used – cars relies on informal relations. The 
                                                          
121 These embedded local relations explain why the forced transfer of close to 200 criminals between 
1961 and 1972 from traditional territories in the Italian south to the region of Piedmont, a counter-
organised crime measure by the Italian government known as ‘soggiorno obbligato’ (Varese 2005), was 
a successful way to disrupt their criminal enterprises.  
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selling of stolen vehicles requires a higher level of trust between buyer and seller 
than it would be needed in other market transactions for two reasons: first because 
the buying of used cars is the type of market exchange where the buyer has little 
information about the quality of the vehicle. Second, because as an illegal 
transaction, the buyer and the seller need to have some degree of trust to minimize 
the risks of being detected. The purchase of a car, especially a luxury car, is a 
different transaction from that of a retail purchase of other illegal products (drugs, 
cigarettes, or sex) where the sums involved and the risks might be insignificant to the 
buyer or even to the seller. The amounts involved in luxury stolen car sales are 
usually at least 20,000 euros, and in financial terms are closer to a lower mid-level 
drug or cigarette deal. 
 
Therefore, when considering Bulgarian criminal enterprises in Spain, it is worth 
examining to what extent ‘ethnic’ ties and the socio-economic environment facilitated 
the operation of illicit enterprises, and in particular the sale of stolen cars. To this end 
the first part of the chapter examines the role that the Bulgarian immigrant community 
might have played in facilitating the ‘market entry’ of Bulgarian criminal enterprises.  
 
The second aspect examined in this chapter is the operation of car-theft enterprises 
within the various local social contexts in Bulgaria. The informal relations used in the 
sale of used / stolen cars are examined in view of the fact that the common ethnicity 
does not serve as a basis for establishing relationships of trust. The socio-economic 
context in Bulgaria is illustrated by the cases of two towns. Pazardjik, even though a 
small town, has a typical socio-economic environment and local political economy 
that can be observed in bigger cities across Bulgaria, where there are well 
established criminal structures. Gabrovo, on the other hand, represents more the 
typical ‘small town’ where crime is not much of an issue. In addition, the chapter 
examines the role that broader criminal networks (e.g. drugs, prostitution) play in 
facilitating the sale of stolen vehicles.  
 
One obvious omission in the present analysis is the importance of kinship / family 
networks and relations (Gambetta 1988, Reuter 1985; Hobbs 2001). In the course of 
the interviews, only one of the criminal enterprises seems to have been at some point 
structured around the immediate family, (only) in its early stage (LEI-14, LEI-15, OTI-
12). More importantly, the family background of most offenders, even the lowest-level 
criminals, suggested that hardly any of them came from families which could be 
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described as ‘criminal’, or that they followed in the steps of their deviant parents. This 
is not to say that kinship does not play a role. Illegal markets and criminal activities in 
Roma communities in Bulgaria are still strongly organised around families, clans, and 
the interfamilial relations upon which entire Roma neighbourhoods are based. None 
of these, however, participated in car theft. 
 
6.1 Immigrants and crime 
 
The research on the relation between immigrants and crime has focused on two main 
issues (Stowell 2007: 29): disproportional involvement of immigrants in crimes, 
especially violent ones, (Hawkins, ed. 2003); and the effect of immigrant communities 
on overall crime rates in cities or regions. Studies (Butcher and Piehl 1998: 655) in 
the US have shown that many immigrants lack the necessary human capital (e.g. job 
training, language proficiency, education, etc.), thus limiting their access to legal jobs 
and pushing them into criminal activities.  Borrego et al. (2008) and Albrecht (1997) 
explain the higher crime rates amongst immigrants in Spain, and respectively 
Germany, by the higher proportion of young males and the differences in socio-
economic opportunities between migrants and the local population (e.g. 
immigrants from Africa in Spain or involvement of Vietnamese in illegal distribution 
of untaxed cigarettes in Germany). The social marginalisation could also lead to 
higher demand for certain illegal products within the immigrant community (Albrecht 
1997). Social structural factors (high rates of population turnover in certain 
neighbourhoods, where residents who achieve a higher status, leave) contribute to 
higher levels of violence (‘social disorganisation’) in areas with concentrations of 
immigrants (Stowell 2007: 42).  
 
A number of scholars, though, (Zhoe and Bankston (1998), Butcher and Piehl 1998) 
have argued that foreign-born immigrants are less likely to engage in criminal activity 
than second-generation immigrants. Stowell’s study (2007: 148-154) finds that 
immigration does not contribute to higher rates of violent crimes, explaining that 
different immigrant communities have specific experiences of immigration and, 
consequently, different levels of experience with crime. Junger-Tas (1997) and 
Albrecht (1997) also point out that not all immigrant populations can be analysed 
equally. Resident minority populations differ in many ways from itinerant groups or 
from immigrant black-market participants (Albrecht 1997), as the latter two groups 
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have different patterns of push-and-pull factors that affect their migration and 
offending patterns. For instance, in North Rhine Westphalia (Germany) in 1993 the 
rate of suspects per 100,000 of the population widely differed between immigrants 
from different communities. Some minorities, such as Romanian Roma had very high 
suspect rates due to ‘distinct cultural behaviour patterns and to an extremely 
marginal social position’ (Albrecht 1997: 51). Also, Polish, Romanians, Bulgarians, or 
Russians were significantly involved in property offences and negligibly in violent and 
drug offences (ibid.). Junger-Tas (1997: 302) also seeks cultural explanations for 
these different crime rates amongst immigrant communities, arguing that ‘group 
values’ or ‘family integration’ could provide explanations.  
 
Resident immigrants’ involvement in crime could also be influenced by the pattern of 
international trafficking routes. For instance, in the 1980s in Germany, a special 
police task force focused exclusively on Senegalese, Gambians, and Nigerians which 
led to numerous arrests and a gradual decrease in and adjustment of trafficking 
routes and distribution networks. By the early 1990s the arrests of sub-Saharan 
Africa suspects approached zero. Then attention shifted towards Northern Africans, 
Turks, Spaniards or Italians. 
 
The following sections suggest that the Bulgarian immigrant community had little to 
do with Bulgarian criminal enterprises. To some extent, the data show that their 
marginal position – that some authors argue had pushed many other immigrants in 
illegal markets – had prevented Bulgarian immigrants from facilitating the market 
entry of car thieves.  
 
6.2 Bulgarian immigrants in Spain  
 
Since around the year 2000, Spain experienced the largest increase of immigrant 
population influx in its history: larger than the increase of any other EU Member 
State. From 0.9 million in January 2000, the number of registered foreigners reached almost 5 
million, or 11% of the total population by 2010 (Spain: Ministry of Labour and Immigration 
2011:1). The main driver behind this wave of immigration was economic expansion, in particular, 
the growth in construction and tourism.  
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Bulgarians, like many other Eastern Europeans, were also attracted by the 
employment opportunities in Spain. For Bulgarians, Spain was a fairly unknown 
emigration destination up to 2001. Bulgaria has experienced several waves of 
emigration since 1989: the first one was in the 1989-1993 period, when an estimated 
450,000 (about 6% of the total population) emigrated122 (Bobeva et al. 1996: 19). The 
second wave took place after 2001 when visa restrictions for travel to the EU’s 
Schengen countries were lifted: an estimated 300–400,000 emigrated.123  
 
Up until the late 1990s, the main European destinations for migrating Bulgarians 
were Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, and Hungary (see Figure 21 below). 
Ragaru (2008) argues that worker-exchange programmes and familiarity with former 
Soviet Bloc countries are the key explanatory factors for these initial destinations. In 
the late 1990s, Greece, Italy, and Spain established seasonal worker programmes 
(especially in agriculture and tourism) that started to attract regular flows of 
temporary migrants from Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria. The ‘legalisation’ 
campaigns for illegal immigrants that took place in Spain in 2000, 2001, and 2005124 
(Ragaru 2008: 5) were a further incentive to the establishment of a permanent 
immigrant presence. The emigration preferences of Bulgarians gradually shifted: 
while in 2001 Germany and the US were the preferred destinations, by 2006 it was 
Spain, Italy, and the UK (see figure below). 
 
                                                          
122 In 1989, much of the emigration (about 150,000) was forced migration when the communist 
government expelled Bulgarian Turks to neighbouring Turkey. In a previous similar move, in 1984, 
another 200,000 were also expelled. Although some of them returned, around 200,000 remained 
permanently in Turkey.  
123 The last population census in Bulgaria was in 2001. Therefore it is difficult to estimate the number of 
emigrants in this second wave. This estimate is based on data of remittances, which tripled from €386 
million in 2000 to €1.04 billion in 2004 (Mintchev and Boshnakov 2006). Adding to this migration 
dynamics a record-low birth rate brought Bulgaria’s total population from about 9 million in 1989 to 7.3 
million in 2008, according to NSI data.    
124 Greece was 1998 and 2001, Italy 1998 and 2002 (Ragaru 2008: 5).  
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Figure 21. Emigration intentions of Bulgarians125 
Source: BBSS Gallup (2006); ASSA-M (2007) 
 
BBSS Gallup’s (2006) nationally representative survey also showed that 9% of 
respondents, or around 540,000 had emigration experiences and had spent time 
working abroad: mostly in Germany (19%), Greece (12%), Italy (10%), Spain (10%), 
or the USSR (10%)126. In addition, 15% of all respondents stated that there was a 
family member working abroad. In some administrative regions of the country the 
proportion of such families was much higher: 57% in Kyustendil or 38% in Vidin.127  
 
The figure below shows the steep growth in officially registered Bulgarian immigrants 
between 1998 and 2010 in Spain. In 2005, the Spanish government introduced an 
amnesty for Illegal immigrants under certain conditions.128 This explains the steep 
increase in the number of registered immigrants between 2004 and 2006, and 
suggests that prior to 2006, there were at least 20,000–30,000 illegal Bulgarian 
immigrants. The real number might have been even higher, given the conditions of 
                                                          
125 The questions that were asked in both surveys included ‘Where would you like to emigrate?’. Both 
surveys are based on representative adult population samples (BBSS Gallup, n=2,500, 16-60 year-olds; 
ASSA-M, n=2,500, 18-60 year-olds). 
126 Before 1989 there were various arrangements, such as an extensive joint Soviet-Bulgarian logging 
development project in the Soviet Republic of Komi, where several thousand Bulgarians went for work. 
127 These two regions were some of the poorest, with the highest unemployment and the lowest 
salaries. 
128 Immigrants needed to prove they had been living in Spain and had been registered with the 
municipal authorities for at least six months, had no criminal record and could produce a work contract 
(BBC 2005). The two previous amnesties in 2000 and 2001 increased the number of registered 
Bulgarian migrants only marginally, indicating that illegal populations were still not very significant at that 
time. 
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Table 9. Registered permanent residents of Bulgarian nationality in Spain
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Work
 
Sixty-one percent of the Bulgarian immigrant population is concentrated in three 
regions of Spain: Madrid (21%), Castilla y Leon (21%), and Vale
Figure 22). The rest, though, are spread 
explained by regional labour market
Ministry of Labour and Social Work data, as of late 2010, the largest share of 
registered Bulgarian immigrants worked in the construction in
In addition, 12,000 worked in agriculture, 3,764 as domestic assistants, while 3,984 
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were registered as self-employed (Pardo 2010). Some of the Bulgarian immigrant 
settlements formed exactly around employment destinations: Castilla y Leon is an 
agricultural region, while Valencia or the Balearic Islands saw significant construction 
projects.  
 
 
Figure 22. Share of total Bulgarian registered immigrants in Spain per region (2008).  
Source: Data: Ministry of Work and Immigration; Map: SpainGuides.com 
 
The employment characteristics of the Bulgarian labour force in Spain differ 
according to the region and city. For instance, in Madrid the differences with the 
overall characteristics quoted above are significant: only 8% are involved in 
construction, and 2% in agriculture, while the majority are in the service industry 
(26%), manufacturing (17%), hotel / restaurant (14%), or retail (15%) (Markova 2006: 
4). On the other hand, the entry jobs for this same sample130 (i.e. the initial jobs that 
immigrants had when they first arrived) were also quite different: 25% had started 
originally in construction, 16% as domestic assistants, and 7% in agriculture 
(Markova 2006: 5). 
 
The interviewees provided some of the stories behind the statistical data presented 
above. All of them had moved to a particular town in Spain because they knew 
                                                          
130 Markova’s study is based on a survey of 202 Bulgarians (legal and illegal) working in Spain.  
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someone, or because someone they went with knew someone. Most often these 
were individuals from the same town (e.g. most interviewees from the town of 
Pazardjik ended up with or around people from Pazardjik). This was not necessarily 
true for the more educated immigrants or people from large cities, whose primary 
reason for going to Madrid, for instance, was job opportunities rather than family 
connections. Some interviewees arrived in Spain only after trying some other 
countries (Italy, Austria). Interviewees recounted stories of their friends / family who 
had gone there without knowing anyone and with just a little bit of money: usually 
stories of homelessness and difficult times. In either case, what was common about 
all the stories was the difficulty in finding long-term jobs. Especially those with lower 
education or without knowledge of the Spanish language, in their early years or 
months in Spain had significant time gaps between one job and another. The 
interviewees considered as ‘well-established’ Bulgarians who had stable jobs, with 
income of €1,500-€2,000 (as domestic help workers or owners of construction 
companies131). 
 
Several respondents talked about informal ‘fixers’, often individuals, well known in the 
local community, who would arrange the jobs for newcomers, or would provide help 
in cases of emergency. Usually these fixers were in contact with different 
construction entrepreneurs, so that when the respondents lost their jobs, they would 
turn to the fixer who would put them in touch with another contractor. 
 
Despite the geographic concentrations in three regions of Spain, and the fact that 
people from the same town end up in the same place, ‘Bulgarian communities’ are 
difficult to come across. In big tourist centres (along the Costa del Sol, or the Balearic 
Islands) as well as the big cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, or even Alicante) there 
are no ‘Bulgarian neighbourhoods’. For instance, even though the Madrid suburbs of 
Parla, Fuenlabrada and Getafe are known to be the home of many Bulgarians, there 
are no concentrations to the extent that the neighbourhoods are known to be 
primarily Bulgarian, and where ‘everyone knows everyone’. In Costa del Sol (around 
resorts such as Marbella, or larger cities such as Malaga), the number of Bulgarians 
is also too small to form communities.  
 
                                                          
131 Spanish employers try to avoid hiring illegal workers directly. Instead they hire a subcontractor, 
usually a company, owned and run by a Bulgarian national, who in turn hires the illegal immigrants.  
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The common characteristic of larger cities is that they attract better-educated 
Bulgarians, many working in the tourist or service industries: there the social 
interactions outside the Bulgarian immigrant community are very common. 
Nevertheless, 84% of the respondents in Markova’s survey in Madrid reported that 
they have no friendships with Spaniards (Markova 2006: 3). 
 
On the other hand, in smaller towns and villages where there are large 
concentrations of Bulgarian migrants (who came as agricultural workers), 
concentrations exist, and the sense of a ‘community’ is stronger. Usually these are 
places where the Bulgarians already come from the same town in Bulgaria, where 
they knew each other, and had a strong sense of community (e.g. minority 
neighbourhoods or small villages / towns in Bulgaria). Deneva (2009) shows how 
over a period of nine years, about one-quarter of the inhabitants (around 500 people) 
of a Bulgarian-Muslim village in Bulgaria moved to the small Spanish town of Tafalla. 
This newly established immigrant community was very closed, with very little contact 
with the wider Spanish community in the town.  
 
Another example, are the Roma who emigrated from the town of Peshtera (15 min 
drive from Pazardjik). In Peshtera there are two neighbourhoods: the Turkish-
speaking neighbourhood, from where most of the inhabitants emigrated and now 
work in the Bordeaux region of France; and the mixed Roma and Turkish-speaking 
neighbourhood, from where most of the residents have moved to work in 
greenhouses around El Ejido (Spain), where they all live in a small community (IMI-
10). Slavkova (2008: 5-15) provides numerous examples of such group emigrations 
of Roma to particular locations. Similarly to Deneva, she observes that in the 
cohesive community groups the contacts with non-Roma and non-Bulgarians are 
very limited. Some of the interviewees, especially those with less education and little 
fluency in Spanish, reported a similar lifestyle where the social interactions were 
limited to other Bulgarians or to other immigrant Slavic groups (Serbs, Russians).  
 
Gómez et al. (2009) present an even more nuanced explanation about social 
networks, comparing Bulgarian immigrants and Bulgarian immigrant entrepreneurs in 
Barcelona and Roses (a town about 150 km north-east of Barcelona). While their 
findings confirm that immigrants in larger cities, such as Barcelona, have more 
encounters with the other immigrants or Spaniards, in Roses, Bulgarian 
entrepreneurs have a very local focus without much connection with Bulgaria. More 
194 
 
importantly, the ‘first wave’ of immigrants who came without relatives or friends in 
Roses, have a much stronger connection with local Catalans, which immigrants 
consider a strong asset. In Barcelona, entrepreneurs’ connections with Bulgaria are 
much stronger (Gómez et al. 2009: 18). 
 
An important characteristic of Bulgarian immigrant communities is their constantly 
changing nature: the movement back and forth between Bulgaria and Spain, with 
new people ‘trying their luck’, working for a few months, and going back, until a new 
job comes up again. Markova’s survey, for instance, shows that 67% of the 
respondents had shorter or longer-term plans to return to Bulgaria (Markova 2006: 
10).  
 
6.2.1 Migration of Bulgarian criminals 
The above description of Bulgarian migration shows that the flows of emigrants from 
Bulgaria followed patterns largely determined by two groups of factors: the demand / 
opportunities for labour, and government policies (temporary labour arrangements or 
visa restrictions). The interplay of these factors in influencing the patterns of 
migration of criminals is quite complicated. On the one hand, visa restrictions limited 
the migration of criminals to certain extent, although they were more likely than 
ordinary illegal immigrants to use fake passports or schemes to try to enter Spain 
illegally. As the Spanish police cases show [e.g. C-0205, C-0706] that was a very 
frequent occurrence, even after visa restrictions were lifted in 2001.  
 
The professional car thieves in Bulgaria started their careers as ‘migrant criminals’. 
Before 1990 there were criminals who committed car theft in Bulgaria but the market 
for cars and car parts was so tightly controlled by the government that no one could 
live on the income from car theft alone. After 1990 many of the individuals who had 
the skills migrated mostly to Central Europe and Germany (LEI-4, OF16). The key 
figure who controlled these first emigrant Bulgarian car theft groups, Ivo Karamanski, 
as well as some of the thieves, such as Dimitri Minev – aka ‘Rusnaka’, later became 
well known bosses of the racketeering insurance companies Korona Ins. and SIC 
respectively132. Most of the thieves coordinated by Karamanski were arrested in 1991 
in the Czech Republic, and the following year 24 of them were deported back to 
                                                          
132 Both were murdered: Karamanski in 1998 and Rusnaka in 2004. 
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Bulgaria. (Angelov 2007: 9-17). The investigation showed that these criminal 
networks stole vehicles from Germany and sold them in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, or stole them in either of the latter two countries, and trafficked them to 
Bulgaria (Angelov 2007: 9-17, Stoev 2006: 9; Bezlov et al. 2007: 147, OFI-15, LEI-4). 
Statistical data from the Czech Republic supports the claim that offenders and law-
enforcement officers made about the early destination of criminal migrants.  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
8 5 12 11 4 4 3 1 
Table 10. Bulgarian car thieves arrested in the Czech Republic (1995–2002) 
Source: (Cejp 2004: 101) 
 
Central European countries had opened fairly quickly to the import of used or new 
cars, and had plenty of criminal opportunities that did not exist in Bulgaria (which 
continued to impose high-import taxes on car-imports for a number of years)133. In 
the early 1990s car theft was much less organised: car security was simple, and 
registering and selling a stolen car required little skill, complex organisation, and 
corruption. Crossing the border with a stolen car was easy as there was no Interpol 
database on stolen cars, the car-registration documents were very easy to fake. 
[OFI-3, OFI-15]   
 
The more significant increase of Bulgarian ‘crime migrants’ in Western Europe, 
though, took place only after 2001 when visa entry restrictions to almost all EU 
countries were lifted. (Germany was an exception as it was a destination for 
immigrants as well as criminals since the early 1990s134).  
 
                                                          
133 The import taxes on cars increased in 1992 to such as an extent that a new car purchased in 1991 
for $4000 could have been sold 3 years later for the same price as used car. 
134 It is not clear if the German data include immigration crimes as well. 
196 
 
 
Figure 23. Number of registered crime committed by suspects of Bulgarian nationality 
Sources: German Ministry of Interior (Annual Crime Statistics 1996-2008); Spanish Ministry of 
Interior data, quoted in Jimenez (2005); Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (2004); Belgian 
Ministry of Interior 
 
Along with the increased flow of labour migrants, the proportion of foreign criminals of 
all nationalities in Spanish prisons grew. From 17.9% of all prisoners in 1999, the 
proportion of foreigners grew steadily, to reach 32.2% in 2006 (although this was 
much slower than the increase in the immigrant population). By 2006, Bulgarians 
constituted almost 0.9% of the total prisoner population in Spain (or 181 individuals), 
out of approximately 20,643 prisoners of foreign nationality in Spain. (Spanish 
Ministry of Interior 2006) 
 
The explanations about the emigration of criminal entrepreneurs are similar to those 
about labour migrants: emigration is motivated by the search for bigger profit margins 
and more revenues. Different criminal markets or criminal activities are fuelled by 
different demand factors in countries of destination. Therefore, the geography of 
criminal migration differs from the geography of labour migration. The police data (as 
well as interviews) showed that Bulgarian immigrant criminals are involved only in 
narrow range of criminal activities in host European countries. For instance, their 
involvement in the drugs market is very limited throughout the EU (with the exception 
of Spain). Similarly, involvement in VAT fraud, illegal cigarette smuggling or 
distribution, and illegal migration, is very limited.  
 
On the other hand, their involvement in organised robberies, burglaries, dispersion of 
counterfeit currency, and skimming of bank cards has been common. Their most 
active involvement has been in the commercial sex market. Bulgaria has been the 
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top source country for victims of trafficking of human beings for sexual exploitation for 
most of the period 2000–2009 (see UNODC data analysed in Gounev et al. 2009). 
Belgium, Holland, France, and Germany have been the top destinations. One 
common characteristic, similar to the migration pattern of labour migrants, is the 
concentrated movement of prostitution networks from certain towns in Bulgaria to 
specific cities in Western Europe. For instance, prostitution networks from the region 
of Pazardjik operate mostly in Bordeaux (France) and Brussels, while prostitution 
networks from the town of Sliven target specific towns in Belgium (Brussels) or the 
Netherlands (Groningen) (Gounev et al. 2009: 15-16).   
 
 
Figure 24. Prostitution-related registered crimes committed by Bulgarians in Belgium 
Source: Belgian Federal Police135 
 
Sivri (2008: 38-45) explains the role of government policies that facilitated the market 
entry of Bulgarian prostitution networks in Brussels after 2001. Up until 2001, 
Bulgarian criminal networks had managed to place only a small number of girls to 
work in the window-display bars in Brussels’ Northern Station district. The 2001 
removal of entry visas allowed for easier entry of prostitutes in Belgium. Prior to 2001 
these women mostly used counterfeit passports and were largely illegal immigrants. 
The Belgian police adopted the approach of not prosecuting any of the prostitutes but 
only the pimps (i.e. the presumed traffickers). To prostitution networks, lower-level 
pimps are more ‘expendable’ than the prostituting women, as they could be more 
easily recruited. Most importantly, the Belgian police focused its investigative efforts 
                                                          
135 The data was provided by the Bulgarian police liaison officer in Belgium. 
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on Albanian trafficking networks, which dominated window-display prostitution until 
2000-2001. They were considered by the police to be much more violent, resulting in 
more victims of trafficking than other networks. All of the above provided a ‘window of 
opportunity’ to Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs. Window-display owners also were 
more likely to prefer ‘lower-risk’ (i.e. legal) girls who the Bulgarian pimps could 
provide. (The girls in window-display bars are usually hired by the bar owners as 
‘waitresses’.) As a result, by 2006, about 80-85% of the girls in the window displays 
were Bulgarian women controlled by Bulgarian criminal networks (according to a 
police estimated quoted in Sivri 2008: 34), while hardly any Albanians were left. 
 
The big incentive for the internationalisation of Bulgarian prostitution rings is that 
profit margins in Western countries are higher than in Bulgaria. Market expansion is 
the other major push factor. The commercial sex market in Bulgaria, despite a 
growing number of tourists and an increasing domestic demand, has gradually 
levelled off. The Belgian case shows that international expansion might not be 
necessarily fuelled by change in domestic demand, but a mix of supply and ‘market 
regulation’ factors. 
 
In the case of car theft (or property crimes in general) the key push factor for 
migration was not profit margins. The costs of stealing and cloning a car in Spain are 
higher than in Bulgaria. Car thieves, for instance, reported earning approximately 
double in Spain than what they earn in Bulgaria (OFI-5 and 7). The key incentives for 
property crimes, such as car theft, are better criminal opportunities. A parallel could 
be made with plundering ‘a natural resource-rich country’. As one offender stated, ‘If I 
skim a card in Bulgaria I can do at most a couple of hundred euros.136 In Spain there 
are all these American tourists that come without limits on the credit cards’. [OFI-15] 
Another offender added ‘If you want to steal some specific type of luxury car in 
Bulgaria you might cruise around forever and not even find it. In Madrid or Marbella 
you just go to the commercial centre parking lot and wait for a few hours’ [OFI-10]. 
(The next chapter considers in detail the financial and regulatory barriers that BG 
criminal entrepreneurs faced when entering the (stolen) used car market in Spain.) 
 
Comprehensive statistical data on the numbers of either labour or criminal migrants 
are difficult to come across and largely unreliable. The table below provides а very 
                                                          
136 That is the cap of most cards in Bulgaria. 
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rough comparison between the number of Bulgarian labour immigrants and criminal 
migrants in Europe. There is little correlation between the two, for the above 
explained reasons. 
 Estimated number 
of Bulgarian 
immigrants (2007) 
Registered crimes 
by Bulgarian 
offenders (2002) 
Prisoners 
(1998-2009) 
Detained as 
of the end of 
2009 
Greece 150 000  4 333 292 
Spain 142 734 1200 1 506 275 
UK 70 000   250 
Germany 53 984 2980137 24 432 163 
Italy 50 000   321 
Austria 12,731 729 1 460  
France  15 000  2 184 180 
Portugal 6,364   23 
Netherlands 11,356 406   
Czech Rep 10 000  1 398  
Belgium 4 000 1761  60 
Table 11. Bulgarian immigrants and criminal migrants 
Sources: Migration data from the Bulgarian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy; Prison and 
detention data from Ministry of Justice. 
 
The statistical data on the increased prosecution of ‘foreign’ criminals, including 
Bulgarians, after 2000 in Western Europe and Spain raises the issue of whether this 
is the result of police racial / ethnic profiling (Delsol 2006, Palidda 2009) or specific 
policies targeting certain ethnic minorities (e.g. Tournier 1997: 549 on immigrants in 
France) which could result in the disproportionate presence of foreigners in the police 
or criminal justice statistics. The issue of profiling is important for the present analysis 
because there may have been a disproportionate police effort to prevent the market 
entry of Bulgarian car-theft groups. 
 
Although this is a legitimate concern, profiling practices have not necessarily 
contributed to a significant extent to the arrest of Bulgarian car thieves for a number 
of reasons. First, because Bulgarians and the Spanish are racially similar, and police 
                                                          
137 Data excludes immigration-related crimes 
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stops would not affect them.138 Immigrant crime is largely associated with Moroccans 
and South Americans and drugs-related crime. Ethnic bias in terms of targeting 
organised crime groups of foreign origin, and in particular Bulgarian, is likely to exist, 
the police statistics show that 82% of the criminal groups investigated in Spain in 
2008 had ‘foreign participants’ (Cosido 2010: 7). Bulgarian organised crime suspects, 
298 in total in 2008, were in proportion to the number of suspects of other 
nationalities (Romanian, Moroccan, Colombian, etc.) and reflected the relative size of 
the overall immigrant populations from these countries (Cosido 2010: 7). The number 
of all car-theft groups identified and investigated in 2008 in Spain was 32 in total 
(Casido 2010: 6-7). Yet only 3 of them included Bulgarians (C-0208, C-0408, and C-
0508). Next, the negative public opinion towards immigration was still forming along 
with the increase in the numbers of immigrants – the police did not need to respond 
to such opinions.139 Eastern Europeans (apart from Bulgarians and Romanians) have 
never migrated to Spain in high numbers, avoiding the negative stereotypes 
prevalent in other Western European countries. Finally, the Spanish police statistics 
on Bulgarian suspects for all crimes show that crime rates amongst Bulgarian 
immigrants are very similar to the crime rates in Bulgaria – i.e. there is no process 
either of over-criminalisation or ethnic profiling.140 
 
6.2.2 Labour migrants and criminal migrants 
 
The connection between labour migrants and criminal migrants is not straightforward. 
Much has been written about the use ethnic or kin relations (Paoli 2002, Hobbs 
2001), and the importance of trust based on ethnic or kin relations (Gambetta 1988, 
Lampe 2002c) in the operation of illegal market transactions. Other authors 
(Bovenkerk 2001, Bovenkerk et al. 2003, and Zaitch 2002) have shown that in the 
                                                          
138 One offender event noted: ‘Drivng a stolen car in Spain is much easier because the police is not here 
[in Bulgaria], they never stop you unless they have a reason’ [OFI-2]. In Bulgaria random checks 
especially of luxury vehicles are regularly carried out by the Traffic Police. Each of the bigger cities has 
‘check points’ on the motorways where all cars need to pass with 60 km. This is one of the legacies of 
the communist regime.  
139 In 1996, only 8% of survey respondents viewed immigrants negatively, while by 2004, 32% viewed 
them negatively, still less than the 39% who had positive views (Pereda et al. 2004) 
140 This argument is only roughly outlined here, and more detailed analysis is needed: first, the actual 
number of Bulgarians in Spain is not clear. Second, the age and gender distributions of migrants are not 
known, which is important for any type of comparative analysis. But since the immigrant population is 
generally younger, as it consists almost entirely of migrants of working age and their children, this rough 
argument holds even more strongly.  
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Netherlands, in the Turkish / Kurdish heroin trade, in Colombian cocaine smuggling, 
or in the Russian-speaking mafyia, culture or ethnicity factors have little explanatory 
power ‘in understanding the extent, form and content of ethnic minority crime’ 
(Bovenkerk et al. 2003: 26).   
 
The case of Belgium is particularly telling because Belgium has a very small 
Bulgarian labour immigrant community and a significant presence of prostitution 
networks. Sivri (2008: 67) also notes that the Bulgarian labour immigrants had 
nothing to do with Bulgarian prostitution networks, and women / pimps were not 
locally recruited.  
 
In Spain, the Bulgarian car thieves started to migrate in the 1990s. During that early 
period they operated more as ‘itinerant crime groups’ (Van Daele 2008), spending a 
few months in Spain, and not selling the stolen vehicles locally, but simply driving 
them to Bulgaria. The criminal enterprises were based in, and run from, Bulgaria. At 
that time, Spain was only peripheral, as countries closer to Bulgaria were ‘plundered’ 
(see Chapter 4). Gradually, in the late 1990s, certain illegal entrepreneurs, as well as 
some car thieves, started to settle locally. Even so, during that period the need for 
recruitment and connections with the local Bulgarian community in Spain remained 
superficial. Whenever a need arose for low-level thieves to be involved, these were 
brought in from Bulgaria, where such individuals had already established themselves 
and were trusted. With the influx of immigrants and thieves after the lifting of visa 
restrictions in 2001, the likelihood of using immigrants as part of a car-theft operation 
or to facilitate the sale of stolen vehicles increased.  
 
Statistical data, as well as evidence from immigrants and offenders alike, shows that 
although connections between immigrants and criminals existed, they were not 
strong and stable enough to provide the social basis needed for the distribution of 
stolen cars. 
 
In Spain, police MVT data shows that, in the past decade, four regions of the country 
have been particularly affected by car-theft: the capital Madrid, the region of 
Andalucía (and especially the provinces of Málaga (Costa del Sol), Cádiz, and 
Granada), Valencia (the provinces of Alicante, Valencia and Castellon), and to a 
lesser extent Cataluña (Barcelona) (see Figure 25). The explanation is that these are 
highly urbanised areas with high concentration of vehicles: Madrid as a natural 
 concentration of the national wealth; and Costa del Sol as an international luxury 
home and tourist destination, which has attracted criminals from around Europe since 
the early 1970s (Resa-Nestares 1999: 47). The mapping of the arrests of the 
Bulgarian car thieves in the 1997–2008 period shows that almost all the cases fall 
within the three geographic areas (see Figure 26): 50% of cases reported by the 
Spanish police were related to Madrid, 20% to Valencia, and 25% to Malaga, 
Granada, and Cadiz. 
Figure 25. Number of stolen vehicle
by region (2004) 
Source: Spanish Ministry of the I
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‘worked’ and lived in a number of other towns, where the police cases did not 
indicate any arrests. In addition, one interviewee described how, often, in some 
suburbs of Barcelona or Madrid, groups lived not far from each other (50 km), which 
allowed them to work together or cooperate when needed. 
 
 
When compared with the geographic data on Bulgarian labour migrants (see Figure 
22. Share of total Bulgarian registered immigrants in Spain per region (2008).) in the 
previous section some differences stand out. Only two of the car-theft areas, Madrid 
and Valencia, where respectively 21% and 19% of registered Bulgarian immigrants 
reside, were areas with concentrated car-theft activity. In the other areas, Malaga 
and Barcelona, there are far fewer Bulgarian labour immigrants. Andalucia (including 
Costa del Sol), for instance, hosts only 2.3% of Bulgarian immigrants. 
 
Evidence from the interviews supports and explains the above statistical 
observations. The labour immigrants interviewed had never heard of, and did not 
know, particular car-thieves in Spain. They only knew about the issue via the media, 
especially the Bulgarian media.  
 
For the migrant to engage in an illegal activity, on the one hand requires a number of 
factors such as being in a financial hardship. Hardly any of the interviewees had had 
permanent work over the years. They were quite often under stress, spending 
months without a. Even without these difficulties, the salaries of migrant workers are, 
for the most part, so low (usually in the range of 800-1,000 euros per month), that 
even temporary or low-skilled help in a car-theft operation (e.g. helping to drive the 
vehicle when it is stolen, driving it back to Bulgaria, or following a potential victim to 
understand their habits) could have provided a significant additional income. 
 
Yet, the only interviewee who admitted to attempts to have been recruited was in a 
case related to drugs. The respondent was originally from Varna and had had some 
acquaintances from his home town, who were involved in drugs smuggling in 
Alicante and Valencia. These people had been involved in the drugs trade in Varna 
as well. Before leaving Varna, some common acquaintances told him to contact the 
guys in Alicante / Valencia if he is in ‘need’ and wants to make some cash. These 
guys periodically called him and his brother with offers. They tried to present the 
involvement as a low-risk deal: ‘you will just need to drive a car from Valencia to 
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Madrid and we’ll pay you 2,000-3,000 Euros’. The respondent was well educated and 
he and his wife had stable jobs, with very little incentive to make additional money 
(IMI-1).  
 
Other respondents shed some more light on the difficulties that criminal networks 
might face in recruiting labour immigrants into criminal activities. While petty crimes 
for survival, such as small thefts or frauds, are common, involvement in professional 
crime, such as car-theft or drugs-distribution is a different matter. One labour 
immigrant hinted that he had received some offers, but he viewed them as extremely 
risky, and he did not sufficiently trust the people who made the offer: ‘you might not 
get paid, or they might ‘fry you’ [i.e. get arrested]’. (IMI-6) 
 
The labour immigrants have many other strategies, including drawing on their 
savings back in Bulgaria, or borrowing from family back in Bulgaria to make ends 
meet before another job opportunity in Spain arises. Another interviewee recounted 
stories of desperate immigrants, especially those of Roma descent, who were so 
poor that they could not afford even to go back to Bulgaria, and were stuck on the 
Balearic Islands, homeless. None of them though, was involved in crime. Here, 
though, one should note again, that for car theft a certain level of education or skills 
(e.g. a driver’s licence) are needed, which makes the involvement of uneducated 
immigrants unlikely.  
 
Offenders commonly stated that even lower-level mules or look-outs need to be 
trusted and tested. Usually the thieves formed their own crews of look-outs. The 
thieves, as explained in Chapter 4, rarely spend any considerable time at one 
location. They change towns, and even the entrepreneur they work for, every few 
months. As result, recruiting of the ‘brigada’ (the theft crew) is done in Bulgaria. The 
offenders interviewed stated that usually they did not know all the other people in the 
group, but they were all from different towns in Bulgaria.  
 
Only one offender-interviewee mentioned that he had gone to Spain to a relative, 
who was a labour migrant, before connecting later on to a criminal group, when a 
‘friend called him’. Other offenders reported that they have family members in some 
parts of Spain, but when they went for ‘work’ it was to completely different part of the 
country. One of the car-thieves interviewed explained that most of his immediate 
family now lives in Spain. ‘I haven’t thought about going there. What would I do there. 
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I like it here...you can say I’m a patriot’ [OFI-23] In other words, for him as a 
professional criminal, the fact that his family lives in Spain offers little in the way of 
criminal opportunities. The second reason is that the destination of migrants, 
especially those from small towns, is often related to agricultural or construction 
work, and in different regions from those where car thieves go (Costa del Sol, 
Barcelona, Madrid). Interviews with members of the Bulgarian immigrant community 
in Marbella / Malaga (Costa del Sol), showed that there were almost no labour 
migrants from the Pazardjik area in that region. Yet Marbella was a popular 
destination for car-thieves from Pazardjik. On the other hand, a major destination for 
work-migrants from Pazardjik is the Balearic Islands, where there is a significant 
community around the tourism service industry and construction. The Balearic 
Islands, though, are off the list of possible targets for car thieves142. 
 
The itinerant modus operandi of car thieves (or entrepreneurs who were formerly car 
thieves) pretty much precluded the establishment of lasting relations with Bulgarian 
immigrant community. On the other hand, as stated in the previous chapter, some of 
the ‘theft enterprises’ were run by individuals who had been established locally for a 
long time. Their connections with other Bulgarians must have been well established: 
for instance with local car-service or even car-key shops that were run by Bulgarians, 
(of which there were a ‘few dozen’143 across Spain, including several in Madrid). An 
offender also indicated that he knew of Bulgarians who ran used-car dealerships and 
car junkyards, but that they were not related to car-theft entrepreneurs (OF-16). The 
low-social status of the majority of Bulgarian labour migrants, and their existence 
outside mainstream society, is probably the key explanation of why the Bulgarian 
immigrant communities were not well positioned to facilitate the entry of criminal 
enterprises in the used-car market. The description of the social status of the local 
theft entrepreneurs was that they were ‘rich’, and had a nice house, but they usually 
had some small business, and could hardly be described as part of the local elite, 
especially in cities such as Madrid, Valencia, or Costa del Sol, where the political 
elite is an entirely different category.  
 
                                                          
142 As one interviewee noted, removing a stolen car from a small island is difficult and risky (IMI-6) 
143 This estimate is made on combined data obtained from ads in the Bulgarian daily newspaper in 
Spain, (Nova Duma), internet search, interviews with researchers, representatives of the Bulgarian 
Embassy in Spain, and immigrants. The data showed that almost all knew of some car-repair shops 
either where Bulgarians worked or which was run by Bulgarians. It was not immediately clear what 
proportion of the repair shops even dealt with luxury cars.  
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A more complex answer relates to the question of the role of Bulgarians who reside 
in towns or cities where car thieves also operate. Here, the answer comes both from 
migrants and car thieves and concerns the issue of trust. For the migrants, the 
perceived level of risk is much higher than it is for the offenders, and for them to 
engage in a risky activity they would really need to trust the other people involved. 
Otherwise migrants expressed fears of becoming victims of violence if something 
went wrong, of not being paid as expected, or of being arrested.  
 
The above conclusions of the lack of relations between criminal entrepreneurs and 
immigrants are not surprising in view of the fact that when international companies 
enter foreign markets, local migrant communities are rarely a consideration: that 
would limit a company’s expansion to handful of markets. It seems that, similarly, for 
organised criminals the migrant community is not a consideration. Where large 
immigrant or ethnic groups exist (e.g. South Asians in the UK, Moroccans in Spain), 
where they constitute a significant consumer target group, foreign companies might 
choose to enter a market to meet a need which local companies either do not meet 
or do so at a higher price. This, though, is a very limited market and counts for little. 
The recruitment of local immigrants to fulfil staffing needs is also rarely a priority: the 
main consideration in recruitment is the possession of the required qualifications, 
which can be met either by bringing staff from headquarters or hire more highly 
qualified local staff. One target group for some companies in Western European / US 
markets is illegal migrants, due to the low labour costs. This group is not solely 
exploited by companies that attempt to enter a market, but by all companies that 
might seek lower labour costs.  
 
The Spanish police cases that were reviewed for this thesis indicated that the ethnic 
and the national composition of the networks are quite diverse. One should be 
careful with police terminology, which often lumps together as a ‘group’ (and this is 
partially done to satisfy Penal code requirements) all the participants in a criminal 
scheme, regardless of whether these are individuals that provide criminal services 
(falsifying documents, forging VINs) or are clients (e.g. buying stolen cars that are 
then trafficked and sold in other countries). Yet the data from these files show that in 
27 of the 55 cases, the ‘group’ or ‘network’ also included other nationalities. In some 
of these cases the foreign members were Spaniards (responsible for the sale of the 
stolen vehicles (C-0307), or owners of car-repair shops (C-0707), or just girlfriends of 
car-thieves (C-0707). In addition, in some cases non-Bulgarian criminal 
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entrepreneurs hired Bulgarian car thieves for their operations: a Moroccan 
entrepreneur directly hired six Bulgarians (along with nine Moroccans), to steal cars 
that were exported to Morocco (C-0209); in another case, an Armenian entrepreneur 
hired a Bulgarian woman from Pazardjik known to be involved in car theft (C-0706b). 
 
6.3 Criminal networks in Spain 
As the previous chapter indicates, Bulgarian car-theft enterprises were successful in 
entering the ‘wholesale’ illegal market for stolen cars, selling stolen cars to other 
foreign criminal enterprises (Moroccan, Eastern Europeans) who either exported 
them for resale outside Spain, or used them to transport drugs within Spain. The 
main explanation to this success is that Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs had broad 
informal relations with other foreign criminal entrepreneurs as they were involved in a 
number of other criminal markets / activities in Spain.  
 
The car-theft business became the entry point for the involvement of many Bulgarian 
criminals in the drugs trade. Spain is the main entry point for cocaine and cannabis 
into Europe, and itself has one of the largest per capita consumptions of cocaine and 
cannabis in the EU (EMCDDA 2008: 14, 37). Since the late 1990s, Bulgarians have 
sold stolen cars to Moroccan drug traffickers. Gradually, some of the Moroccans 
started paying for the cars in drugs. Most offender interviewees admitted to have 
been involved in various low-level drugs market activities – either in Bulgaria or in 
Spain. As one interviewee stated, ‘as a car-mule I can make a couple of thousand 
Euros driving a car to Bulgaria in a matter of two weeks – [but] to drive some drugs 
from one town to another in Spain, I can make the same money in a few hours’.   
 
Almost all offender interviewees had some contact and exposure to Moroccan 
smugglers. Some interviewees recounted that they often lived in Moroccan 
neighbourhoods, side by side with Moroccan criminals (‘as these [neighbourhoods] 
were the cheapest’), which further facilitated the contacts. Moroccan criminal 
entrepreneurs involved in car theft usually doubled as drugs smugglers, and 
investing in stolen cars was a way of repatriating some of the drugs profits. 
 
Bulgarian vehicle thieves, though, took this ‘customer relationship’ a step further: 
they sold stolen light trucks or all-terrain vehicles to the drug smugglers after having 
installed a GPS tracking device in them. Once the drug smugglers had loaded the 
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cargo, the vehicles were stolen back from them (C-0204b, C-0205; C-0703; C-0607). 
Another approach described was to follow the vehicles sold and to mix with the 
traffickers who were expecting the unloading of the drugs shipment at the coast, and 
then trap them.  
 
In the course of law-enforcement operations against such groups significant 
quantities of drugs have been recovered. In total between 2003 and 2005, 5.9 tons of 
hashish and 111 kg of cocaine (C-0905) were confiscated from Bulgarian vehicle-
theft networks, including two seizures of 3.7 tons (C-0204B) and 1.3 tons of hashish 
(C-0205). This scheme seemed to be replicated by a Spanish car-theft network as 
well, whose investigation in 2008 led the Spanish police to the seizure of 6.3 tons of 
hashish (Fernández 2008). This network’s tactic was to dress as police officers 
during the secondary thefts. 
 
Law-enforcement interviewees generally describe the involvement of Bulgarians in 
the drug trade as being at fairly low levels. To some extent, the same booming 
economy that made Spain an attractive place to work for Bulgarian labour migrants, 
attracted low-level ‘soldiers’ ready to enter into a lower echelons of organised crime 
activities: car theft, burglaries, transporting drugs. Bulgarian drug mules (‘swallowers’ 
or ‘boleros’), for instance, are regularly arrested for trafficking cocaine between South 
America and Spain. Bulgarian boat crews transporting cocaine from South America 
have also been apprehended. There have been occasions on which Bulgarians have 
been arrested for the smuggling or distribution of heroin, in most instances, the 
quantities indicating low-level transportation logistics involvement (C-0204; C-1206).  
 
In one such case, related to trafficking of hashish between Spain and France, luxury 
all-terrain vehicles supplied by Bulgarians were used by French drug-smugglers to 
transport several hundred kilograms of hashish to Marseille in a single operation. 
Such luxury vehicles were needed due to the tactics that the French used: they 
would use two vehicles, one pilot, followed 3 km behind by the drug-transporting 
vehicle. Both would drive at high speeds, and the pilot would warn of any police 
presence (C-0505, C-0703, C20, C27). 
 
The other significant market involvement that provided connections to car-theft 
entrepreneurs was the commercial sex market. Although, prostitution is legal in 
Spain, in recent years, quite a few Bulgarian-run illegal prostitution rings, involving 
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mainly Bulgarian women, have been dismantled in Spain (C-1006, C-0404, C-0506). 
There are at least a couple of cases in which criminal entrepreneurs were involved in 
both prostitution and car theft (C-1105, C-0702). In these cases, vehicle theft was an 
additional activity, rather than the principal occupation of the entrepreneurs. One 
case that the Spanish police described in more depth involved a group, which 
between 2003 and 2005 had involved at least 600 Bulgarian women in the province 
of Alicante. Its ability to forge documents144 was used to arrange the immigration 
documents of the women, while at the same time it was rendering its services to car-
theft groups (C-1105). As explained in the previous chapter, prostitution rings in 
Bulgaria often use luxury cars to launder profits, and many pimps own car-
dealerships, some which also distribute stolen cars.  
 
The intertwining of prostitution and car-theft networks is also demonstrated in two 
other ways. Car thieves and prostitutes may share common facilities, such as 
accommodation, or use brothels to establish themselves. [OFI-9] In addition, 
prostitutes and pimps provide information on customers that are potential targets and 
facilitate the theft. [OFI-9, OFI-11, OFI-7]  
 
In Spain, another typical secondary activity for Bulgarian car thieves or entrepreneurs 
was the smuggling and sale of illegal firearms. For most of the 1990s, and up until 
around 2005, access to stolen firearms and remodelled guns in Bulgaria was 
relatively easy (Rynn et al. 2005, Gounev at al. 2006).145 Some car-theft groups 
became involved in the illegal arms trade on a small scale, using the readily available 
supply of guns in Bulgaria, the trafficking channels for cars, and the distribution 
network connections with the Spanish underground economy (particularly drug-
dealers).  
 
The largest amount of firearms ever recovered from Bulgarian car thieves by the 
Spanish police was in February 2004, when the Guardia Civil arrested a group of 
vehicle thieves and discovered 17 firearms, including handguns, UZIs and 
                                                          
144 The skills required to forge vehicle documents are readily transferable to other domains: forging of 
lottery tickets, personal IDs, and passports (C-1105). Stolen credit cards used along with fake IDs are 
also used to rent a vehicle fraudulently and then steal it.  
 
145 The easy access to firearms was due to problems with security at newly privatized arms-producing 
plants, the security of military arsenals, and the significant number of unemployed specialists skilled in 
remodelling gas-pistols into combat ones. (Rynn et al. 2005) 
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Kalashnikov automatic rifle (C-0204B). In 2003, the police arrested on its arrival from 
Bulgaria to Gandia (near Alicante) a vehicle whose interior was entirely remodelled 
and stuffed with 50 new factory-made Makarov pistols without markings,146 7 AK-47 
assault rifles, as well as numerous car key blades (to make copies of car-keys) and 
corkscrews (to remove car key locks) (C-1103). On most other occasions, the police 
reported the confiscation of 12 firearms or less (C-1201; C-0202; C-0803; C-0903) 
from apprehended theft groups. At that period, several public statements by Spanish 
law-enforcement officials alleged that Bulgarians were major players in the ‘illegal 
guns’ market in Spain.   
 
The prisons were also another place where Bulgarian criminals managed to 
establish connections with other criminals. In some cases, Bulgarian entrepreneurs 
continued to run their business from prison (C-0707). One car thief recounted that 
often he got jobs through people that he had met in the various prisons, especially 
Slavs, such as Serbs or Ukrainians. (OFI-16)   
 
The analysis in this section showed that the informal relations between Bulgarian 
criminal entrepreneurs and political or economic elites, as well as luxury car dealers, 
as customers for (stolen) luxury cars were very limited. One explanation is the 
perception that local elites may have had of Bulgarian entrepreneurs. The 2007 
survey of political and economic elites in Europe shows that elites in Spain are very 
different from the rest of Western Europe, and in many respects their characteristics 
are closer to those in Eastern Europe. Probably the most important difference from 
other Western European countries is the importance of being ‘Spanish’ (to ‘be born in 
Spain’ or ‘to have Spanish parents’) that political and economic elites in Spain attach 
to the notion of being part of the elite (Jezer Mir and Vazquez 2009).  
 
6.4 The political economy of selling stolen cars in Bulgaria 
As the previous chapter showed, ‘entrepreneurs’ who sell stolen cars in Bulgaria 
operate in variety of social settings: from the big cities, such as Sofia or Varna, to the 
small towns. The two sections below examine two different social settings: Pazardjik, 
                                                          
146 There are two companies that produce Makarov pistols in Bulgaria, Arsenal and Arcus JSC, and only 
one, Arsenal, that produces Kalashnikov. There have been various allegations about the security at 
Arsenal, the low salaries and poor organization which has for years fuelled thefts from the factory, and 
numerous illegal arms-producing shops in local towns have been dismantled (Rynn et al. 2005) 
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which is a bigger town, where criminal entrepreneurs are closely integrated into 
‘national criminal elites’, and Gabrovo, a smaller town with a ‘small town’ culture.  
 
6.4.1 The case study of Pazardjik 
Although being the 14th largest city in Bulgaria, with a population of around 80,000, 
Pazardjik is considered by its citizens to be a small town – the kind of place where 
everyone knows everyone, with a main street where people stroll after work or on 
weekends to meet and chat to friends and family. It is also an hour’s drive from the 
capital Sofia, and a 15-minute drive from Plovdiv (Bulgaria’s second largest city) 
situated on a major international motorway connecting the Middle East to Europe 
(Istanbul is a five-hour drive). It would not be an exaggeration to describe Pazardjik 
as one of Bulgaria’s crime hubs, where international prostitution, drugs, cigarettes, 
fuels, or stolen-car smuggling rings cross paths in a town where criminal 
entrepreneurs and the political / judicial / economic elite have managed to exert their 
influence beyond the limits of the town.  
 
Pazardjik has a picturesque downtown area where the only reminder of the 
underground economy on which the town runs is the always-present group of stolen-
jewellery and mobile-phone dealers. They spend their days right in the middle of the 
main pedestrian strip, selling either to each other or to occasional passers-by, stolen 
gold and mobile phones. The many other signs are not visible to the naked eye – the 
local bars where police officers and criminals spend their time hanging out; or the 
newly constructed buildings, small stores, entertainment venues, and bingo halls 
where criminal profits are invested / laundered; and the hundreds of young women 
graduating from local secondary schools only to be recruited into prostitution.  
 
Corruption is entrenched in the city’s culture. An index147 of Bulgaria’s 28 regional 
capitals ranked Pazardjik as the most corrupt in Bulgaria (Mladenova et al. 2009). 
Over the period 2000–2010, a number of corruption scandals surfaced, only 
indicating the possible depth of the corruption issue. In 2004, the city’s mayor was 
accused of having arranged prostitutes for a visiting Russian delegation and other 
municipal employees and councillors. It came out that, prior to being elected as 
mayor, he was defence lawyer to the pimp and trafficker in human beings who 
                                                          
147 The index is based on a survey of business, non-profit and local administration representatives, as 
well as analysis of local legislation. 
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provided the prostitutes.148 The sex scandal also brought to light a number of other 
corrupt deals related to public procurement deals arranged by the mayor. 
(Staridolska 2004) When, in 2006, the regional head of the police resigned, assuming 
responsibility for an involuntary manslaughter by a police officer, a number of 
corruption cases were made public, connected to police departments across the 
Pazardjik region (in the nearby towns of Velingrad and Batak). It emerged that a 
number of police officers were involved with car-trafficking networks149 (Terzieva 
2006). In 2009, a local judge and a defence lawyer150 were investigated for taking 
bribes from a trafficker in cultural goods. (Ilkov and Yordanova 2009) In 2010, the 
head and deputy head of Pazardjik’s anti-organised crime unit were temporarily 
sacked after allegations of corruption and connections with organised crime. The 
allegations, made by a local businessman / municipal councillor and supported by 20 
convicted / investigated criminals (including some involved in car-trafficking), were 
dismissed as no evidence was found (BTV 2010).151 In July 2010, the Deputy 
Regional Prosecutor of Pazardjik was dismissed after phone call records revealed 
that on numerous occasions he had contacted an intermediary who arranged top 
magistrate appointments using corrupt means (the implication was that he was trying 
to buy the position of Regional Prosecutor of Pazardjik152) (24 Chassa 2010).  
  
The criminal elites thrive by using a mass of local criminals, or simply ordinary 
citizens who are willing to become involved in the informal or illegal economic 
activities in Pazardjik or in other EU countries. Pazardjik has a few neighbourhoods 
where criminal activities are concentrated, and where most of petty criminals come 
from: ‘Iztok’ [East], ‘KAT’153, and ‘Zapadna’ [Western]. ‘Iztok’ [East]154 is the biggest 
                                                          
148 The pimp’s brother was bodyguard to one of the SIC heads and was murdered along with his boss 
and four other bodyguards in the same year (2004) in one of the most brutal episodes of organised 
crime bloodshed.  
149 In one of the cases, the VINs of a confiscated car were rigged right inside the police yard. 
150 One of offender described the lawyer, whose husband was a high-level prosecutor, in the following 
way: ‘She can fix you up quite well if she want, but she’s very expensive…. she’s not someone you can 
count on…she was the bride’s maid at a friend of mine’s wedding, but she charged him tons of money 
($20,000) and she fucked him up: his wife and mother in law both went to prison with very long 
sentences on drugs charges’ [OFI-23] 
151 The interviews with offenders (which took place before this scandal broke) supported the allegations. 
152 The so called ‘Krassio affair’ is one of the biggest corruption scandals concerning the Bulgarian 
judiciary, which took place in 2009–2010, after it became apparent that a young intermediary was in the 
middle of arranging top magistrate positions, including positions on the Supreme Judicial Council.  
153 ‘KAT’ is the abbreviation for Traffic Police [Kontro varhu Avto-Transporta], and the neighbourhood 
has taken the name from the fact that city traffic police office is located in the neighbourhood.  
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Roma neighbourhood in Pazardjik. The description provided by a local low-level pimp 
(who prostitutes his wife) from the balcony of their flat in a building situated in the 
heart of the neighbourhood best describes the socio-economics of the 
neighbourhood: 
 
‘The house straight across the street belongs to a pimp who works in 
France. [...] The one on the left to a guy who ‘keeps a few girls’ in 
Germany but his son works in construction in France [...] Next to him is 
the imam, but his house is bigger than the mosque, which is the 
building over there. He stole most of the money that some Arab 
foundation gave for the mosque.[...] The house there and the big yard 
belong to some guys that deal in scrap metal.155 The newly constructed 
house to the right, over there, belongs one of the local loan sharks.156 
[...] Down the street there are a bunch of shops, where you can get 
[illegal] cigarettes. [Going down the stairs of the building, he pauses on 
each floor to explain the work the neighbours do] The family that lives 
in this flat – the wife is a prostitute in Greece, but the husband works in 
Germany [...]. This family: the wife works as a prostitute in Germany 
and supports them [...] This family is a normal one, they run a currency 
exchange business in town. [...] This family – they are in the business 
of [selling stolen] gold and phones on the main street.’ [OFI-22] 
 
This quick scan of the neighbourhood does not even touch on the heroin trade that is 
run from the neighbourhood. The socio-economics of the Iztok neighbourhood is 
quite similar to that of many other Roma neighbourhoods in Bulgaria, particularly the 
ones in larger cities such as Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Kazanlak, or Bourgas.157 Only two 
                                                                                                                                                                      
154 The names of many Roma neighbourhoods around the country, given during communism, are ‘East’ 
or ‘Sunrise’.  
155 Scrap-metal collection points in Roma neighbourhoods rely on metal which is either picked up in 
garbage or stolen. It is a significant concern. Every year over 5 million euro worth of electricity cables is 
stolen across the country. (Todorov 2008) 
156 The usurers are widespread in Roma neighbourhoods, where citizens have no access to credit. The 
interest rates offered are so high, that many Roma get into debt for life. The usurers also take the 
personal ID cards of their clients. In Pazardjik, they use their influence to sell votes during municipal 
elections [State Agency for National Security agent, Angel Stoev, quote by Darik News 2009], which is a 
widespread phenomenon in small towns and Roma neighbourhoods in Bulgaria.  
157 The only exception concerns heroin: not all Roma neighbourhoods distribute heroin, as only the 
Turkish-speaking ones, such as those in Plovdiv and Pazardjik, have connections to Turkey from where 
most of the heroin is imported.  
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interviewees involved in car theft came from the Roma neighbourhood. They had 
only peripheral roles as mules or onlookers. There are two key reasons why Roma 
are not involved in the theft or sale of luxury vehicles: very few have driver’s licences; 
very few have mechanical or electrical technical skills (as less than 10% graduate 
from high-school) or are even literate enough to become involved in any of the more 
sophisticated roles.  
 
The second neighbourhood that had turned into a recruitment ground for petty 
criminals is known as ‘KAT’,158 and it is adjacent to the Iztok neighbourhood. KAT’s 
ethnic make-up is mixed, as Roma and Bulgarians live side-by-side, although it is 
seen as a predominantly Bulgarian neighbourhood, and the Roma are of a slightly 
higher social status. KAT has a reputation amongst the town’s citizens as being a 
‘tough neighbourhood’ where ‘groups of hooligans’159 roam around, making the 
streets unsafe (OFI-15, OFI-19). Most of the offenders that were interviewed were 
from this neighbourhood. If, in the context Pazardjik, the phrase ‘everyone knows 
everyone’ is more of a metaphor, in KAT this phrase reflects reality, especially in 
certain age groups. Interviewees described their growing up in that neighbourhood in 
different ways: ‘It was hell growing up there – lots of fights and violence; you don’t 
wanna know the kind of things that I’ve seen’ (OFI-4); ‘In this neighbourhood every 
second girl is a prostitute’ (OFI-18). Another respondent described KAT in the 
following way ‘There is no criminal head [tartor] in the neighbourhood, there are 
rather a few ‘authority figures’ (avtoriteti160). These authority figures control the low-
level criminals, by occasionally setting them up with ‘jobs’, but also extorting a share 
of their criminal incomes (CDI-2). They also have connections to the higher-level 
criminal elites (e.g. high-level pimps, or car thieves) and can provide expendable low-
level ‘garbage’ (as police officers or higher-level criminals refer to the lower-level 
criminals). The main form of control is violence: ‘They would line us up, and beat you 
up if you have hidden money’ (CDI-2).  
 
For car theft networks, the historical roots of these connections go back to the 1990s, 
when many of the low-level criminals worked for one of the ‘grupirovki’: 
                                                          
158 KAT (stands for Control over Automobile Transport) and is the official abbreviation of the Traffic 
Police. The neighbourhood takes its name from the fact that Pazardjik’s Traffic Police headquarters are 
situated in that part of town.   
159  The concept of ‘gangs’ is not used in Bulgaria. 
160 The same term is used by Russian criminals (e.g. Varese 2001: 141). 
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‘I liked going out...it sucked to go out to a club in the evening and hang 
out over a glass of coke, while you watch the ‘lion pups’ throwing money. 
So I started first with thefts of car stereos. Then my friend ‘The Frog’ 
taught me how to steal cars. So I started working as ‘lion pup’ [lavche / 
лъвче – foot soldier] for Apollo and Balkan. We had also SIC and VIS in 
town...’ [OFI-8] 
 
If the neighbourhoods provide networks to recruit low-level criminals, there are 
several ‘institutional’ networks that provide for the recruitment of criminals with 
specific skills or connections. One of them is the regional correctional school: a 
communist heritage, semi-penitentiary institution where ‘difficult’ children were sent. 
The mechanical technical school in the city, for instance, is where many technically 
savvy students meet: some, who could make theft instruments, become car-
mechanics, and eventually even become car thieves (OFI-18). Higher-level 
prostitutes are commonly recruited in the foreign languages school and the 
specialised gastronomy school (OTI-15). Pazardjik’s prison is probably the most 
notable network. With its 900 prisoners (Helsinki Committee 2002: 23), the prison is 
not only a place to make connections with other criminals, there is an entire illegal 
economy around the prison – especially in a small town such as Pazardjik – for drugs 
and (stolen) mobile phones.  
 
Since 1975 Pazardjik has also been the home of the only ‘Police school’ (until 1990 
its name was the Intermediary Militia School): it is not a policy academy, but rather a 
preparatory school, as well as a professional development school, where around 
1,000 students pursue initial police training.161 Some of the well-known ex-police 
officers-turned-crime figures are graduates of the school. Interviews and public 
sources suggest that many other graduates have also followed criminal careers, 
including car theft. Others have taken different professional paths, such as director of 
Pazardjik prison, or heads of police departments. 
 
While the police school is unique for the country, the sports intermediary school in 
Pazardjik, Georgi Benkovski, a boarding high-school school for professional athletes, 
up to 1990 was one of 36 such specialised sports schools (Tzvetkova 2008: 181). 
                                                          
161 After 2000, the school became a specialized training centre of the General Directorate Border Police. 
(www.nsgp.mvr.bg) 
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The phenomenon of the role professional athletes in organised crime is examined in 
depth by Petrunov (2006) and Tzvetkova (2008) in Bulgaria, by Volkov (2002: 6-11) 
in Russia. Graduates of the Benkovski school formed the core of one of the rather 
well-known private security firms in the early 1990s, ‘Gardenia 69’, headed by former 
wrestler. ‘Gardenia 69’ became involved in some of the bloodiest organised crime 
conflicts in Sofia. The company declined because ‘clients were scared by rumours 
[that] they’re involved in car-theft and [the] gun trade’ (Cholakova 2007: 94-100). Two 
of the offenders interviewed were also graduates of sport school in Pazardjik [OFI-9] 
and Plovdiv [OFI-12].  
 
‘In the 1990s the centre of town you can see the offices of all the big 
[racketeering] firms: VIS, SIC, Gardenia (which was associated with Korona 
Ins), Zora, Apolo and Balkan. They had all divided the turf and there wasn’t 
much of a fight about anything. All these guys new each other from school 
and they were friends even though they worked for different companies’ 
[OFI-23] 
 
Another well known graduate of Pazardjik’s sport school is the wrestler athlete 
already referred to in previous chapters, present-day politician, Mr. Big. Mr. Big is an 
example of what would be considered the criminal elite. In the early 1990s he was 
amongst the founders of a racketeering private security companies, whose other 
partners included the future bosses of SIC and VIS-2 (see chapter 4). He later 
became involved with Multigroup, an economic empire which has often been seen as 
the incarnation of oligarchy and organised crime.162 He later established one of the 
racketeering insurance companies (where his partner was another present-day 
politician and former athlete), whose license was rescinded in 1998163.  
 
Many sports schools graduates went to the National Sports Academy to pursue 
university level sports career. Here is how one offender described the social 
networks established at the Academy: 
                                                          
162 There is much work on the background to Multigroup and its significance in Bulgarian political and 
economic life in the 1990s, until the assassination of Ilia Pavlov in 2003 (see for instance, Glenny 2008: 
3-20; Dimitrov 2009). 
163 Mr. Big gradually developed other businesses, becoming involved in the gas trade with Russian 
partners (who were also former wrestlers). He escaped several assassination attempts in 2002 and 
2003. 
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‘In the Academy one makes tons of connections. Our graduating group164 
was about 30, and about half of them went on to work for the police – in 
Pazardjik, or in Sofia, or one became a prosecutor in Pazardjik. Some of 
us though remained on the ‘other side’. We all know what the other does. I 
haven’t had a need for an ‘umbrella’ [cover-up], but you can always count 
on them for small favours, avoiding administrative stuff...when we get 
together for a drink we usually talk about other things. We also get 
together once a year in Borovets [a skiing resort]. [OFI-16] 
 
The connections between local elites and racketeering private security and insurance 
companies (who later became the entrepreneurs that run car-theft enterprises) have 
strong historical bonds. In the 1990s, the widespread racketeering and absence of 
effective law-enforcement forced local business elites to use the services of 
racketeering companies for protection, for dealing with competition, solving of 
disputes, and collecting debt. VIS, SIC, Apollo and Balkan, and Zora, became 
substitutes for, or rather complements to, law-enforcement and judiciary that were 
corrupt, slow, and weak. At the local level in small towns and cities, businessmen 
used the services of the local offices of the big national or regional racketeering 
companies. On the central level, even large corporations such as Multigroup used 
the services of VIS (Cholakova 2007) either for debt collection or protection from 
extortion. Therefore, most businessmen in a small or medium-sized town would know 
who they might turn to collect debts or settle a dispute.165 
 
The distribution of cars within a small town such as Pazardjik, where a few dozen 
potential customers live, is not very profitable. What is needed for a successful 
entrepreneur is a wider network that may fulfil year-round demand. The example of 
Mr. Big shows very well how his background provided a network with access to local 
economic and political elites beyond Pazardjik.  
 
His network of acquaintances, as well as his professional / business career reveals 
that he is placed in a network with all the major figures who were involved in the 
                                                          
164 A graduating class of 150 is usually split in five groups of 30 students. As there are no elective 
courses, each group takes the same courses. The students in each group therefore get to know each 
other very well, as they spend their 5 years at the academy everyday together. High-schools are 
organised in a similar way.  
165 Tzvetkova (2008: 258-306) provides a good empirical account of the services that racketeering 
companies provide to businesses.  
 racketeering business in the 1990s, as well as the related car-theft. It also shows 
how he managed to connect to political and economic elites that come from former 
wrestling or other athletics backgrounds. In his interviews he admits to having joint 
business ventures with the mayor (also a famous former athlete) of another town, 
where major prostitution networks operate.166 The connection between athletes and 
the security forces was facilitated by the fact that until the early 1990s the Ministry of 
the Interior and the Army were the owners of the two largest professional sports 
clubs in Bulgaria (that included not only the biggest football teams but also any other 
professional sport). Many athletes in these clubs directly joined the police or the army 
after their sports careers ended. 
 
Across the country in big and small cities, entrepreneurs with either a police / security 
background or who are athletes have transformed themselves into local political and 
economic elites. They have built upon this network, involving local businessmen or 
businessmen-turned-politicians. At the local level in Bulgaria, there are very few 
professional politicians, as the local 
political structures are very weak. 
During the past decade two 
governments167 came to power, run by 
charismatic leaders, who created new 
parties, mostly attracting opportunist 
local businessmen.  
   
Figure 27 aims to visualise the social-
economic power relations in a town 
such as Pazardjik. Each of the three 
tubes below may represent a town. If 
the town in the middle tube is Pazardjik, 
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istorical and social circumstances or professional and criminal activities have made 
he social groups listed in this tube part of several intersecting social networks 
                                                         
66 For a short time in the late 1990s, Mr. Big was on the board of one of the biggest football clubs, 
hich at the time was owned by Multigroup.  
67 In 2001, the former King of Bulgaria, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha became Prime Minister. In 2006, 
he former Secretary General of the Police of the ‘King’s government’, Boyko Borisov, established his 
wn party, which won the 2007 local elections in Sofia, and in 2009, the parliamentary elections, thus 
ecoming first Mayor of Sofia and then Prime Minister. Borisov is also former owner of a private security 
irm (‘Ipon’), and former business partner of one of the SIC founders.  
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(represented by the different concentric circles). Often these networks extend to 
nearby towns or to bigger regional centres or the capital, Sofia.  
 
At the core of these networks in a town, such as Pazardijk, is the economic elite, 
which consists of a legitimate businesses and grey entrepreneurs. Some grey 
entrepreneurs are also involved in illegal market activities – they usually have a 
criminal background, but have managed to launder and legitimise their profits. They 
usually finance higher level illegal market deals or provide protection from 
prosecution to the professional criminals (e.g. the car-theft groups). These ‘grey 
entrepreneurs’ may have all sorts of professional backgrounds including lawyers, 
former police, or public officials that have access to magistrates or police and can 
provide protection. They simply use their legitimate economic and social positions to 
influence the political / administrative ‘caste’: local politicians, police, tax officials, or 
magistrates. In a worst-case scenario they might even directly participate in politics, 
covering themselves with a veil of legitimacy.  
 
The symbiosis between the police-magistrates-politicians on one side and the grey 
businessmen on the other is strong and resistant to political change. The 
businessmen are the main source of additional income, in the various forms of bribes 
and favours to these public officials and politicians. And, vice-versa, the public 
officials and politicians are a source of income to the businessmen (e.g. from rigged 
public contracts) and are also a source of protection – not only of their unlawful 
business practices, but also from prosecution for any illegal enterprises the 
businessmen might be protecting or financing.  
 
The professional criminals coming from sports or police schools – the higher-level 
supervisors (e.g. including the technology-savvy car thieves, higher-level pimps, drug 
area supervisors, the escort service girls) are the people actually moving and 
coordinating the illegal deals. They know and control through violence the petty 
criminals, with whom they might have grown up in the same neighbourhood (the 
‘expendable’ criminal participants, the prostitutes, drugs dealers, the pimps, and 
cigarette smugglers). These are for the most part, just employees working for their 
‘back’ [grub] – illegal entrepreneur. Regardless of which social group one pertains to, 
there are always relations and connections to other towns (represented by the two 
tubes on the side). Over time, the social networks are recreated or new ones are 
220 
 
being added and shifting, as people move from one to another social group, or the 
social environment and institutions impact the milieu. 
 
6.4.2 The case of Gabrovo 
If the case of Pazardjik accounts for the wider social environment within which much 
of the car-sales take place in big cities or towns with a significant presence of former 
grupirovki or illegal enterprises involved in other illegal activities, the case of Gabrovo 
is more representative of the situation in other smaller towns around the country.  
 
Gabrovo is about a third smaller than Pazardjik in terms of population (62,000). In the 
early 20th century and during communism it was an industrial powerhouse; however, 
the city declined economically in comparison with its pre-1990 glory. The city is away 
from all major international routes. Unlike Pazardjik it does not have a prison, a 
sports school, police school, or a Roma neighbourhood. ‘We’ve had a couple Gypsy 
families that have been here for decades but they’ve never given us real problems’ 
(LEI-14). In addition, during the 1990s the presence of racketeering private security / 
insurance companies was much weaker than in other towns. ‘The grupirovki never 
really managed to do much here. People quickly got fed up with them168 and started 
coming to the police complaining, and they [the grupirovki] did not have either police 
or political support to do much’ (LEI-14). Gabrovo (and the region to which it is an 
administrative centre) have had the lowest unemployment for years, and higher than 
average incomes. Emigration, either to other bigger towns (Sofia and nearby Veliko 
Tarnovo), or to Spain (in particular Madrid and Valencia) has been common since the 
late 1990s.  
 
Much like other smaller towns – the city has a small economic elite consisting of local 
entrepreneurs: some former state-enterprise managers; local entrepreneurs that built 
on grey economy activities (starting from the few security firms, to construction, 
clothing and footwear production, or the logging business); or those who managed to 
run properly privatized state enterprises. The city also is also a small IT hub, built 
around the Gabrovo Technical University. The local politics is closely enmeshed with 
local business, as municipal councillors or mayors are usually local businessmen. 
                                                          
168 The local office of the groupirovki is described as a bunch of local tough guys without much 
influence. (LEI-14, OTI-11) The local representative of SIC, in addition to several arrests on racketeering 
charges (in 1996 and 1999), was eventually convicted on pimping charges and imprisoned.  
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The small judiciary (a dozen judges and five prosecutors) is closely linked to the few 
lawyers in the city, who provide an efficient corruption network to serve the city’s 
business-elite interests.169 The city has a very low crime rate, and petty crime is the 
major focus of the handful of local detectives. There are no neighbourhoods that 
have a concentration of criminals. Petty criminals are few, and they often feel 
pressured to leave town (either to Spain or to bigger cities), where the police does 
not know them. In fact much local crime, including car theft, is the work of ‘itinerant’ 
criminals who raid the city from other towns. [LEI-14] The city has not had any 
politicians, police or judicial representatives investigated for corruption. Gabrovo has 
hardly any drugs, cigarettes, or prostitution markets, as the nearby slightly bigger 
town of Veliko Tarnovo (which sits on a major motorway) is where all illegal goods 
could be bought. Gabrovo’s ‘international crime’ connections are quite weak, as the 
city has little to offer in terms of local markets or resources, and other ‘export crime 
hubs’ (see Gounev et al. 2009) are used instead (LEI-14).  
 
The city has a dozen used-car dealers, mostly selling cheap cars either imported 
from Italy or Germany, or bought at the Gorublyane and Dupnitsa open-air markets. 
The car-dealers are small local businessmen without any other business [LEI-14, 
LEI-15, OTI-11]. All this makes the picture of the selling of stolen cars by the few 
local ‘sales entrepreneurs’ very different to the one painted above in Pazardjik. For 
some of them, e.g. the Pirana, described in the previous chapter, the ‘Spanish 
experience’ has furthered his international and domestic contacts, allowing him to sell 
stolen cars to sales entrepreneurs in Macedonia and Albania, or to other ‘sales 
entrepreneurs’ in bigger cities around Bulgaria. He also has a reputation as a stolen-
car importer with regional criminal networks in Northern and Central Bulgaria (LEI-
14). For him, as well as for the other one or two local sales entrepreneurs, their 
personal contacts, and the contacts of their contacts, provide them with access 
almost to all potential clients in the region: i.e. the local economic elites in Gabrovo 
and the nearby towns. The few private security entrepreneurs in the town have 
identical career path to the ones seen in other towns: former athletes, who set up 
private security companies in the early 1990s, and who were (and continue to be) 
involved not only in protection, but also in debt collection (which implicitly relies on 
the threat of physical violence). With the real-estate and car-trade boom after 2001, 
                                                          
169 Corruption amongst local lawyers is such an issue that often local businessmen are forced to hire 
lawyers from the capital Sofia, to avoid the influence of competing businessmen, or corrupt officials over 
the local lawyers. 
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they became involved in car-imports as well as construction, gradually transforming 
themselves into local businessmen. The former local office of SIC is now transformed 
into BulIns, and continues to provide (without being a protection racket) insurance to 
local businesses. The former racketeering / private security businesses continue to 
have the exposure to both legitimate and ‘underground’ networks, mostly because in 
a small town, once established, such networks endure and are continuously 
reinforced by the fact that a small town provides very few social opportunities and 
lack of any exclusive opportunities for social interaction (elite clubs, restaurants,  
societies, etc.). This historical background explains why even in a town like Gabrovo, 
local business elites and stolen-car sales entrepreneurs belong to the same social 
milieu.  
 
The local customer base though remains fairly small (probably not more than a few 
hundred potential customers in a region where these networks are fairly strong). 
Local stolen-cars entrepreneurs make more intensive use of Internet used-car 
websites or local dealerships to access bona fide customers.  
 
It is not only the entrepreneurs that need to some type of protection in small towns 
such as Gabrovo or even Pazardjik. One interviewee, a local ‘grey entrepreneur’ 
explained the need for protection in respect to the purchase of real-estate in this way:  
‘In a town like Gabrovo, most of the real estate sold is usually around 20–
30,000 thousand euros. A deal for anything more than this immediately 
attracts the Revenue Service guys, who start sniffing around. Not that this 
is a problem, I can always arrange it with them, and give them their cut, but 
otherwise it is a problem’. [OTI-10]  
The issue with luxury cars is very similar [LEI-20]170. The luxury cars in a town like 
Gabrovo number a few dozen. Тhe police and the local elite usually know who the 
owners are. ‘In Gabrovo there are 12 Audi Q7, and I know which one belongs to 
whom.’ [OTI-11] The buying of a stolen car towards 2010 was seen already as a 
reputational, social risk, or potentially even legal risk. Therefore, another local 
businessman explained:  
                                                          
170 In 2009, the National Revenue Agency started the first of a series of tax inspections of owners of 
luxury cars and yachts. Although, such a measure may seem discriminatory, the only ‘risk’ profile used 
by the NRA was the value of the car – all owners of ‘Bentley’ were audited. In the first round of such 
audits in 15 out of the 45 inspections showed that the owners had no sufficient declared income that 
would explain how they bought their cars (possibly indicating that some of the cars purchased were 
stolen cars).  (Vedomost 2009) 
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‘If I was to buy a stolen car, I would probably try to get one rather from Sofia or 
Plovdiv, because buying it from someone like Pirana, whom I know well, might 
be risky: we’re a small town, he’ll get drunk and start bragging around that he 
sold me the car...I see him hanging around with cops once in a while.. The guys 
that I know that drive the stolen cars or luxury cars, are usually guys that made 
quick money, and wanted to quickly to show-off. For most of these guys today 
the business has dried out and they’re struggling to pay their lease payments.... 
[OTI-12]  
 
‘The car confirms their status as members of this elite.’ [LEI-20]  
The effect of the small town is that someone without the right connections would 
quickly attract attention of authorities who might try to ‘extort’ him: if not the Revenue 
Service it would be the police; if not the police, it would be a prosecutor; if not the 
prosecutor it might be the mayor or the municipal administration.  
 
The description of the above ‘social organisation’ best explains the access to 
customers for ‘sales entrepreneurs’. Much like it was shown in the case of Spain, in 
Bulgaria there are professional criminal networks (e.g. around drugs, prostitution) 
that help car-theft entrepreneurs to tap into another type of ‘social capital’. What is 
different from Spain, though, is the specifics of the car-theft industry in Bulgaria, 
which makes the car-thieves generally the category of criminals with one of the 
widest social networks. This is due to the reliance of this network to carry out the car-
theft for ransom schemes, which have dominated the domestic car-theft industry for 
over a decade.  
 
6.4.3 Distribution of stolen cars and criminal networks  
 
The distribution of stolen cars nationally relies also on the connections of both 
entrepreneurs and car thieves. The well-known car thieves are usually hired by 
different entrepreneurs and they gradually develop their own informal network 
through which sales can be arranged. In Pazardjik, for instance, there are two 
brothers, nicknamed the ‘Tomatoes’, who were technically savvy and skilful car 
thieves. Most interviewees and law-enforcement officers referred to them during the 
interviews. Both brothers had worked in Spain, and both were occasionally hired by 
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entrepreneurs around Bulgaria for local jobs. According to law-enforcement sources 
both had ‘a wide network of contacts’ across Bulgaria (LEI-4).  
 
‘The Tomatoes were both athletes from the sports school. They were 
good, you know. But these guys had a lot of connections. They did not 
work specifically for any of the racketeering companies. But they were 
part of the same group of people and they knew all these guys [from the 
racketeering insurance companies]. When you’re in the business for a 
long time you develop lots of connections and you can the cars...It’s easy 
to steal a car but to land a sale, it’s tough’ [OFI-23] 
 
The distribution of stolen cars in Bulgaria relies on a very important set of relations – 
those used for the return of cars stolen and returned for ransom. As Chapters 3 and 
4 explained, during the past two decades most cars in Bulgaria had been stolen to 
extort a ransom (up to 60% of stolen vehicles in some years). The organisation of 
these thefts is quite complex, as it consists of multiple layers of intermediaries used 
to return the car to the victim. In Sofia (Figure 28 below), for instance, there are three 
entrepreneurs that run theft for ransom enterprises. They coordinate the ‘watchers’ 
who select the potential victims (‘1’ in Fig.28), the brigades of auto-thieves who steal 
the vehicles (2), and the intermediaries who return the car to the victim (4 and 5).  
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Where the active use of informal networks comes into play is in the return of the 
stolen vehicles. There are a number of ‘brokers’ or intermediaries, who work along 
with the entrepreneurs (‘prominent brokers’) in arranging the return of the vehicle. 
They usually rely on the ‘small world’ model, trying to access the friends or 
acquaintances of the victim and inform them about the possibility of getting their car 
back for a ransom. To do this, and to arrange the exchange of the money for the car, 
the brokers use a network of local repair shops, parking garage, neighbours, corrupt 
police officers, or a locally known criminals, or anyone else that the victim might know 
and trust. If the car is insured by one of former racketeering insurance companies 
their security unit might use violence and recover the car (3a). In some instance, the 
insurance may even act as an intermediary in the return of the car, as the victim pays 
the ransom. If the victim does not pay the ransom (and the car turns out to be insured 
by some company that does not use marking stickers), the car may be sold for parts, 
sold to an entrepreneur who is involved in car-export, or on rare occasions simply 
‘burn’ it as a threatening sign. Sales entrepreneurs may use these same networks to 
arrange the sale of stolen cars (OTI-1). In addition, the car thieves, who often work 
for entrepreneurs involved in car theft for resale, use these networks to access 
potential customers.  
 
Figure 28. Relating car-theft for ransom and sale  
Source: Adapted from Bezlov et al. 2007 
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The effectiveness of these networks was also demonstrated during a series of 
ransom-seeking kidnappings that took place between 2007 and 2009 in Bulgaria. At 
least 12 well-known businessmen and criminal entrepreneurs were kidnapped 
(several victims were killed or mutilated). The main perpetrators and organisers of 
the kidnappings were all well-known car thieves (two well-known car thieves were 
also executed, apparently after having supplied vehicles by means of which the 
victims were abducted). A number of arrests made in December 2009 and January 
2010 revealed connections to one of the major insurance companies. The 
investigations showed that amongst the kidnapped victims there were a well-known 
drugs boss, car-theft entrepreneur (and former customs officer). The basic skills 
acquired in ransom-seeking car theft were used in the kidnappings: victims were 
usually taken at gun-point from their vehicles to remote locations (several villages 
near Sofia were used). Their return, though, involved tapping into slightly different 
informal networks to communicate and obtain the ransom. Corrupt police officers and 
former police officers facilitated the kidnappings, leaked information to the 
kidnappers, or arranged for convicted prisoners to leave prisons for short periods of 
time to participate in the kidnappings. (Sega 2009)  
 
6.5 Social barriers to market entry  
 
The present chapter has described two very different social environments within 
which criminal entrepreneurs dealing in stolen vehicles operate. In Bulgaria such 
entrepreneurs constitute part of, or are in many ways connected to, local economic 
elites, which represent the biggest part of the customer base. In addition, they are 
connected to a multitude of other social networks (criminal, educational, professional, 
neighbourhood, sports) that expand the opportunities to access potential customers. 
All these facilitate greatly the sale of stolen cars.  
 
In Spain, on the hand, the criminal entrepreneurs could be in one of three situations: 
1) they might remain ‘itinerant criminals’ moving every few months from town to town, 
disassociated from local social structures; 2) they might settle and become 
associated with local immigrant criminal structures; 3) they might settle and run a 
small legitimate business; in any of these cases, linguistic or cultural barriers prevent 
them from becoming part of local political-economic elites. In the few cases where 
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they have managed (either by laundering significant criminal profits) to become part 
of local economic elites, their social environment is usually restricted to one locality – 
a resort area, and without the reach required to carry out a sufficient number of sales.  
 
In illegal markets, such as drugs or cigarettes, the level of mutual trust that seller and 
buyer need is minimal. Therefore, for a criminal enterprise that deals in cigarettes, for 
instance, and has access to wholesale supply, the entry barriers at the retail level 
could be low (unless competition or law-enforcement agencies put up barriers).  
 
In the case of stolen cars, though, the retail distribution holds a higher risk for the 
retailer and for the (non-bona fide) buyer, and it requires some level of trust. Selling 
stolen cars to bona fide customers as private sellers makes the deal risky for the 
buyer, who needs to make a significant financial investment without much guarantee 
either of the origin or the quality of the product. The use of complicit used-car 
dealerships to sell stolen cars to bona fide customers is also risky for the car-dealer. 
Used-car dealerships rely on their reputation to a great extent, and that provides 
them with a competitive advantage in comparison to other dealerships. The sale of a 
stolen car, though, carries a reputational risk (if the car is confiscated by authorities, 
which sometimes the case), as well as the risk of being detected by law-enforcement 
agencies.  
 
In some illegal markets, immigrants might be able to establish their own distribution 
network around an immigrant community or neighbourhood (as might be the case 
with some stolen goods or illegal products). The data presented in this chapter show 
that the facilitating role of the Bulgarian immigrant community in selling stolen cars is 
very limited. The fact that Spain became a destination for car thieves had little to do 
with the presence of a significant Bulgarian immigrant minority there. The Bulgarian 
immigrant community remains an urban labour or rural agricultural community with 
little connections to the type of economic or administrative elites that might either be 
connected to used-car dealers or to the potential customers to buy either stolen or 
luxury cars. 
 
Therefore, to sell stolen cars in Spain, Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs needed access 
either to bona fide buyers directly, or via used-car / franchise dealers. The main issue 
with accessing either of these is the fairly restricted social networks within which 
these entrepreneurs function. In small or resort towns, or even in large urban suburbs 
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(where some offenders or reports indicated that these entrepreneurs were based), 
the social networks remain restricted to local connections, and even there, 
acceptance by locally established legitimate political or administrative elites is 
difficult, unless one becomes significantly involved in the local legitimate economy 
(which could attract attention from the police about the origin of funds). The second 
option, using small independent car-dealers, likely to risk their reputation to sell 
stolen cars, also provides limited opportunities: first, because the majority of luxury 
cars are sold via franchise used-car dealers; second, because a relationship would 
mostly be built at the local level, which is not sustainable for the business model of 
selling stolen cars, which requires a wider distribution network. 
 
The lack of relations between labour and criminal immigrants shown in this chapter is 
more in agreement with the findings of Bovenkerk et al. (2003) than with Vander 
Beken and Van Daele (2010), who explain that members of itinerant crime groups 
initially came to Belgium in search for [legitimate] work, ‘made contact with people in 
the same situation, and in this way, got involved in crime’.171 It seems unlikely that 
professional criminals, who might have come for a short period of time, would meet 
by chance and enter into a serious criminal enterprise, where relationships of trust 
are quite important. Vander Beken and Van Daele (2010) add that ‘in several cases, 
offenders originated from the same region or even the same town’, and that ‘it is 
quite likely that they have known each other beforehand’ (ibid. p.4). A much more 
likely explanation is that, even in cases when criminals came from different regions, 
they were recruited directly or via intermediaries who knew them prior to coming to 
Belgium. 
 
The limits to information imposed by the secretive nature of the subject matter of the 
present thesis leave a number of questions unanswered. The fact that no 
‘established criminal entrepreneurs’ in Spain were directly interviewed poses the 
question of whether there were social constraints on selling stolen cars within their 
‘social networks’; immigrant entrepreneurs, even if criminal, attempt to have a 
legitimate face. In Spain, and especially in a small town, the social network could 
have been a constraint rather than a social capital to carry out the sales of stolen 
cars. The sale, just like the purchase of stolen cars [OTI-11] carries in Spain a social 
risk, which is missing in Bulgaria. To an immigrant who is trying to enter the local 
                                                          
171 The analysis is based on the description of 27 police cases of ‘itinerant’ groups in Belgium (some of 
which were also involved in vehicle theft). 
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elite, this risk could be significant, and therefore could well be a reason for not selling 
locally, even if one has access to a limited number of potential buyers. 
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7 Market entry: barriers and social structures 
 
The previous chapters showed how Bulgarian-run criminal enterprises involved in car 
theft operated in Spain and Bulgaria, mostly during the period 1998–2008. The key 
empirical question that remains to be answered is given the following factors: (1) the 
sale prices for used cars in Spain were higher than those in Bulgaria; (2) Spain is big-
enough market where cars could be stolen in one city and sold safely far away in 
another one (3) in the period 1998–2008 the demand for luxury used cars in Spain 
was even greater than the one in Bulgaria; and (4) there was an additional expense 
and risk in trafficking the stolen cars across international borders to Bulgaria, why did 
Bulgarian criminal enterprises fail to sell the stolen cars locally (i.e. enter the local 
market for used cars), but were successful in carrying out a significant volume of 
sales in Bulgaria?’  
 
There are a wide range factors that need to be considered. The present chapter will 
engage in this analysis by offering two perspectives. The first one draws on a range 
of pure business / economic rationality, whose explanatory power, as demonstrated 
in the following pages, has significant limitations. Therefore, the second aspect that 
brings together some of the historical and sociological materials from the preceding 
chapters, seeks to expose a more fundamental explanation.  
 
7.1 Criminal enterprise finance 
The economic rationale of criminal entrepreneurs could be examined through two 
fairly narrow analytical frameworks: that of strategic management and of economic 
theories of ‘market entry’. Before going into this analysis, some further empirical data 
may serve as useful tool: a ‘profit and loss’ statement of a criminal car-theft 
enterprise. Table 12 below summarises the possible expenses that the ‘theft’ and the 
‘sale’ enterprises might incur during, respectively the theft / trafficking, and the sale of 
one stolen vehicle. The case is fictitious and it assumes that the final price at which 
the customer buys the vehicle is €40,000.172 The categories of expenses and costs 
are taken from the various interviews with offenders, car-dealers, and law 
enforcement officers. Each of the costs has been verified by several sources, and on 
                                                          
172 The sale price of stolen vehicles for committing other crimes (e.g. to Moroccan drug-dealers) is 
generally very low [OFI-4], as they are usually not cloned; only the registration plates are changed. 
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several occasions, the table was shown to offenders and law-enforcement officials 
for comment.  
 Process Expense category 
Minimum 
expenses 
per vehicle 
Maximum 
expenses 
per vehicle 
Theft 
enterprise 
Stealing 
Thieves (3-4 thieves and watchers)  €       2,000   €            4,000  
Spotters (1-3 spotters)  €          300   €            1,000  
Prostitute / pimps (occasional)   €             -     €               200  
Cloning 
Forging of VIN numbers  €       1,000   €            2,000  
Forging of documentation  €          200   €               500  
Changing parts (e.g. locks)  €          300   €          1000173  
Documentation of clone vehicle  €          -     €               500  
Trafficking 
Mule(s)  €       1,500   €            2,500  
Gas / Tolls / Ferry (Spain - Bulgaria)  €          500   €               500  
Sunk / 
Fixed 
costs  
Coordinator’s salary (commission)  €          500   €            1,000  
Rent of space for cloning stolen car  €          -174  €               300  
Rent of temporary storage of stolen cars   €          -   €               200  
Laundering Laundering of profits  €          -   €               500  
 Total expenses of theft enterprise   €       6,100   €          14,200  
  
Sale 
enterprise 
Import and 
registration 
Registration fee and traffic police bribes  €         500   €            2,000  
Customs bribes to disguised car as non-EU   €            50  €              200 
Mules (to drive car internally)  €          100   €               200  
Nominal owner fee for multiple registrations 
that disguise origin 
 €               -    €               500  
Sale 
Car-dealer sales commission   €               -    €            2,000  
Local sales coordinator  €          500   €            2,000  
VAT: (20% on pre-tax price of €33,334)  €      100175   €         6,666176 
Laundering of profits  €          -   €               500  
 Total costs of sale enterprise  €       1,700   €          14,066  
 Combined costs of sales & theft enterprises  €       7,800   €          28,260  
 Sale price of stolen vehicle  €     40,000   €          40,000  
 Profit of theft entrepreneur (negotiable)  €     13,500   €           7,534  
                                                          
173 This expense depends on the model, and may reach into the thousands of euro. Other parts that 
have been marked might also need to be changed if the car is to be sold to a bona fide customer.  
174 Established entrepreneurs often have their own space, or the VIN changers may incur the expense. 
Entrepreneurs who set up their own space might need to rent a place, and then the cost of several 
thousand euros is spread over the cost of the 8-10 vehicles that are stolen each month.  
175 Avoiding the payment of VAT is typically associated with sort of a documentary fraud, and laundering 
of the profits. The payment of VAT is not needed, when the transaction is between private individuals. 
176 The payment of VAT is mandatory for used car dealerships, but, often used-car dealerships in 
Bulgaria (especially) and Spain use VAT-avoidance schemes.  
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 Profit of sales entrepreneur (negotiable)  €     18,700   €           4,200  
Table 12. Car theft operational profit and loss statement 
 
The majority of the costs are incurred by the ‘theft enterprise’, showing that the 
minimum investment required to steal, to clone, and to traffic a vehicle is minimum 
around €6,000. This cost excludes any operational overhead (phones, electricity, 
travel) or fixed investments (e.g. technical devices needed for stealing the vehicle) 
that the criminal enterprise incurs. In addition, there are occasional costs associated 
with police seizing stolen vehicles. Theft costs have been generally on the rise since 
the late 1990s, due to new security measures and inflationary pressures on salaries 
in Bulgaria.177 Some other interesting observations related to the cost of laundering 
the profits. The investigation into the assets of criminal entrepreneurs show that often 
there is little though (and expense) put into laundering the profits, as spending it on 
‘lifestyle’ (drugs, prostitutes, parties, clothing etc.) is often a priority. This is especially 
true for lower level criminals: several interviewees lamented ‘how much money has 
passed through their hands” [OFI-5, OFI-22] 
 
The above cost estimates, though, could look very differently for non-luxury vehicle 
thefts. With the 2009 financial crisis, a new type of ‘low-cost thieves’ appeared, who 
sold in Bulgaria for about 7 to 10,000 euros mid-range cars, stolen in Spain. This 
illicit enterprise, which operated for about a year, managed to make profit from such 
low final price only by cutting corners, increasing risks, and hiring only a small crew. 
The group focused only on one type of car, the Renault Laguna, as they invested 
only in one type decoder. They drove the cars to Bulgaria themselves. One member 
was a counterfeiter, which saved money on counterfeiting. In addition, they used very 
low quality VIN rigging, which they tried to compensate by bribing the Bulgarian traffic 
police officer, who did not inspect properly the cars during their registration. They 
sold the cars directly to customers through internet, car-exchanges, and personal 
connections without any intermediaries. The bottom line for this transnational 
enterprise was that its members pocketed only around 1500-2000 euros per month 
per person in profits (putting them somewhere on the lower end of middle class in 
Spain). [C-0911] [LEI-21] 
 
                                                          
177 Between 2001 and 2007 average household incomes in Bulgaria doubled (Tomova et al. 2008: 11). 
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One question that arises from the costs table above is: how are the profits split 
between the ‘theft’ and the ‘sales’ entrepreneurs?178 This brings up the question as to 
how the final sales price is determined at all, especially in the cases when the car is 
sold to a customer who is aware that the car is stolen and expects a significant 
discount.   
 
Much like regular used car dealers, illicit sales entrepreneurs may expect profit 
margins that may even exceed the cost of acquiring the vehicle (i.e. selling for double 
the price at which they got it). Similarly, Bulgarian used-car dealers often import €500 
cars from Western Europe which they sell, after a ‘facelift’, for €2,000 [CDI-1, CDI-2, 
OFI-3]. The ‘market price’ of a stolen vehicle, especially from the point of view of 
some buyers who are aware that the car is stolen, is also difficult to determine. This 
market segment could be best described as a ‘thin market’ (Cook et al. 2005): there 
are very few buyers and sellers, and obtaining information about the market price of 
a stolen car is difficult. Therefore the final sales price (and the related profit margin) 
remains subject to negotiations.  
 
There are other factors that may drive the desired profit margins that the ‘sale 
enterprise’ or the ‘theft enterprise’ may seek to achieve. On the one hand, the risks of 
detection as well as the investment associated with the ‘theft’ enterprise are 
significant. On the hand risks of the sales enterprise are lesser as the car is delivered 
usually already ‘cloned’ (i.e. legal) and a buyer is identified in advance. The ‘sales 
enterprise’ in Bulgaria may only be an intermediary making a small cut of the overall 
profit, as many imported stolen cars are trafficked further to the Middle East or former 
Soviet Union. Finally, before the car reaches the final customer it often passes 
through a number of sale entrepreneurs, each making a small profit. Their 
commissions can amount to a few hundred or a few thousand euros each.  All this 
reselling spreads the profit across several entrepreneurs and can easily make the 
cost of selling higher than the cost of stealing and trafficking the vehicle. 
 
Law enforcement officers and lower-level offenders were generally unaware of the 
exact profit split. Offenders who had been involved in or knew of such deals stated 
that the price at which a ‘theft enterprise’ sells the stolen car to the ‘sales enterprise’ 
                                                          
178 Luxury car dealers’ profits are generated not only through the sale but also through the supply of 
spare parts and financing arrangements (Hoover’s Inc. 2008).  
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is always subject to negotiations and depends on the type(s) of vehicle, the quantity 
ordered, and the terms of the deal (e.g. speed of delivery) [OFI-12, LEI-4, OFI-22].179 
The table above provides a couple of different profit scenarios, but they are arbitrary, 
and are not based on actual cases. 
 
The above profit and loss analysis questions some widely quoted estimates, such as 
the one of Europol, which is based on police reported crime data. According to 
Europol’s calculations organised crime’s income (revenues) generated from stolen 
vehicles in the EU was €6.75 billion (Europol 2006). This estimate is based on the 
total number of non-recovered vehicles reported by EU police forces (450,000), 
multiplied by an estimated average vehicle value of €18,000. If one takes into 
account the analysis of expenses, it could be argued that the profit that serious 
criminals accumulate is significantly less: not exceeding €3 billion per year.  
 
Europol’s estimate is inaccurate for other reasons as well. First, the €18,000 is quite 
arbitrary, and not based on actual “cost of stolen vehicle” averages, as most police 
forces do not provide such estimates. The crime victimisation data from Bulgaria 
shows that the average price of stolen cars is less than 5000 euros, which is likely to 
be the case for most other EU countries with a similar age of their national car fleet. 
There are no credible estimates about share of cars which were stolen and sold for 
parts or scrap, where profit margins and costs are quite different. Some profits from 
sales to bona fide customers, may go not to ‘organised crime’, but to legitimate used 
car dealers. Finally, the inclusion of motorbikes in the stolen vehicle data or the 
different criteria for ‘recovery rates’, makes the police data any estimates based on 
this data unreliable.  
 
The above cost estimates provide a basis upon which one could analyse the 
rationale of the economic behaviour of illicit entrepreneurs and other market actors, 
in an effort to explain factors that influence market entry. The two analytical 
frameworks that complement each other, and could be used to examine the factors 
that influenced the market entry of Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs (from the point of 
view of some rational economic behaviour) are: the ‘OLI paradigm’ (Ownership-
Location-Internationalisation) and the ‘barriers to entry’.  
                                                          
179 One offender (OFI-6) claimed that it is the ‘sales entrepreneur’ who makes the biggest profit, the rest 
are more or less ‘coordinators’ who work on a percentage basis. 
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7.2 Internationalisation of criminal enterprises  
 
The OLI paradigm through which Dunning (2004) explained ‘internationalisation’ of 
multinational corporations is relevant only to some of the cases of Bulgarian illegal 
entrepreneurs: the cases of individual entrepreneurs (such as Mr. Z or Parana), who 
ran car-theft businesses in Bulgaria and then moved their operations to Spain. These 
cases would be typical examples of ‘internationalisation’ of a firm, which the OLI 
paradigm addresses. The Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs who had already settled in 
Spain and had other (criminal) businesses, and became involved in the car-theft 
business only when the demand for such cars started to grow were in a different 
position. They did not need to internationalise or ‘transplant’ their operations. Yet 
they still needed to enter the local used-car market. The ‘barriers to entry’ framework 
is therefore more appropriate to analyse the cases of the majority of Bulgarian 
entrepreneurs who seemed to have been already based in Spain prior to getting into 
the car-theft business.  
 
The motivations of enterprises to ‘internationalise’ (i.e. move operations into another 
country) could vary: to seek new or cheaper ‘natural resources’ (including cheaper 
labour), to expand sales into a new market, to improve efficiency of production or 
sales, to acquire the strategic assets of a competitor, to escape regulatory 
restrictions in the home market, or to support (e.g. logistically) their overall business 
activities (Dunning and Lundan 2008: 73). The motivations of criminal entrepreneurs 
who came from Bulgaria and tried to establish themselves in Spain fall largely into 
two categories. First, these were entrepreneurs who were only seeking cheap 
‘natural resources’ (i.e. more and better luxury cars that could be stolen).180 Second, 
an additional motivation for some entrepreneurs was their intention to increase their 
revenues by selling the stolen cars in the Spanish used-car market or in markets 
elsewhere in Europe and Africa. All entrepreneurs who came to Spain had some 
experience in running their own illegal car-theft enterprise or working for one in 
Bulgaria. 
  
                                                          
180 In Bulgaria, including amongst car thieves, there is a perception that used cars in Western Europe 
are generally in better condition due to the better road infrastructure and maintenance habits of owners.   
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Susman and Stites (2007: 232) argue that two main strategies are used to enter a 
market when an enterprise decides to ‘internationalise’: The first strategy is the 
‘following the customers’ approach. In this case the enterprise is likely to invest in 
building its own ‘sales assets’ because they already have a local customer base. An 
example could be a producer of certain car parts, who follows a car producer that is 
building a factory in a new market. The second strategy, usually adopted by ‘market 
seekers’, (i.e. enterprises who enter a new market without having customers) is to 
sub-contract or buy the ‘sales assets’ of an enterprise that is familiar with the local 
market.  
 
The entry mode is also influenced by three other interdependent factors: risk (of 
investing too much without being able to sell with sufficient return), uncertainty 
(because the firm has little knowledge about the way the local market operates), and 
control (the use of an external sales agent diminishes the level of control over the 
firm’s operations). (ibid. 2007: 233)  
 
When examining the case of Bulgarian car-theft entrepreneurs in light of the above 
factors, several observations can be made: 
• None of the Bulgarian entrepreneurs who moved from Bulgaria were in a 
position to ‘follow their customers’. Their motivations to internationalise were: 
(a) to establish direct control over the supply and increase their profits by 
directly selling to an already existing customer-base in Bulgaria; and (b) to 
find local customers to whom to sell directly.  
• The entrepreneurs most likely underestimated the difficulties of finding local 
customers and linking to local distributors. The cost advantage alone proved 
insufficient for the distributing of stolen cars.  
• Sub-contracting and buying local ‘sales assets’ proved difficult, as they were 
in a position of direct competition with local car-theft groups. Pricewise, 
Bulgarian criminal enterprises could offer probably a cheaper product (due to 
the fact that Bulgarian car thieves, VIN riggers, mules, etc. were low-paid). 
This discount, though, is offset by the increased cost of risk, which was priced 
in by the potential local ‘buyers’ or ‘external sales assets’ (e.g. resellers), who 
take the risk of entering into a deal with a new market player.  
• The question then arises: if entrepreneurs could subcontract the falsification 
of documents, the mules, and occasionally even the VIN rigging, to local 
collaborators, why wasn’t it possible to outsource the selling of cars? The 
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answer is that the selling of the stolen car requires such levels of skill and 
breadth of connections that whoever possesses them could run his own 
illegal enterprise. In that sense, giving up control over such an important part 
of the operations was considered unacceptable.  
 
If the OLI paradigm is more appropriate to analyse behaviour of entrepreneurs who 
moved from Bulgaria to Spain between 2001 and 2007 and tried to run an illegal 
enterprise, the ‘market entry barriers’ is more comprehensive as it would help 
examine also the behaviour or Bulgarian criminal enterprises that were already 
established in Spain.  
 
 
7.3 Incumbents and barriers to entry 
 
As already noted in the introduction to this thesis, ‘barriers to entry’ is an economics 
term used to analyse the advantages that domestic incumbent firms might have over 
new-comers in a given market. Bain (1954) and later Porter (2008) have discussed a 
number of market entry barriers: ‘supply-side economies of scale’, ‘demand-side 
benefits of scale’, ‘switching costs’, ‘capital requirements’, ‘incumbency advantages’, 
‘unequal access to distribution channels’, and ‘restrictive government policy’. The 
sections below will examine whether and how each of these barriers might have 
prevented the Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs from entering the used car market in 
Spain and why it did not prevent the successful sale of stolen cars in Bulgaria.  
 
Before doing this, however, one methodological clarification is needed: Who are 
Bulgarian criminal enterprises competing with in the sale of stolen cars in Spain? 
There are two categories: (1) other criminal enterprises and (2) legitimate actors 
(such as private sellers and used-car dealers). From the point of view of the Spanish 
market the Bulgarian ‘theft enterprises’, which tried to enter the local market, also 
operated as ‘sales enterprises’, either selling directly to final customers or to used-car 
dealerships. A challenge that both used and stolen car entrepreneurs face, though, is 
‘the number of players’ and ‘similarity of players’ (i.e. dealerships).   
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7.3.1 Supply-side economies of scale  
 
The first barrier to entry considered is defined by Porter (2008: 81) as ‘supply-side 
economies’. It arises when established firms that produce larger volumes enjoy lower 
costs per unit because they can spread their fixed costs over more units. Established 
firms may also employ more efficient technologies, or may enjoy better terms of trade 
with local suppliers. To overcome these barriers, the new entrant should either start 
producing on a large scale and spread the fixed costs over more units, or to accept 
that its costs are higher, and accept a lower profit margin. 
 
Car-theft enterprises have a significant cost-advantage (especially in the case of 
luxury cars) over their legitimate competitors. The costs, compared to those of 
legitimate enterprises, could be as little as a half to one-third, depending on the value 
of the car.  
 
A strategic competition analysis of the used-car market in Spain shows that the 
single most important factor that shapes the used-car market and provides a 
competitive advantage is the ability to provide a low-cost product (Euromonitor (2007: 
17). While most sellers usually set their price according to estimated values based on 
depreciation and car mileage, the risk minimisation strategy of car thieves usually 
pushes them towards lowering prices to ensure quick sales.  
 
 
Figure 29. Drivers of degree of rivalry in the used-car market in Spain, 2007 
Source: Datamonitor (2007: 17) 
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The used-car market is generally considered to have low entry barriers, requiring a 
small initial investment. In Bulgaria, small dealers selling cars on the open-air 
exchanges there are no fixed costs: only the investment in buying the used cars and 
monthly per-car fee made to the owner of the used-car exchange lot. The start-up 
costs for a luxury used-car dealership, on the other hand, could be high: customers 
of luxury vehicles might even expect the dealership to have a luxury showroom (such 
as the ‘integrated services centres’ in Spain). A great number of luxury used-car 
dealerships invest at least in a good location, if not a purpose-built showroom.  
 
Unlike a legitimate used-car enterprise that might build a showroom and sell a few 
hundred cars per year, the illegal sales enterprise needs to find many distributors 
(dealerships) / buyers. Therefore it does not have the ‘start-up’ fixed cost of building 
a showroom. The illegal enterprise may also have expenses related to renting of 
space where the stolen vehicles could be stored. For car theft enterprises such costs 
are lower as they hardly ever store more than a few cars in one place. Due to the 
risks of detection, these spaces are not purchased but rented, so that they can be 
quickly abandoned if the need arises.  
 
Other costs that should be considered are the labour costs. Bulgarian criminal 
enterprises enjoyed significant advantages over local competitors in Spain in terms of 
labour costs. In the same way that cheap labour migrants from Bulgaria filled the 
demand for low-cost labour in agriculture and construction, the Bulgarian criminal 
migrants filled the positions of watchers, spotters, mules, and car thieves. None of 
these offenders work on a fixed salary for an illicit entrepreneur – they are only paid 
on a per stolen car basis. Even though offenders often go to work in Spain because 
salaries are higher there than those in Bulgaria, they are hired for less than Spanish 
criminals. The only exception are the high-profile technically savvy car thieves who 
are hard to come across, are usually well-paid, and often become entrepreneurs 
themselves. These are often described as ‘loners who work for themselves and only 
show up for a few minutes to open and start a car’ [OFI-16]. It is unlikely that 
Bulgarian car-theft groups have any ‘cost-saving’ advantage over other ‘ethnic’ 
criminal networks, such as those from Lithuania or Morocco.  
 
One significantly higher cost that new illegal enterprises incur, in comparison to 
incumbent legitimate or illegal enterprises, is the cost of risk. Typically, an already 
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established legitimate used car-dealers or illegal enterprises will have reputation181 
either with final buyers or with used-car dealers respectively. The new-comers 
though, usually need to lower their prices as buyers perceive them as riskier. 
Bovenkerk et al. (2003: 27), for instance, explain that ethnic reputations could play 
either a positive or negative role, depending on the social context. In the case of 
Bulgarian car-theft enterprises, the ethnic reputation gradually became an additional 
cost, due to the negative image built by the local law-enforcement in the media. Bona 
fide car-dealers and buyers had become suspicious and careful when buying cars 
from Bulgarians.  
 
 
7.3.2 Demand-side benefits of scale  
Another barrier that exists originates from the behaviour of the customers. Porter 
(2008: 81) argues that a ‘buyer’s willingness to pay for a company’s product 
increases with the number of other buyers who also patronize the company.’ As 
Chapter 3 indicated, reputation and ‘informal’ networks are very important for the sale 
of used cars, due to the information asymmetry about the quality of the car between 
buyers and sellers. Therefore, the reputation of a locally established dealer or 
criminal entrepreneur certainly provides them with a competitive advantage over 
new-comers from Bulgaria who have no reputation. 
 
In Bulgaria established sales entrepreneurs usually have a network of potential 
customers. These buyers perceive the purchases of stolen cars as low-risk 
transactions. The number of buyers within these informal networks therefore 
increases as more and more transactions occur without detection or punishment. 
 
The most difficult ‘variable’ to analyse and compare, and for which little data exists, is 
the demand for stolen and used luxury cars in Spain and in Bulgaria. One cannot 
presume that it is equally strong in both countries and that illegal enterprises had 
equal incentive to supply stolen cars on the Spanish and Bulgarian used-car markets. 
In the description of the used-car market (Chapter 3) it was shown that in both 
                                                          
181 Porter (2008: 81) groups a number of additional advantages that incumbent companies may have:  
‘proprietary technology, preferential access to the best raw material sources, pre-emption of the most 
favourable geographic locations, established brand identities, or cumulative experience’. Some of these 
have either already been discussed or are not relevant for the purposes of the present analysis. 
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Bulgaria and Spain the demand for used / new luxury cars was quite strong, and that 
the Spanish market, being much bigger, provided more sales opportunities to illegal 
enterprises. This demand though relates mostly to bona fide buyers. Although the 
blurring of ‘licit and illicit’ trade and lack of empirical data make it difficult to compare 
the consumer demand for stolen cars in Bulgaria and in Spain, one should attempt 
to, at least analytically, disentangle the demand for stolen from the demand for 
legitimate used cars. There are several factors that make such an analysis a 
complicated matter. 
 
The ratio of bona fide to non-bona fide buyers of stolen cars in either country is 
difficult to estimate. Only if these ratios are known, could one estimate the ratio 
between the demand for used luxury cars vs. the demand for stolen luxury cars. The 
argument made in previous chapters, based on police reports, is that in Spain a 
greater proportion of buyers are bona fide buyers, while in Bulgaria it is vice versa. 
Although police and offender interview data are not completely reliable, analysing 
how demand for stolen cars is structured in Bulgaria or Spain might provide further 
explanation of the behaviour of illegal entrepreneurs. 
 
The non-bona fide customer has a clear choice of buying an illegal or a legal product. 
The factors that influence the likelihood of a buyer choosing illicit products have been 
probably best understood in studies of customer demand for counterfeit products 
(e.g. counterfeit brand-name goods, pirated CD / DVDs, and so on). The purchase of 
stolen cars, especially luxury cars, bears many resemblances with that of brand-
name counterfeit products: in both cases the customer is willing to buy an illicit luxury 
product or one that mimics a luxury product (Crăciun 2009) at a lower price, with 
limited knowledge of the quality of the product, and with knowledge of the illicit nature 
of the product.182  
 
                                                          
182 The production of counterfeit luxury cars is rare as it requires significant skills and investment, and 
cannot be done on a large scale. In some Asian countries such production outfits exist. Car parts from 
some brands are assembled and remodelled into high-end luxury vehicles (e.g. the chassis of a Toyota 
MR2 is used to make a Lamborghini, or an Opel Carrera to make an Aston Martin). The costs are 
significantly higher than those of theft and cloning, because the cars are handmade and may require 
some expensive parts (Beiser and Gershon 2011)  
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A number of factors have been analysed to understand what influences the demand 
for counterfeit goods: price benefits, product features, psychographic183 or 
demographic characteristics of consumers, and social influences (Bian and Moutinho 
2011: 2). Buyers who knowingly purchase counterfeit goods have different consumer 
profiles than those who purchase goods, unaware that that they are illegal. Basic 
demographics (age, sex, education, income) have little explanatory power (de Matos 
et al. 2007: 44, Veloutsou and Bian 2008: 6), but two factors seem to be statistically 
significant: risk perceptions (de Matos et al. 2007: 44, Mitchell 1999, Albers-Miller 
1999, Wee et al., 1995) and psychographic characteristics of buyers (de Matos et al. 
2007: 44; Ang et al. 2001: 224; Bian and Moutinho 2011; Wee et al. 1995).  
 
Marketing scholars generally differentiate between objective risk factors related to 
buying a product184 and the risk, which buyers perceive to exist. Ever since the term 
‘perceived risk’ was introduced in the marketing literature by Raymond Bauer in 1960 
it has been used to explain consumer behaviour for many product categories 
(Mitchell 1999). The perceived risks could be about physical threat (e.g. arrest), 
social risk (others may detect that the item is counterfeit), or financial / performance 
risk (the quality of the product may not be as expected) (Veloutsou and Bian 2008). 
Perceived levels of risk differ between countries. (Veloutsou and Bian 2008: 15) In 
China, for instance, where the government tolerates the sale of counterfeit items, 
consumers who choose to buy illicit and those who buy licit products have similarly 
low risk perceptions, and social constraints play little role (Phau and Teah 2009).  
 
The second set of factors that explain demand for counterfeit goods are 
psychographic factors.  Consumer research in Singapore has indicated that buyers of 
counterfeit goods are characterised as being ‘less successful, less confident, and 
had lower perceived status’, characteristics associated with individuals who seek 
‘accomplishment, comfortable living, and social recognition’ (Ang et al. 2001: 224). 
 
When considering the risk perceptions and psychographic characteristics of buyers 
of stolen cars, applying the framework used to analyse counterfeit goods, a couple of 
points could be made. While the objective risk of buying a stolen car in Bulgaria and 
                                                          
183 ‘Psychographic’ characteristics: this is a marketing term that refers to behavioural characteristics 
related to the customer’s lifestyle and the influence that it has on their buying behaviour. Different 
market segments could be identified using these various characteristics.  
184 Here the risks that scholars have in mind include health or quality.  
 Spain might be comparable (it is prosecuted in both countries), the subjective, or the 
‘perceived’ risks differ. The perceptions of law-enforcement officials and offenders – 
that 40–50% of some luxury car models on the streets were in fact imported stolen 
cars from Western Europe ([LEI-4; LEI-5; LEI-21 OFI-10], as well as the corruption 
networks with which the majority of buyers are involved at the local level – indicate 
that for non-bona fide buyers in Bulgaria, the perceived risk involved in buying a 
stolen car is quite low. A survey of the EU of attitudes and experiences with 
counterfeit goods, shows a similar difference: whereas in Bulgaria, 47% of 
respondents admitted to having bought counterfeit goods (and were much less aware 
of the anti-piracy legislation), in Spain only 26% did so (Eurobarometer data in 
Barneveld 2010). Similarly, the general public’s perceptions (and experiences) of the 
corruption of the police and judiciary in Bulgaria are significantly higher than those in 
Spain (Eurobarometer 2009: 23). Even more telling, this perception of lower risk in 
Bulgaria accompanies the illegal lifestyles (illegal houses, informal economic 
activities) described in Chapter 5. It could be therefore argued that the demand for 
stolen cars (defined as the proportion of non-bona fide to bona-fide buyers) was 
probably higher in Bulgaria than in Spain.  
 
Regarding the psychographic factors, it is difficult to estimate how different are the 
levels of prestige or status that owners attach to luxury vehicles in Spain and 
Bulgaria. One possible explanation is the 
complete absence of luxury vehicles until 
1990, and the inability of the economic elite 
to purchase such vehicles for most of the 
1990s.185 
 The class stratification and inequality that 
developed in the 1990s created a market for 
low-priced and used luxury cars (similar to 
that for counterfeit goods186). This was a 
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tFigure 30. Street vendor in Pristina, Kosovo, 
selling flags out of a BMW-X5. At the time 
this picture was taken (2007) this model was 
worth over €20,000 (Photo credit: Reuters) 243 
                                                         
85 Prior to 1990 the Communist elite almost exclusively drove Russian luxury cars – Chaika and Volga, 
ither of which were technologically very far behind Western luxury brands. Only foreign diplomats in 
ofia could be seen in luxury Western cars, such as Mercedes or BMW, which eventually came to be 
sed by the very top of the Communist elite.  
86 Even for brand-name sports goods, only exclusive licence production took place: for instance Adidas 
ad authorized the production of one model of trainers that were produced for over a decade. Therefore 
he company had strong brand presence, but after the 1990s most Adidas goods were simply beyond 
he purchasing power of most consumers in Bulgaria.  
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phenomenon throughout Eastern Europe, which in Albania (where private cars were 
completely banned during Communism) went to an extreme: the country was soon 
nicknamed ‘Mercedes country’, after (second-hand imported) Mercedes became the 
most popular car (Simpson 2002). With the increase in living standards and mass 
imports after 2001, the cheap used luxury brands gradually stopped being a status 
marker. Luxury cars, though, as in any country, are affordable to only a few 
consumers, and remained such a marker.  
 
In Bulgaria, the luxury car is more than a symbol of status: it is not used to simply to 
show your peers (or the opposite sex) that one is successful. It is also a symbol of 
power and of being beyond the reach of the law: ‘I bought this type of car [a luxury 
Audi model] because now they think I’m a mutra [a tough guy] – on the highway other 
cars get out of my way…the police don’t dare to stop me… [more importantly] the 
real mutras also think I’m one of them and don’t dare fucking with me’. (OTI-13) 
 
It could be argued, though, that the number of people that aspire to a higher social 
status in Bulgaria is greater than in Spain, largely due to the common perception of 
social inequality (Redmond et al. 2002: 15-16). A 2004 national consumer survey of 
intentions to buy vehicles in Bulgaria showed that people with high-school and 
secondary education, and those from small towns and villages, were much more 
likely to have the intention to buy a ‘brand new latest model car’ than people with a 
college education, or the ones from Sofia (i.e. those on lower incomes aspired to buy 
new car more than those with a higher income). (Vitosha Research 2004: 15-16)  
 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis. The lesser 
demand for stolen cars from non-bona fide buyers in Spain forced Bulgarian criminal 
entrepreneurs to compete directly on the used-car market with legitimate used-car 
dealers and private sellers. It also created the need for potential accomplices such as 
legitimate used-car dealers. This created a number of additional challenges 
discussed further below.  
 
7.3.3 Switching costs  
Another barrier, again related to customer behaviour, is the cost (switching costs) 
that customers might incur if they decide to buy the products of a new entrant (Porter 
2008: 81). It might appear that since Bulgarian car-theft enterprises offer a low-cost 
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quality product, local customers might even reduce their costs by changing their 
supplier. There is a key switching cost for customers, especially non-bona fide ones, 
which is the cost of ‘risk’. Pricing risk, especially in such market, where the penalty 
(e.g. imprisonment) is usually valued more than an individual stolen vehicle, is 
difficult. Risk is also a perception issue depending on the specific market 
environment. To Bulgarian buyers, normally the cost of risk is low: first, the enterprise 
might be willing to mitigate its own risks or the risk for the buyer by securing 
protection from arrest / prosecution. Alternatively, the customers, often members of 
economic elites, might be able to mitigate their own risks through their personal 
connections (i.e. they do not need to transfer the entire cost of risk to the ‘sale 
entrepreneur’). In Spain, though, these options are not available, and the risks to 
buyers are higher. As noted in Chapter 5, some Bulgarian entrepreneurs started to 
engage in schemes where they would sell light trucks to drug-traffickers, only to steal 
them back later. These practices inevitably became known to drug-traffickers, and 
the negative reputation increased the switching costs, as Moroccan drug-traffickers 
became more cautious about buying stolen cars from Bulgarian groups. Therefore, 
the switching costs represent a significant barrier to a new market entrant.  
 
7.3.4 Capital requirements  
A classic ‘entry barrier’ that Bain (1954) formulated has been the need for newly 
entering companies to have capital that is higher than that of the incumbent 
companies. This alone cannot constitute a barrier if the expected return on 
investment is high enough (Porter 2008:81). The initial capital of a car-theft 
enterprise could be estimated to be anywhere between 50,000 and 100,000 euros at 
least for a ‘theft’ enterprise, and significantly more, probably over 100,000 for a 
‘sales’ enterprise. These enterprises need at least a month’s worth of revenue 
turnover time to deal or sell 10 cars.187 As indicated, the average number of cars that 
legitimate dealerships sell, especially in Spain, is much greater.188 The initial capital 
seems to have been a small issue, as entrepreneurs already had legitimate 
businesses, or used counterfeit euros to start their businesses, were involved already 
in other criminal activities such as drugs, or had a successful car-theft business in 
Bulgaria from which they could fund their involvement in Spain. Several cases and 
                                                          
187 This is based on the fact that weekly thefts are 1-3 cars, as reported by offender interviewees.  
188 The annual revenue of one of the mid-size luxury car dealership in Sofia was around €5 million, 
indicating that an operating capital of a few hundred thousand was needed.  
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interviewees mentioned that revenues from stolen property or cash were also used to 
fund vehicle-theft operations. (C-0298; C-0303; C-1006B) 
 
7.3.5 Law-enforcement and criminal justice policies 
The government has the power to prevent (through ‘restrictive government policies’) 
or encourage the entry of foreign companies into an industry (Porter 2008: 82). There 
are several factors that could be considered in analysing the government policies and 
actions that could facilitate or inhibit the entry of a criminal enterprise into a foreign 
market: penal policies, law-enforcement policies, industry regulations, and 
government corruption. In neither Spain nor Bulgaria is there any regulation of the 
‘used-car industry’, so this factor will not be examined. The industry regulation that 
could be analysed comes down to criminal justice and law-enforcement policies on 
prosecuting tax evasions or the distribution of stolen cars.  
 
Penal policy 
Several interviewees pointed out that Spain is an attractive place for car-theft, due to 
its lax penal policy related to car theft (OFI-1, OFI-2), not necessarily in comparison 
with Bulgarian penal policies, but in comparison with other European countries (e.g. 
Greece or France). Similar views have been detected amongst offenders from other 
countries by the Spanish Civil Guard (ABC 2006). If the police find the stolen car 
within 48 hours following the victim’s report that it has been stolen, even if it is driven 
by the thief, it is considered merely as an ‘undue use’. Only if this period is exceeded, 
and if there is evidence of forced entry189 into the vehicle, does the law define it as 
‘theft’: for which the penalty amounts to between one and three years in prison. 
Spain’s 1995 Criminal Code did not specify that driving a stolen car is a crime. To 
accuse someone of ‘stealing’ a vehicle, the thief needs to be arrested while entering 
and driving away with the vehicle. If the thief is simply stopped while driving a stolen 
vehicle, s/he can claim that s/he did not know that the vehicle was stolen or who stole 
it. Recent amendments to the Spanish Penal Code changed this only slightly. Art. 
244 stipulates that ‘to take away or to use without proper authorization a motor 
vehicle, whose value exceeds 400 euros, without the intent to appropriate it, will be 
sentenced to community service of between 31 and 90 days or a fine if they return it 
within a period not exceeding 48 hours.’  
                                                          
189 In luxury vehicles ‘forced entry’ is normally avoided by the thieves, as replacing car locks can cost 
several thousand euros. 
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In addition to the lax penal policy is the slow criminal justice process in Spain, which 
forces authorities to release car thieves so that they await the trial free. ‘As a result 
most car-thieves spend 5–6 months in detention, and as soon as they are freed, they 
change their identity and continue to work’ (Officer of Car Trafficking Unit of the CNP, 
quoted by Cholakova 2005) ‘We need new laws and we need that the judges change 
their understanding of the problem’. (Head of Car Trafficking Unit of the CNP quoted 
by Gómez 2005: 210) 
 
The Bulgarian penal system (as most former socialist countries) has a fairly robust 
approach and imprisonment is most often the penalty given by courts. For instance, 
art. 345a of the Bulgarian Penal Code190 implies that the cloning of a vehicle, such as 
VIN rigging, should result in ‘3 to 10 years of imprisonment’, or ‘ up to 3 years of 
imprisonment’ even if only the ID numbers of the vehicle’s parts are changed. In 
Bulgaria ‘undue use’ is still punishable by ‘1 to 8 years of imprisonment’ (art. 346), or 
1 to 10 years of imprisonment if a ransom is asked for, the vehicle is abandoned, ‘or 
the offender had been drunk, or has committed the crime for a second or more times’ 
(art. 346.2). The use of force in stealing a car, or stealing it as a part of an organised 
crime network, or ‘an attempt to export it outside the country, or changing the VIN or 
registration numbers’ carries 3 to 12 years of imprisonment (art. 346.5).  
 
This seemingly aggressive law is not applied in practice, as comparison of judicial 
and police statistical data shows. In 2009, for instance, 4470 registered crimes under 
Art. 346 and 346a resulted only in 321 court cases, of which only 19 involved 3 or 
more individuals. As a result, out of the 365 individuals sentenced in connection to 
the 321 cases, only 261 were imprisoned, while the rest were fined or put on 
probation. The majority of the sentences were short term: 222 were less than 1 year 
long, 37 were between 1 and 3 years, and only 2 individuals were given 3 or more 
years-long penalty191. Therefore in Spain and Bulgaria the law seems to be equally 
lenient towards car-thieves. 
 
                                                          
190 State Gazette No.67, as amended as of 29.07.2008. 
191 The statistical data on conviction is based on judicial statistics published on the website of the 
National Statistics Institute (www.nsi.bg). The police data is drawn from the police statistics provided to 
the author by the Ministry of Interior. 
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The sale or storage of a stolen vehicle, on the other hand, is not specifically outlined 
as part of the relevant sections on ‘vehicle theft’ either in the Bulgarian or the 
Spanish Penal Code (unlike, for instance, the storage and distribution of drugs or 
illegal excisable goods). Based on the above, it could be concluded that, at best, the 
penal policy of Spain facilitated, and if nothing else posed lesser risks to, Bulgarian 
illegal enterprises that tried to steal and sell stolen cars in Spain. 
 
Law-enforcement policies 
Spain has a complex law-enforcement system, largely due to its ethnic make-up and 
history. A multitude of law-enforcement units are occupied with countering vehicle 
theft. The leading law-enforcement agencies in Spain are the National Police Corps 
(NPC) and the militarised Civil Guard Corps (CGC), aided by local municipal police 
forces.192 Several different types of investigation squads were created between 2000 
and 2007 specifically aimed at tackling organised crime.193 The CGC has seven 
regional units that specialise in the fight against organised crime, called Counter-
organised Crime Teams (ECO – Equipos contra el Crimen Organizado).194 The NPC 
has two main specialised organised crime investigation squads: (1) the Drugs and 
Organised Crime Unit (UDYCO stands for Unidad de Drogas y Crimen Organizado), 
situated in larger cities and (2) GRECO, which stands for Groups of Special 
Response against Organised Crime.195  
 
The interviews and the police cases analysed show that all of these specialised 
investigative units have been involved in investigating Bulgarian criminal enterprises. 
In some cases, as many as 150 officers (C-0306) were involved in the operations 
against car-theft networks. Compared to the spread and type of operations that 
Bulgarian law enforcement has carried out during the same period, the Spanish 
                                                          
192 The Civil Guard is supposed to control the countryside, while the National Police are responsible for 
the cities. In practice the Civil Guard has a strong presence throughout the country. The decentralisation 
movement after the fall of Franco, the increasing autonomies of Cataluña, Navarra, and the Basque 
Country (Pais Vasco) led to the establishment of autonomous police forces, independent of the NPC.  
193 In addition, in September 2006, a National Intelligence Centre against Organised Crime (CICO – 
Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen Organizado) attached to the Ministry of the Interior was 
established. CICO coordinates mainly counter-narcotics operations between various government 
agencies, including the CNP, the CGC, Customs and the Ministry of Defence. 
194 The ECOs are located in regions where there is higher organised crime activity: Alicante, Malaga, 
Barcelona, Pontevedra, Baleares, Las Palmas, Tenerife. 
195GRECO groups, which might include UDYCO officers, are located in regions with a high level of 
organised crime, and are headquartered at six locations: Malaga (Costa del Sol), Cadiz, Canarias, 
Beleares, Levante, and Galicia.  
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operations seem to be not only much more regular, with a greater spread (not limited 
to 1 or 2 offenders), but also more effective, at least in terms of temporarily disabling 
operations or confiscating assets.  
 
In Bulgaria, the system of enforcement against car theft has undergone a 
transformation, generally leading to reduced risks for car thieves. The special unit for 
vehicle crime at the General Directorate for Combating Organised Crime closed 
down in 1999.196 The investigations were transferred to the criminal police’s local 
units, and a small national-level car-theft unit was established at National Police 
Headquarters which has fewer than ten officers who mostly work international 
investigations. The result has been that there have not been any significant 
investigations: most have targeted only one to four individuals of a particular brigade, 
or intermediaries in ‘theft for ransom’ schemes. Overall attention has been directed 
towards the theft for ransom schemes as they constituted the majority of reported car 
thefts. The result is that in Bulgaria no major car-theft enterprise has been 
dismantled, unlike in Spain where authorities usually arrest 15 to 20 offenders and 
target the entire enterprise. Therefore, the ‘attention’ that Bulgarian criminal 
enterprises received in Spain was much greater than in Bulgaria. The key difficulty 
that Spanish law-enforcement forces faced was the ‘itinerant nature’ of criminal 
operations. Especially at the lower level, the constant rotation of criminals did not 
allow police to get to know them.  
 
In Bulgaria, on the other hand, especially at local level, the police have very good 
knowledge as to who the car-thieves are, their whereabouts, and even their assets. 
Well-known car thieves are periodically summoned to the Sofia-city police station for 
a ‘talk’, and then released. Investigations in which ‘entrepreneurs’ are arrested and 
convicted are an exception. When this is done it is usually on other charges (e.g. 
drugs) rather than car theft. The criminal assets of car thieves are never investigated 
by criminal investigation units, even in cases when they are known (as is the case in 
small towns like Pazardjik or Gabrovo, where law-enforcement interviewees knew 
details about the type and number of real-estate or business investments made by 
the criminal entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                          
196 According to a former officer at the unit, the reason for closing it down was that the unit had 
accidentally interrupted the operations of one of the major smugglers (Fatik), who was at the time so 
well connected with the government that he ensured that the unit was permanently closed. 
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The effect of the intensive operations of the Spanish police is difficult to judge, 
partially because law-enforcement had little experience with investigating this type of 
criminal networks. ‘In the first period, in the 1980s car theft was the work of Italian, 
French, Belgian, and German criminals. [In Spain] this was white collar crime. People 
stole car documents and falsified them... [Spain] was on the receiving end.’ 
[emphases added] (Gomez 2005: 210). There are other factors that influence the 
effective dismantling of criminal enterprises. First, police did not put away car thieves 
for very long (because as noted above the penalties are fairly mild). In no year did 
the number of arrests exceed 100. ‘In 2004 we had four big operations and we 
arrested between 70-80 Bulgarians. Most of them are now free. Some are not in 
Spain, while others are back here under a fake identity.’ (Raul Fuentes, Head of Car 
Trafficking Unit of the NPC, quoted by Cholakova 2005). Second, most operations 
targeted the ‘car thieves’ and their crews, who are ‘expendable’ from the point of view 
of the criminal entrepreneur, who can hire another ‘brigade’. On only a few occasions 
have the police successfully prosecuted the criminal entrepreneurs. The issue of 
investigative capacity to deal with Bulgarian car theft networks, is also underlined by 
the Head of the Car Trafficking Unit of the NPC, who admitted that ‘we need one 
hundred officers to have a true effect over these criminals’ (quoted in Gómez 2005: 
210). Lastly, there were very few international operations that targeted both ‘theft’ 
and ‘sales’ enterprises. As one law-enforcement officer involved in cross-border 
investigations put it, ‘going after an entire network at all levels in Spain and Bulgaria 
is impossible’. [LEI-4]197 Therefore, enterprises that were operated by Bulgaria-based 
entrepreneurs, rather than a locally based one were not dismantled. 
 
Yet, it could be argued that the media campaign, which the police led, motivated 
principally by its own public relations strategy, seemed to have had an effect of 
raising ‘public awareness’, or at least creating a negative reputation. Therefore, the 
widespread newspaper and TV publicity portraying Bulgarians as car thieves worked 
as an impediment to market entry. It made ‘bona fide buyers’ of used cars, including 
car-dealers, far more suspicious of Bulgarian sellers. As one Bulgarian car thief 
                                                          
197 One additional minor law-enforcement policy aspect that some offenders pointed to as an advantage 
in Spain, is that cars could be stopped by traffic police only if there is an infraction. In Bulgaria, on the 
other hand, traffic police can stop cars without a specific reason just to inspect the car documents: in 
addition, on all outgoing roads of major cities the police have control points where car can be stopped. 
[OFI-1, OFI-5] 
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stated, ‘Imagine a Romanian trying to sell you an expensive car here in Sofia, would 
you ever buy it?’ [OFI-3] 
 
 
Corruption 
The role of law-enforcement should be analysed also in light of the issue of 
corruption in law-enforcement and the judiciary. Corruption has already been 
discussed at length in the preceding chapters. As explained, the access to corruption 
as tool to Bulgarian criminal enterprises in Spain was very limited. Although some 
interviewees indicated that corrupt links existed,198 it was usually at the police level 
(typically to provide information on ongoing investigations) and did not reach the 
courts or local political level. In terms of using corruption to facilitate the registration 
of stolen cars as a way of facilitating the sales, in Spain this is not needed to the 
same extent as it is in Bulgaria. As one interviewee explained: ‘The registration 
control in Bulgaria is much tighter than in Spain. It’s easier to register a stolen car in 
Spain because they don’t check the identification numbers. Here [in Bulgaria] if they 
want to they will easily detect. Well, now it’s easier since they changed the law and 
they don’t check the VIN numbers when a car simply changes owners.’ (OFI-1)  
 
Until 2006 in Bulgaria, the traffic police closely inspected vehicles for traces of VIN 
tampering, and the Interpol database.199 Therefore, corruption in Bulgaria becomes a 
necessity to avoid complications. Where corruption really provides an advantage is in 
cases of investigation, and lowering the risk of detection or prosecution.  
 
Therefore, while the penal policies in Bulgaria are much more robust than in Spain, in 
practice corruption softens the impact of penal policies to a great extent. Overall, it 
could be argued that the absence of access to widespread corruption in Spain 
possibly played a role in deterring used-car dealers or Spanish partners from 
partnering with Bulgarian criminal enterprises. Corruption, though, is of secondary 
importance, as trust and informal relations are preconditions that need to be in place 
                                                          
198 One interviewee for instance, who participated in a joint operation (and was seconded in Spain) 
between the Bulgarian police and the Civil Guard, was warned that the National Police unit working on 
the Bulgarians had a problem with information leaking. 
199 All imported cars were given a one-month temporary registration while the car was checked against 
Interpol databases. After 2006, a car’s VIN is only checked against Interpol’s database. The police may 
still check the VIN if they suspect that the car is stolen. Therefore, bribing the traffic police remained a 
necessity even after 2006.  
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in a relationship with a business partner before corruption can be used. The absence 
of widespread corruption is also a structural characteristic of the Spanish used-car 
market environment that makes market entry more difficult. Nevertheless, the sale of 
stolen vehicles takes place in Spain in this environment, and Bulgarian criminal 
enterprises needed to find a way around it. 
 
The local criminal enterprises dominated by Spaniards seem to use corruption more 
frequently200. None of the 65 police cases that concerned Bulgarian organised 
criminal groups reported the use of corruption in Spain, while in almost all of the 
handful of cases involving Spaniard-dominated criminal groups the use of corruption 
was reported. In one case the group used ‘connections in the used-car industry, such 
as independent used car or franchised dealers, service agencies,201 which facilitated 
access to reports on vehicles and potential customers’ [C-1203b]. In another case, a 
police officer and a civil guard were implicated in the schemes [C-0705]. In a third 
case, several bank directors and a used-car dealership were involved in the 
fraudulent acquisition of vehicles and their subsequent sale. [C-0708] 
 
7.3.6 Unequal access to distribution channels  
The difficulty of access to efficient distribution channels to sell stolen cars is probably 
the most obvious observation that could be made to explain the inability of Bulgarian 
criminal entrepreneurs to sell stolen cars in Spain. The reasons behind this ‘unequal’ 
access can only be partially explained via a standard economic / management 
analytical framework.  
 
Reuter (1985) suggests that illegal enterprises are characterised by a narrow local 
geographic scope of operations. Used-car distribution is also a highly localised 
market: typically car-dealers do not have more than one or a few showrooms in a city 
or region. Until 2010 there were geographic limitations on the operations of 
franchised dealers as well (see Chapter 4). While for legitimate firms geographic 
limitation is not an issue, as they may advertise locally and invest in establishing a 
                                                          
200 The Spanish police reported that 15% of the 616 organised crime groups investigated in 2009 were 
known to have used corruption. (Spain: Ministry of Interior 2010) 
201 These are companies that provide services related to the sale of a car (especially between private 
persons) that include the transfer of the title, the registration of the car, driving licence renewals, etc.  
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local reputation, for an illegal firm, establishing an efficient distribution network is an 
expensive and time-consuming process.  
 
The illegal car-theft enterprise needs a geographically wide distribution network. A 
highly concentrated distribution network increases the risks of being uncovered. 
Several cases (C-1010, C-0305, C-1002) show that concentrating the distribution of 
stolen cars in a single outlet (usually a single used-car dealership) attracts police 
attention. For a new entrant, the ability to establish a reputation throughout numerous 
regions in Spain is almost beyond reach in the short term (2001–2007) when most of 
the enterprises operated, before the used-car market crashed with the financial crisis 
hitting Spain in 2008.  
 
Building a customer base in such a short period is not impossible, but keeping in 
mind that many entrepreneurs have faced interruptions, and most have never felt the 
need to establish a viable local client-base, as they had a readily available one in 
Bulgaria, it is understandable that this timeframe proved insufficient. For a legitimate 
enterprise, most likely, this would have been sufficient time, as they could rely on 
advertising, on setting up their own showrooms, and concentrating activities at high-
profit locations.   
 
Theoretically, the use of the used-car sale internet websites should have put the 
Bulgarian criminal enterprises on an equal footing with private sellers or used-car 
dealerships, who all use the same sites. That did not happen for at least two reasons: 
first, internet sales of expensive cars from private individuals are risky; whereas 
dealerships provide some level of security, so that if something happens then the 
buyer can go back to the dealer. Second, the Bulgarians’ negative reputation meant 
that they would need a Spanish intermediary to successfully sell the car, which 
increases the costs.  
 
On the other hand, in Bulgaria, the criminal enterprises had exactly this type of 
dispersed nationwide distribution network built around long-term relationships and 
reputations. This network was a significant cost advantage that is factored in by 
entrepreneurs, as the cost of risk is considered low by both the ‘theft’ and the ‘sales 
enterprise’. 
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If, in Spain, Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs needed to enter a market and compete 
with legitimate car dealers (which proved risky and difficult), in Bulgaria they had 
parallel distribution networks, which were just as efficient and often overlapped with 
legitimate distribution networks, and occasionally were controlled by or closely 
related to criminal entrepreneurs. One entry barrier typical of many illicit markets 
concerns the strategies that incumbent firms may take – using violence or corruption 
of law-enforcement officials to preserve their territory (as may be the case with drugs 
distribution), or to protect their market share. The distribution of stolen cars is 
different in that respect, as the market is characterised by such a great number of 
distributors and buyers, and the internet allows for such global reach, that no one’s 
market share is known. As a result, criminal entrepreneurs involved in selling stolen 
cars face few or no reprisals from their competitors. 
 
7.4 Beyond the economic rationale 
 
The ‘barriers to entry’ and OLI analytical frameworks provide a good understanding 
of the financial rationale behind the motivations and decisions of the economic actors 
involved in the market for (stolen) used cars. The present chapter showed that most 
classic barriers to entry were not the obstacles that stopped the Bulgarian criminal 
enterprises from successfully entering the Spanish used cars market: the criminal 
enterprises could afford very low costs (especially cheap labour), sufficient to 
compete with other illicit or licit competitors. Illicit entrepreneurs could afford to offer 
low sales prices that compensated for the perceived higher risks that local buyers 
might have had from switching to a new supplier of used cars. Also, there was no 
need for significant capital investments for new market entrants that could have 
made Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs non-competitive. In terms of government 
policies: Spanish penal policies were a magnet that attracted many car-thieves from 
across Europe to Spain. Spanish law-enforcement actions, despite a significant 
number of arrests only marginally affected some individual illicit entrepreneurs. The 
lack of access to corruption as a tool to reduce risks could have been a barrier to 
market entry, but only of marginal importance, as the penal policies were already 
quite lenient.  
 
The factors that constituted the most significant barrier were the lack of access to 
distribution channels. The analysis based on the barriers to entry and OLI paradigms 
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is useful only in-as-far as it helps to provide an answer the question ‘what’ but does 
not help with answering what logically follows from this conclusion: the answer to the 
question ‘why?’ In other words, these analytical frameworks convincingly provided an 
answer of the question ‘What factors created a barrier to the Bulgarian criminal 
entrepreneurs from entering the Spanish used-car market?’: the lack of access to 
distribution networks. Focusing the analytical attention to this answer logically brings 
up the follow-up question – ‘Why did not the Bulgarians develop adequate distribution 
networks or used existing networks, or ‘sub-contracted’ distributors?’.  
 
Financial and economic theoretical frameworks provide no pointers about answering 
this question. One needs to revisit then the economic and political history of the used 
car market in Bulgaria (Chapter 5) of the period of transition to democracy in 
Bulgaria, of criminal histories and biographies, as well as of the socio-economics of 
Bulgarian (criminal and labour) migrant communities in Spain. One set of these 
factors could be defined as ‘structural’: such as the structure and operation of the 
used-car market / industry in Bulgaria and the corruption of the political and criminal 
justice processes. Another set of factors could probably be best described as 
‘functional’ factors: the historically determined social or professional informal 
networks that facilitated the distribution of stolen cars in Bulgaria.   
 
All of these aspects were already discussed in Chapter 3,4, 5 and 6: the control of 
organised crime over used-car dealers and open markets since the early 1990s; the 
general ‘grey economy’ and informal market practices that characterised the used-
car business – including tax evasion and money laundering; the role of the insurance 
(former insurance / private security racketeering) companies; corruption in the 
criminal justice system, traffic police, customs, or the private sector (car dealerships, 
software engineers, service shops). As many of these issues were already discussed 
in depth throughout the thesis, the final concluding chapter that follows will bring 
together some of these arguments in a more cohesive manner.  
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8 Conclusions 
 
8.1 Overview 
The present thesis set to examine the factors that influence the entry of illicit 
enterprises into the markets for illicit goods and services, particularly the ones in 
country different from their traditional area of operations. The empirical journey of this 
thesis started with the description of the mechanics of the car-theft enterprise and its 
intertwining with the car-market. To understand how the two interact, it then provided 
a detailed examination of their historical, social, and economic underpinnings.  
 
Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs moved to Spain for different reasons and in different 
periods. Some escaped justice or the lingering violence and control of former 
racketeering criminal syndicates in Bulgaria. Others ran away from law-enforcement 
in Central and Western Europe. Some criminal entrepreneurs were not initially 
involved in car theft but in drugs, prostitution, firearms smuggling, or credit card 
fraud. The growing demand for luxury cars in Spain, Eastern Europe, Middle East, 
and Africa in the late 1990s pushed many of them in the profitable business of 
stealing and selling luxury cars and commercial vehicles.  
 
The actual volume of cars that Bulgarians stole and sold was small (possibly around 
2,500 annually) in comparison to the tens of thousands of car-thefts that the Spanish 
police and the media publicly tried to attribute to Bulgarian criminals. This number of 
cars, though, was significant for the twenty or so Bulgarian car-theft enterprises that 
operated at any given time in Spain (between around 2000 and 2008). They needed 
to sell such a number of cars continuously throughout the year to bona-fide buyers 
or, via informal networks, to customers who were aware that the cars were stolen. 
Most buyers of stolen cars in Spain were potentially bona-fide ones, but Bulgarian 
nationals already suffered from bad reputation as car-thieves. Therefore to effectively 
sell stolen cars these entrepreneurs needed to gain access to numerous informal 
networks of potential non-bona fide buyers: a task that proved too challenging for 
Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs in Spain. 
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The present thesis examined a key structural factor that prevented criminal 
enterprises from effectively distributing stolen cars in Spain, but facilitated their sale 
in Bulgaria: the structure of the markets for used and new cars in Bulgaria and Spain. 
The nature of car retail industry and the market structure in both countries influenced 
in an important way the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs.  
  
The data showed that the structure of the used car market in Spain was not 
conducive to facilitating the sale of stolen cars there. First, consumers were much 
more inclined to buy new cars, rather than used ones (in comparison to many other 
Western European countries). Second, unlike in Bulgaria, in Spain the majority of 
luxury used cars were distributed via the same channels as new ones: franchised 
car-dealers and large networks of luxury car dealerships. These retailers were very 
unlikely to sell stolen cars and would do so only if they had been deceived by the 
criminals.   
 
This picture contrasted with the Bulgarian market for used cars, which was marked 
by a very recent history of control by mafia-type racketeering organised crime groups 
up until the late 1990s. The used car market in Bulgaria is also different from the 
Spanish one as it is populated by numerous risk-prone actors. First, the main luxury 
used-car dealers are often with criminal past or actively involved in corruption 
networks. Next, every bigger town or city in the country has used-car 'exchanges’ 
where thousands of individual semi-professional dealers sell used cars that they 
have personally imported. Most of these dealers are involved in various tax frauds. 
Unlike Spain, franchised dealers in Bulgaria play insignificant role in the sale of used 
cars.  
 
The analysis presented in this thesis showed that some factors were not decisive in 
influencing the market entry of Bulgarian illegal entrepreneurs in Spain. The 
Bulgarian immigrant community did not serve as an efficient distribution network for 
stolen cars, like other immigrant communities do for drugs or illegal cigarettes. The 
corruption in Bulgarian law-enforcement probably facilitated the distribution of stolen 
vehicles but was not a decisive factor, just as the non-corrupt law-enforcement 
prosecution efforts of the Spanish police proved little more than a hassle, an 
additional cost to criminals (even though a few enterprises were dismantled). In the 
end it was the 2008 economic crisis and the shrinking of the car market that forced 
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most Bulgarian car-theft enterprises to discontinue their operations and turn to other 
illicit activities.  
 
Several financial factors were also considered in Chapter 7. The significant cost 
advantages that Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs enjoyed (cheap labour and low 
fixed costs), and which would have given a legitimate enterprise possibly a sufficient 
competitive advantage to enter the Spanish used-car market, were insufficient. The 
costs of risk made some criminal enterprises non-competitive, while for others the 
cost of distribution proved to be too high. In Bulgaria, the historically blurred social 
boundaries between criminals, criminal entrepreneurs, legitimate businesses, and 
wealthy buyers are at the core of a social milieu that enables and condones the sale 
and use of stolen cars.  
 
The empirical data in the thesis provides some ground to speculate that the demand 
for stolen cars in Bulgaria was greater than the one in Spain. This was due to the 
broader illicit lifestyles of the economic elite in Bulgaria and the non-economic 
symbolic value vested in a luxury car. In Bulgaria the stolen car is only part of a 
lifestyle full of ‘irregular’, stolen, untaxed, or otherwise illicit assets, including one’s 
house, or company incomes, as Chapter 5 shows. The special value of the luxury car 
is rooted in the history of the shortage of cars during the communist period, the 
prestige that Western cars brought in the post-1990 period, and finally the power and 
prosperity symbol that luxury vehicles still bring in the present day. In Spain, on the 
other hand, the used car, also for historical reasons, is less valued, and economic 
prosperity and access to financing pushes most buyers towards the purchase of a 
new car. Therefore, even though the Bulgarian used car market was much smaller 
than the Spanish one, the number of potential customers for stolen cars in Bulgaria 
probably rivalled the one in Spain.  
 
In Bulgaria, a buyer’s behaviour, though, is explained not only by the value vested in 
the car but also by the historically predetermined relations within which he lives: the 
access to corrupt public officials who could mitigate the risk of losing the car to law-
enforcement seizure; and the access to sellers with whom he has history of 
relationships of trust built during the 1990s, when private security / insurance 
racketeers protected his business interests. Therefore, the market transaction from 
the buyer’s perspective is embedded in this complex web of relations, ‘learned 
behaviours’ and ‘dispositions’ that make the purchase both socially acceptable and 
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safe. It is even more so as the transactions are embedded in a public morality where 
many government and police officials drive stolen cars that had been seized by law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
If the Bulgarian used car market was a structural factor that facilitated the sale of 
stolen cars, ultimately, the decisive factor that enabled the selling of stolen cars was 
the access to distribution channels in Bulgaria: the ability to reach members of 
criminal and other (economic, political, judicial, and law-enforcement) elites. These 
elites constituted the main customer base for stolen cars. This access was grounded 
in a mix of historically and economically shaped development of the car-market, as 
well as by the broader political and social history of 1980s’ and 1990s’ Bulgaria.   
 
If one uses the social networks approach (Granoveter 1985, 2005; DiMaggio and 
Louch 1998) to examine how criminal entrepreneurs and buyers of stolen cars 
related and transacted, this would provide a very narrow understanding of the market 
or their social network. The observation would, most likely, be that all economic 
actors are operating ‘within multiple cross-cutting networks of criminal and legitimate 
opportunities’ (Hobbs 1998b: 415). It would probably allow one to logically trace how 
a market transaction starting with the stealing and then selling of a car moves 
through these interconnected networks and their ‘knots’: from (1) the networks of 
‘thieves’ who have a contractual relation with (2) the criminal entrepreneur whose 
legitimate business investments, in turn, connect him to (3) the local social network of 
the economic elite (within which buyers for the stolen cars are to be found). Such an 
analysis could have led one to the classic criminological conclusion that the bonds of 
trust, created through the existence of such informal networks and the ‘within 
network exchanges’ (DiMaggio and Louch 1998), explain the great number of sales 
of stolen cars in Bulgaria.  
 
This, though, is more of an observation than an explanation. Cross-cutting social 
networks that allow car thieves to sell to wealthy customers exist also in Spain. Yet 
they remained closed to Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs. It is therefore the 
understanding of how these networks developed over time and the social-cultural 
milieu within which they function that explain a criminal enterprise’s ability to operate 
within them.  
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The network approach, therefore, provides an ‘ahistorical vision’ of economic 
behaviour (Bourdieu 2005: 5), making the need for a historical view of market 
relations (Lie 1997: 351) even more salient. It deprives one of an explanation of the 
‘genesis of economic dispositions’ (ibid.) of the key economic actors involved in a 
market transaction of a stolen car: thieves, criminal entrepreneurs, other actors 
(insurance companies, and used-car dealers). 
 
The access of criminal entrepreneurs to potential buyers within the local economic 
elite cannot be explained without looking at the pre-1990 history of elites in Bulgaria. 
During the communist era the only elite that was exclusive, and could be described 
as a separate class, was the highest level of Communist Party functionaries and the 
immediate privileged circle around them. They were concentrated primarily in the 
capital, Sofia and to some extent in the five big cities. In small towns, even though 
there were privileged individuals connected to the security structures and the 
Communist Party, it is difficult to speak of ‘elite’ in the sense of an exclusive or 
separate class. There were few social opportunities (e.g. schools or social venues) to 
maintain this kind of exclusivity. Therefore the social distance between the elite and 
the rest was not significant, even after the elite assumed privileged positions in the 
local economy after 1990. In the 20 years since the beginning of the 1990s, 
economic inequality created some social distance in the bigger cities, while in smaller 
towns these social structures were difficult to change, as developing transport 
infrastructure and rising incomes started to stimulate geographic and social mobility 
mostly after 2001.  
 
The historic roots of relations between criminal and economic elites could be sought 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the contraction of the State Security 
apparatus when thousands of former security officers were dismissed, and either 
went into private sector or in criminal careers. The extortion and protection rackets 
during the 1990s provided the ‘glue’ that ultimately connected much of the criminal 
and economic elites. Extortion racketeering companies described in this thesis (VIS, 
SIC, Apollo and Balkan, etc.) controlled car-theft, the sale of stolen cars, local 
markets for used cars, and the transnational trafficking of stolen cars. At the same 
time, they provided protection (most of the time in the form of a racket) to most 
legitimate business. These relations remained strong even after extortion 
racketeering disappeared, as at that time the former racketeers had already turned 
into legitimate business partners.  
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The process of criminal elite’s entry into the legitimate economy intensified in the late 
1990s, when reinvesting the profits from car-theft in illegal activities did not 
necessarily bring the highest rates of returns. The rigged privatisation process, which 
intensified after the 1997 parliamentary elections, provided lucrative investment 
opportunities. It enticed many criminal entrepreneurs to enter the legitimate 
economy. The years 2000–2009 also provided very good investment opportunities 
with a tremendous rate of return in the real estate and development sectors202: both 
car dealers and illicit entrepreneurs turned to investments in this area, as Chapter 3 
showed. All these legitimate investment opportunities were lower-risk than investing 
in illicit businesses. Most importantly in this way many criminal entrepreneurs tried to 
became part of the legitimate business elite or even enter local politics.  
 
The connections were especially strong between criminal entrepreneurs and grey 
entrepreneurs: those who avoided paying taxes, import duties, or used corruption. 
They often became the core of local economic elites and key players in many 
industries in Bulgaria: construction and real estate development, agriculture, fuels 
distribution, alcohol production, used-cars distribution, gambling, and Internet 
provision services. Such public exposure (and impunity) created an atmosphere of a 
large degree of social acceptance of illicit incomes and investments. It also 
legitimised the relations that existed amongst illicit and licit entrepreneurs as part of 
market and economic realities. On a local as well as national scale it legitimised the 
connections between criminals and grey entrepreneurs on one side, and law 
enforcement, politicians, magistrates, or public officials on the other, because the 
distinction between the licit and illicit provenance of their capital was blurred. 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 has shown how car-theft entrepreneurs were related to other 
criminal elites.  There were very few car-theft entrepreneurs who were solely involved 
in car-theft. Very often drugs trafficking, prostitution, smuggling of excisable goods, 
distribution of counterfeit currencies, or bank card fraud were either at times the main 
or supplemental activities to car theft. The historic view in Bulgaria provides an 
explanation of these relations: protection racketeering firms and the criminal 
                                                          
202 The real-estate bubble brought minimal profits in comparison to the massive market in land swaps 
between individuals and corrupt municipalities. (Center for the Study of Democracy, p. 95) 
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entrepreneurs that succeeded them were the ones who controlled the various 
monopolies in the drugs, prostitution, card fraud, or other markets for illicit goods and 
services. In Spain, although this access to criminal elites also existed, it was much 
more limited geographically (to the areas of operations) and structurally (to lower and 
middle levels of criminal networks). 
 
8.2 Markets, illegality and global crime 
 
The questions that this thesis attempted to answer are narrowly defined but have 
complex answers and broad policy and theoretical implications. The issues examined 
are not simply the ability of criminal enterprises to enter a foreign market, but also 
their ability to globalise, the implications of ‘social embededness of crime’ in a 
globalised world, the boundaries of the ‘illegal’ market, even the ability of criminal 
groups to influence international relations (Friman and Andreas 1999). These issues 
call into question the law-enforcement strategies used to reducing car-theft, or the 
(lack of) regulation of the used-car market to prevent the sale of stolen cars.  
 
The empirical data presented questioned the parameters of the criminological / 
sociological concepts that were used: especially the ‘illegality’ of markets. The 
traditional definitions of ‘organised crime’ as markets for illicit goods and services 
(Cressey 1969, Shelling 1971) or even present-day definitions (Albanese 2004, 
Hagan 2006) are increasingly challenged by realities, as organised criminals become 
important actors in markets for licit goods:  cigarettes, apparel, art, alcohol, fuel, 
arms, or cars. The word ‘illicit’ in reality refers primarily to the origin of the goods: 
which may have been stolen, counterfeited, or illegally imported. In reality, the sellers 
of all these goods are fully fledged actors in legitimate markets. They end up 
competing with sellers of legitimate goods. Looking for the limits of the ‘illicit market’, 
therefore, is difficult, while the ‘legitimate’ market is expanded and enriched with a 
much more nuanced range of actors or market spaces.  
 
The thesis also questions the conclusions about effects of product ‘illegality’. Reuter 
(1985: 21-23) has argued that one of the results of product illegality is that 
enterprises attempt to remain ‘local’ in their geographic scope (to ensure better 
control of operations, reduce risks of long-distance transport, or reduce counteraction 
from multiple enforcement agencies). Yet, the Bulgarian enterprises preferred to 
spread their operations to more locations and internationally, despite all these risks. 
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The same considerations (listed above) that traditionally kept the operations of 
criminal groups local, in a globalised world pushed them to reach outside their 
immediate area of activity. For Bulgarian criminal entrepreneurs it became easier / 
safer to ship and sell cars across the EU. 
 
The present thesis goes beyond the obvious that previous authors (Berdal and 
Serrano 2002, Castells 2000:171; Naim 2006; Thachuk 2007, Glenny 2008) have 
made: that illicit markets are now global and the criminal groups now have a global 
reach. These studies largely focused on the factors that created the opportunities for 
illicit entrepreneurs to become global, seeking parallels with the forces that were 
attributed to the spur of global flows of people and goods: the development of cheap 
global transport and communication infrastructures. More importantly, none of these 
studies examined in depth what factors limited the ‘march’ of criminal globalisation. 
The present thesis partially fills this empirical gap. Even more, it shows that different 
criminal activities and markets are governed by market-specific forces and 
conditions. Therefore, speaking in general terms about globalisation of crime does 
little good to understanding the real forces and issues behind it. What is true about 
illicit drugs, may not be true about stolen cars, or sex trade. 
 
The present thesis also contradicts the findings of one of the few studies that 
examine the foreign market entry: Varese’s (2011) study on the ability of ‘mafia’-like 
organisations to impose protection rackets in a foreign country. Although, his overall 
conclusion is that there are limits to the globalisation of crime, Varese’s basic 
argument is that when demand for protection rackets and supply of Mafiosi meet, 
then there is successful ‘transplantation’ of mafia activities. The present thesis shows 
that the there is more the market equilibrium of than supply and demand factors. In 
‘thin’ markets, such as Spain’s market for stolen cars, with little information about 
other customers and prices, a more complex set of relations between sellers and 
buyers of illegal goods need to be met. In Spain both, supply of stolen cars and 
demand for luxury cars, were in place but the market entry failed to materialise.  
 
In addition, the present thesis showed that a number of factors were only marginal in 
explaining the behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs. Some of the findings of the 
thesis, especially about the role of the Bulgarian immigrant community were in line 
with other academic (Varese 2011, Bovenkerk 2001, Bovenkerk et al. 2003, and 
Zaitch 2002) and contradicted others (Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004) by showing that 
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this community played no role in facilitating the market entry of Bulgarian criminal 
enterprises.  
 
The thesis also questions the economic approach that some criminologists have 
embraced (Naylor 2004; Reuter 2004; 1985; Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995). They 
seek to find in ‘rational’ economic arguments the main explanation about the 
behaviour of criminal entrepreneurs, and they seek to draw parallels between legal 
and illegal firms. Such an approach, though, stops short of providing a 
comprehensive answer to the question of the failure of Bulgarian enterprises to enter 
the Spanish market, or fully understanding their ability to sell stolen cars in Bulgaria. 
What this thesis has shown is that analysis of the roles of historical determinants, 
broader ethical norms, and institutions help one understand how two seemingly 
similar markets for used cars in Spain and Bulgaria differ. 
 
8.3 Policy implications 
 
In addition to the above considerations for criminological thought that the empirical 
data of this thesis provokes, there are several policy implications. The analysis of the 
markets for used cars in Bulgaria and Spain showed that there is a direct relation 
between, on the one hand, the market demand for used and new luxury cars, and on 
the other, the level of activity of car-theft networks. Therefore, the demand for stolen 
cars may not be differentiated by the demand for cars in general: the same 
underlining economic principles drive both. With the economic crisis that engulfed 
Bulgaria and Spain, the sales of new and used cars plummeted as did registered 
motor vehicle thefts. As a result new low-profile actors appeared, stealing and selling 
mid-range, rather than luxury cars. Therefore, the monitoring of car markets in 
countries that are ‘receivers’ of stolen cars may point to the trends also in the sale of 
stolen cars, and focus law-enforcement attention on market segment that has higher 
risk. 
 
The other important implication concerns the structure of the enterprises and the way 
they interact. Normally, police focuses its efforts on the lowest levels of criminal 
structures, the car-thieves, who much like low level ‘drug dealers’ are replaceable. 
There are significant difficulties in gathering evidence against such low level criminal 
actors as well, as in many countries, including Spain, ‘misappropriation’ and ‘car-
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theft’ are often difficult to set apart. A significant impact requires investigative efforts 
that focus on criminal entrepreneurs (either theft or sales). On a local level, the 
impact of apprehending a highly skilled car-thief, may also have a temporary impact, 
as such individuals are, at least in the short term, difficult to replace.  
 
Another effort of law-enforcement should focus on the Internet. Much like the sale of 
stolen art via auction websites has forced some law-enforcement agencies (like the 
Italian police) to develop ‘crawling software’ that identifies possible stolen art objects 
sold on auctions sites, similar software may in the very near future be the right tool to 
prevent the sale of stolen cars via used-car websites, which are bound to become an 
ever more influential sales outlet. (Capgemini 2011: 14-16) 
 
From a policy point of view, one of the issues that interests regulators is the effect of 
organised crime on the legitimate market, in this case the market for used cars. 
Apparently, there are two very different situations in Spain and Bulgaria. The impact 
is difficult to assess, as in both Bulgaria and Spain there was already a significant 
part of the used-car industry that was informal, involving tax-irregularities, or various 
other consumer frauds. Yet, this impact seems to be limited. The involvement of 
international corporations and major franchised dealer networks significantly reduced 
the opportunities for sellers of stolen cars. The few thousand stolen cars that were 
sold in Spain had little impact on distorting the overall market of 1.6 million cars, or 
on reducing consumer confidence in legitimate car retailers. In Bulgaria, there were 
few market constraints on criminals, as the dealer networks were either related to 
organised crime or likely to engage in irregular practices. As the confidence of 
consumers was already shaken due to years of flooding the market with stolen cars, 
the government took measures and introduced services such as inspection of cars 
for VIN interventions, or consulting Interpol databases before purchase and 
registration of a car. With stolen cars becoming remaining mostly in the luxury class, 
the overall market impact in Bulgaria was gradually minimized.  
 
In both cases, and especially in Bulgaria, the absence of any form of government 
used-car industry regulation left space for ‘backdoor traders’ to come in. A set of 
regulatory measures, such as licensing or the introduction of industry standards 
could certainly reduce not only informal market practices but also the number of 
stolen cars sold via used-car dealers.   
 
266 
 
8.4 Foresight 
 
Although at the end of 2010 luxury car theft had gone out of ‘fashion’, its future 
seems as bright as ever, awaiting the next economic cycle in Eastern Europe or in 
Northern Africa, where aspiring economic elites will be buying (stolen) luxury cars. 
Regardless of the types of security measures developed by car makers, or the 
tracing systems that Interpol or law-enforcement agencies implement, criminal 
entrepreneurs will continue, just as they do presently with some lag, to surmount 
security systems and ‘clone’ vehicles. Yet, the lowering costs of security and tracking 
systems are likely to focus the efforts of car-thieves on high-priced vehicles. The 
economic development that is yet to occur in much of Eastern Europe and the rest of 
the developing world promises a healthy number of potential buyers, who will be 
lured by the symbolic power that such cars will continue to endow their owners with. 
Grey economies in such countries will facilitate the sale of stolen cars while weak 
law-enforcement and judiciary will allow economic elites to enjoy the same illicit 
lifestyles as observed in Bulgaria, which sustain the normalcy of buying cheap stolen 
luxury cars. 
 
Criminal syndicates will continue to ‘globalise’ and move between national 
jurisdictions in order to avoid justice. They increasingly will use technologies not only 
to avoid detection and facilitate crimes, but also to participate in legitimate markets. 
With consumer habits and access to technology in constant flux, Internet sales 
portals, from auction web sites to used car sale sites or dating sites203 will 
increasingly provide the disguise and opportunities to distribute various illicit goods 
and services.  
 
Yet, some fundamental market principles and behaviour of legitimate actors will 
continue to impose limits to the market participation of criminals. Government and 
industry bodies will increasingly use new technologies and regulation to limit the 
opportunities for illicit entrepreneurs: whether it concerns the traceability of stolen 
goods or detection of counterfeit or illegally imported goods. In addition, the 
inevitable transformation of global or national retail trade, which is increasingly 
                                                          
203 Such sites are increasingly used by prostitution networks to find customers.  
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transferred within the control of multinational companies, will further constrict the 
product distribution opportunities of high-risk ‘grey’ or illicit entrepreneurs.  
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Annex 1: Map of Bulgaria 
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Annex 2. Interview codes 
 
Law-enforcement interviewees 
Code Position / Department Institution City / Country 
LЕI-1 Head of Vehicle Crime unit  Regional Police Directorate  Varna, Bulgaria 
LЕI-2 Former Investigator General Directorate Combating 
Against Organised Crime  
Varna, Bulgaria 
LЕI-3 (Former) Head of Vehicle 
Crime Unit 
City Police Directorate  Sofia, Bulgaria 
LЕI-4 Investigator, Vehicle Crime 
Unit -  International 
operations  
Police Headquarters  Sofia, Bulgaria 
LЕI-5 Investigator City Police Department Sofia, Bulgaria 
LЕI-6 Police Liaison Officer  Embassy of Bulgaria  Brussels, Belgium 
LЕI-7 Police Liaison Officer  Embassy of Bulgaria Madrid, Spain 
LЕI-8 Investigator  Gendarmerie  France 
LЕI-9 Council  Embassy of Bulgaria  Madrid, Spain 
LEI-10 Former Head Customs 
Intelligence and 
Investigation   
National Customs Administration  Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-11 Investigator  National Customs Administration  Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-12 Investigator National Police, UDYCO, 
Vehicle Crime Unit 
Algeciras, Spain 
LEI-13 Administrator Customs  Algeciras, Spain 
LEI-14 (former) Head of Criminal 
Investigations 
Regional Police Directorate Gabrovo, Bulgaria 
LEI-15 Head of Criminal 
Investigations 
Regional Police Directorate Gabrovo, Bulgaria 
LEI-16 Former investigator General Directorate Combating 
Against Organised Crime 
Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-17 Former Minister of the 
Interior (1994-1995) 
Ministry of Interior Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-18 Former head of department General Directorate Combating 
Against Organised Crime 
Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-19 Investigator Economic Police Sofia, Bulgaria 
LEI-20 Investigator Customs (Spain) Madrid, Spain 
LEI-21 Investigator Economic Police Sliven, Bulgaria 
 
Offender interviewees 
Code Age City Description Criminal career / int’l 
experience 
OFI-1 30 Sofia Car-thief  10 years of experience in 
Italy, Bulgaria  
OFI-2 30 Sofia Car-thief & legitimate job in 
sports  
10-15; Location: 
Bulgaria, Spain 
OFI-3 42 Sofia Car-thief / used car dealer   16 years of experience in 
Sofia, Spain 
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Code Age City Description Criminal career / int’l 
experience 
OFI-4 30 Pazardjik Former car thief & pimp; 
presently drug dealer 
Worked in Spain (2003-
2004) / Belgium 
OFI-5 27 Pazardjik Drug dealer / mule for car-
theft rings 
Worked in Spain (2006-
2008) 
OFI-6 36 Pazardjik Car-thief Legitimate jobs; starts 
with thefts;  spent time in 
prison for car-theft; starts 
with car-theft in 2000 in 
Spain 
OFI-7 39 Pazardjik Car-thief since 1995 Drug dealing, robberies; 
worked in Spain & 
Germany, France  
OFI-8 29 Pazardjik Robber, car-thief, drug-
dealer  
Spain , Austria (2005) 
OFI-9 40 Pazardjik Former police officer / 
athlete, car-thief, presently 
drug-dealer 
Spain, Bulgaria 
OFI-10 33 Pazardjik Worked as a bar-tender; 
then fake documents, car-
thief around 2001-2002;  
Spain (2003) 
OFI-11 29 Pazardjik Prostitute (started in 1997) Worked in Spain (2005-
6), Germany, Italy (2002-
05) 
OFI-12 32 Pazardjik Former athlete; since 2000 
car-thief; presently mid-level 
drug smuggler 
Italy / Spain; Significant 
experience across Latin 
America & Western 
Europe 
OFI-13 30 Pazardjik Drug dealer; car theft since 
2003 (France / BG)  
Austria, France 
OFI-14 29 Pazardjik Car thief / VIN rigging expert 
since 1998; drug dealer 
Car repair technician; 
Germany 
OFI-15 45 Pazardjik Former athlete (sports 
school); car-thief / low mid-
level drug dealer;  
Started in 1991 in 
Hungary Czech Rep; 
Spain, Germany, Austria 
OFI-16 28 Pazardjik Low level drug-dealer / 
pimp; used to work as 
spotter / mule 
Germany 
OFI-17 27 Pazardjik Tool-maker; low-level pimp Spain (labour migrant / 
petty criminal; France 
(pimping) 
OFI-18 32 Pazardjik Prostitute on Pazardjik ring-
road 
Greece, Germany  
OFI-19 33 Pazardjik Pimp (pimping his wife – 
OFI-18) 
Greece 
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Code Age City Description Criminal career / int’l 
experience 
OFI-20 36 Sofia former car-thief, presently 
drug-dealer & legitimate job 
Worked in Sofia for a 
SIC-related brigade up 
until 2002-2003 
OFI-21 35 Septemvri204 burglar / heroin dealer; 
former car-theft crew driver 
None;  
OFI-22 33 Septemvri Former car thief (1997-
2001); present heroin dealer 
/ user 
Mostly in Sofia, most 
family in Spain (labour 
migrants) 
OFI-23 36 Pazardjik Document counterfeiter / 
assisted car theft groups 
Sports school grad; 
drugs; fake document 
maker / fraudster 
 
Immigrant Interviewees 
Code City in 
Spain 
Job in 
Spain 
Age Sex Time in 
Spain 
Prior job in 
Bulgaria 
City of 
origin 
IMI-1 Madrid Legal 
services 
37 F Since 10 
years  
legal Sofia 
IMI-2 Marbella Retail / 
landscaping 
38 M Since 9 
years 
Engineer Gabrovo 
IMI-3 Barcelona Drug rehab / 
prostitution 
30 F  Since 2 
years 
Prostitute Pazardjik 
IMI-4 Barcelona Retail 30 M 7 years None / student Varna 
IMI-5 Barcelona Agriculture / 
prostitution 
27 M 3 
months 
Family 
retail/prostitutio
n 
Pazardjik 
IMI-6 Balearic 
Island 
Construction 38 M 1.5 
years 
Photography / 
construction 
Pazardjik 
IMI-7 Balearic 
Island 
Construction 
/ Agriculture 
52 M 1 year Small business 
(1 stores & 1 
kiosk 
Pazardjik 
IMI-8 Balearic 
Island 
Musician 55 M 6 
months 
Musician Pazardjik 
IMI-9 Barcelona Agriculture / 
prostitution 
27 M 6 
months 
Prostitute / 
retail family 
business 
Pazardjik 
IMI-10 Benavente Construction 32 M 6 m Municipal 
worker / NGO 
Peshtera 
 
Other interviewees 
Code Type  Based in Subject experience 
                                                          
204 Septemvri is a town situated 16 km. away from Pazardjik 
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Code Type  Based in Subject experience 
OTI-1 Academic Sofia Research on car-theft in Bulgaria, including 
interviews with offender, police,  criminal 
entrepreneurs 
OTI-2 Academic London Research on Bulgarian migrants in Spain – 
anthropological fieldwork in Spain 
OTI-3 Academic Sofia Research on Bulgarian migrants in Spain – 
sociological work in Madrid 
OTI-4 Lawyer Madrid Involved in defense of Bulgarian and other 
immigrant offenders 
OTI-5 Entrepreneur Madrid Construction company owner with multiple 
sites throughout Spain 
OTI-6 Academic Prague Researcher on organised crime in the Czech 
Republic 
OTI-7 Academic UK Researcher on organised crime in Greece 
OTI-8 Academic Slovenia Researcher on organised crime in the 
Balkans 
OTI-9 Academic Milan Researcher on organised crime in Italy 
OTI-10 Entrepreneur Gabrovo ‘Grey’ entrepreneur (money-laundering, 
developer); part of local elite 
OTI-11 Entrepreneur Gabrovo ‘Grey’ entrepreneur (private security 
company owner, used-car importer, 
developer); part of local elite 
OTI-12 Entrepreneur Gabrovo ‘Grey entrepreneur’ (sole proprietor in 
plastics recycling 
OTI-13 Entrepreneur Sofia Businessman and former government official 
OTI-14 Social-worker Sofia Representative of an NPO working with 
offenders 
OTI-15 Social worker Pazardjik Representative of an NPO working with 
offenders 
OTI-16 Researcher Sofia Researcher at a researcher on organised 
crime at think-tank in Sofia 
OTI-17 Lawyer Sofia Former employee at one of the former 
racketeering insurance companies 
OTI-18 Driver Sofia Former driver of car transporter lorry from 
Western Europe 
 
 
Used-car market participants 
Code Position Type of 
business 
International 
experience 
City / Country 
CDI-1 Owner Used-car 
dealership 
Germany / Italy Sofia – 
Gorubliane 
CDI-2 Employee Used-car 
dealership 
Germany Pazardjik / 
Plovdiv 
CDI-3 Car mechanic / 
independent used-car 
Car-service shop Germany Sofia 
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dealer 
CDI-4 Director of leasing 
operations 
Leasing company n/a  Sofia, Bulgaria 
CDI-5 Sole entrepreneur  Used car dealing 
at car exchange 
Italy Dupnitsa 
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Annex 3. Summary of police cases analysed 
 
The tables below summarise some basic information about the 83 investigation 
cases carried out by Spanish law enforcement that were analysed in the thesis. 
Some links refer to newspaper websites but the source is still a police press release 
that was printed by the media. There are three types of cases in the three tables 
below: 
• Cases of Bulgarian car-theft networks / groups 
• Cases of Bulgarian-run criminal enterprises, whose primary criminal activity was 
different from car-theft (prostitution, drugs, credit card fraud) 
• Cases of other, non-Bulgarian, car-theft networks / groups 
 
The information derived from these cases was much more substantial than the 
summarised version provided below. Each case was about 2 pages long, in which 
details about the police actions and the basic modus operandi of the criminal network 
were provided: the number of offenders, their age, gender, and nationality. In some 
cases the city of birth or previous criminal record was also listed. The brands and 
numbers of the cars seized, or any other evidence collected (usually implicating the 
participants in other crimes was also found), involvement in other crimes, the modes 
of selling or trafficking the vehicles, and the trafficking destinations. All websites were 
accessed between 2007 and 2010.  
 
 
Cases of Bulgarian groups involved in car-theft 
No Code Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Area of theft Total 
Bulgarians 
involved 
Destination for 
sale of stolen cars  
Involvement in other 
crimes 
1 C-0495 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/E
SPANA/BULGARIA/MADRID/COLLADO_VIL
LALBA_/MADRID/MADRID/GUARDIA_CIVIL
/Desmantelada/red/venta/vehiculos/roba
dos/elpepiespmad/19950419elpmad_4/Te
s 
Collado Villalba 4 North Africa n/a 
2 C-0497 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/M
ADRID/MADRID_/MUNICIPIO/BARAJAS_/D
ISTRITO/_MADRID/banda/dedicaba/robar/
coches/Barajas/elpepiespmad/19970420el
pmad_14/Tes  
Madrid 2 Eastern Europe / 
Africa 
N/A 
3 C-0897 http://www.elmundo.es/papel/hemerotec
a/1997/08/10/madrid/287389.html  
Madrid 3 Morocco, Bulgaria N/A 
4 C-1197 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/E
SPANA/BULGARIA/CUERPO_NACIONAL_DE
_POLICIA/Desarticulada/banda/bulgaros/d
edicada/robo/coches/lujo/elpepiespmad/1
9971108elpmad_8/Tes  
Madrid 7 Eastern Europe N/A 
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No Code Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Area of theft Total 
Bulgarians 
involved 
Destination for 
sale of stolen cars  
Involvement in other 
crimes 
5 C-0298 http://www.elmundo.es/papel/hemerotec
a/1998/02/25/madrid/372873.html  
Madrid 9 Bulgaria / 
Morocco  
Credit card fraud, 
robbery; 
counterfeiting money;  
6 C-0798 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/M
ADRID__/COMUNIDAD_AUTONOMA/MAD
RID_COMUNIDAD_AUTONOMA/Desarticul
ada/banda/robo/exporto/centenar/coches
/elpepiespmad/19980801elpmad_8/Tes  
Madrid 3 N. Africa N/A 
7 C-0100 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2000/np011401.htm 
Madrid 1 via Ceuta to 
Morocco 
N/A 
8 C-0600 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2000/np062803.htm 
Madrid, Costa 
del Sol 
4 Morocco;   
Eastern Europe 
 N/A 
9 C-0600b http://www.admin.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Pr
ensa/Policia/2000/np062803.htm  
Costa del Sol 2 Spain   N/A 
10 C-1100 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2000/np111501.htm    
Pozuelo 
(Madrid); 
Miraflores de la 
Sierra (Madrid) 
1 N. Africa ; Eastern 
Europe 
N/A 
11 C-0501 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/
Guardia_Civil/2001/np051004.htm 
Madrid 16 export / n/a N/A 
12 C-1201 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2001/np120701.htm 
Madrid 1 n/a Firearms trafficking/ 
Extortion, illegal 
protection of pubs 
13 C-0202 http://www.elmundo.es/papel/2002/02/1
5/madrid/1107086.html  
Madrid, Avila,  
Alicante 
22 Eastern Europe  N/A 
14 C-0202b http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2002/np022201.htm  
 Stolen in 
Germany, 
Sweden, 
Finland, Spain, 
France, USA, 
and recovered 
in Spain 
2 Spain; Africa N/A 
15 C-0502 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2002/np050901.htm 
Madrid 2 Bulgaria N/A 
16 C-0203 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/0
2/27/madrid/1046362467.html 
Madrid area: 
Colmenar de 
Oreja, 
Aranjuez, 
Fuenlabrada, 
Getafe  
9  Exported abroad Burglary 
17 C-0703 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2003/np071607.htm 
Costa del Sol 7 Bulgaria  N/A 
18 C-0803 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2003/np082601.htm 
Madrid / 
Tenerife 
3  N/A Firearms trafficking, 
document and money 
counterfeiting  
19 C-0903 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2003/np090501.htm  
Stolen Costa 
del Sol; and 
transferred to 
Madrid 
6 via Greece to 
Eastern Europe; 
via Turkey to 
Persian Gulf 
 N/A 
20 C-0903b http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1374  
Madrid 8 Eastern Europe Firearms trafficking 
21 C-1203 http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1427 
Madrid  
(Guadalajara - 
suburb of 
Madrid) 
5 Eastern Europe N/A 
22 C-0104 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2004/np012302.htm  
Alicante, 
Málaga, 
Murcia, 
Orihuela y 
Lorca 
17  Some in  Spain; 
the majority via 
Italy / Greece to 
Bulgaria and other 
Balkan countries 
and former Soviet 
Union; via Turkey 
towards Persian 
Gulf 
N/A  
23 C-0204 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2004/np020503.htm 
Leganes, 
Madrid 
3   Drug trade (heroin / 
hashish)/ counterfeit 
money  
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No Code Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Area of theft Total 
Bulgarians 
involved 
Destination for 
sale of stolen cars  
Involvement in other 
crimes 
24 C-0204B http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1464 
Fuengirola y 
Marbella 
(Málaga); 
Madrid  
5 Eastern Europe Extortion of other 
criminal groups; 
(stealing drugs) 
Firearms trafficking 
25 C-0204C http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2004/np022608.htm 
Marbella; Mijas 
Costa 
6   N/A  N/A 
26 C-0704 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2004/np060702.htm  
Canillas, 
Madrid  
11 Eastern Europe Credit card fraud  
27 C-1204 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2004/np120302.htm 
Madrid 14 Eastern Europe; 
UK 
 N/A 
28 C-0205 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2005/np022802.htm  
Costa del Sol 
(Arroyo de la 
Miel 
Benalmadena) 
4 Domestic - 
Moroccan drug-
dealers 
Drugs 
29 C-0305 http://www.noticias.info/Archivo/2005/20
0503/20050322/20050322_53774.shtm  
Gandia (near 
Valencia) 
19 Germany  N/A 
30 C-0805 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2005/np080203.htm 
Huelva, Madrid 6 Eastern Europe / 
other countries 
 N/A 
31 C-0905 http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1805 
Madrid, 
Alicante, 
Málaga y 
Guadalajara 
7  N/A Drugs trafficking, 
document / money 
counterfeiting ; stolen 
art  
32 C-1105 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2005/np111201.htm  
Alicante / 
Palma de 
Mallorca 
15 Bulgaria Prostitution 
33 C-1205 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2005/np120701.htm  
Madrid 4 Eastern Europe  N/A 
34 C-0206 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2006/np022408.htm 
Burgos y 
Valladolid 
15    N/A 
35 C-0306 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2006/np032402.htm  
Madrid, Toledo 
y Guadalajara;  
20 to criminal gangs 
in Spain 
 N/A 
36 C-0706 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2006/np071802.htm  
Costa del Sol 
Madrid 
6 N/A  N/A 
37 C-0706B http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2006/np071801.htm  
Madrid, Costa 
del Sol, 
Valencia, 
Alicante 
1 via France, Italy, 
Turkey, to 
Armenia 
 N/A 
38 C-1006 http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=2054  
Madrid, 
Toledo, 
Valencia 
1 Mauritania & 
Senegal 
N/A 
39 C-1006B http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2006/np102801.htm  
Orense y la 
Costa del Sol, 
(Seville)  
2 Spain - domestic 
sales  
Costa del Sol 
(Fuengirola, 
Benalmádena) 
40 C-1206 http://www.policia.es/prensa/061213_1.h
tm 
Madrid ; 
Pozuelo de 
Alarcón                   
Maquillaje: 
Toledo, 
Marbella 
8 Eastern Europe / 
other countries 
Drugs 
41 C-0307 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/
Guardia_Civil/2007/np030201.html  
Cantabria, 
Madrid y 
Vizcaya 
2 Spain - domestic 
sales 
 N/A 
42 C-0407 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2007/np041809.html 
Madrid 5 export / n/a N/A 
43 C-0407B http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2007/np041809.html  
Madrid 5 Eastern Europe Document and money 
counterfeiting 
44 C-0607 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2007/np060102.html  
Valencia 7 export / n/a Forgery of documents 
and credit cards, drugs 
trafficking 
45 C-0707  
http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=2224 
Madrid y 
Toledo, 
2 Spain / other EU 
countries 
 N/A 
46 C-0707B http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2007/np070301.html 
Mijas y 
Fuengirola 
3 N/A  N/A 
47 C-1007 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2007/np100101.html 
Madrid; 
Alicante 
3 Africa (Nigeria 
and Cameroon) 
 N/A 
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No Code Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Area of theft Total 
Bulgarians 
involved 
Destination for 
sale of stolen cars  
Involvement in other 
crimes 
48 C-0208 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2008/np021101.html 
Madrid, 
Barcelona,                          
Villanueva de la 
Torre. 
9 via France & Italy  N/A  
49 C-0408 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/
Ultimos_comunicados/np040901.html  
Madrid / 
Barcelona                                       
12 Spain - domestic 
sales;  
 N/A 
50 C-0508 http://www.guardiacivil.es/prensa/notas/
noticia.jsp?idnoticia=2381  
Madrid, 
Alicante y 
Malaga 
16 Spain and 
elsewhere in 
Europe 
 N/A 
51 C-0209 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2009/np022001.html 
 
Malaga, 
Algeciras, 
Estepona. 
6 North Africa Drugs 
52 C-1209 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prensa/P
olicia/2009/np121701.html 
 
Madrid 4 Bulgaria N/A 
53 C-0310 http://www.policia.es/prensa/20110
323_1.html 
Madrid 1+ Spain (internet);  
Iraq and Russia 
N/A 
54 C-1010 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Pre
nsa/Policia/2010/np101401.html 
Oviedo, 
Pamplona 
6 Spain (stolen  in 
Bulgaria) 
N/A 
55 C-1210 http://www.diariodecadiz.es/article/
provincia/868478/detenidos/por/rob
ar/coches/y/venderlos/marruecos.ht
ml 
Cadiz, Malaga 5-7 (out of 
15) 
Morocco drugs 
56 C-0911 LEI-21 Madrid 5 Bulgaria Counterfeiting, 
robberies 
 
Cases of Bulgarians involved in other crimes 
No Code Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Region Arre
sts 
Other 
nationalities 
Primary criminal 
activity 
1 C-1106 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2006/np112501.htm  
Madrid 6 1 Moroccan, 1 
Spaniard 
Drugs trafficking 
2 C-0702 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2002/np072201.htm  
  1 20 Romanians Prostitution 
3 C-0807 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2007/np082401.html 
  3   Drugs (heroin) 
4 C-1006 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Guardia_Civil/2006/np101701.htm 
Madrid 6 1 Albanian, 5 
Spaniards 
Prostitution 
5 C-1106 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2006/np112803.htm 
  11  1 Spaniard Drugs (hashish) 
6 C-0404 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2004/np040501.htm 
  2   Prostitution 
7 C-1103 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2003/np111003.htm 
Valencia, Alicante 6   Arms trafficking 
8 C-0803 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2003/np080601.htm 
Madrid, Alicante 6 Greek, 
Argentinean 
Document 
forgery 
9 C-0706 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2006/np071304.htm 
Madrid ( 
Fuenlabrada, 
Getafe suburbs) 
8   Credit card fraud 
C-0506 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2006/np051202.htm 
Baleares 5 Bulgarian, 
Spaniard 
Prostitution 
11 C-0707c http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/200
7/07/23/espana/1185190430.html 
Almeria, Valencia 4 Romanina, 
Lithuanian, 
Canadian 
Credit card fraud 
12 C-0702 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/0
7/19/sociedad/1027095280.html 
 Madrid, Samora 7   Grand theft 
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Cases of non-Bulgarian groups / networks involved in car-theft 
No 
CODE Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Region of 
operation / 
theft 
Number / 
Nationaliti
es 
Country where 
cars are sold 
Involvement in 
other crime 
1 
C-0208 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/
Desmantelada/banda/robo/coches/And
alucia/elpepuesp/20080226elpepunac_
20/Tes  
Granada, 
Málaga y 
Almería 
Lithuanian
s 
Lithuania n/a 
2 
C-0602 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Comunid
ad/Valenciana/detenidos/Alicante/vehic
ulos/lujo/robados/elpepiespval/2002060
5elpval_28/Tes  
Alicante Spaniards, 
Hungarian
s 
Spain Illegal migration 
/ document 
forgery 
3 
C-0497 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/
MADRID/MADRID_/MUNICIPIO/EURO
PA_CENTRAL/EUROPA_ORIENTAL/p
olicia/desarticula/banda/internacional/M
adrid/vendio/2000/coches/robados/elpe
piesp/19970427elpepinac_11/Tes  
Madrid Polish (13), 
Portugues
e, 3 
Spaniards 
Eastern Europe Robbery / 
burglary 
4 
C-0699 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Comunid
ad/Valenciana/Guardia/Civil/detiene/brit
anicos/Torrevieja/requisa/coches/robad
os/elpepiespval/19990627elpval_15/Te
s 
Alicante UK Algeria n/a 
5 
C-1203b http://www.elpais.com/articulo/madrid/D
esarticulada/banda/dedicada/trafico/ilici
to/coches/robados/elpepiespmad/2003
1216elpmad_17/Tes  
Madrid Spain Spain drugs 
6 
C-1002 http://www.elmundo.es/p
apel/2002/10/20/madrid/1
253413.html 
Madrid Spaniards, 
South 
American 
Spain  
7 
C-0504 http://www.guardiacivil.org/prensa/nota
s/noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1525 
 
Seville, 
Madrid, 
Huelva, 
Murcia, 
Barcelona 
Spain Spain VAT fraud 
8 
C-0204 http://www.guardiacivil.org/prensa/nota
s/noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1463  
Alicante 24 
Lithuanian
s 
Lithuania 
Spain 
Drugs / 
counterfeit 
money 
9 
C-0104 http://www.guardiacivil.org/prensa/nota
s/noticia.jsp?idnoticia=1440  
Cadiz; ‘Sale 
enterprise’; 
cars stolen in 
EU 
1 Pole; 2 
Spaniards 
Spain n/a 
10 
C-0705 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2005/np072901.htm  
Barcelona, 
Madrid, 
Seville, 
Huelva, 
Marbella and 
Alicante 
16 
Spaniards 
Spain (stolen in 
Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, 
US, Holland, 
Luxembourg) 
VAT fraud 
11 
C-0909 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np090902.html  
Madrid 
(Castilla la 
22 in Spain 
& 9 in 
Germany / 
France (in used-
N/A 
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No 
CODE Source: Link to Police, Civil Guard, or 
media website 
Region of 
operation / 
theft 
Number / 
Nationaliti
es 
Country where 
cars are sold 
Involvement in 
other crime 
Mancha) / 
Grenoble 
FR/IT car dealerships / 
internet) 
12 
C-1108 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2008/np112406.html  
Valencia 10 Polish, 
Venezuela 
Poland N/A 
13 
C-1108 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2008/np111001.html  
Alicante, 
Valencia, 
Madrid, 
Guadalajara 
n/a Spain (imported 
from Germany, 
Holland, 
Belgium) 
VAT fraud 
14 
C-0708 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2008/np070803.html  
Madrid 6 
Spaniard; 
9 Brazilian 
Spain Fraud 
15 
C-0509 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np052201.html  
Barcelona 8 Spain (Stolen in 
France) 
Burglary / 
robbery 
16 
C-1009 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np100701.html  
France / 
Germany  
15 (2 in 
Spain) 
Spain – 
Germany  - 
France 
This is only a 
VAT fraud case  
17 
C-0409 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np042106.html  
Vitoria 3 
Romanian 
Outside Spain N/A 
18 
C-0409b http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np040206.html  
Ciudad Real, 
Jaén, Gerona, 
Badajoz, 
Córdoba and 
Madrid 
3 
Spaniards 
Spain (via 
Internet) 
N/A 
19 
C-0309 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Notas_Prens
a/Policia/2009/np032003.html  
Malaga 3 Ghana  Ghana N/A 
20 
C-1010 http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/
sociedad/20101016/desmantelada-
una-banda-que-robaba-coches-lujo-
catalunya-para-venderlos-
marruecos/537797.shtml  
Vallès 
Occidental 
(Cataluña)  
Spaniards 
and 
Moroccans 
(16 total) 
Morocco drugs 
21 
C-0707d http://www.hoy.es/prensa/20070706/re
gional/mayoria-afectados-fraude-
venta_20070706.html 
Merida Spaniards Spain n/a 
22 
C-0211 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/0
2/19/andalucia_malaga/1298108699.ht
ml 
Marbella Spaniards; 
different 
Spain n/a 
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